The attempt to assassinate Adel al-Jubeir (the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States) and the associated plans to bomb the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. represent a black swan[1] for those interested in Iranian foreign policy. A number of experts on Iran have cast doubt on the country's involvement in the plot, suggesting the possibility of the United States having fabricated the whole operation. Another proposed explanation is the involvement of a fourth party seeking to harm the relationship between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.
The majority of these doubts have arisen due to factors relating to the intended location of the attempted assassination, as well as to the nature of the parties recruited to perform the operation. It turns out that the assumption of the assassination's location as proof of the attack actually discredits rather than reinforces it, for it was not the first operation of its kind to be planned in Washington. In 1980, Iran successfully recruited an American citizen, Daoud Salah ad-Dine, to assassinate one of the Shah's constituents who had been residing there at the time.
Furthermore, Iran has vehemently denied the charges, pointing out the fact that it would have had no need to recruit the Mexican Los Zetas cartel to carry out such an operation, having always relied on its traditional network of affiliates - most notably Hizbollah. This statement raises some important implications if the charges should prove to be true: the level of skill demonstrated in the operation was markedly in contrast with that normally associated with the al-Quds Force (i.e., the Jerusalem Force), the group charged with organizing the plot. As the al-Quds Force is considered one of the most capable security forces in Iran, both in training and ability to carry out operations, proof of a decline in its effectiveness would be a significant indicator of changes taking place in Iran.
A Shift in Tehran's Policies?
This operation reveals a change in the Iranian way of thinking of how to manage their relationships with their Arab neighbors. To a large degree, this change is linked to the strategic shift that has occurred in the region subsequent to the Arab Spring, fostering an environment hostile to Iranian expansionism. This has been most noticeable following the failure of the Tehran-endorsed protests in Bahrain that attempted to oust the al-Khalifa regime, and in Iran's conspicuous failure to achieve any significant political gains to date in relation to the Arab Spring, particularly in light of the increasing international pressure on the Assad regime (its strategic ally). This raises the question of why Adel al-Jubeir was selected as a target of the Operation Red Coalition (as it is referred to by Washington). He is known to be one of King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz's closest associates and is considered the King's advisor on foreign affairs as well as being privy to many royal meetings with US officials, a fact exposed in WikiLeaks documents revealing him to be the King's official translator.
The choice of al-Jubeir as a target points to a desire on the part of Tehran to prevent something from happening, perhaps something that al-Jubeir was planning with the Americans. Some reports have shown that he had been lobbying to increase American pressure on the Assad regime. However, the Red Alliance's planning for the operation had begun the previous May - i.e., two months prior to the protests in Damascus - before the official Saudi position on Syria's uprising had been made clear. Another factor of note, in relation to Bahrain, is that Saudi Arabia (along with many other Gulf states) had provided political, financial and military support to the al-Khalifa family to aid them in dispersing the protests. Similarly, the marriage that took place between the al-Saud and al-Khalifa families during the crisis was a clear bid to strengthen familial ties between the two dynasties.
Iran's behaviour has revealed its readiness to respond to any move by the Saudis that it considers threatening to its influence in the region, even if this requires targeting individuals of al-Jubeir's prominence. This position is in marked contrast to that of Saudi Arabia, which tends conspicuously away from direct confrontation with Iran.
On the other hand, since the rise of the Islamic Republic, Iran has been sending messages to Saudi Arabia through its agents in the region - e.g., Hizbollah in Lebanon or the Shi'ite forces loyal to it in Iraq and Bahrain. When Hizbollah assumed control of Beirut in May of 2008, it attacked the Saudi Arabian embassy and threatened its ambassador, who was then transported out of Lebanon (first to east Beirut and subsequently to Cyprus). Saudi security sources have revealed that, during the recent protests in Bahrain, Iran sought - through Ghulam Shakouri, leader of the al-Quds Force and one of those accused in the al-Jubeir assassination attempt - to incite demonstrators to attack the Saudi embassy in Manama. Iran has also deliberately fought to maintain the struggle of influence with Saudi Arabia through a loyal third party belonging to its traditional network of agents, which are chosen on primarily doctrinal grounds) in a neighboring country that falls under the Iranian sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Tehran chose to employ temporary agents outside its traditional network to complete the al-Jubeir mission.
The choice of Washington as the location for this operation indicates Iran's desire to direct a double message to Saudi Arabia and the United States; or perhaps more accurately, a message to the United States through Saudi Arabia. For if the only intended recipient of the message were in fact Saudi Arabia, then the attempt would have no doubt occurred on Saudi territory (as has been the case in previous attempts). The history of Iranian-Saudi relations presents many examples in this regard, among them the 1987 incident of the Iranian pilgrims to Mecca. This began as a political demonstration organized by the pilgrims inside the pilgrimage site, and ended with the death of almost three hundred Iranian citizens. Another example would be that of the al-Quds Force's involvement in the al-Khabar bombings of 1996 in Saudi Arabia's largely Shi'ite eastern region.
With Iran's targetting of Saudi Arabia on US ground in the case of the Red Alliance, tension has continued to mount between the two countries, producing several possible scenarios. The first scenario points to a certain confusion in Tehran in predicting the consequences of the assassination attempt, were it to succeed, and the implications of its resulting backlash. It is important to remember that, according to the indictment issued by the US Department of Justice, the assassination of al-Jubeir was to be effected through the bombing of a favorite restaurant of his in Washington, which was frequented by a number of other diplomats and foreign ambassadors. Thus, the damage would not have been to Saudi Arabia alone. Was Iran ready to assume such a responsibility? It would have come at a time when Iran was already the subject of an international campaign of isolation, due to its support of the oppressive policies of the Assad regime, funding of terrorist groups and lack of cooperation in relation to nuclear advancement.
