Amid the debate over the US withdrawal from Iraq: A new reading of the Baker-Hamilton Report

Preface

Due to the losses suffered by the American forces occupying Iraq after 2003 and the US administration's failure to contain the escalating situation in the country, official and popular calls arose in the United States, demanding a reassessment of the situation in Iraq and a search for the most effective means of extricating the United States from the "Iraqi quagmire". A number of American Congressmen and other politicians sought to form an independent committee to assess the Iraqi situation and to formulate proposals regarding the future of the American presence in the country. These efforts were crowned in the summer of 2005 with an invitation to form a bipartisan committee, a proposal that received widespread support from both Houses of Congress and in the ranks of both parties. On March 15, 2006, the founding of this commission, the Iraq Study Group (ISG), was announced in a meeting held at the Hall of Congress. The ISG was formed upon the recommendation of a group of congressmen belonging to both major parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party.

The ISG received the welcome and support of the Bush Administration, which consists mainly of neoconservatives who support the project of global American hegemony and the project of the Greater Middle East, as well as the Zionist project in the Arab region. Administration support was demonstrated by the meeting of President George W. Bush with the members of the ISG on June 14, 2006, and on another occasion, on November 13, 2006, in addition to the access granted to the ISG to interview subjects and to review secret documents related to the occupation and the administration of Iraq, and the facilitation and provision of travel to Iraq for a considerable number of the ISG's members.

It is unquestionable that the importance of the report emanates from the moral weight of the role given to the Iraq Study Group; this importance stems from the high levels at which the commission was formed, the personalities and figures who were consulted in its work, and the geo-political sphere that was included in the mission of the ISG, as well as the results that came out of the commission 's work: of these, only the 79 recommendations proposed by the Group (and which came to be termed the "Baker-Hamilton Recommendations") were publicized. The scope of the ISG's mission was not limited to the Iraqi situation, instead touching on everything that influences the latter, regionally and internationally, since the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, as well as the influences of this occupation on the Iraqi and regional scenes and the potential scenarios for the future.

Why was the Iraq Study Group formed?

The purpose of the formation of the Iraq Study Group was twofold:

First: Re-assessing current conditions in Iraq and their potential future course.

Second: Providing advice and consultation to the US government regarding Iraq policy.

The make-up of the Iraq Study Group

The ISG was composed of a number of senior American politicians belonging to both the Democratic and Republican parties and possessing broad experience in the affairs of the Middle East region. The leadership of the ISG was given - with the complete approval of the group's sponsors in Congress and the US Institute of Peace and other supporting organizations to two senior figures with deep knowledge and experience in the affairs of the Middle East and especially Iraq: former US Secretary of State James Baker (Republican), and Lee Hamilton (Democrat), former chairman of the House of Representatives' International Relations Committee. Following their appointment as co-chairmen of the ISG, Baker and Hamilton chose the other members in consultation with the US Institute of Peace and the other sponsoring groups. The most notable of the members were:

Lawrence Eagleburger, former US secretary of state.
Vernon Jordan, Jr., chief executive at Lazard Frères & Co.
Edwin Meese, former US attorney general
Sandra Day O'Connor, former Supreme Court justice
Leon Panetta, former White House chief of staff (and currently US defense secretary
William Perry, former US secretary of defense
Charles Robb, former senator.
Alan Simpson, former senator.

The Iraq Study Group's methods of operation

The US House of Representatives Appropriations Committee supported the ISG in the conduct of its work by financing its activities and logistical requirements; these activities took place through the US Institute of Peace, which took the role of the agency in charge of facilitating the work of the ISG - with support from the Center for Presidential Studies, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the James Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.

The group's work received support and advice from a large number of committees and specialized work groups engaged in the affairs of Iraq and the Arab region, which included many experts in the fields of economics, reconstruction, the military, security, political developments, and the domain of strategy. These committees included academic experts from universities, government, and the private sector; they presented 31 different reports and political and analytical studies for the interest of the ISG. In all these studies and reports, 44 experts offered their voluntary support (free of charge) to the Iraq Study Group.

The members of the ISG met with 171 individuals over nine months, in addition to other meetings and consultations with hundreds of other experts. The panel's main figures met with many of the senior officials and personalities in the Iraqi and American governments, in Washington and Iraq and other locations. These included President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, in addition to army officers and government officials from Iraq, the United States, and other countries. The ISG also conducted interviews and consultations with a large number of former and current US officials, ambassadors and foreign ministers from Arab and other countries, and a variety of experts, journalists, and researchers. Among the most notable figures consulted by the Iraq Study Group were former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh, Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Javad Zarifi, former US President Bill Clinton, former US Vice President Walter Mondale, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, as well as journalists and researchers such as Thomas Friedman, Martin Indyk and others.

