The Army and Politics
During the Democratic Transition in the Arab World
1 - 3 October, 2016

Summaries
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Between the Militarization of Politics and the Civilianization of the Military: Towards a Theoretical Framework

Abdulwahab El-Affendi

This paper addresses the factors behind the current paucity of theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between the civilian and military domains. It explores the current scholarship, which has generally been found lacking. It identifies the unwillingness of many relevant institutions to share what information exists with scholars as contributing to the first difficulty here, being the lack of relevant information, whether qualitative or quantitative. The long shadow cast by early writings is identified as a second factor, in particular works such as Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957), which has been criticized for misleading scholars. What literature does exist, moreover, tends to be rooted in the experiences of stable democracies in the West, which means that the generalization of these experiences is problematic. This paper presents key debates within the field of military-civilian relations and examines the political, social and economic factors that resulted in the militarization of politics, as well as the conditions necessary for the military to be “civilianized,” bringing it within the realm of legitimate civilian governments, as well as how this might influence the structures of military and security bodies. Finally, it examines the effect of democratic transitions on the relationship between civilian and military domains.

The Transformations of the Arab Armies’ Political Doctrines: A Review of the Arabic Literature with an Emphasis on Egypt

Khalil Anani

Since the latter half of the Twentieth century, comparative politics has taken particular interest in the interaction between the military and politics. A number of theoretical approaches have been used to try and understand these relations, most of which have concentrated on the nature of civilian-military relations; the role of the military in societal development and modernization efforts; and the safeguarding of national security. While these theoretical approaches have shaped Arab scholarship on the issue, Arab academics have been able to move beyond these constraints through their own theorization, or through justifying
military interventions in civilian political life. Despite clear advances, the author argues that the body of knowledge examining Arab military interventions in civilian political affairs continues to lack any analytical and interpretative works that examine the changes to the political doctrines—not merely the military doctrines—of the Arab armies in question. Instead, theoretical treatments of this issue have tended to either be descriptive or prescriptive, a trend made clear with the unexpected outbreak of the Arab popular revolutions in 2011, where scholars neglected the changes to the political doctrines of Arab armies. Focusing on Egypt, this paper attempts to redress this balance by examining some of the Arab theoretical frameworks and interpretative approaches to understanding the nature of the military’s relationship to politics over the previous five decades, and especially since the Arab Spring.

Moving Beyond Categorization Theories of Civil-Military Relations: Interpreting the Relationship between the Military and the Arab Spring

Taibi Ghomari

Arab militaries are intimately linked to the political orders of the countries from which they emerged. They also carry the hallmarks of the societies out of which they grow. Each Arab army, then, represents an individual set of specificities and was therefore prepared to respond in its own way to the events of the Arab Spring. Through a historical reading of the circumstances giving rise to Arab armies, this study reveals that the structures of these militaries is a result of four factors, all of which are linked to the need to prevent military takeovers of power. The first is the relationship between the ruler and the military—something determined by the manner in which the ruler ascended to power. The second is the relationship of the military to the trajectory of state building in the country in question, and the wider role which the military plays in that state. A third factor is the social, ethnic and sectarian composition of the society out of which the army is drawn. Finally, the set of international circumstances across the Middle East and North Africa are also important in the shaping of Arab militaries.

Opposition Strategies in the Face of Military Rule: A Comparative Study

Ahmed Hajaji

This paper addresses the various strategies deployed by the democratic opposition in the Arab world in the face of ruling military regimes. It divides strategies into six categories – armed force, nonviolent resistance, selective violence, factional alliance, assistance from foreign powers, and working for change from within the
régime — and compares them through a cost-benefit rubric. Given these diverse strategies, the paper asks: does the nature of the opposition to the military regime affect the longevity and stability of the ruling junta? Which strategies are the most feasible and what would be their consequences? How significant is democratic opposition as a factor in changing a military junta when compared to other factors such as the international climate (and its receptiveness to military rule), the economy and the internal coherence of the ruling establishment? In evaluating these matters, the paper examines the evidence from four different cases of military governments: Brazil (1964-1985), Turkey (1960-2002), Sudan (since 1957), and Mauritania (since 1984).

**Armies and Democratic Transition: What Leads Militaries to Give Up Politics and Power? A Comparative Study**

*Abdelfattah Mady*

When are military officers forced to abandon political power? How does the military come to accept civilian control? Despite the fact that no single framework can explain all situations in which the military abandons power, the author offers some broad generalizations drawn from a variety of experiences and which have some relevance to the Arab case. Generally, the military never abandons power of its own volition, argues the author, but rather is coerced to do so. Military officers are incentivized to leave power either when they believe that civilian rule will continue to protect their interests, or that they will otherwise be held accountable for human rights abuses. In these situations, the existence of a unified democratic opposition which can agree on a joint strategic objective is vital, as it contributes to the success of three important goals: the emergence of pro-democratic military officers; the ousting of the military from power regardless of their success or otherwise in economic management of the country; and confronting foreign support for the military rulers by demonstrating that alternative, civilian powers exist and are capable of governing. The author here highlights a number of key prerequisites needed to achieve a successful transfer of power from military to civilian rulers.

