المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات
Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies

Arab Opinion Index 2024-25

In Brief

Introduction

The 2025 Arab Opinion Index is the product of the ninth round in a series of public opinion surveys conducted across the Arab world. Following a year of preparation, the fieldwork was conducted between November 2024 and August 2025 in 15 Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Syria. Sampling in all countries surveyed followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted, clustered approach. Dimensions such as urban versus rural areas and top-level administrative divisions in each surveyed country were considered according to the relative weight of each demographic stratum, such that each respondent has an equal probability of inclusion in the sample, giving an overall margin of error of ±2–3% across all countries. The sample was designed such that results may be analysed based on the regions, provinces, and principal administrative divisions of all surveyed societies.

The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with a sample of 40,130 respondents, making the AOI the largest public opinion survey in the Arab world.

More than 413,000 hours of work was needed to carry out these surveys by a team of 1,000 researchers, equally balanced in gender. The team covered a total distance of over 1,000,000 kilometres. The results of the index for the 15 surveyed countries represent a general average for all countries of the Arab world, which is calculated by assigning equal weight to public opinion in each state without distinction (i.e. instead of using the weight of each state relative to its population, all states are treated as similar units within the same population). This approach avoids bias toward countries with larger populations in calculating overall public opinion.

The results of the index are presented according to the countries surveyed and the general average of the Arab world. For the purposes of comparison, data from the surveyed countries is classified according to the geographic regions of the Arab world, namely:

- The Arab Maghreb (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya)
- The Nile Valley (Egypt, Sudan)
- The Arab Mashreq (Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Syria)
- The Arab Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar).

Number of Respondents to the AOI Since Its Launch



Section I: Living Conditions of Arab Citizens

How do Arab citizens assess their economic conditions?

- 57% of respondents believe that their countries are headed in the right direction, compared to 37% who say they are headed in the wrong direction.

- Those who reported that things were headed in the wrong direction gave many reasons. A majority attributed this to economic causes, whereas 14% cited unfavourable political conditions, such as political confusion and the failure of the political system to function as it should. 9% stated that the reason is poor state management and policy, and 7% indicated a general lack of stability.

- Meanwhile, of the respondents who answered that that their countries are headed in the right direction, 83% provided reasons: 19% stated that the conditions in the country had improved, while 15% attributed their answer to the security and safety in their countries, 13% to good governance, 7% to an improvement in the economic situation, 5% to political stability, and another 5% to a sense of optimism about the future.

- Only 26% of respondents, mostly in the Gulf region, reported that their household income was sufficient for them to make savings after covering necessary expenditures. A further 41% reported that while their household income was sufficient to cover necessities, they were unable to save. 28% of respondents reported that their families were experiencing poverty, with household incomes not covering necessities. It is important to note that there is a significant gap between the Gulf states and other countries (especially the Mashreq) when it comes to the percentage of families experiencing poverty.

- 31% of families in need resort to borrowing from family and friends, with 16% receiving assistance from friends and neighbours whilst 12% take loans from banks and financial institutions.

- 17% of families in need rely on institutional aid, whether from charitable, governmental, religious, or civil associations, while 10% resort to selling their assets. This means that the frameworks of traditional social solidarity are still stronger than the framework of institutional aid.

Figure 1: Regional comparison of respondents' assessment of how things are heading in their countries



Figure 2. Longitudinal comparison of self-reported household income sufficiency



Figure 3. Regional comparison of self-reported household income sufficiency



How do Arab citizens assess the political and security situations in their countries?

- 63% of respondents rated security in their country positively, compared to 34% who rated it negatively. As expected, a majority of Sudanese, Syrian, and Palestinian respondents indicated that security in their country was poor.

- While 48% described the economic situation of their countries as good, 49% evaluated the economic situation of their countries as negative overall. The majority of respondents in Arab countries, with the exception of the Gulf countries, Algeria, and Mauritania, evaluated the economic situation in their countries negatively, especially in the countries of the Mashreq.

Figure 4. Regional comparison of respondent assessments of the economic situation in their countries



- 55% of respondents evaluate the political situation in their countries positively, compared to 38% who evaluate it negatively. Most respondents in the Gulf states evaluated the political situation positively.

Figure 5. Longitudinal comparison of how respondents assess the political situation in their countries



Priorities of Arab citizens and the desire to emigrate

- The priorities of the citizens of the Arab region vary, but the largest bloc (60%) specified priorities of an economic nature. More than half of the citizens listed unemployment, high prices, poor economic conditions, and poverty as the most important challenges facing their country.

- 22% of respondents indicated that their priorities relate to security, safety, and political stability.

- Of the 25% of respondents expressing a desire to migrate, the majority were motivated by the desire to improve their economic situation whilst 18% cited political or security reasons. 14% of respondents wishing to migrate indicated that their motivation was education or educational stability.

- More than one third of respondents in the Mashreq and Nile Valley and nearly one third in the Maghreb wish to migrate, compared to 8% in the Gulf. 50% of respondents in Sudan indicated they wish to emigrate from their country.

Figure 6. Longitudinal comparison of desire to emigrate



- Respondents' attitudes varied regarding the countries posing the greatest threat to their countries; 28% of the public believe that Israel is the most threatening to the security of their countries, while 10% point to the US of America as the source of the threat, and 8% Iran. 35% of Kuwaitis cite Iran as the main security threat.