The meetings, consultations, studies, and analyses of the Iraq Study Group were centered on four main axes:

The strategic conditions in Iraq and the region.
Security in Iraq and the main challenges to boosting it.
Political developments in Iraq following the 2005 elections and the formation of the new Iraqi government.
The economy and reconstruction.

A brief review of the Baker-Hamilton Recommendations

The 79 announced recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, representing the Iraq Study Group, did not reflect in their entirety the four axes mentioned above, which were expected to be included in the recommendations based on the studies and reports conducted by the ISG.

Most of the Baker-Hamilton Recommendations focused on the diplomatic activities of the US government relating to Iraq on the international and regional scenes, with special attention to relations with Syria and Iran and the methods of dealing and interacting with the issues in the region, chief among them the Palestinian issue and the Lebanese resistance represented by Hezbollah. The Baker-Hamilton Commission specified the objectives of the required US diplomatic action as follows:

Supporting the unity of Iraq and the integrity of its territory, fending off the interventions of Iraq's neighbors and attempts to destabilize it, securing borders (including the conducting of joint patrols with neighboring states), preventing conflicts from spreading, and the increase of economic, commercial, and military aid as well as political support. This has not taken place so far. In fact, the exact opposite has happened; interventions by Iraq's neighbors have increased, including artillery and aerial bombardment in northern Iraq, violations of its national waters and the closing of shipping lanes in the Shatt Al-Arab and Khawr Abdallah, and the smuggling of weapons, explosives, drugs, and suicide bombers into Iraq with the aim of undermining its security.
Encouraging regional governments to support national reconciliation in Iraq and to prop up the legitimacy of the Iraqi government by resuming diplomatic relations whenever suitable, reopening embassies in Baghdad, and helping Iraq to establish active embassies in the main capitals of the region. This axis witnessed some notable progress, and a number of foreign and Arab embassies were reopened in Baghdad; however, tension remained the dominant character in the relations of the current Iraqi regime with most Arab states.
The American diplomatic campaign to support the ambitions of the Iraqi government to hold a conference in Baghdad for the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab League - in order to regain its diplomatic presence - did not succeed. The Iraqi regime failed to host the Arab League summit, which had been scheduled to take place in Baghdad in early 2011.
The US government did not take seriously the Baker-Hamilton recommendation calling for the formation of an "International Group for the Support of Iraq", which was envisioned to involve Iraq and all of its neighbors, including Iran and Syria, in the addition to the major states in the region, including Egypt and the Gulf states, as well as the European Union and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Other states such as Germany, Japan and South Korea could also join. The hope was that the group would develop a specific method for dealings with the states surrounding Iraq that took into account the interests of these states, their preferences, and their potential contributions.
As per the recommendations of the ISG, the United States began conducting direct talks with Iran and Syria in an attempt to extract a commitment for constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. The wager was on the possibility of repeating the US-Iranian cooperation in Afghanistan and applying it to the Iraqi case, which provided Iran a historic opportunity to reinforce its influence in Iraq and the region, in addition to escalating the levels of its involvement in Iraqi domestic affairs to the point of directly influencing the course of the so-called "political process" in Iraq. This came despite the fact that the Baker-Hamilton Report affirmed that Iran viewed the United States being bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire as being in its interest.

The Baker-Hamilton Recommendations also discussed internal Iraqi affairs and the role of the government in determining the course of the evolution of the domestic political scene. That included assisting the Iraqi government in reaching an acceptable solution in the city of Kirkuk, and helping it put in place solid structures on the security, economic and political fronts, including the enhancement of its performance in the dossier of national reconciliation, the equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the disbanding of militias.

The Baker-Hamilton Commission also recommended that the level of political, military, and economic support for Iraq be lowered if the Iraqi government did not achieve tangible progress on the path of national reconciliation, security, and the improvement of services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis, calling for timetables to be set for the achievement of these targets. However, the panel did not detail the standards that should be adopted by the US government in order to gauge the commitment of the Iraqi government in regards to national reconciliation, security, and the improvement of services.

The US military presence in Iraq

The Baker-Hamilton Commission did not specify a clear course for the US military withdrawal from Iraq, instead making the matter more opaque, the proof being that the commission recommended:

An increase in the number of US military personnel embedded in Iraqi military units from 3,000-4,000 to 10,000-20,000;
That US troops remaining in Iraq be charged with helping Iraqi military units with intelligence, transportation, aerial and logistical support, and the provision of some equipment;
The US Army should maintain rapid reaction units and Special Forces tasked with the execution of military missions against Al Qaeda in Iraq whenever the opportunity presents itself;
Even after the United States withdraws all of its combat units from Iraq, it will maintain a substantial military presence in the region, manifested in its important force in Iraq, its aerial, land, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, and its even larger presence in Afghanistan.
The US government has to make it clear to the Iraqi government that America is capable of carrying out its plans, including the scheduled redeployment, even if Iraq does not achieve its planned reforms.
The other security needs of the United States and the future of its army cannot remain hostage to the actions of the Iraqi government or its deficiencies.