**The Army and its Role in Democratic Transition: Three Case Studies**

*Mohanad Mustafa*

Using case studies from Turkey, Thailand and Argentina, this study examines the relationship between the military and democratic transition. Specifically, it looks at the difficulties faced by authoritarian (or formerly authoritarian) regimes when
faced with waves of democratization. Chosen for their wide geographic breadth and their different trajectories, all three countries witnessed intermittent waves of democratization and counter democratization, in which the militaries played crucial roles. While democracy triumphed in two of these cases (Argentina and Turkey), the military continues to rule over a non-democratic regime in Thailand. In attempting to understand the similarities and differences across these three cases, this paper hopes to shed light on their relevance to the Arab world. A number of themes are addressed here, including: the political legitimacy (acceptability) of military interventions; economic crises and the effectiveness of the prevailing regime; the impact of foreign intervention; the extent of political polarization within the prevailing political order; and the ideological orientation of the militaries in question as well as their social composition. The study is not an attempt to find a theoretical model which can be projected onto the Arab region, but aims instead to contribute to a deeper understanding of the relationship between the military and democratic transition.

The Arab Ottoman Military Elite and the Formation of Modern States: Iraq

Abdulwahab al–Qassab

The Ottoman Empire ruled over the Arab East for close to five centuries, beginning with Sultan Selim I (who ruled from 1513-1520). By 1839, a Sultanic Reform order had made space for the subjects of Arab territories within the Ottoman realm to join the administrative and military apparatus of the state. This paved the way for many of the young men of Iraq and Syria to enroll in academic institutions in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. Most Iraqis—defined as those who had come from the Vilayat (“governorates”) of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra—who left to study in Istanbul enrolled in the War College, following the end of military education in their own country. This contrasts with the students arriving from the Syrian governorates, who were more likely to enroll in medical, legal, and engineering studies at academies designed along the French secular model. One factor behind this was that the War College was free of charge and even provided students with room and board, allowing the cadets’ families to avoid the otherwise high cost of education. One of the most notable Iraqi officers of the Ottoman military to climb the ranks by virtue of this system was the Baghdadi General Mahmud Shevket Pasha, who was in charge of the Ottoman Fleet in Thessaloniki, and who helped lead the Ottoman coup against Sultan Abdulhamid, preventing the resurgence of absolutist monarchy in the Ottoman state. Shevket would later become the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Empire before his assassination which occurred
only a short while before the convention of the Arab National Congress. When that Congress was held, Iraq was represented by Abdulhamid Zahrawy, who had studied law in both Istanbul and Paris and would eventually become the Prime Minister of Iraq during the monarchy.

The Early Roles of the Military in Politics and Military Leadership

Khaled Ziadeh

Modernized professional armies, formed along rational lines and based on education, training and hierarchy, were found in both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, where the military was the state institution most in touch with the technological and scientific developments of the 19th century. For the Ottomans, the creation of a professional army was intended to help stymie the massive losses which the state had otherwise sustained, while Egypt’s first professional army was built to fulfill Mohammed Ali Pasha’s self-aggrandizement and expansionist wars. In both cases, the professional armies effected social change, in particular with regards to the central government’s relationship with their own populations. Not only were the Ottoman and early Egyptian armies the engines behind the modernization of the wider state, but the officers within them often saw their role as transcending mere military professionalism. Instead, they were early proponents of ideas of patriotism, freedom and equality as well as constitutionalism. The author highlights how, in the Ottoman Empire, it was officers in the professional army who first led a constitutionalist revolution, presaging an expanded political role for the army during the twilight of the Ottoman state. Similarly, Arab officers in the former Ottoman military played their role in the Great Arab Revolt of 1916, contributing later on to the creation of the modern Iraqi state. As the Arab Levant came under British and French colonial control, the Arab peoples began to look to Arab military officers as the means to national liberation, giving rise to the wide perception of the military officer as national savior.

The Free Officers in Jordan: The Experience of Politicizing the Army

Mohammad Almasri

Jordan is rarely cited as an example of a country where the military intervenes in political affairs. If anything, Jordan is cited as an exceptional case in the Arab Levant, where the army is regarded as a professional institution isolated from politics and controlled by civilian power. This paper addresses what it considers a misconception in the understanding of the relationship between the army and the state in Jordan. It does this by re-examining and analysing a key historical
experience – that of the Free Officers, a group formed in reaction to the 1948 war – that affected the army’s relationship with political power, and that led to the involvement of officers in political affairs. Formally known as the Secret Organization of Nationalist Officers in the Jordanian Army, the movement of the Free Officers in Jordan embodied the prevailing model for the intervention of army officers in politics in the Levant. Moreover, this experience led to crucial changes that affected the structure of the Jordanian political regime, impacted the role of the military establishment as well as its relations with civilian authorities. This paper explores the movement, its origins and its organizational structure, in an attempt to reassemble the historical events that led to this experience. It also addresses the implications of such a movement on reformulating the role of the army within the structure of the Jordanian political regime, as it becomes one of its main pillars and the basis of maintaining its survival when facing internal challenges. Such a situation is not unlike what is taking place in other countries in the region, except that officers did not take direct control in the Jordanian case.