- 53% of the respondents in the Mashreq said that Israel is the main threat to their countries, compared to 38% in the Nile Valley region.
- 9% of Gulf respondents said that Israel is the main threat to their countries, whereas 14% cited Iran.
- For threats facing the Arab region, Israel occupied the first place as a threat to the Arab region in the eyes of the respondents from all countries.
- While public opinion varies across countries on the question of which state poses the greatest threat to the security and stability of the Arab world, Israel holds first place as the greatest threat to the region.

Section II: Perceptions of State Institutions and Governmental Performance

How confident are Arab citizens in their state institutions?

- Confidence of Arab citizens in state institutions in their countries varies: while confidence is especially high for the military, public security, and judicial institutions, confidence in executive and legislative branches is low. Parliaments/legislative councils received the least amount of confidence.

Figure 7. Citizen confidence in principal state institutions (general average)



How do Arab citizens evaluate government performance?

- Public opinion is divided regarding government performance on foreign and economic policies, while it is generally negative when evaluating a range of public policies and services.
- There is a clear consensus among the Arab public that financial and administrative corruption is widespread across their countries: 84% of the Arab public believes that corruption is prevalent to varying degrees in their home countries, compared to only 11% who believe that corruption is not at all prevalent. Data also indicates, over the course of nine survey rounds (since 2011), that citizen perceptions of the extent of corruption in their countries have not changed substantially. However, in recent years a substantial decrease has been observed in the number of respondents who believe corruption is widespread compared to those who believe it is only somewhat or slightly prevalent. Respondents in the Mashreq countries are most convinced of the spread of corruption in their countries, while the highest rates of citizens that do not believe that corruption is widespread were recorded in the Gulf countries.
- 40% of respondents said that their country enforces the law equally among citizens, while 39% think that it favours certain groups (i.e. discriminates according to their interest), and 18% think that the state does not apply the law equally at all. Respondents from the Mashreq expressed, at higher rates than those from other regions, that their state institutions do not enforce the law equally among people.

Figure 8. Longitudinal comparison of public opinion on the prevalence of financial and administrative corruption in respondents' countries



Figure 9. Longitudinal comparison of respondent assessments of the extent to which the state enforces the law equally



Figure 10. Regardless of the extent to which you agree or disagree with current government policies, which of the following statements best expresses your perspective on the state in your country?



Figure 11. Which of the following statements best expresses your perspective on the government in your country?



Section III: Arab Public Opinion and Democracy

How do Arab citizens understand democracy?

- Most citizens of the Arab region are able to provide a definition of democracy; 83% of respondents provided a substantive definition, a clear increase.
- 34% of the citizens of the Arab region define democracy as a guarantee of political and civil freedoms. 20% of them said that democracy is a guarantee of equality and justice among citizens, while 14% focused on participation and the institutional aspect of a democratic system (circulation of power, separation and control between the authorities), 6% defined democracy as a guarantee of security and stability, and 5% defined it as improving economic conditions.
- The results show an increase in the percentage of those who defined democracy as participation and the institution of democratic governance (circulation, separation, and oversight between authorities), especially in countries such as Egypt, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, and Sudan.
- The majority of Arab citizens reject negative statements about democracy, but they are divided on the statement “Our society is unprepared for democracy”.

- A majority of public opinion supports the democratic system, at a rate of 68%, compared to 20% against.
- Rates of support for democracy have grown closer together over the years since the first survey in 2011.
- The majority of respondents (67%) believe that democracy is more suitable for their countries than other systems of governance. A majority also reject authoritarianism, military regimes, competitive systems restricted to certain parties (whether Islamist or secular), and theocratic systems without elections or political parties.

Figure 12. Respondent views on statements about the democratic system



Figure 13. Longitudinal comparison of respondents' agreement with the statement "Democracy, despite its shortcomings, is better than other systems"



Figure 14. Respondent perspectives on the suitability of certain political systems for their countries



- 50% of respondents in the Arab region would accept the rise to power of a political party with whom they disagree through the ballot box, compared to 41% who said that they would not accept that. The highest rates of acceptance were recorded in the Nile Valley and the Maghreb and the lowest in the Mashreq.

Figure 15. Longitudinal comparison of responses to the question "Would you accept a political party with whom you disagree taking power through free and fair elections?"



How do Arab citizens evaluate democracy in their countries?

- Respondents rated the level of democracy in the region at 6.2/10 – that is, democracy remains, as far as they are concerned, only halfway achieved. It is higher than the percentage recorded in the 2023 survey.
- Respondents' perceived ability to criticize their governments appears limited, with an aggregate level of 5.3/10.

Figure 16. Longitudinal comparison of respondent evaluations of the level of democracy in the countries surveyed and the ability of citizens to criticize the government



Section IV: Civic and Political Participation

Although Arab citizens support the democratic system based on a substantive understanding of what democracy is, their civic and political participation is limited. To clarify this point, the AOI tested indicators to measure the degree of political involvement, namely: the extent of citizens' interest in political affairs in their countries, the extent of citizens' confidence in political parties, and intention to participate in the next elections.

Interest in political affairs and following political news

- Arab citizens' interest is divided over the political affairs of their countries. Notably, there has been an increase in rates of interest in politics (by 7%), whereas the proportion of those reporting they are completely uninterested dropped by 6% relative to the 2023 survey.