The second scenario sees Iran as using this operation, even if it were to fail, to maintain the coherence of its internal system; especially since it has, historically, depended on the presence of an external enemy for this purpose, lurking in wait to attack the Islamic Republic. This explanation is particularly compelling in light of the possible existence of divisions in the ruling elite in Iran, specifically that between the Supreme Leader and the forces loyal to him on the one hand and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on the other. These are the two main powers at play in Iranian foreign policy, with the possibility of the existence of some current trying to make use of this operation. Since Khomeini's successor rose to power in 1989, his goal has been to maintain the stability of the system of clerical rule in Iran. However, from another angle, the goal may be to put pressure through public embarrassment on those members of the ruling elite in Tehran that refuse to renew relations with Washington. In this case, it may be that the operation had been intended to fail from the beginning. This would have resulted in pressure on Iran, forcing that nation to accept a more open stance toward Washington (assuming, or course, that such openness would be beneficial to the orchestrators of the plot).
This scenario is supported by Iran's reaction to the American accusations. Initially, Tehran categorically denied the charges, calling the whole affair an "evil plot" in its letter to the United Nations. According to the US State Department, the Iranian delegation had met with its US counterpart at the UN to converse but then withdrew, citing the possibility of a later discussion regarding the accusations, only to subsequently accuse the MKO (The People's Mujahedin of Iran) for the attacks. The Mehr news agency reported that Gholam Shakouri, accused by Washington of being responsible for the attack, was part of this planning. Tehran then accepted the initiative proposed by Iraq to hold meetings between Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, for the sake of resolving contentious issues among these various nations on the one hand, and between Iran and Iraq on the other. Iran is expected to raise the issue of the attempted assassination of al-Jubeir during these meetings, in the event that Saudi Arabia agrees to participate in them. This is especially likely in light of the fact that Turkey requested detailed information about the assassination attempt from the United States after accepting to be part of the initiative.
All this indicates that the Iranian leaders may have been aware of the mission, without necessarily having issued a direct order for its execution. If follows, then, that the responsible parties were likely to have had close ties to important leaders within the ruling establishment in Iran. This would explain the regime's attempt - after realizing the seriousness of the United States' investigation, as well as Riyadh and Washington's escalation of the matter to the UN Security Council - to move in order to provide protection to the accused parties, even contacting Mansour Arbab Sayyar subsequent to his arrest (despite his status of dual citizenship).
The Next Step?
Saudi Arabia has continued doing business with Iran as if the latter were a neighbor it wanted to avoid. King Abdullah deems Iran's policies to be"satanic" according to WikiLeaks documents, and has wanted to spare his country contact with the evil he perceives in Tehran. The question that is raised, then, is: does this operation represent a significant incentive for Saudi Arabia to change its strategy vis-à-vis its conflict with Iran?
What generally distinguishes Saudi Arabia's conduct in its dealings with Iran is caution, a policy that can be expected to continue as it is consistent with Riyadh's official position of seeking the farthest possible distance from direct confrontation with Tehran. Perhaps this explains Saudi Arabia's continuing refusal to participate in the abovementioned initiative proposed by Iraq; all the more because the meetings would give Iran a regional political advantage, an eventuality that Saudi Arabia fervently wishes to avoid at this stage.
In this context, it is expected that the Saudi response will be issued via Bahrain, perhaps through the increase of military and financial support to the al-Khalifa family, which will allow the regime to put pressure on forces loyal to Iran. Saudi Arabia may reveal more details about Gholam Shakouri's relationship with the Bahraini opposition, including specific information about the nature of their organizational and financial links. It may also exert stronger pressure on the regime of Bashar al-Assad, perhaps by obstructing the Arab League delegation's visit to Damascus University (scheduled for November 2011), thus seeking to escalate matters in light of the Arab league's deadline for the Assad regime.
Some indicators support the possibility that Saudi Arabia may use oil as a method of retaliation against Iran, by increasing its oil production to force a price reduction. This would ultimately represent a new source of pressure on Iran, especially with the continuation of economic sanctions against it. Such a possibility is likely in the context of the historical competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the area of oil production, especially after Rostam Ghasemi stated that "Saudi Arabia [does not represent] all of OPEC" upon his appointment as president of that organization. The fact that Washington allows Saudi Arabia considerable freedom in increasing the limits of oil production to serve Saudi interests is not unrelated, nor is the fact that, following Gaddafi's death, Libya is also in a position to step up its own oil output. If Saudi Arabia decides to sway the National Transitional Council of Libya in this direction for an overall increase in regional production, this would indeed put further economic pressure on Iran.
The occasion of Hajj will be the most telling test of how Saudi Arabia and Iran will manage their relations in the wake of the plot's discovery. It is uncertain how Saudi Arabia will deal with Iranian pilgrims this year, assuming that it even allows them entry into the country. Also uncertain is whether Iran will seek to incite its pilgrims to chaos in a repetition of the events of 1987. When, inspired by the Arab Spring, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke of the "echo of the Iranian revolution" and the beginning of the "New Islamic Middle East," he in fact enabled Saudi Arabia to move to limit Iran's influence within the Gulf. It is expected that now, after the attempted assassination of al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia's revised management of its relations with Iran will set new boundaries on Iranian policies throughout the region.
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- [1] The term "black swan" refers to an unexpected occurrence of low probability; in the case that it actually occurs, its impact is great and immediately palpable.