The rehabilitation of the Iraqi Army

The Baker-Hamilton Commission advised the US administration to attempt to finalize the training and arming of the Iraqi Army by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006. However, the administration did not take seriously the recommendations of the commission regarding the arming, equipping, preparation, and training of the Iraqi Army and security forces, despite the fact that the commission linked the ability to lower the US military and civilian presence in Iraq to the latter's capacity to exercise the tasks of defense and governance.

Moreover, the US administration did not heed the recommendations of the commission, which advised against the establishing of permanent US military bases in Iraq. Quite to the contrary, the Obama administration has exerted pressure to maintain a permanent American military presence. A delegation sent by the US Congress to Baghdad has linked the continuing presence of American forces in Iraq after 2011 to the demanding of financial compensation for the efforts of American troops in "liberating Iraq". The head of the delegation, California Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, asked his Iraqi hosts to repay the expenses incurred by his country during its invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the eight years that followed. Rohrabacher added that the financial factor would be decisive regarding the option of maintaining some American forces in Iraq after the final date for the withdrawal of troops on December 31, 2011.

The rehabilitation of the Iraqi security forces

The Baker-Hamilton Commission recommended that the Iraqi Interior Ministry be subjected to a process of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand the capabilities of the main crime-fighting unit, imposing more control on local police, and affording the Iraqi police greater responsibilities to conduct criminal investigations while increasing its cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi justice system in order to improve crime-fighting and protect Iraqi civilians.

The Baker-Hamilton Commission recommended that the aforementioned process of reform and reorganization be conducted under the direct leadership and supervision of the US Department of Justice; however, the panel did not specify the manner in which this processes of organizational reform and transformation would take place. In the field of intelligence, the Baker-Hamilton Commission recommended the allotment of greater analytical resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq. It also called for urgent changes in the process of data collection on violence and its sources in the country in order to provide a more accurate picture of the events on the ground. The commission asked the Central Intelligence Agency to provide more officers in Iraq in order to develop and train an effective intelligence agency, and to found a center for combatting terrorism that could facilitate counter-terrorist efforts.

Nevertheless, the US administration and the leadership of the US occupation forces in Iraq did not take all these recommendations seriously. Iraqi officers continued to complain about the weakness of the intelligence apparatus and intelligence-gathering agencies on the sources of threats and violence in Iraq. This deficiency has led to unjustifiable losses among Iraqi civilians and security forces throughout the period following the issuing of the Baker-Hamilton Recommendations.

The economy and reconstruction

Despite the massive destruction visited upon Iraq's infrastructure by the US invasion and occupation, in addition to the acts of looting and sabotage targeting Iraqi cultural and educational institutions, museums and archeological sites (with clear complicity on behalf of the US forces), the axis of the economy and reconstruction did not garner considerable space in the 79 recommendations made by the Baker-Hamilton Commission. There was an orphaned recommendation calling for the encouragement of investment in the Iraqi petroleum sector by the international community and multi-national energy corporations, an indication of the intent to abolish the laws nationalizing the sector that were promulgated in the early 1970s. The Baker-Hamilton Commission also did not specify the ways in which the American aid it called for - amounting to USD 5 billion dollars - should be spent. The commission did not clarify whether this aid was economic or whether it should go to security and military purposes. The recommendation affirmed the renewal of the authority of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction for the duration of the aid programs in the country, with SIGIR serving as an auditing entity to identify waste in the disbursement of these sums due to the administrative and financial corruption that has spread during the US occupation of Iraq, taking root in many junctures of the Iraqi government apparatus since 2003.

The economic dimension in the Baker-Hamilton Recommendations was limited to no more than three of the 79 recommendations in total. It appears that former Secretary of State Baker did not forget his threat to the Iraqis to bring them back to the pre-industrial era, which he made in 1990 during talks with his Iraqi counterpart at the time, Tariq Aziz, in the context of the last-minute negotiations following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. At any rate, the Iraqi economy has not witnessed any serious American or international support since the publication of the Baker-Hamilton Recommendations, with Iraq transforming into a consumer market for the products of neighboring states and the low-quality products of other countries, which have accumulated massive profits at the expense of the Iraqi citizen.

Concluding analysis

It is important to note that the Iraq Study Group began its mission in circumstances of extreme difficulty and sensitivity, witnessing broad sectarian tensions that were accompanied by acts of violence, massacres, assassinations, and explosions that struck all of Iraq's cities - causing massive losses in lives, property, and government buildings, which contributed to the fragmentation of the Iraqi social fabric. At the same time, the conditions in Iraq following the 2003 US occupation constituted a motive for a wave of anti-American hatred on the regional and international levels. This was reflected in most of the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, which focused on the so-called "diplomatic offensive" of the US administration relating to Iraq on the international and regional levels, focusing on relations with Iran and Syria and the means of dealing with the rest of the region's problems, headed by the Palestinian issue and the Lebanese resistance represented by Hezbollah.