- The results of the past nine surveys have revealed fundamental shifts in the sources Arab citizens rely on to obtain political news. Reliance on the internet has increased, whereas dependence on television has decreased.

- 38% of respondents, the highest rate since 2011, indicated that they rely on the internet to follow political news, representing more than a sevenfold increase in that period. Conversely, rates of reliance on television have gradually decreased over the years.

- Television and the internet are the two main sources people use to follow politics, with 80% of respondents relying on them.

Figure 17. Longitudinal comparison of the extent of respondents' interest in politics in their countries



Figure 18. Longitudinal comparison of most used media for following political news



To what extent do Arab citizens participate in civic organizations and political parties?

- Membership and participation in civic and voluntary organizations remain extremely limited across the Arab region, with no more than 11% of respondents reporting that they are members of such groups in any given country. When considering the level of

participation in the activities of such groups, the level of active participation would likely fall further still.

- Affiliation with family associations and organizations is still higher than affiliation to civil, civil, cultural and voluntary associations.
- Just 6% of respondents reported being affiliated with political parties (asked in countries where political parties exist), while 60% reported having no confidence in political parties, compared to 23% who do.
- Public opinion is divided on whether respondents will vote in the next elections; the percentage of respondents intending to vote has mostly declined since 2011, when 61% reported an intention to vote, to just 45% in the most recent survey.
- Although Arab public opinion favours democracy, political apathy is clearly prevalent. This may be expected in the context of limited political participation and given that available opportunities to participate in or influence the political system are not convincing to Arab citizens.

Figure 19. Respondents participating and not participating in certain civic and voluntary associations



Figure 20. Representativeness of political parties and movements



Figure 21. Respondents' confidence in their countries' political parties



Figure 22. Do you intend to vote in the upcoming elections?



Section V: Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, and Syria

In keeping with now established tradition, the AOI continued developing questions tailored to current affairs. In this context, it allocated a set of special questions to countries undergoing transitions or facing crises and conflicts.

A look at public opinion among Palestinians in Gaza

The following is a glimpse into the dire humanitarian situation faced by residents of the Gaza Strip during the war, as revealed by respondents to a field survey conducted in March 2025.

- 93% of respondents reported being displaced from their homes once or more during the war.
- 48% of respondents indicated they were living in a house (either complete or damaged), while 24% said they were living in tents, and 13% in a public building, such as a hospital, school, etc.
- 60-66% of respondents stated they had mattresses and blankets, while 35-40% said they did not. Electricity, internet access, and medicine were available to only 11-36% of respondents, meaning 64-89% of respondents lacked these essential services.
- 90% of respondents indicated they had needed medicine or medical supplies for themselves or a family member during the war but had not been able to find them. 85% reported that they or a family member had experienced hunger multiple times during the

war, while 81% said that they or a family member had been unable to find drinking water on several occasions.

- 46-57% of respondents indicated that they witnessed multiple instances of people begging for food or water.

Figure 23. Percentage of Palestinians Gaza forcibly displaced since the start of the war



Table 1. Where Gaza Residents Are Living

Type of Accommodation	**%**
House (complete or damaged)	48
Tent	24
Public Building / School / Institution / Business	13
Abandoned or unfinished building	6
Garage / warehouse / depot	6
In the street / public spaces	2
Workplace	1
Total	100

Figure 24. Percentage of Gaza respondents indicating that certain basic needs were available most of the time, sometimes, or rarely



Figure 25. The experiences of Gaza respondents or their families in obtaining basic needs during the war



Figure 26. Respondents in the Gaza Strip reporting seeing people forced to beg for food or water during the war



A Look at Lebanese Public Opinion

The AOI included a set of questions for Lebanese respondents about their situation during the Israeli war and ongoing aggression against Lebanon. The survey was conducted in Lebanon in March 2025.

- 10% of respondents in Lebanon reported that a family member had left Lebanon as a result of the war.
- 76% of respondents from areas targeted by Israel (southern Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, etc.) stated that they had been forced to flee during the conflict. Of these, 54% said they fled because nearby homes were bombed and destroyed, while 19% reported that they had fled because parts of their own homes had been bombed and destroyed. 16% indicated that their displacement was due to threats from the Israeli army.
- 88% said they felt that the area to which they had fled was welcoming.
- At least half of respondents from the war affected regions expressed a lack of access to basic foodstuffs and 41% expressed a lack of access to healthcare, medicine.

Figure 27. Did any of your family members leave Lebanon as a result of the war? (%)



Figure 28. Percentage of Lebanese forcibly displaced during the war



Figure 29. While you were displaced, to what extent did you feel that the district where you were living welcomed you? (%)



Figure 30. Lebanese respondents who reported that various services were available to them most of the time, sometimes, or rarely



A look at Sudanese public opinion on the war

The following is a select summary of Sudanese respondents' experiences of the ongoing armed conflict in Sudan, which began on 15 April 2023. The survey was conducted inside Sudan in November 2024.

- 47% of respondents reported being displaced, either individually or with some or all of their families, since the outbreak of the conflict. Of course, this percentage excludes those who fled the country entirely.
- 34% of those displaced indicated they had been able to return to their homes, while 66% reported not having returned as of the time of the survey. Of the latter, 38% stated they were staying in extended family homes or with relatives, 31% said they were renting other accommodation, 15% were residing in shelters, and 11% were staying with acquaintances.