Jamal Barout

Over the period 1949–1970, Syria, which gained full political independence in 1946, witnessed 11 successful military coups, and at least 10 failed coup attempts, an average success rate of one every two years. The successful coups were accompanied by the overhaul of the legal and constitutional model of the state: in the period under consideration there were a total of seven constitutions or constitutional declarations akin to constitutions. This indicates the severity of the socio-political upheavals in Syria following national political independence and the important role of the army as a political player in the process of socio-political transformation within the cycle of conflict between the military and civilian elites. This paper investigates the conflict arising from this military-civilian dichotomy, and the roots behind ideologically constructing authoritarianism as a program of popular socioeconomic transformation, particularly in terms of defining its formative historical roots. The author contends that these roots go back to the third and fourth coups, that is shortly before and after the Free Officers coup in Egypt, and that the Free Officers coup replicated many of the political determinants of the two Syrian coups. In the internal military-civilian development, it also represented a prototype for the subsequent military committee of the Baath. Latent within the experience of these two Syrian coups are the roots of military authoritarianism in terms of the program for comprehensive socioeconomic transformation.
The Army and Irregular Forces in Iraq: The Dialectic between the State and the Ethnocentric Alternative

Ali Al-Mamoouri

Most of the preexisting literature on the question of irregular militias in Iraq has misunderstood the nature of these groups, the existence of which results from the complicated reality of Iraq, in which various ethnic groups compete among each other in the midst of the failure of the state to impose a monopoly of violence. With this imbalance, the structures of sub-national identities—tribal, sectarian and ethnic—have come to play a huge role in the lives of individuals, given the frailty or total absence of the state. The author traces the birth of this situation to the birth of the modern Iraqi state, which in fact began to be rolled before it was fully formed. This has continued to the present day, and served to diminish the prestige of the Iraqi state in the collective consciousness of the various ethnic groups in Iraq. The situation was further exacerbated by the intervention of various regional and global powers, which have contributed to the disintegration of the Iraqi state. The author observes that the frailty of the Iraqi state and its political order, as well as the lack of public confidence in Iraq’s army, have all contributed to collective actions unsupportive of the military and the security services. This is evidenced even in those cases where political leaders outwardly are seen to support the military, such as when Ayatollah Sistani called on Iraqis to volunteer in the military, only for these groups to be integrated, in some form or another, into militias allied with Iran.

The Challenge of Building a Unified Military in a Regionally Divided Society: Somalia

Sumaya Sheikh Mahmoud

The first act of Somalia’s transitional government—which had taken the place of the Mohammed Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu in 1991—was to dissolve the country’s National Army, entrusting its weapons and assets to the militia that had since taken the capital. This catastrophic decision resulted in social and political chaos, precipitating the secession of Somaliland in the north. As repeated national reconciliation attempts stalled, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front declared its own autonomous enclave in Puntland, forming a regional government and military forces, dividing Somalia into three distinct geographic entities. It was not until 2000 that a transitional government (the Transitional Federal Government, installed by a group of world powers including the US) attempted to form a unified national army, but efforts have thus far gone nowhere as successive cabinets have
lacked the political will to attempt such a move over the protests of regional neighbors such as Ethiopia as well as other Western powers. Domestically, the long years of civil war have made Somalis weary of attempts to integrate the regional military units. The various local leaders, protective of their own domains, have also worked to stall the formation of a new Somali national government. While the division of power may be seen as an expedient solution for societies dealing with the aftermath of civil war, the unification of warring military factions might also grant greater legitimacy to future governments: a single army would calm fears, removing the obstacles which have prevented the creation of a popularly sanctioned, legitimate government for 15 years.

National Militaries and Private Military Contractors: A Problematic Relationship

Bader Al-Shafei

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) have taken on a prominent role globally since the end of the Cold War, with major powers increasingly using the services of these companies to forward their own aims. The continued chaos and destruction in Iraq has been only one consequence of this phenomenon, with many nations on the African continent experiencing similar changes. Private military contractors have made themselves indispensable to repressive governments seeking to crush armed opposition, or possibly even insurrections within the military. This paper sets out to investigate the nature of the relationship between PMCs and the national militaries of the countries in which they operate. The author concludes that reliance on such private contractors is the result of the weakness of the national militaries of the countries concerned, and that this reliance expands at times of tension between the political and military leaderships of a country.

The Army, the Political Authorities and the Stalled Democratic Transition in Algeria

Adel Ourbah

The Algerian military, like all other Arab armies, has played a crucial role in political decision making within the country. This is due in part to the fact that its historical formation preceded Algerian independence, as well as the historical legitimacy which the military enjoyed due to its participation in the struggle for national liberation. These early foundations are essential to understanding the development of the Algerian military and its authoritarian approach to the country’s politics. The politicization of the Algerian military is due to its institutional expansion and
its involvement in diverse roles such as state building and social surveillance. This also sharpened the conflict between the military and civilian realms in Algeria, enshrining the primacy of military aims over civilian concerns as a cornerstone of the Algerian government. In effect, the Algerian military controls life in the country, handing over bureaucratic responsibilities to civilians. This was illustrated most clearly by the military’s orchestration of the Algerian transitional period in the 1990s. Although this model has held since the country’s independence, it has been shaken over the previous decade as a result of international factors, including the global war on terror and the promotion of democratic oversight programs for militaries around the world by international agencies. This paper examines the challenge posed by the wide degree of interaction between the military realm and civilian political affairs in Algeria. It does this through a historical approach to the study of the Algerian military, including an appraisal of the Algerian military’s performance during the transitional period.

