The Aim of the “Framework Agreement” is to Extend Negotiations

US Secretary of State John Kerry’s tenth trip to the region since taking office in February 2013 marks an effort to mobilize support for pressuring the Palestinian Authority to sign the “framework agreement” with the Israeli government.^[1] Following meetings with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Kerry headed to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Paris, to meet Arab foreign ministers and ensure the right atmosphere for his endeavor. This paper sheds light on Kerry’s recent efforts to gather support for this agreement, and considers the consequences of such an agreement on the parties involved.

The US Vision of the Framework Agreement

The notion of a “framework agreement” first appeared in a speech by US President Barack Obama at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute in Washington in December 2013, where he expressed “I think it is possible over the next several months to arrive at a framework that does not address every single detail but gets us to a point where everybody recognizes better to move forward than to move backwards [...] And I think that we’re now at a place where we can achieve a two state solution in which Israelis and Palestinians are living side by side in peace and security. But it’s going to require some very tough decisions.”^[2] From this, it was understood that the broad framework of the agreement would comprise the call for the creation of a Palestinian state along with agreement on land swaps and Palestinian recognition of Israel as a “Jewish state.”

The US believes that the time is right for the signing of a peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This view was expressed by Chairman  of the joint chiefs of staff General Martin Dempsey when he indicated that the current “turmoil” throughout the Arab world had created what he termed a “strategic opportunity for Israel”. Unlike previous years, no Arab country is currently able to threaten Israel. This weakness among Arab states would also allow Israel to sign a peace treaty that reinforces its gains in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and increases its regional strength.^[3] The current US-Iran rapprochement is also pushing in this direction, as Secretary Kerry signaled by stating, “Israel becomes safer the moment this first step agreement [on the Iranian nuclear program] is implemented.”^[4] It is clear then that the US’s desire to reach a peace agreement rests on its ironclad commitment to Israel’s security, though one should take into account the regional arrangements sought by the US as it turns away from the region to focus its attention on the Far East.

Kerry commenced his effort to restart negotiations on two fronts: economic and security. In May 2013, at the World Economic Forum at the Jordanian Dead Sea resort of al-Shawna, Kerry spoke of attracting investments totaling 4 billion dollars in an attempt to expand the Palestinian economy by 50 percent within three years. He then linked the economic element with a draft political agreement that would gradually end Israeli control. On the security front, the plan, developed by US General John Allen, includes an Israeli presence along the length of the Jordan River for a period ranging from four to ten years, with jointly administered border crossings, alongside an American presence. The plan also includes the Israeli Army’s withdrawal from the West Bank with the exception of the Jordan Valley.^[5] This US security plan is a duplicate of the Gaza model applied in the West Bank. Control of borders, border crossings, and air space would remain in Israeli hands, while the Palestinian Authority would have to be content with a demilitarized state. The US would provide the PA security assistance solely by supplying light weapons to build Palestinian capacities to maintain domestic security.

While the Palestinian Authority has not objected to the economic part of the Kerry plan, it has rejected the security part, especially the idea of an Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley.^[6] Likewise, the Arab League has rejected these proposals, which it considers a US retreat from support of the peace process. Netanyahu has expressed reservations over the plan, saying that “Israel will make the decisions regarding security issues and will not accept being dictated to.” In this context, Kerry’s return to the region brought the “framework agreement,” a political initiative that sets out broad guidelines for negotiations: the borders of the Palestinian state, the fate of Jerusalem and the refugees, security issues, and mutual recognition.

However, in this context, one must note that the framework agreement is not a plan to be implemented, per se, but one that must be followed by negotiations. If the negotiations fail to implement these principles, as happened with Oslo because Israel controlled the interpretation of the principles and the implementation of the articles, then the PA, by its acceptance of the framework agreement, will have plunged into a new round of concessions without achieving any of the things it hopes to achieve.

Chances of the Framework Agreement Being Signed

In response to media reports on the framework’s contents, the PA has declared that the agreement presents little more than preliminary proposals. However, leaks of the document presented to the PA and the Jordanians stipulate that Israel will annex 6.8 percent of the West Bank in return for the PA receiving 5.5 percent of Israeli controlled territory.^[7] All settlements in the Jordan Valley would be evacuated, and US forces would be deployed along the border with Jordan, supervising the crossings between Jordan and Palestine. Eighty percent of settlers are to be brought together in Israeli settlement blocs, following the evacuation of 20 percent of settlements in the West Bank.

The plan is also supposed to stipulate a safe and fast passage between the West Bank and Gaza,^[8] and guarantee the placement of what is termed the Jerusalem Basin (Jerusalem’s holy places) under the supervision of an international committee made up of Israel, Palestine, Jordan, the US, and Saudi Arabia. Regarding Palestinian refugees, the proposal speaks of “family reunification” for some refugees inside Israel, the creation of an international fund for resettlement, and the opening of the doors for emigration to Australia and Canada.^[9] The current customs regime of the Paris agreement is to remain in force.