Figure 31. Forced displacement since the outbreak of the war in Sudan



Figure 32. Displaced Sudanese who have returned home compared to those who remain displaced



Figure 33. Where are displaced Sudanese living now?



- Regarding the availability of certain necessities, 58% of respondents indicated that potable water was available, while 45% indicated a lack of access to electricity and 58% a lack of access to food supplies.
- 71% reported that they were unable to obtain necessary medications, while 72% indicated that they did not have access to healthcare when needed.
- 34% of Sudanese respondents reported their property had been stolen, 89% of whom said that the RSF were responsible for such theft. 23% said their home had been raided. A further 18% said their homes had been occupied.
- 17% of Sudanese respondents said they or a member of their family had been attacked, compared to 82% who said they had not. Meanwhile, 9% had been detained, 4% had faced sexual assault. All the respondents who had been subjected to these crimes were able to identify the perpetrator.
- Of the first category, 94% said the Rapid Support Forces were responsible, while 3% blamed the army.

Figure 34. Percentage of Sudanese respondents reporting that various services were available most of the time, sometimes, or rarely (arithmetic mean %)



Table 2. Percentage of Sudanese respondents saying they or a family member had been a victim of specific crimes since the start of the war, and the perpetrator.

	Have you or members of you family experienced…?			Who was the perpetrator?			
	Yes	No	Declined to answer	RSF	Army	Other	Declined to answer
Theft of Property	34	66	0	89	2	7	2
House Raid	23	77	0	95	1	0	4
Occupation of House	18	81	1	97	1	0	2
Attack by factions in battle	17	82	1	94	3	0	3
Arrest	9	90	1	82	16	0	2
Sexual assault	4	95	1	86	5	0	9

A look at Syrian public opinion

The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies conducted a first-of-its-kind public opinion poll in Syria from 25 July to 17 August 2025, following the fall of the Assad Regime, covering a wide range of variables. The following are some selected findings.

- Between 80% and 94% of Syrian respondents expressed feelings of hope, joy, happiness, and relief at the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, while around 80% expressed feelings of anxiety or uncertainty.

Figure 35. Measuring sentiment among Syrian respondents since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime



- Regarding general conditions in their country, Syrians reported that the most pressing problems facing their country are related to the economic situation, security, political stability, and national unity.
- 36% of respondents reported that their families rely on remittances from abroad, whether regular or irregular.
- Only 1% of Syrians eat meat daily, while 16% reported eating it a maximum of three times a week. 89% reported eating it once a month.
- Public opinion regarding a range of basic services in Syria was largely negative. 54% of respondents rated the availability of food as "good," while less than a third said the same about the availability of healthcare, internet, water, and electricity.

Figure 36. Distribution of Syrian respondents according to whether their families receive monthly remittances from abroad



Figure 37. Frequency of consumption of various meat/fish products (per week)



Figure 38. Proportion of Syrian respondents ranking specific services as "good"



- Regarding Syrian public opinion on the political situation, the majority of respondents support the establishment of political parties in the country, including Syrian national political movements and Islamist movements. The largest group of respondents supported the presence of Arab nationalist and liberal civil movements.

- More than half of respondents rated the government's performance as "good" with regard to guaranteeing freedom of expression, respecting human rights, and preserving territorial integrity. However, the majority expressed a negative assessment of the government's performance concerning ending discrimination among citizens, guaranteeing political pluralism, and disbanding armed groups.
- 65% of respondents support holding accountable anyone involved in human rights violations, even those who belong to the opposition to the Assad regime.
- Regarding the type of state Syrians want, 42% support a civil state, compared to 28% who support a religious state.

Figure 39. Percentage of Syrians rating government performance on certain principles as "good"



Figure 40. Syrians' views on who should be held accountable for the sake of transitional justice (%)



Figure 41. Syrian preferences for the form of the Syrian state (%)



- In the context of societal, cultural, and ethnic diversity, 64% of respondents believed that over the years, the Syrian people have succeeded, to varying degrees, in integrating into a single united family, while 12% said that no such integration has occurred at all.

- 19% of respondents believe that the most important factor shaping Syrian national identity is "shared Syrian culture," followed by the following factors: the Arabic

language (17%), living on Syrian territory (10%), social and cultural diversity (9%), and Islam (8%).

- 70% of respondents reported that "sectarian rhetoric" is widespread in the country, and 84% believed that people in Syria today categorize themselves and others based on sect and religion.

- 66% of respondents believe that discrimination between people based on their sects and religions is widespread in the country. A further 57% believe that discrimination based on regional origin is widespread.

- 41% of respondents believe that tension between citizens based on sect or religion is the result of foreign interference, while 36% believe it is a result of an absence of citizenship and tolerance.

- Although Syrians acknowledged the existence of sectarian discourse, 66% of respondents said that they do not differentiate in dealing with others, regardless of their sect or religion.

- 25% expressed a preference to deal with people of the same sect. A majority of 66-78% said they would not mind if their neighbours were of other religions, sects and ethnicities; this reflects a rejection of discrimination.

