The young Mohammed Al Bouazizi did not set himself alight in the Tunisian province of Sidi Bouzid to protest a socioeconomic situation per se, but to protest his humiliation by a policewoman who insulted his humanity and dignity by slapping him on the face for demanding his basic human rights. Bouazizi's angry outcry reverberated throughout the Arab world and encouraged demonstrators to take to the street en masse to pursue their freedoms, earn their rights, and achieve their socioeconomic aspirations.
Egyptians only gave their ruler eighteen days to resign. Yemenis recreated Egyptians' Tahrir Square experience and astonished the entire world with their resilience, civility, and peacefulness in their revolution. In Libya, revolutionaries launched their uprising on February 17 to topple and replace the haphazardness of the Gaddafi regime and era.
Moreover, in Syria, protests broke out in the peripheral city of Daraa, which has suffered marginalization and deprivation, and has, therefore, had one of the highest rates of labor emigration in Syria. Much like Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, demonstrations in Syria broke out protesting the arrest of juveniles under the age of fifteen, as well as authorities' irresponsiveness to pleas for their release.
In light of all of this, we can claim that the real cause behind revolutionary outbreaks in a number of Arab countries is that Arab societies have outgrown and out-developed their own political regimes whose foundations have become incapable of meeting the peoples' demands. Instead, they have become an obstacle preventing the development in the social, political, and economic domains.
The economic and political marginalization of large segments of the population - especially the youth - is symptomatic of the negative role Arab regimes had come to play. Naturally, this creates fertile ground for dissent, which, in the absence of legitimate political channels to voice discontent, results in demonstrators resorting to the street as their only way to voice their demands. The question then becomes: what led to the economic and political marginalization of the population? Does the resemblance between different Arab revolutions necessarily mean they will result in similar outcomes?
Governments in Arab countries have followed economic programs based on the recommendations and requirements of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to achieve desired economic reforms and structural adjustments. However, direct and indirect privatization policies led to the emergence of a new class of businessmen and entrepreneurs, with a monopoly over economic growth and its benefits. A narrow, limited group of businessmen managed to monopolize contracts and projects, as well as the fruits of economic growth. In Egypt, a number of personalities were accused of monopolizing vast sectors of the Egyptian economy; these included, for instance, Ahmad Ezz, Hussein Salem, and others. In Syria, some one hundred businessmen monopolize a large portion of the Syrian economy.
Adopting this authoritarian, neoliberal approach by Arab regimes, despite its proven failures in other developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, resulted in the uncontested economic hegemony of a tiny economic elite in the Arab world. Furthermore, it failed to produce sustainable and balanced development; although it may be capable of achieving economic growth, it fails to distribute wealth which accumulates wealth in the hands of a minority, elite class and exacerbates poverty and deprivation amongst the poorer classes - which is precisely what has taken place in the Arab countries that adopted neoliberalism. The result was the gradual decline of the industrious middle class.
The middle class played an important role in liberating Arab countries from colonialism, and witnessed a golden age in the post-colonial era as education became more accessible, while members of the middle class became better equipped to occupy public sector jobs which were, at the time, of socioeconomic significance. Additionally, since the middle class usually leads processes of economic and political change, relatively advanced forms of political debate flourished in an environment of openness and liberty. Nevertheless, Arab countries quickly fell under the rule of dictatorships and corrupt regimes, which brought this golden age to an end. These regimes argued that their societies were unworthy of, and unready for, democratic transitions. As such, the biggest achievement of Arab revolutions today is that they prove that these essentialist and authoritarian perceptions of the Arab people are indeed unfounded. Arab revolutions have also revitalized the role of the middle classes in society.
Together with this economic decline, the most extreme forms of political marginalization prevented citizens from voicing their economic grievances and demanding their political rights. This took the form of an authoritarian hegemony by a single party - represented by one party, a ruling ‘front,' or some other form of the "one and a half party system" - together with an increasingly incompetent performance by the state and its institutions on domestic and international levels. State agencies had indeed been transformed into tools in the hands of political bureaucracies, and legislative authorities were transformed into extensions of the executive authority and the alliance of political bureaucrats and businessmen it represented. Corruption had also become widespread in increasingly fragile judiciaries.
The most demonstrative example of the incompetence and inability of state institutions to perform their functions in the Arab world has been the obstruction of parliaments from performing their political roles. The performance of the Egyptian Parliament is a stark example: the People's Assembly, for instance, did not object to government policies that wasted Egypt's chances to achieve economic development and allocated Egypt's considerable natural and human resources to the benefit of a select few instead of supporting and benefiting the poorer classes and low income brackets. This is particularly true of Egypt's gas exports. Egypt's gas sales to Israel have been at an internationally unprecedented low price, which is inexplicable in any way other than the ruling elite's desires to secure Gamal Mubarak's succession.
Similarly, the People's Assembly in Syria never objected to or questioned former Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam for improper disposal of toxic wastes until he defected from the regime and betrayed the Syrian people. This had a very negative impact on Syrian citizens, leaving them deeply suspicious of their representatives in parliament and their carelessness and disregard to public health and national security. Likewise, reducing government subsidies on fuel did not stir much opposition in the Syrian Parliament despite its negative impact on agriculture and the lower and working classes. This disregard and negligence takes place despite the fact that half of the parliament is, constitutionally, reserved for workers and farmers.