Army, Authority, and State in Algeria: From Populist Ideology to Neo-Patrimonial State

Nouri Dris

Algeria may arguably be the country with the clearest example of a political authority’s attachment to and reliance on the national military. Although not, apparently, a military dictatorship, the Algerian military enjoys a place at the heart of government and bestows legitimacy on the civilian leaders. Based on structures established at the very creation of the state, the military has been able to monopolize power and dictate the terms of how that power is meted or recreated throughout the period of single party rule until today. This paper analyzes the conditions that gave rise to the military’s dominance and illustrates the ramifications of this on the process on building other legal and political institutions with a view to democratic transition. It shows how Hawari Uday’s notion of a “duality of authority of Algerian authority” applies, and examines in particular the terms “populism,” and neo-patrimonialism,” charting the phenomenon from independence to the present day. It finds that if populism was the means by which single party rule was held in place, and how the end of that rule was the neo-patrimonial model. These concepts illustrate how the military seized power and became identified with the state, and why it has thus far refused to redistribute political power across different social groups even as the February, 1989 constitution allowed for political pluralism. It finds that the military will not produce a state run by the rule of law, but will only transform the state into a tool for the purpose of exercising its own power.
Military Coup as Political Transition: Army and Political Authority in Sudan

Hassan al-Hajj Ali

The 1958 coup that brought General Ibrahim Aboud to power in Sudan set a precedent for post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. It marked a break with a decades-old system put in place by the British that had governed Sudan’s military-civilian relations. The rule of Sudan’s first junta lasted six years, while a second military takeover put in place a government that would last a full sixteen years. This was followed by a successful coup in May, 1969 and again in June, 1989, two overturnings of power that were punctuated with a number of less well-known and failed efforts. The latest coup put in place a regime that has been in charge for some 25 years. Part of the success of this long period of rule has been the policy of a “revolving door” allowing the free flow of leaders to move between the country’s military and civilian leadership. Given this, analysis of the nation’s past – examined here through each successive period—cannot divide the civil from the military, and the success of the military cannot be understood without examining its civilian accomplices.

The Military within the Nexus of Power in Syria (2000-2011)

Nerouz Satik

This study examines the relationship between power and the army in Syria. It investigates the colonialist intentions behind the formation of the Syrian army and observes the new variables that came into play with the creation of the nation-state. Using the ideas of Michel Foucault on power as a theoretical framework for analysis and discussion, the study presents data on the economics of the military and the mechanisms of control and domination within the Syrian army in the era of Bashar Al-Assad. Created during the colonial period in the Arab world, and later serving a nation-state that was unable to free itself of colonialist thinking, the military held on to power in Syria and entrenched colonialist perspectives on Syrian society. With time, the military was gradually absorbed into neo-liberal policies, and power in Syria became more diffuse and difficult to pin down, an effect that went as far as the army itself. The officer class became split into authoritarian officers who observed a military constrained by colonial legacy. Forms of surveillance, punishment, and domination preponderate in the Syrian army. This makes the military an institution dominated by an alliance of security, military, and economic interests, just like other institutions of the Syrian state. The military discipline shown by soldiers in the official institutions is not
the result of laws being in force or commitment to the institution, but is the result of the bewitchment and seduction of absolute power enforced by means of the reach of the regime and discipline within each and every level of the Syrian army.

The Army and Armed Militias in Sudan: Complementarity or Competition?
Hassan Gasim

The question of the Sudanese military’s relationship with the armed militia has long been a matter of contention between scholars interested in civilian-military relations in Sudan. This has gained importance with renewed and repeated civil strife and ethnic and sectarian conflicts across the country in the wake of the Cold War. The spread of these conflicts and of armed groups across the periphery of Sudan—especially in Darfur—have threatened the very existence of the Sudanese state. The prolonging of the conflict in the south of the country eventually led to a peace agreement in 2005, which provided for the disbanding of irregular armed forces fighting in the now-independent region. While this peace agreement ended the long-running civil conflict in the south and east of Sudan, it did not prevent the rise of another, more bloody and violent conflict in Darfur, one which has its own tribal and ethnic dimensions. This new conflict also saw the emergence of armed irregular militia which engaged in unconventional warfare tactics. This paper will focus on the nature of the relationship between the Sudanese military and the paramilitary militia active in conflict zones in Sudan. It does this by examining the factors which contributed to the rise of such irregular forces. The author argues that the unconventional tactics employed by Darfur-based factions opposed to the central government were the main reason behind the emergence of irregular forces loyal to Khartoum and operating in regions where the national army could no longer operate.

The Interplay of Domestic and Foreign Factors in Sudan: The Military and the Heart of Power
Sahar Al-Faki

The political landscape in post-colonial Sudan has been defined by cycles of military takeovers followed by periods of civilian rule. Beyond the takeovers, the military plays a key role in Sudanese politics. In addition to the regular coups, and the direct involvement of the military establishment in political affairs, the mere presence of the military as an external power that could aid officers vying for power led directly
to the transfer of power in Sudan over to the military. These takeovers were often justified on the grounds of protecting domestic security, stability, or military interests. The military, however, has been motivated by both domestic and external factors—on both the regional and global levels. This paper examines these factors, and reads the history of the military against its domestic, local, and global backdrop. Without understanding the complex terrain within which the military operates, the structural crisis faced by the country will only be prolonged, and no solution found.

