



المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات
Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies

Situation Assessment | 14 October 2025

The Peace Framework for Gaza: Drivers, Details, and Difficulties Ahead

Unit for Political Studies

The Peace Framework for Gaza: Drivers, Details, and Difficulties Ahead

Series: **Situation Assessment**

14 October 2025

Unit for Political Studies

The Unit for Political Studies is the Center's department dedicated to the study of the region's most pressing current affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS' activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Political Studie draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center's publication series: Assessment Report, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. .

Copyright © 2025 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved.

The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences.

The Center's paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective.

The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non-Arab researchers.

The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies

Al-Tarfa Street, Wadi Al Banat

Al-Dayaen, Qatar

PO Box 10277, Doha

+974 4035 4111

www.dohainstitute.org

Table of Contents

Drivers of the Agreement 1

General Features of the Agreement 3

Will the Agreement Hold? 5

Conclusion 5

In the early hours of 9 October 2025, US President Donald Trump announced that Hamas and Israel had agreed on his proposal of a peace framework to end the war on Gaza.¹ For its part, Hamas announced the points that the movement had agreed upon without addressing those it disagreed with. These included its willingness to release the remaining Israeli detainees within 72 hours of the agreement's ratification, in exchange for a number of Palestinian prisoners, alongside the start of a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip (a matter that was not clearly stated in Trump's plan).² In contrast, the Israeli cabinet approved the agreement on Friday morning, about 24 hours after the official announcement. Trump interpreted Hamas' positive response as an endorsement of the plan, which surprised Israel which considered it an endorsement of only the first phase. Meanwhile Netanyahu continued to reiterate the necessity of implementing the next phases, which include Hamas disarmament. Despite the optimism surrounding the initial phase of the agreement, ambiguity surrounds the subsequent phases, particularly regarding implementation mechanisms and guarantees for a permanent ceasefire.

Drivers of the Agreement

Israel's war on Gaza has deepened its international isolation and triggered profound shifts in global public opinion towards it, including in the United States. Public opinion polls have shown, for the first time, that sympathy among the US public for the Palestinians has surpassed that for Israel, with this shift extending to both the Republican and Democratic camps, particularly among younger generations.³ At the same time, protests have swept cities and capitals across the world, as well as digital platforms, calling for an end to Israel's genocidal war in the Gaza Strip, an end to the starvation of Palestinians, the entry of humanitarian aid, and the lifting of the suffocating blockade. Popular pressure has had an evident impact on the shifts seen in the positions of Western countries long known for their historical support of Israel – such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia – whose governments moved towards recognising the State of Palestine during the Two-State Solution Conference held on the sidelines of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York last September, despite strong Israeli and US opposition.⁴

The war also posed a challenge to unconditional US support for Israel – especially given the growing difficulty of aligning with the Israeli narrative after two years of genocidal war in Gaza and the

¹ "The White House," X, 9/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPBb>. For details of the agreement, see: "Enshrining Israeli Hegemony Under the Veil of Peace: Trump's Revised Plan for Gaza", Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPcf>

² "Gazans Trek to Ruined Homes as Israeli Forces Pull Back Under Ceasefire," *Reuters*, 11/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BP8G>

³ A CNN/SSRS poll, published in July 2025, revealed a significant shift in American public opinion regarding the Israeli war on Gaza, showing a clear decline in traditional support for Israel and a growing scepticism towards its military policies. According to the poll, only 23% of Americans now believe that Israel's military operations are fully justified, while 27% consider them to be partially justified, and 22% regard them as completely unjustified – a striking increase compared with the period following 7 October, when that figure stood at just 8%. There has also been a growing perception that the United States provides Israel with excessive military support. Among Democrats, this view rose from 44% to 59% since March, while among Republicans it has remained almost unchanged at around 24%. Young Democrats under the age of 35 emerged as the most critical group of Israel's policies: 72% believe that Washington gives Israel too much support, 43% think that all aid should be halted, while 29% favour reducing it. The poll also found that only one in ten young Americans considers Israel's operations to be "fully justified", while one-third see them as "completely unjustified". Furthermore, 61% believe that Israel has used excessive force, and 56% think that the United States is over-supporting Israel in its war on Gaza. See: "Just 23% of Americans say Israeli Military Actions in Gaza are Fully Justified, CNN Poll Finds," *CNN*, 18/7/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BOYe>