Figure 42. Syrians' evaluations of the country's success in integrating into a single, united unit (%)



Figure 43. How Syrian respondents see the prevalence of sectarian discourse and discrimination in the country today



- 70% of respondents oppose an agreement with Israel that does not include the return of the Syrian Golan Heights, and 74% believe that Israel "is working to support certain groups in Syrian society in order to fuel separatist conflicts and threaten the unity of Syrian territory." Meanwhile, 88% believe that Israel "is working to threaten security and stability in Syria."

Figure 44. Do Syrians support an agreement with Israel that does not include the return of the Syrian Golan Heights?



Section VI: The Palestinian Cause and the War on Gaza

- Arab public opinion is almost unanimous (80%) that the Palestinian cause is a collective Arab cause, while just 12% believe it is solely a Palestinian cause. Public opinion in Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Kuwait was highest in considering the Palestinian cause to be an Arab cause. The highest regional percentage of those who believe the Palestinian cause is not an Arab cause was recorded in the Mashreq.

Figure 45. Longitudinal comparison of attitudes toward the Palestinian cause



Figure 46. Country comparison of attitudes toward the Palestinian cause



How do Arab citizens feel about recognizing Israel?

- An overwhelming majority of 87% of respondents oppose their countries recognizing Israel, while only 6% said they would accept such recognition. Of those who supported their countries recognizing Israel, half made such a move conditional on the formation of an independent Palestinian state.

- Despite the recent wave of normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, the percentage of those who supported recognition of Israel dropped by two percentage points in the 2025 AOI compared to 2022/23.

- The highest rates of opposition to recognizing Israel were recorded in Libya and Jordan (96% and 95%, respectively), followed by Kuwait (94%), Palestine (91%), and Lebanon, and Morocco and Qatar (89% each).

- Respondents from the Gulf and North African regions were the most opposed to recognizing Israel. The results of this survey show significant changes in the opinions of some of the surveyed countries, most notably Sudan, where the percentage of those supporting recognition of Israel dropped to 7% after fluctuating between 13% and 23% in the surveys between 2013 and 2022. Similarly, the percentage of those supporting recognition of Israel in Morocco decreased from 20% in 2022, shortly after the signing of the peace agreement, to 6% in 2025. Meanwhile, the percentage of those who oppose recognition of Israel in Kuwait rose to 94%, compared to 85% in 2022.

Figure 47. Longitudinal comparison of Arab opinion on their countries recognizing Israel



Figure 48. Country comparison of Arab opinion on their countries recognizing Israel



- Those who opposed recognizing Israel cited various factors, mainly linked to Israel's colonial, racist, and expansionist nature and its continued occupation of Palestinian territory. Cultural or religious explanations were largely absent. The reasons cited by respondents clearly indicated that their position on recognizing Israel is not likely to change as long as its colonial nature persists.

Table 5. Reasons cited for opposition to recognizing Israel in AOI polls since 2014 (% of total)

	25-2024	/2022 23	2019 2020/	/2017 2018	2016	2015	2014
Because Israel is a settler-colonial state occupying Palestine	31.5	36.6	33.7	31.7	27.0	24.5	23.4
Because Israel treats Arabs with racism and hatred	5.0	5.2	5.9	6.3	8.2	10.3	12.2
Because of Israel's enmity towards my people and to Arabs in general	2.7	3.7	4.1	3.4	3.3	4.7	11.5
Because recognition would be a denial of the Palestinians and their rights, and would legitimize what has been done to the Palestinian people	6.0	3.6	4.8	5.3	5.8	5.6	7.5
Because Israel has exiled the Palestinians and continues to oppress and kill them	9.1	6.5	6.8	8.3	8.1	6.9	5.5
For religious reasons	2.3	5.1	6.7	6.6	5.2	3.3	4.9
Because Israel threatens and undermines regional security and stability	3.0	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.4	2.5

	25-2024	/2022 23	2019 2020/	/2017 2018	2016	2015	2014
Because Israel is an expansionist state seeking to dominate or occupy countries in the Arab world and control their resources	13.3	9.0	9.4	10.1	13.0	13.0	2.4
Because Israel does not respect agreements or treaties	1.5	1.8	1.6	1.6	2.1	2.4	2.3
Because Israel is a terrorist state that supports terrorism	6.6	7.0	7.6	7.4	7.6	10.4	1.2
Because Israel has occupied more Syrian territory in recent months	0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
Because Israel occupies the Golan Heights	0.1	--	--	--	--	--	--
There is no state called Israel	0.3	0.2	2.3	1.1	0.6	0.3	3.4
No reason given	5.5	2.5	1.9	1.6	1.8	0.6	10.2
Total opposed to recognizing Israel	87.1	84.3	88.2	86.8	85.9	85.4	87.0
Total agreeing to recognizing Israel	6.0	7.5	6.2	7.9	9.5	8.9	6.0
Don't know/decline to answer	6.9	7.9	5.6	5	5	6	7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Israel's War on Gaza

- Respondents saw Israel's war on Gaza and Lebanon as something that directly affected them, with 87% reporting that they felt psychological stress as a result.
- 70% of respondents said they were following news about the war on Gaza, compared to 28% who said they were not. The majority of those following the war indicated that their two main sources of information were satellite television (57%) and the internet (35%).
- When asked in an open-ended question about which country in the world had taken the best stance towards Palestinians during the war, 15% of respondents chose South Africa, followed by Spain and Iran, each with seven percent.
- 83% of respondents said that South Africa's decision to bring a case against Israel before the International Court of Justice had boosted their morale, seeing it as a step in the right direction. In this context, 70% supported the idea that their governments should develop relations with South Africa.
- 83% of respondents saw the recognition of Palestine by Latin American and European countries as a positive development.