The Sudanese Army, the Janjaweed and Democratic Transition

Tarig Haroun

The term Janjaweed entered common parlance in Sudan following the Cold War, and gained increased currency when the governments in Khartoum sought novel methods to protect the regime from military and paramilitary organizations. This study focuses first on the Janjaweed, the rapid support forces that worked alongside government forces in Darfur before being deployed across the entire country. It examines how the Janjaweed, as a militia, has been ferociously opposed to democratization, and how this impacted the growth of democracy in the country. An analysis of the major issues surrounding the Janjaweed phenomena—such as massive government expenditure needed to sustain them and now, to contain and disband these groups—is key to understanding the present situation. The Janjaweed fighting units are not only responsible for protecting the state, they are often formed from narrowly defined regional or ethnic/tribal factions, lending a communitarian air to a civil war-type conflict. The lack of awareness and training on the part of the members, their inadequate training in the use of weapons, and the lack of clear rules of engagement all further contribute to the overall state of disarray internally, as well as to human rights violations. The paper cautions against the use of Janjaweed units to disperse peaceful protestors in cities, and examines methods of reform.

On the Dynamics of Civilian-Military Relations in Tunisia: From Independence to Revolution

Eya Jarrad

Civilian-military relations in Tunisia have long been characterized by a state of flux, with the military vacillating between independence from and subservience to the political authorities, alternating from passive bystanders to interventions in the political scene. Understanding the nature of the dynamic role played by the Tunisian military is pivotal to better understand the development of the Tunisian revolution. To grasp the balances of power between competing political and military leaderships in Tunisia, the author focuses on a number of conflicts between various Tunisian
institutions and individuals striving for power. The paper is meant primarily to test the hypothesis that military coups d’états remain a standing threat in present-day Tunisia, in spite of the sophisticated strategies deployed by the country’s civilian governments to prevent such military takeovers of power. Secondly, the author will illustrate how the military’s facilitation of the toppling of the Ben Ali regime in 2011 was the result of long-standing, and ongoing, marginalization of military institutions in Tunisia. The end result was a complete transformation of the Tunisian military. Evidence of this transformation can be seen in the novel ways in which the Tunisian army is now being subject to governance protocols and oversight—something which was unthinkable only a short time ago, when the Tunisian military was a “black box” within the wider state apparatus.

The Military and Democratic Transition in Tunisia
Anouar al-Jamoui

The Tunisian military establishment is one factor in the achievement and maintenance of national stability, protecting Tunisia’s national institutions and the existence of the state. For decades, the Tunisian military stayed out of politics, and its generals did not work to dominate economic or administrative life. Instead, officers opted to maintain the military as a structure for the protection of national borders, the prevention of smuggling, relief following natural disasters, and assisting in development projects. This is not to neglect points when founder of the modern Tunisian state Habib Bourgiba and his successor Ben Ali used military forces to quell intermittent popular protests and regionalized uprisings. However, the military declined to answer calls for intervention in politics following the country’s Jasmine Revolution of 2011. This paper looks at the Tunisian military and answers questions such as: How does the Tunisian military view the transition of power in Tunisia post-independence? How did the Tunisian military deal with the democratic transition within their country? To what extend was the Tunisian military the guarantor of the democratic transition within their country? And what are the prospects for the modernization and rehabilitation of the Tunisian military so that it can adapt to the country’s newborn democracy?

The Military Establishment in the Face of Revolution: Comparing the Cases of Tunisia and Libya
Larbi Larbi

Arab militaries played prominent roles in most of Spring countries, regardless of whether or not they supported their nations’ revolutions. This paper examines
the cases of Tunisia and Libya, outlining the varying roles played by the militaries between 2011 and 2015. The paper adopts a dialectical approach to studying the relationship between the military and political spheres, and the roles each of these militaries played in determining the political and security landscapes of their countries throughout the Arab Spring. While the Tunisian military attempted to take a neutral approach in national political conflicts, and ultimately supported the popular revolution, the Libyan military did the opposite and involved itself in the political fray followings its hostile—indeed antagonistic—approach to the Libyan revolution. A historical examination of the structural differences between the Libyan and Tunisian militaries will help determine the reasons behind these different approaches to broadly similar phenomena. In democratic systems, the military would have been expected to behave with complete professionalism, and to simply work to defuse political polarizations: it would never view violence as a means to ensure the transformation from an oppressive regime to a democratic one.

Libya: The Military and the Conundrum of Democratic Transition

Mustafa Attir

Libya was granted independence by decision of a United Nations committee in 1951. It was an opportune moment to build a civil state rooted in democratic institutions. However, over the past 70 years, Libya has become a failed state, even a “non-state.” This paper seeks to uncover the role of the military in this descent. Looking at three distinct periods: under the monarchy; after the “Al Fateh” Revolution (the 1969 coup d’état); and in the wake of the popular uprising of February 17, 2011, it examines the military’s role in obstructing the building of mediating institutions that might have realized a democratic transition. This paper identifies the hitherto hidden factors that have led to current armed confrontations across the country in the wake of the Libyan popular uprising of 2011.

Arab Armies and the Revolutions of 2011: The Cases of Tunisia and Egypt

Ghassan El-Ezzi

Prior to 2011, Arab political tyranny was often confused with what Harold Lasswell called the Garrison State. Confusion tended to center on the fact that Arab militaries had seized the reins of power for long periods, and that a number of tyrannical Arab regimes had taken shape soon after the militaries had come to power. This heralded the creation of “military regimes,” a part of the deep militarization of Arab societies, under the pretext of combatting western colonialism and the Zionist project. The
events of 2011 demonstrated that the concept of the Garrison State belonged to a bygone age, and that the military and political structures of the Arab states have undergone important transformations. This paper examines those transformations beginning with a look at relevant theoretical frameworks aimed specifically at defining theories of military sociology and the question of civil-military relations after the 1950s. It takes Egypt and Tunisia as its case studies, since the revolutions there have already succeeded in effecting a political transition (if not a democratic transition). Lessons can thus be drawn from reactions of the Tunisian and Egyptian armies toward popular revolutions. These cases are briefly contrasted with those of the Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni militaries, which either disintegrated or were dragged into civil wars that have now also transmogrified into seemingly intractable international conflicts.