⁴ "Two State Solution Summit: Symbolic Recognition Under the Reality of Occupation", Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 28/9/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPzc>

mounting international outrage over Israel's crimes and arrogance. Increasingly, Israel came to be treated as a pariah state committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, with its leaders wanted for international justice. This in turn added to the burden on Washington in sustaining its support for Israel on the world stage. Lately, it has appeared that Trump, who is widely regarded as the most pro-Israel of all US presidents, had lost patience with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Determined to continue the war without any clear prospect of ending it, Netanyahu was preparing Israel to occupy Gaza City, home to around one million Palestinians, and began displacing them, sparking fears of horrific massacres against civilians. Trump's strong personal ambition to win the Nobel Peace Prize also played a significant role in his shift towards seeking an end to the war in Gaza, as he worked hard to project himself as a peacemaker in conflicts around the world.

US embarrassment over Netanyahu's policies intensified further when Israel attacked Qatar on 9 September, provoking widespread anger from Arab and Muslim states.⁵ Israel's failed strike on the Qatari mediation team came amid a wave of international recognition of the State of Palestine, the growing isolation of the Israeli and US positions globally, and deep changes in both US and international public opinion, which collectively marked a turning point that pushed Trump to declare that the time had come to end the war in Gaza.

Seizing the opportunity of the UN General Assembly meetings, Trump convened a gathering with several Arab and Islamic leaders, most notably from Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Egypt, to develop his plan for ending the war in Gaza. Following this, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was summoned to Washington and stood with Trump as he announced his 20-point plan during a joint press conference at the White House. In truth, however, the plan was an Israeli draft, encompassing all the war aims repeatedly articulated by the Israeli government.⁶

The plan was announced with endorsement from several Arab and Islamic states despite none of their proposals being included, causing major embarrassment for Hamas. In effect, the plan provided Netanyahu with a way out of his international isolation by recasting his conditions for ending the war as an international initiative. Hamas was thus compelled to issue a statement and generate a dynamic that would make it difficult to resume the war after the release of Israeli prisoners (all of whom are soldiers and officers), who had become a liability for the movement. The expectation that the release of these prisoners, along with Trump's celebration of his "achievement", would create an international atmosphere opposed to resuming the war was primarily a moral wager – its success dependent on the extent of public pressure in the West and on a clear stance from Arab states, which have been the main weak point since the start of the genocide. Hamas' response thus represented the only feasible way out: granting Trump the symbolic success he sought without accepting the Israeli conditions contained within the US plan.

⁵ "The Doha Emergency Summit: Outcomes and Regional Implications", Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 18/9/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BOUS>

⁶ "Enshrining Israeli Hegemony Under the Veil of Peace: Trump's Revised Plan for Gaza"

Agreement on the first stage of Trump's plan came as a result of indirect talks hosted by Egypt in Sharm el-Sheikh, held one day after the second anniversary of 7 October and the start of Israel's genocidal war on Gaza. The talks were attended by senior officials from the United States, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt, lending them considerable weight. Trump dispatched both his son-in-law, Jared Kushner – known for his close ties to Netanyahu – and his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, to participate in the Sharm el-Sheikh discussions, signalling his keen interest in reaching an agreement.⁷

The following day, Trump announced that Israel and Hamas had signed the first stage of the framework plan, providing for a cessation of hostilities, the release of all prisoners, both alive and dead, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces to what is known as the "yellow line" marking the boundary for the initial phase of Israel's withdrawal under Trump's plan.