In light of this, it becomes clear that achieving meaningful reforms, and rebuilding the Arab state in the post-revolutionary era, requires a new approach that would bring an end to the monopolization of power and wealth by a few economic, business elite in control of the state's economic life. The state's developmentalist role must be revitalized, especially in the more industrious and labor-intensive sectors that the private sector traditionally abstains from investing in. All of this will result in genuine economic development with an impact on all members and segments of society and contribute towards a socially just distribution of national income, rather than discriminately favoring one segment over all others. Furthermore, this would renew the state's commitments in the social, economic, and cultural domains, especially in the more strategic aspects that represent the backbone of the national economy. Only then can we speak of a process of development capable of living up to the economic expectations and aspirations of the people. As for political development, this cannot be achieved unless a meaningful transition to democracy takes place, allowing for broad political participation represented by unrestricted freedom to establish political parties, a revival of civil society, and a genuine commitment to the peaceful transition of power according to effective and constitutional mechanisms.
Political and economic development must go hand in hand. In fact, political development must remain a step ahead in order to guarantee government policies are transparent and hold the executive accountable to a freely elected Parliament. Nonetheless, although Arab states share similar political regime structures; they are considerably diverse in terms of social structures. As a result, not everything that applies to Egypt or the Arab Maghreb applies to the Arab Middle East.
A political and social heritage rooted in the repressive techniques of colonialism and dictatorship in the post-colonial era has produced sub-national loyalties and collective identities in many Arab societies, especially in the Arab Middle East. These loyalties and collective identities are more acute in times of political crisis, internal turmoil, and perceived lack of security. In the complete absence of democracy, societies with an identity crisis are, obviously, less capable of achieving national unity between their various components due to mutually-reinforced mistrust and conflict between its sub-national groups. This allows uncivil leaderships to emerge and influence people in a negative way, reflecting sectarian, patronymic, or clan solidarities and fears. Ambiguity only exacerbates the pervasiveness of sub-national loyalties to the detriment of national unity, especially in the absence of civil associations and a civil society capable of producing a national framework that attracts citizens away from the political and social polarization of these uncivil leaderships.
It is in this light that we can conceptualize political regimes' strategies of sowing fear and inciting different segments of society against one another. This does not have to be done by the executive authority itself, for the political regime transcends the executive to include the security forces, businessmen, and other beneficiaries of the status quo and the regime as we have already established.
Consequently, political change varies in different societies, depending on the society's social cohesion. For instance, national unity is often reinforced by the revolutionary fervor societies experience. Other forms of political change are divisive and have a negative impact on social cohesion, especially if dissent, opposition, and revolution are not produced by the marginalized but by an integral part of society. This may have a specific historical background.[1] These complexities are exacerbated if foreign intervention manages to infiltrate both actors. In this case, even if both parties wish to coordinate and collaborate, the conflicting interests of foreign powers may prevent that from materializing.
Turkey, for instance, has maintained its relationship with the political regime in Syria although it has taken a few steps back. In the meantime, the secular, as well as the Islamist, opposition in Syria has received support from Ankara that exceeds the support they received from any other regional power with a conflict of interest vis-à-vis the Syrian regime. Similarly, Turkey has tried to build new relations with Tunisia, including the Islamist Nahda Movement. In Libya, Turkey has partaken in NATO's military missions against Gaddafi and his armed forces and headquarters. Even in Yemen, the only country that resisted Ottoman invasion, Turkey has become an important player in the country.
Iran, on the other hand, has considered the Syrian uprising a Western conspiracy and has expressed unconditional support for the Syrian regime. The Iraqi government, represented by Al-Maliki, has taken a similar stance in support of President Assad and reiterated the importance of political reforms. Within Syria, until now at least, demonstrations have been largely confined to one sectarian community. In neighboring Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Progressive Socialist Party all expressed their confidence in the Syrian regime and its ability to bypass the crisis while reiterating the need for political reforms.
All of this demonstrates that the dilemma of identity politics, especially when complicated by foreign interventions, produces reasonable fears of dangerous repercussions and potential divisions and subdivisions in the Arab Middle East on sectarian and ethnic bases. Therefore, finding a political solution to the Syrian crisis, which guarantees a peaceful transition to democracy free from any foreign intervention, is of paramount importance. This amplifies the importance of a successful, democratic transition in other Arab countries, especially Egypt, in order to become a cornerstone in a new Arab regional order capable of addressing questions of a geopolitical, regional scope and dealing with challenges instead of succumbing to them.
This necessitates developing our capacities and possessing the mechanisms for economic, political, military, and technological development in a way that emboldens us to achieve and uphold Arab national interests and regional security. Furthermore, this requires developing strategies that are rooted in our national interests and reaching a reasonable and sustainable balance between our defense strategies and our economic and political choices.
In this respect, Arabism emerges as an ideology with the potential to bring together sub-national collective loyalties in a coherent manner. Moreover, Arabism promises to reassure smaller Arab countries and alleviate their fears while providing the bigger Arab countries with the required support and cooperation to achieve development in the different domains. This, however, can only be achieved in an environment of freedom, liberty, and democracy so as to assure the sustainability, continuity, and effectiveness through mechanisms of accountability that eliminate incompetent individuals unable to serve the public good and achieve national interests from positions of power and authority.
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[1] Ahmad Youssef Ahmad. (2011). "Al tahawulat al arabiya wal wihda al wataniya (Arab transformations and national unity)." Al Itihad. 31 May 2011, http://www.almogaz.com/news/128206.