Militaries during Arab Political Transition: Egypt and Algeria

Gamal Delh

This study examines the deep structural similarities between Egypt and Algeria, and the vital roles of the militaries in the political lives of these countries. Militaries enjoy privileged positions within the Arab state apparatus, a fact reflected in the extent of military involvement in the political life of all Arab countries. With time, the Arab military establishment became influential across all facets of government life, not only with regards to defense and security matters. This reality, which arguably has its roots in a range of policies and actions, merits serious attention. From the perspective of successive ruling regimes, the necessity of enforcing their rule and its apparent certainty—as far as they were concerned—meant ensuring that no disturbances to peace and order would be tolerated, with any perturbations believed to have the capacity to topple the state as a whole. That this belief was so widespread served entrench the military’s authority monopoly. This fact is then presented as a type of the defense of the national securities of each of these states as well as for Arab regional security. One consequence is that all governmental actions or reform attempts—whether political, economic social—are approached “top down,” originating with the highest administrative authorities within the state. Other parties, meanwhile, regard the behavior of the militaries as an abrogation of their main tasks, resulting in the setting up of obstacles to democracy.

Arab Militaries and Democratic Transition: A Comparative Study of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Syrian Cases

Hamza al-Mustafa

The repercussions of the Arab Spring extended far beyond the Arab region to the wider world. The unexpected nature of the Arab revolutions raised a number of
questions concerning the predictive abilities of wider theories of democratization and their capacity to help forecast and analyze upcoming changes. They also raise questions about the effectiveness of specialized programs for Middle East studies and their biased outlooks. Additionally, the Arab Spring highlighted how Western academic literature often neglected the crucial role of Arab militaries in their countries. Western academic treatments of the Arab region instead sought to attribute the lack of democracy in the Arab world to essentialist, “cultural” factors, overlooking issues such as economic development and the frailty of civil society and of the middle class as well as the lack of a democratic example in geographic proximity to the Arab world. There is no single obstacle – maintains the author – which alone prevents democratic transition, but rather a multiplicity of factors which, combined, promote Arab authoritarianism (or otherwise). Yet the military can be said to have the most significant role in this regard. The author compares the experiences of three Arab Spring states of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. He suggests that a more comprehensive view of the role played by the military in the countries examined in this paper would require an understanding of the relationship which the militaries in question have with the wider political order, and the extent to which these militaries can be amenable to democratic demands.

**Reforming Arab Militaries: A Preliminary Comparative Study**

Mohammed Saadi

Arab militaries have remained largely dormant and insular, with little in the way of mechanisms of oversight or investigation, making it difficult to envisage the possibility of reform. In addition to this lack of transparency there is a general stifling of discussion of defense-related issues in particular on campuses, media outlets, civil society, and legislative bodies. This has prevented discussions related to corruption and the ballooning of “rentier military” spending, and the silence has meant a great deal of misinformation and confusion. Militaries must carry out deep and meaningful reforms to bolster their transparency and integrity. This can only be achieved—the paper suggests—through a strengthening of the mechanisms available for administrative monitoring and investigation. In the face of ever more complex threats and the rise of paramilitary forces, this can best be achieved through the creation of an atmosphere of transparency and the creation of mechanisms for legislative monitoring within the ranks of the armed forces.

**The Algerian Military and National Reconciliation**

Eltaher Saoud

Since Algerian independence the country’s military has played a pivotal and multifaceted role in political and civic life, beyond merely guaranteeing the integrity of its borders. Initially bolstered by a doctrine that defined the military as ‘Protector
of the Nation,’ the introduction of political pluralism by the 1989 Constitution saw the military's role relegated to the protection of Algerian independence and territorial integrity. This did not, however, change the power of the military. In fact, the army's removal from political life was purely superficial, as demonstrated by the Islamist victory in the 1991 legislative elections that precipitated rapid military intervention. This intervention led to serious security and political crises, the destabilization of the North African nation and its descent into internal strife and civil war. In order to deal with the resulting crisis, and following the failure of iron-fisted law and order rule of the people, Algeria's military leaders were forced to search for compromises. These eventually took the form of the national reconciliation pact which alleviated some of the main aspects of the national crisis which Algeria lived through during its civil war in the 1990s. This paper, then, shall seek to arrive at a deeper understanding of the role which the Algerian military played in the country’s transitional politics and its interest in achieving a national reconciliation.

The Army and Politics in Algeria: Challenges and Future Prospects

Laroussi Rabah

The prospects for future political intervention by Algeria’s military increase whenever its officials step in to play a political role. The chances to play such a political role, in turn, grow whenever crisis arises. This, in particular, includes points of democratic transition that leave the nation with a power vacuum. This paper seeks to understand the role of the military in the machinations of state institutions more broadly, and to understand the backdrop against which Algeria’s military carries out its political functions. Given how deeply intertwined the military is with the other state institutions, this seems vital to understanding the wider political process in the country.