General Features of the Agreement

Hamas, through the head of its political bureau in Gaza, Khalil al-Hayya, announced that it had reached an agreement to end the war in the Gaza Strip, providing for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the territory and a prisoner exchange between the two sides. Al-Hayya confirmed that the movement had received guarantees from the US and several regional mediators to end military operations and begin implementing the terms of the agreement.⁸

For its part, the Israeli Prime Minister's Office announced at dawn on Friday, 10 October, that the government had officially approved the proposal put forward by Trump to end the war in Gaza and secure the release of the Israeli captives. Kushner and Witkoff attended part of the special cabinet session convened to approve the agreement, in an effort to pressure the government's far-right members to vote in favour of the plan. Kushner described the deal as one that "isolates Hamas and encourages actors in the Arab world to pursue peace. This agreement ensures Israel's security."⁹ It was evident that Kushner's circle within the US administration sought to turn the isolation of Israel into the isolation of Hamas.

Nevertheless, five cabinet members, led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, voted against Trump's plan. Following the government's approval, the Israeli army announced the commencement of the ceasefire from Friday noon, marking the start of the first phase of the plan's implementation. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu affirmed that Israeli forces would remain in Gaza to ensure Hamas is disarmed, saying "If this is achieved the easy way, then that will be good, and if not, then it will be achieved the hard way"¹⁰ – an explicit threat to resume the war.

7 "First Phase of Ceasefire Deal to End War in Gaza Agreed by Israel and Hamas," *The Guardian*, 9/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BP7r>

8 "Watch | Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, Khalil al-Hayya, announces an agreement to end the war on the Gaza Strip", *Al Jazeera*, YouTube, 9/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPhm>

9 Keshet Neev, Amichai Stein, & Jerusalem Post Staff, "Ceasefire takes effect after Israeli gov't votes to approve Gaza deal", *The Jerusalem Post*, 9/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPQI>

10 "Netanyahu: Hamas will be Disarmed the Easy Way or Hard Way," *The Telegraph*, 10/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPLT>



The first phase of the plan stipulates that Israel will withdraw its forces to the "yellow line" within 24 hours, allow the flow of humanitarian aid, and complete a prisoner and body exchange within three days. During this phase, Israel will retain control over approximately 53% of the Gaza Strip. Estimates suggest that the exchange will include 20 Israeli captives believed to be alive, 26 deceased, and two whose fate remains unknown. Hamas clarified that the recovery of the dead would take longer than the release of the living. In return, Israel will release 250 Palestinian prisoners serving extended sentences in its prisons, in addition to around 1,700 Palestinians captured during the war. Once the agreement comes into effect, truckloads of food and medical aid will begin flowing into Gaza, supporting hundreds of thousands of displaced residents who sought refuge in camps after their homes were destroyed by Israeli military operations. President Trump stressed that no resident would be forced to leave Gaza.¹¹

Although Trump expressed confidence that the ceasefire would hold and spoke of a "consensus" on the next steps, he admitted that some details regarding subsequent stages still required a final agreement.¹² To lend the accord greater momentum, Trump delivered a speech at the Knesset¹³ on Monday before flying to Egypt to endorse the first phase of the agreement between Israel and Hamas at a ceremonial event attended by a number of regional and world leaders.¹⁴ The international summit on Monday was attended by more than twenty heads of state, including Trump, as part of regional and international efforts to bring a definitive end to the fighting in Gaza and promote peace, security, and stability in the Middle East.¹⁵ The summit is linked to the next phase of Trump's plan, which calls for the establishment of an international body known as the "board of peace" to oversee the administration of Gaza after the war, chaired by Trump himself. However, Hamas and other Palestinian factions issued a joint statement rejecting what they described as "foreign guardianship", insisting that the administration of Gaza is a purely "internal Palestinian matter".¹⁶

As part of the plan's implementation, the US decided to deploy around 200 troops within a joint task force to monitor compliance with the agreement. The commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), Brad Cooper, who visited Gaza "to inform how we are moving forward to establish a CENTCOM-led Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) that will synchronize activities to support post-conflict stabilization", confirmed that no US troops would be deployed inside the Gaza Strip itself.¹⁷ Meanwhile, Arab and Islamic countries that Washington hopes will contribute to the stability

11 "Trump Says Gaza Hostages Should be Released on Monday or Tuesday," *Reuters*, 9/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BP6J>

12 "US President Donald Trump Confident Ceasefire Will Hold as Gazans Trek to Ruined Homes, Israel Pulls Back," *The Nightly*, 10/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BOWW>