Figure 49. Respondents who reported feeling psychological stress because of Israel's wars on Gaza and Lebanon



How do Arabs perceive the policies of international and regional powers towards Palestine?

- Respondents were asked to evaluate the policies of various international and regional powers towards Palestine. They generally had a negative view, with less than 50% seeing the policies of Iran, Turkey, Russia, the US, and certain European countries as positive. The sole exception was South Africa; nearly a third (62%) of respondents agreed that the country's policy towards Palestine was positive, compared to 17% who viewed it negatively. This assessment also indicated that Spanish policy was the most positively viewed among Arab and European countries.
- Public opinion regarding Spanish policy toward Palestine was divided, with 43% viewing it positively and 35% viewing it negatively. As for Turkish policy, 49% said it was positive toward Palestine, while 33% saw it as negative.
- 37% of respondents had a negative view of Iranian policy toward Palestine, compared to 45% who viewed it positively.

  Respondents from the Mashreq were more likely to have a negative view of Iranian policy towards Palestine.
- Regarding US policy toward Palestine, a majority of respondents (76%) viewed it negatively, compared to only 11% who viewed it positively.
- Although public opinion is somewhat uniform across the region in its assessment of US policy towards Palestine, citizens of the Mashreq were more likely to view it negatively.

- When it came to German policy towards Palestine, 55% of respondents saw it as negative, while only 23% saw it as positive. 22% responded "don't know" or declined to answer.

Figure 50. Evaluating the policies of regional and international powers towards Palestine



Figure 51. Regional comparison of evaluations of South African policy towards Palestine



Figure 52. Regional comparison of evaluations of US policy towards Palestine



Figure 53. Longitudinal comparison of evaluations of US policy towards Palestine



Figure 54. Regional comparison of evaluations of Iranian policy towards Palestine



Figure 55. Regional comparison of evaluations of German policy towards Palestine



Section VII: Arab Public Opinion on Intra-Arab and International Relations

How do Arab citizens perceive the Arab nation?

- 76% of respondents agreed with the sentiment that the region's inhabitants formed a single nation, despite distinct characteristics, while 17% believe they represent different nations and peoples tied together by only tenuous links. Changes in these percentages over the years have been negligible.
- The highest percentage of those who do not see the Arab people as one nation was recorded in the Mashreq, at 25%.

Figure 56. Longitudinal comparison of responses to statements on Arab nationhood among the Arab peoples



Figure 57. Regional comparison of responses to statements on Arab nationhood among the Arab peoples



Which state poses the greatest threat to the Arab nation?

- Arab public opinion largely agrees that Israel and the US pose the greatest threat to Arab security, with 44% and 21% of respondents identifying them as such. Iran comes in third place with 6%. This suggests that Arab public opinion acknowledges the possibility of discussing Arab security and identifying the countries that pose the greatest threat to it.

Table 4. A longitudinal comparison of the states that pose the greatest threat to the Arab nation.

	/2024 2025	/2022 2023	2019 2020 /	2017 2018 /	2016	2015	2014	/2012 2013	2011
Israel	44	38	37	39	41	45	42	52	51
US	21	21	29	28	27	22	24	21	22
Iran	6	7	12	10	10	10	9	6	4
Arab States	4	5	5	7	5	5	5	3	2
Russia	1	3	1	2	3	1	--	--	--
European States	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	--
Other States	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0.3	1
Other	0	1	1	0	1	1	0.1	--	0.2
No threat	1	15	2	4	1	1	1	1	0.4
Don't know/Refused to answer	19	7	11	8	9	12	17	15	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Threats to the Region's Security and Stability

- Respondents were asked about the extent to which the policies of certain powers threaten the region's security and stability. The results showed near-unanimous public opinion, with 84% agreeing that Israeli policies threaten the security and stability of the Arab region. A further 77% of respondents agreed that US policies threaten the region's security and stability. This clearly demonstrates that public opinion views the policies of Israel and the US as the two greatest threats to the region.

- 53% of respondents selected Iranian policies and 48% Russian policies as threats to the region's security and stability.

Figure 58. Longitudinal comparison of which states respondents believe pursue policies that threaten the region's security and stability



Section VIII: Public Opinion on the United States

This year, the AOI included a set of questions to gauge public opinion trends toward the US in general, and the extent of cultural ties with it. The AOI had previously measured this 10 years ago.

- 73% of respondents agreed that they have some degree of knowledge about the US, while 8% said they were well-acquainted with the US, which has remained stable since 2014.
- 24% indicated that their primary source of information about the US was the media, while 21% reported that their sources were the internet and search engines, specifically social media.
- Comparing the results of the 2025 survey with those recorded 10 years prior reveals a qualitative shift in the sources of knowledge about American culture and society: the internet and social media have become primary sources of information about the US, alongside traditional media.