Military Officers in Mauritania and Algeria and the Experience of Democratic Transition

Ouled Bahi Boun

The militarization of politics in both Mauritania and Algeria has formed a huge obstacle to the democratic transition of the two states, preventing the separation of civilian and military roles. The very structure of militaries and the expectation that members comply with a strict hierarchy is out of line with democratic principles, and the paternalistic nature (in the Weberian sense) of military command thwarts the growth of democracy. So long as these general rules remain in operation within a nation’s government structure, reform seems impossible. Adding to increasing research on the capacity of armies to reform wider society, this research examines the cases of Mauritania and Algeria. The paper examines the divergent experiences
of civil-military relations in a state where the military has intervened in political affairs to the point where it now controls what the civilian authorities do, and the second where generals opted to take power through a coup. It finds that that the politicization of the military resulted in a conflict over power and that all experiences of a political transition have ended with a military coup. Finally, it examines the prospects for a democratic transition in each state.

Civilian-Military Relations in Algeria: Statics and Dynamics
Ahmad Idali

The battles of the Algerian War of Independence gave rise to a political order in which the military had precedence over civilian politics. This ultimately created a regime in which the Algerian military became its own authority, instead of being subservient to the wider state. This paper asks: Has the military been able to maintain its revolutionary legitimacy—that is, the legitimacy of the struggle for independence? Or was the army in fact retreating from the political fray into its role as guardian of the country’s territorial integrity? Contrary to the popular narrative, which states that the military has a central role in furthering political change as a progressive and idealistic force advancing democratization, this paper contends that the Algerian military has monopolized the keys of power in Algeria and altered the development of the political process. In contrast to other examples where political party elites beseeched the army to intervene and alter the course of the political order, the Algerian military has remained strong as a coherent force holding the reins of power in Algeria amid successive political crises. A reading of Algeria’s modern history hints at the military’s reactionary tendencies, and its commitment to a doctrine of total control over the Algerian state and society and its weariness of any changes which could see the army lose any privileges and rights.

Alnasser Said and Kamal Hassan

Iraq has had a unique experience of military interventions. Dividing the nation’s history into three periods, this paper works to assess the most significant points of the past, and those that most heavily impact the politics of the current era – beginning with the monarchal period and the foundation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921, and the 1958 coup that brought Abdelkarim Kassem to power. This first era was punctuated by the country’s first attempted military coup that did not bring the then-government down. During the second period, the new Iraqi Republic gave rise to new sets of political elites, prior to the infiltration of the Iraqi army by ideological factions. This latter phenomenon became apparent with the
1963 coup. This takeover ushered in the third and final period under consideration, marked by the ascendance and rule of ideologically motivated military officers aligned with the Baath Party. Thus began a period where the Iraqi leadership openly made use of the army to further their own political aims whether domestically (such as the Kurdistan wars) or abroad (the First and Second Gulf Wars, 1980-1988 and 1990-1991). Ultimately, these policies led to the destruction of both the Iraqi army and the very state itself with the fall of Baghdad in 2003.

The Political Role of the Iraqi Military During Social Transformations
Emad Allaw

The Iraqi military has played a vital role in the formation of both the nation's central authorities and society since the birth of the modern state in 1921. The military had a longer institutional history than any other organ of the state, and throughout its history the military has continued to play an active role in the development of society on all levels. Although it was dissolved following the US invasion in 2003, the nature of the social tensions and sectarian conflicts have made the rehabilitation of the Iraqi army a pressing need for the preservation of social peace, and saving the Iraqi state from division and fragmentation. The research presented in this paper is an exposition of the main challenges that have risen as a result of the political role the Iraqi military has played through various stages of social transformation since 1921. It pays particular attention to the period since April 9 2003, when the Iraqi military was disbanded and then revitalized under the supervision of the US military. It examines the role Iraq's military has played amidst of sectarian tensions and the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It shows that because the Iraqi military was reconstructed to meet immediate needs, without the benefit of long-term, comprehensive strategy, the ability of the military to fight ISIL as well as unify the nation have both been compromised.

The Army and Politics in Iraqi Kurdistan
Aziz Sardar

In the 1990s, the Baghdad authorities began withdrawing from Kurdish regions in northern Iraq, leaving a political and administrative vacuum as well as a military one. Without any institutional transformations, the Peshmerga militia came to fill in the role of a standing army within Iraqi Kurdistan. The attempts to unify the various Peshmerga militia began in 1994, but these were quickly aborted by a civil
war in Iraqi Kurdistan. During this conflict, the Peshmerga had effectively fought on two separate sides. The civil war drove the individual Kurdish Peshmerga militias closer to the respective political parties to which they were allied, to the point that any distinctions between them became obscured. The political parties in question had particular interest in maintaining links with their militia; the symbiotic relationship between the civilian political parties and their military wings became vital to the continued existence of both. Despite a cessation of hostilities, the civil war in Iraqi Kurdistan never truly came to an end. Instead, the various political parties came to divide power between them, making the situation in the region today amenable to the theoretical framework developed by Giorgio Agamben and Nicole Loraux. This contrasts with most of the literature surrounding civil-military relations, which, in general, are predicated on the understanding that an armed military can overpower a civilian regime and therefore poses a threat to it. This does not apply to the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Obstacles to Democratic Transition in the Arab Homeland: the Case of Mauritania
Abdelrahman Al Alaoui

This paper begins with a general description of the factors that determine the political realities of contemporary Arab societies. It looks at how these factors prevent the realization of democratic reform, and identifies two factors – public awareness and the status of the military—that means this reality is unlikely to change. The path to democratization in the Arab world, this paper suggests, must begin by raising the awareness of the Arab peoples of their rights and responsibilities. This will liberate the people from the relentless subjugation and pacification to which they have been subject. Equally, the military must learn that it must be limited to the barracks as in the free and civilized world.