13 "As Donald Trump heads to Gaza 'peace summit' in Egypt, who is going – and who isn't?" *The Guardian*, 13/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPnj>

14 Felix Tamsut, Timothy Jones, John Silk, & Kieran Burke, "Gaza ceasefire deal signed by leaders after hostages freed", *DW*, 13/10/2025 accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BP05>

15 "20 countries celebrate the Gaza agreement in the Sheikh Rift Valley under Egyptian and American sponsorship," *Al Jazeera*, 12/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPpB>

16 "Palestine factions refuse foreign guardianship on Gaza as truce takes hold", *Al Jazeera*, 10/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPye>

17 Betül Yilmaz, "US special envoy, CENTCOM chief visit Gaza Strip after withdrawal of Israeli forces: Reports", *Anadolu Agency*, 11/10/2025, accessed on 13/10/2025, at: <https://acr.ps/1L9BPDm>



force in Gaza, such as Indonesia and Azerbaijan, are insisting that any participation must have a legal mandate, either through a UN Security Council resolution or, as some have proposed, a resolution by the Arab League.

Will the Agreement Hold?

Despite the success of the mediators in resolving many of the points of contention between Hamas and the Israeli occupation regarding the first phase of the plan, it remains unclear whether the negotiations have achieved genuine progress on the more complex issues. The agreement reached so far represents merely an initial step within a broader framework, and it cannot be relied upon to secure lasting stability unless the parties can agree on the subsequent phases. While the first phase constitutes the least complicated part of the agreement, questions surrounding the fate of the Palestinian resistance and its weapons, the reconstruction and administration of the Gaza Strip, and Israel's full withdrawal remain unanswered and undefined. Accordingly, apart from its first phase, which contains clear and binding measures for both parties, Trump's plan amounts to little more than a set of broad outlines and preliminary principles lacking a comprehensive and coherent strategy for implementation that could bring an end to the conflict and deliver a lasting resolution to the Palestine question.

This, in turn, hinges on Netanyahu's ability to manoeuvre and exploit the many loopholes and ambiguities within the plan to his own advantage, in the absence of binding guarantees compelling him to uphold the agreement's terms—something already evident in the matter of the list of Palestinian prisoners. Although implementing the first phase's provisions concurrently may reduce the chances of the agreement's collapse, concerns persist that Netanyahu might renege on his subsequent commitments once the Israeli captives have been recovered. In this sense, the later phases of the agreement face genuine challenges, and Israeli adherence to a permanent ceasefire will ultimately depend on the political will of the international community— including the United States, as well as European and Arab states—to end the war and to curb Netanyahu's desire to resume it.

Conclusion

The announcement of a ceasefire agreement in Gaza marks the most significant step yet towards ending a two-year genocidal war that has left nearly a quarter of a million Palestinians dead or wounded— around 13 per cent of the Strip's population— representing the highest civilian casualty rate of any modern conflict. The agreement's first phase draws on strong international momentum and intense US pressure led by President Trump, making it difficult for Netanyahu to back away from it, despite the framework plan's evident alignment with Israeli demands.

The agreement is structured in two phases: the first entails a ceasefire and a partial Israeli withdrawal, followed by an exchange of prisoners and hostages. This phase serves as a cornerstone for consolidating the ceasefire, yet the agreement as a whole remains complex, as it rests on three



distinct frames of reference. Hamas and the Palestinian factions have their own interpretation of the initial terms and their eventual outcomes; Israel, meanwhile, maintains an entirely different vision of the agreement's final form and the conditions for its implementation. The White House, which ultimately yielded to Israeli terms, seeks to preserve a degree of flexibility that might lead to a permanent cessation of hostilities – something that will depend on Washington's ability to pressure Israel into resolving the remaining disputes over resistance weapons and the presence of Israeli forces in Gaza through negotiation rather than renewed warfare.

What remains unclear, however, is whether the international momentum observed at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit will translate into genuine pressure to end the war and continue negotiations, or instead turn into pressure on Hamas and a pretext for Israel to resume its assault, under the guise of the resistance's alleged failure to comply with the Israeli conditions embedded in the US plan.