Figure 59. Comparison of how well-acquainted respondents report to be with the United States (2014 and 2024/5)



Figure 60. Comparison of sources from which respondents get most of their information about society/life/culture in the US (2014 and 2024/5)



- When respondents were asked about their feelings toward the US in general, 56% expressed negative feelings, a higher percentage than ten years ago.
- 54% of respondents said their negative view of the US was a result of its foreign policy and not a disagreement with American values or culture, compared to 24% who said their negative view was a result of disagreement with American values and culture.
- When asked specifically about the American people, 27% of respondents said that notwithstanding US foreign policy, they had a negative view (compared to 19% ten years ago), while about half reported that their view of the American public was either positive or neutral when foreign policy was put aside.

Figure 61. Comparison of how positively respondents describe their feelings toward the US (2014 and 2024/5)



Figure 62. Comparison of answers to "Putting aside US foreign policy, what is your view of the American people?" (2014 and 2024/5)



Figure 63. Country comparison of answers to: "Which of the following statements is closest to your view?"



To explore further whether negative attitudes toward the US were based on factors other than foreign policy (such as culture and values), respondents were asked whether they would choose the US or another country for specific personal reasons: medical treatment for themselves or a family member; professional training; university studies; working abroad; purchasing imported goods; emigrating to another country and settling there; or taking a vacation.

- The results showed that less than a third of respondents would choose the US for medical treatment or professional training. A quarter said they would choose American products when purchasing imported goods, and 21% said they would choose the US as a country to which to emigrate. Meanwhile, 14% said they would choose the US for a vacation.
- A comparison of respondents' choices in the 2025 survey against those recorded 10 years prior shows a clear decline in public opinion regarding the US versus other countries. The percentage of those who indicated it would be their top choice dropped by approximately 15 to 20 percentage points, reflecting a statistically significant shift in perceptions, which could be attributed to the critical evaluation of US foreign policy.
- The results also show that public opinion has become more negative concerning American society; respondents were more negative than previously when asked about a range of positive statements, such as American society's tolerance, respect for minorities, democratic nature, advanced arts, and appreciation of individual effort.

- An assessment of US policies in the Arab region in general, and towards Palestine in particular, indicates that Arab publics view these policies negatively. Furthermore, approximately three-quarters of citizens in the region agree that US policies threaten regional stability. Between 50% and 66% see the US as attempting to impose its policies on the rest of the world, control Arab countries, exacerbate divisions among them, and favouring undemocratic governments. 55% of respondents rejected the claim that the US protects human rights.
- 44% of respondents agreed that a change in US policies toward Palestine (such as protecting Palestinians from Israel and halting financial and military support to the latter) would improve their view of the US.
- The negative assessment of US policies in the Arab region, and toward Palestine in particular, has significantly altered public opinion toward the US more fundamentally. It has also resulted in a less positive view of American society and a decline in Arab citizens' preference for the US even in areas where it is known for being advanced, such as medicine, education, and training.
- When asked how Western publics, including the American public, views Arabs, 60% said it was a negative view, while 28% said it was positive.
- When asked about the reasons for this negative view, 25% cited religious reasons, 20% said it was the result of organized campaigns to disparage Arabs, while 14% blamed bad or offensive actions by Arabs themselves.

Figure 64. Longitudinal comparison of which activities Respondents chose the US as the best place to undertake



Figure 65. Longitudinal comparison of the extent to which respondents consider the US as characterized by specific values (1-10)



Table 6. Longitudinal comparison of respondent agreement with proposed statements about the US

	Agree / somewhat agree		Disagree / somewhat disagree		Don't know / decline to respond	
	2025/2024	2014	2025/2024	2014	2025/2024	2014
The US seeks to dominate Arab countries	66	--	20	--	14	--
The US seeks to impose its policies on the rest of the world	62	63	26	24	12	13
The US exploits its foreign aid to impose its own agenda	63	64	23	22	14	14
The US exacerbates divisions among Arab states	61	--	24	--	15	--
US policies contribute to increasing terrorism in Arab countries	58	50	26	30	16	20
The US fuels sectarianism, ethnic divisions and separatism in the Arab world	58	54	23	25	19	21
The US helps spread financial corruption in the Arab world	55	52	28	28	17	20
The US prefers dealing with undemocratic governments in the Arab world	50	--	29	--	21	--
The US protects human rights in the Arab world	31	34	55	49	14	17

Table 7. Longitudinal comparison of responses to "Which of the following decisions, if it were implemented, would improve your view of the US?"

	2025/2024	2014
Halting material and military support for Israel	17	26
Protecting Palestinians from Israel	14	--
Bringing about a just resolution to the Palestine question	13	35
Not interfering in our country's internal affairs	10	6
Treating the Arab people with dignity and respect	9	3
Helping solve the fundamental challenges our countries face	4	2
Increasing economic aid to the region	3	4
Halting support for autocratic and undemocratic Arab regimes	3	4
Working to end the Iranian nuclear programme	3	2
Working to resolve the Syrian crisis in a way that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people	--	6
Boosting humanitarian aid to needy and crisis-hit areas of the Arab world	--	1
Reaching an agreement with Iran over its nuclear programme	--	1
My opinion of the US will not improve regardless of what it does	9	--
Don't know/decline to respond	15	10
Total	100	100

Figure 66. Respondent answers to "In your view, do Western publics have a positive or negative view of Arabs?"



