The Iranian Studies Unit (ISU) of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies hosted director of the School of Public and International Affairs at Virginia Tech Professor Mehrzad Boroujerdi on 24 May 2021 who presented a lecture on “Iran’s 2021 Presidential Election: What We Can Expect.” Mehran Kamrava, Director of the ISU and Professor of Government at Georgetown University in Qatar, served as the moderator.

Boroujerdi began by outlining the timeline of Iran’s elections, slotted for 18 June 2021. Following the registration of candidates and approval of a limited number after vetting by the Guardian Council and the release of the definitive list of candidates, election campaigning begins. Boroujerdi opined that Iran’s electoral calendar was far too compressed to allow sufficient time for the country’s 59.3 million eligible voters to get to know the candidates.

This year’s presidential election saw a decline in the number of registered candidates compared with the last election, held in 2017, in which approximately 1600 candidates registered to run for office. Due to strict Guardian Council vetting the percentage of candidates allowed to run decreased, such that it now stands at about 3 to 4 percent of the total registered candidates - in comparison to the first post-revolutionary election in 1980, in which over 80 percent of registered candidates ran for the office of the presidency. In 1980, 106 candidates were approved whereas in recent elections the final list of the approved ranged from four to eight, and Boroujerdi predicted a similar number would be seen in this year’s election.

 “Iran’s politics is predominantly a male affair,” Boroujerdi stated, commenting on the percentage of female candidates registered. Prior to 1997, when Azam Taleghani (daughter of a well-known cleric) registered and challenged that status quo, no women ever had registered to run for presidency. In 2021, 40 of the 592 registered candidates were female. Boroujerdi’s stated expectation was that “none of them will be approved by the Guardian Council when the final list is published.”

Increasing involvement of the Revolutionary Guards has been a critical factor in Iranian politics, with Boroujerdi observing that four out of seven candidates for the presidency in 2005 were former members of the Revolutionary Guards; in 2009, that figure was two out of the total of four, in 2013 it was three out of six, and in 2017 none were presidential candidates. Boroujerdi anticipated that in 2021, at least one or two candidates will be from the Revolutionary Guards.

Boroujerdi also discussed aspects of Iran’s electoral system weakness: the actual period for election campaigning is extremely short, often no more than three weeks; the elections are characterized by their candidate-centered nature and the absence of political parties; and lack of concrete planning and the short time available for campaigning and an overabundance of sloganeering. Finally - and most noticeably - the number of candidates is unmanageable: in the last 12 post-revolutionary Iranian elections only 164 candidates (3 percent) of 5,361 registered candidates (averaging 446 per year), were approved after vetting by the Guardian Council.

Boroujerdi then addressed the recurring claim that if the Guardian Council would approve more candidates, the turnout rate would increase. He indicated that the data does not back up this assertion: the 1997 election that brought Khatami to the presidency, and the 2009 election that gave rise to the Green Movement, both offer evidence to the contrary, namely that high voter turnouts have nothing to do with the numbers of candidates allowed to run: “it was all about the personalities of the candidates and their rivals.”

Boroujerdi then enumerated reasons for a likely low turnout in the upcoming Iran presidential election: citizenry disenchanted with their and their country’s deteriorating economic circumstances; the government’s inadequate response to the coronavirus pandemic and the slow pace of vaccinations; infighting among Iranian elites in the wake of the Trump administration’s withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); the Rouhani administration’s poor overall performance; reformists’ dearth of ideas that were demonstrably viable or interesting; and the insider status of top candidates.

Boroujerdi then examined the internal dynamics of Iran’s 13th presidential election, with well-known figures such as Hasan Khomeini, Azari-Jahromi, Qalibaf, Zarif, Aref, Vaezi, Nobakht, and Fattah all absent as candidates for the presidency from this round. The Guardian Council decided upon new criteria for candidates only a week prior to the date designated for candidacy registration, including possessing a master's degree and being of an age between 40 and 75 years. Reformists are currently without a candidate enjoying sufficiently wide appeal, while conservatives have not been able to agree on candidates. There is a pervasive discontent within both camps.

Commenting upon the implications for Iran’s foreign policy should a conservative candidate win the election, Boroujerdi predicted that “conservatives would then sweep all three branches, and given its economic fragility, Iran will not be able to return to its 2005-13 position.” He noted in this connection that one of the top conservative candidates in this round, Raisi, is also on the US sanctions list, and that this could have legal ramifications for his attendance (or otherwise) of UN General Assembly meetings.

In closing this presentation of Iran’s upcoming election, Boroujerdi predicted that some six to seven candidates will be approved by the Guardian Council, since the latter wants “the number to be big enough to generate interest, but at the same time they do not want to see a real splitting of the votes, because the state does not want an election runoff.” He predicted that about 20 to 22 million Iranians (34-37 percent) will participate in this election, and he expected there will be no last-minute voting “tsunami.” A winner will need at least 10 million votes to avoid runoff. Lastly, Boroujerdi predicted that TV candidate debates will be important, and may influence people to vote.