The Baker-Hamilton Recommendations facilitated the Iranian intervention in Iraq, endowing it with a form of legitimacy, by calling for the conduct of US-Iranian talks regarding Iraq. This provided Iran a historic opportunity to reinforce its influence in Iraq and the region, in addition to escalating the levels of its involvement in Iraqi domestic affairs to a point of directly influencing the course of the so-called "political process" in Iraq. This came despite the fact that the Baker-Hamilton Report affirmed that Iran viewed the United States being bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire as being in its interest. This contradiction in American stances towards Iran - between what is declared and the roadmap recommended by the Baker-Hamilton Report for dealing with Iran's influence and role in Iraq - justified for the US administration the failure to commit to the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group in terms of supporting the unity of Iraq and the integrity of its territory, fending off the interventions of Iraq's neighbors and attempts to destabilize it, securing its borders, preventing conflicts from spreading, and the increase of economic, commercial, and military aid as well as political support. This has not taken place so far. In fact, the exact opposite has happened: interventions by Iraq's neighbors have increased, including artillery and aerial bombardment in northern Iraq, violations of its national waters and the closing of shipping lanes in the Shatt Al-Arab and Khawr Abdallah, and the smuggling of weapons, explosives, drugs, and suicide bombers into Iraq with the aim of undermining its security

Furthermore, despite the ISG's awareness of the diplomatic isolation suffered by the Iraqi government, which resulted from the ongoing political process in Iraq under US supervision, it did not urge the US administration strongly enough to take Iraq out of this isolation, from which it still suffers, evidenced by the failure of the current Iraqi regime to hold the Arab summit league that was scheduled to be held in Baghdad in early 2011.

As for the domestic situation, the US administration does not appear to be serious about improving internal affairs, as recommended by the Baker-Hamilton Commission, especially in terms of achieving national reconciliation, security, and the improvement of services touching upon the daily lives of Iraqis: no timelines were ever set for the accomplishment of these targets. In addition, no standards were set for the US government to gauge the commitment of the Iraqi government to national reconciliation, security, and the improvement of services. Despite the apparent success in the holding of legislative elections in 2010, doubts regarding the results did not differ from those accompanying the 2005 elections, and the problems of national reconciliation, security, and the improvement of services remained the same.

I must mention that the Iraq Study Group, in its reading of the Iraqi situation and its relation to the regional and international situations, was preparing the regional and international scene for a US military withdrawal from Iraq, which was originally scheduled for the first quarter of 2008 but was delayed until the end of 2011 under the pretext of continuing security deterioration in the country, and the unpreparedness of the Iraqi Army and security forces to fill the void that would emerge following an American withdrawal. Later, the Obama administration began pressuring the Iraqi government to concede to the presence of US troops beyond 2011, and demanding financial compensation for the expenses incurred by the United States during its invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the eight years that followed. This indicates an American need for a new study or situation assessment for the Iraqi and regional scenes, especially after 2011 and the events of Arab Spring which has overtaken the region.

It also should be mentioned that the US administration did not take seriously the ISG's recommendations regarding the submission of the Iraqi Interior Ministry to a process of organizational transformation, including greater responsibilities for the Iraqi police in conducting criminal investigations, reinforcing and developing the Iraqi justice system to improve crime-fighting, and the protection of Iraqi civilians. Iraqi leaders continued to complain about the weakness of the intelligence apparatus and the agencies collecting intelligence on the sources of threats and violence in Iraq, despite the Baker-Hamilton Recommendations to develop and reinforce these organs.

It is noticeable that the axis of the economy and reconstruction did not take a significant place in the 79 recommendations resulting from the Baker-Hamilton recommendations; with a sole recommendation on the encouragement of investment in the Iraqi petroleum sector through the international community and multi-national energy corporations, indicating an American and Western will to dominate and control the Iraqi hydrocarbon sector, which constituted one of the most important strategic objectives of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In sum, I could say that the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission represent an important historic document and a critical juncture in the history of the US occupation of Iraq. The ISG is notable as a serious American attempt to avoid the mistakes, failures, and heavy losses which called for its formation. It also drew a roadmap for policy in Iraq and regionally, including an assessment of potential future options in dealing with the development of the Iraqi situation from an American perspective inclusive of both major parties, a broad spectrum of American politicians, academics, researchers, journalists, experts, military figures, diplomats, and economic figures, as well as others with a stake in Iraqi affairs and the Middle East region.