Figure 67. Respondent evaluations of why Western publics have a negative view of Arabs



Section VIII: Internet and Social Media

To what extent is the internet used in the Arab world?

- Only 18% of respondents reported that they do not use the internet, compared to 79% who said that they use the internet to varying extents. 65% reported that they use the internet daily or almost daily. Internet use has seen a statistically significant increase when comparing this year's survey results with past rounds. The rate of those who do not use the internet has decreased from 55% in 2013 to 18% in 2025.

- The highest rates of internet use were reported in the Nile Valley, whereas the lowest came from the Mashreq.

- 90% of internet users report that they browse the internet in Arabic, showing that use of Arabic has risen compared to previous surveys.

- Internet users rely primarily on mobile devices to access the internet, followed by computers.

- 98% of internet users reported that they have accounts on social media applications and platforms.

Figure 68. Longitudinal comparison of internet use



Figure 69. Indices of internet use



- Despite variation in rates of social media account use, most respondents who have accounts across all regions have WhatsApp and Facebook. Less than half have X accounts, apart from the Gulf where 69% of internet users reported they have accounts on X.
- Nearly half of social media users (47%) prefer to receive content in video form, compared to 27% who prefer text and 15% who prefer photos.

Figure 70. Respondents with various social media accounts out of total internet users



Figure 71. Preferences of social media users in accessing content



- 27% of social media users reported that they use it to communicate with friends and acquaintances, 15% to follow the news in their countries, and 11% to fill free time.
- 13% of social media users reported that they use it to follow news and political topics, compared to 14% to keep up with trends.
- 41% of social media users said that they trust the information and news circulated on social media, against 59% who do not trust it. This indicates a decrease in trust in information and news circulated on social media compared to the two previous AOI rounds.
- The lowest levels of trust were recorded for news and information circulated by influencers and celebrities on their personal pages, at 32%.

- 57% of social media account holders use these platforms to express their views on political events, with 11% doing so daily or several times a day.
- 54% reported that they use social media to participate in or engage with political issues, while 42% said they do not.
- Saudi Arabia and Jordan are the least likely among Arab societies to use social media to engage with political issues. This pattern is reflected in the Mashreq and Gulf regions, which also record the lowest levels of social-media engagement with political matters.

Table 8. Reasons for using social media, and preferred topics to follow.

Reasons for using social media		**The topics respondents prefer to follow**		
Reasons	**%**		**2025 /2024 %**	**2023 /2022 %**
To connect with friends and acquaintances	27	Social media trends	14	--
To keep up with local news	15	Political content	13	18
To fill free time/entertainment	11	Social content	10	25
To follow content that interests me	9	Religion and prayers	10	5
To keep up to date with trending topics	9	Sports	9	8
To follow global news	8	Educational/informational content	7	2
To share my daily activities with friends	7	Cooking	6	7
To meet new people	4	Health	5	2
For work or to promote my field	4	Listening to music	5	13
To share my opinions	3	Fashion and style	4	2
To become an influencer	1	Celebrity news	4	4
Other	0	Commercial advertisements and promotions	3	2
Don't know/Decline to answer	2	Art (theatre, painting, poetry)	3	4
Total	100	Beauty	3	1
		Crime and mystery	1	1
		Decline to answer	3	5
		Total	100	100

Figure 72. Longitudinal comparison of social media use to engage with political content



Table 9: Social media users' self-reported trust in the news and information published on specific types of platforms (arithmetic mean)

	2025 /2024	2023 /2022
Official government pages	56	--
News TV channel pages	48	48
Media/journalist pages	44	44
WhatsApp news groups	39	36
Facebook newsrooms and groups	35	34
Public pages of social media users	34	35
Influencer and celebrity accounts	32	33

Figure 73. Longitudinal comparison of social media use to engage with social content



Figure 74. Social media users who trust the news and information circulating on it



Figure 75. Longitudinal and regional comparison of social media user trust in the news and information circulating on it



To what extent do Arab citizens follow and trust social media influencers?

- Half of social media users do not follow influencer accounts, compared to 9% of who said they follow influencers regularly, 28% who follow them occasionally, 18% who follow them rarely. Social influencers are the most followed, followed by those in sport, then politics, and finally religion.

- Following influencers does not necessarily translate into trust or influence: 43% of those who follow influencer accounts said they are influenced by what influencers post, compared with 57% who said they are not.

Figure 76. Followship of social media influencer accounts



Table 10. Social media users who follow influencers ranked by how much they follow

	%
Social Influencers	15
Sports Influencers	12
Political Influencers	11
Beauty Influencers	9
Religious Influencers	8
Cooking/Nutrition Influencers	8
Educational Influencers	6
Travel Influencers	6
Health and Medical Influencers	6
Technology Influencers	5
Fitness Influencers	3
Online Shopping Influencers	3
Other	2
Decline to Answer	6
Total	100

- 37% of respondents with social media accounts believe their social media activity is monitored; 44% of whom believe the platforms themselves monitor them while 34% believe the government is monitoring them.

- 15% of respondents reported being aware of the existence of so-called "electronic armies", compared to 76% who were unaware of them.

Figure 78: respondents with social media accounts who believe their social media activity is monitored



Figure 79. Who respondents believe is monitoring their social media activity



Figure 80. Are you aware that there are electronic armies on social media?