Until now, Netanyahu’s insistence that the PA recognize the Jewish nature of the state, which he describes as a fundamental condition for reaching a framework agreement, and his outright rejection of the return of any Palestinian refugees and any suggestions for resolving the question of Jerusalem, are the main causes for debate and controversy. This last stipulation, in particular, threatens to make the time period for reaching an agreement run out before any progress is made. To forestall any proposal with regard to Jerusalem, the Knesset’s legislative committee has ratified a draft law that bans negotiations on the status of Jerusalem without the agreement of two-thirds of Knesset members. Correspondingly, the PA refuses to recognize the Jewish nature of the state, and states that the subject of Jerusalem remains off-limits. Peace cannot be achieved without the declaration of East Jerusalem as capital of the Palestinian state for all the territories occupied in 1967 when Jerusalem was divided into East and West. In anticipation of any US pressure to recognize the Jewish nature of Israel, Arab foreign ministers, before meeting with Kerry in Paris on January 12, 2014, reaffirmed that the Arab peace initiative represents the sole defined framework for any agreement to come.^[10]

The Dilemma of Negotiation Deadlines 

In light of the difficulties faced in selling his proposals, Kerry, who is also chasing personal prestige and glory via successful negotiations, has signaled that his country will reduce efforts to reach a peace agreement if a framework agreement is not signed before the end of March. The current flurry of meetings and leaks suggests that despite Kerry’s insistence on the signing of a framework agreement, the formulation of this framework remains under threat as long as US diplomatic efforts are not coupled with real pressure on Israel to halt settlement projects and all steps aiming to change facts on the ground, such as annexing the Jordan Valley.^[11]

Similarly, the PA is trapped in a dilemma. It finds itself awaiting the fourth stage of the prisoner release during negotiations, while maintaining that any extension for the current talks (nine months) is unacceptable and that it will find itself free to act once that time period ends. The PA is thus unable to either accept or reject the Kerry plan since there are foreign and domestic risks associated with any decision in this regard. Should the PA agree to the framework, it will set itself in opposition to most of the political parties, forces, and civil society bodies that make up Palestinian society in that the agreement represents the giving up of national rights and principles. Should the PA reject the framework, it will face intense pressure as a result of the European Union’s (the PA’s main funder) and the US’s threats to stop the flow of aid.^[12]

On the other side, Netanyahu’s government is also witnessing internal pressure. Both Tzipi Livni and Yair Lapid have signaled that they will withdraw from the coalition if an agreement is not reached. Livni has pointed to what she called the “bubble” that will burst, exposing Israel to the risk of international isolation and sanctions if the PA resorts to the UN and if settlement and land grab continue. Israel is also at risk of economic sanctions from the EU should no agreement be reached. One US official put the dilemma like this: “A rejection by Abbas of the Kerry initiative could cause irreparable damage to the entire Palestinian national enterprise, while rejection of it by Netanyahu would cause tremendous damage to Israel’s international standing and economy.”^[13] These statements reveal the apprehension that, without negotiations, Israel could find itself in a new situation where the international calls for a boycott grow louder.

In the midst of this, and in light of the Palestinian and Israeli positions, echoing the same unresolved difficulties that caused talks to stall in the past, Kerry’s zeal to reach an agreement, rectify the decline in the US role in the region during the Arab revolutions, and achieve personal glory, even if at the expense of the Palestinians and their future, is fading. For this reason, he will rely on a return to the traditional US approach of continuing the peace process without ever achieving peace, and continuing negotiations with ever reaching an agreement.^[14] The region has witnessed this approach since the Oslo agreements, whereby negotiations exist simply for the sake of negotiating, paving the way for a “peace process” that justifies itself with itself without leading to a clear goal. This manner of thinking ignores the reality on the ground and the changing regional factors.

*This Assessment was translated by the ACRPS Translation and English Editing Department. The original Arabic version published on January 14th, 2014 can be found here.

[1] In August 2013, under US pressure, the Palestinian leadership agreed to resume direct bilateral negotiations with Israel. These negotiations, with a maximum time frame of nine months, were accepted even though they failed to meet two of the three main conditions set down by the Palestinian leadership, namely the end to settlement in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 and the acceptance of the June 4, 1967 borders as the basis for talks. Israel refused to accept these two demands, but did accede to a third, the release of Palestinian prisoners incarcerated before the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, and who number some 104 prisoners. In return, the Palestinian leadership committed itself not to resort to UN bodies throughout the period of negotiations. Policy Analysis Unit, “Negotiations that Serve Israeli Settlement and Expansion,” Arab Center for Reseach and Policy Studies, August 23, 2013, http://172.17.30.6:3030/sites/doiportal/en/politicalstudies/pages/negotiations_that_serve_israeli_settlement_and_expansion.aspx .