Military Coups d’état and Military Rule in Mauritania: Obstacles to Democratic Transition
Mohamed Hosni

The first coup d’état in Mauritania took place in 1978. Although this was a full 18 years after the country gained independence from France, it nonetheless set in motion a pattern of events that remains in place today. Since that time, military takeovers have become the only avenue to gain political power in the country. To date, the military remains the single most powerful actor in Mauritanian state affairs. The country’s civilian political movements have progressively waned since the coups of
1978 and 1984, and have remained marginalized. Through its direct involvement in politics, the Mauritanian military has been the single most significant obstacle to the democratic transition and civilian rule in the country. The first task addressed by this paper is the investigation of the many theoretical fields of knowledge that have explored the question of the democratic transition and the role of militaries within it. One school of thought maintains that the military, as the primary driver of modernization and change is the key to democratic transition. A second approach, and the one adopted here, holds that the military remains an obstacle to democratization so long as it is not answerable to a civilian authority and continues to be driven by its own political ambitions. With this in mind, the paper reveals the necessity of a sharp division between the civilian and military domains and asks: To what extent can the Mauritanian military’s intervention in political affairs be considered an impediment to democratic transition in the country?

The Army, the Monarchy, and the Establishment in Morocco

Ihsane Elhafidi

The relationship between Morocco’s military and the country’s political elite – in particular its monarchy – was formed together with the rest of the state apparatus immediately following independence. The military came to take a neutral approach to the rapidly developing pattern of partisan jockeying between the various political camps vying for power, and tended to find ways that would allow military positions to remain firmly within the royalist camp. These early patterns, established at the very birth of the modern Moroccan state, formed the basis on which these two powers would interact in the years to come. Later, transformations in the relationship took the form of concessions by the military establishment, turning it eventually from a state institution reporting to the Minister of Defense into a limited body responsible only for the immediate protection of Morocco’s borders, answerable directly to the King. The Moroccan military gradually receded from public life, particularly following the two failed coups of 1970 and 1972. In tracing this relationship, the paper writes of a historic battle for power in the country, and identifies longstanding reasons for the vested interested of the Moroccan elite in ensuring the tranquility of relations between the Royal Court and the military establishment.

Sudan’s May 25, 1969 Coup

Mohannad Ahmad

In the early days of post-colonialism, the roles of the military in what would become the developing world were considered to be limited to protecting the
realm from foreign aggressors. Nonetheless, military officers quickly took on new and varied roles in the political life of their countries. The higher level of discipline in comparison to other state institutions and the strictly hierarchical nature of the military are often cited for the eventual success of military leaders in politics, and in the overthrow of civilian governments through coups. The May 25, 1969 coup d'état in Sudan which brought Col. Gaafar Nimeiry was spurred by a complex of factors: the absence of popular support for the civilian leadership; an economic crisis; and widespread corruption. Nimeiry remained in power despite several attempts at an overthrow, all of which were quashed by the armed forces. These same armed forces toppled what had come to be known as the “May Government” in April of 1985.

The Sudanese Communist Party: A Coup Born within the Revolution
Abdullah Ibrahim

Analyzed in this study are the disastrous moral and political outcomes for the Sudanese Communist Party of its promotion of military takeovers in 1969 and 1971, and which resulted worse outcomes for the country’s Communist Party in Sudan than for any other political party in Sudan. The paper attempts to write history in a break with decades of an investigative tradition that has monopolized analysis of these two coups, and which exclusively focused on limited questions such as “Who ordered the coups?”. The author explores the development of an anti-coup camp within the SCP, and which was promulgated by Abdelkhalil Mahjub, former Secretary General of the SCP (1949-1971), and who had always warned revolutionary Sudanese to be wary of power gained through military coups. Mahjub, speaking at the General Assembly of the SCP on May 26, 1969, spoke of the tactic of coups as being favored by the bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie as an alternative to popular action led by the proletariat. The paper further examines the tensions within the SCP, between its proletarian wing, led by Mahjub, and an adamant petit bourgeoisie wing which was enamored with the coup as a means of gaining power.

The Role of the Military in Sudan’s Democratic Transition
Khalifa Ismail

Since 1958, the Sudanese military has intervened in the country’s post-colonial political affairs, inhibiting genuine democratic transition in the country. A number of domestic and external factors contributed to bringing about military intervention in Khartoum’s political affairs. The mixed results of successive coup attempts witnessed by the country have served to make the Sudanese military establishment and its role in political life more ambiguous. This predicament was only made worse
by the lack of a permanent constitution to enshrine such a role. With this in mind, the author attempts to respond to one major question: What exactly is the nature of the relationship between Sudan’s military and the elected governments? In answering, the author explores the formation of political parties and lobby groups, the various roles they played, their sources of income as well as the influence which such formations have had on present-day political regimes. The paper is divided in three sections: the first addresses the nature of Sudan’s political system, the second examines the domestic and external factors which led to military intervention in political life, while the third explores military interventions in Sudanese political life during two distinct periods, from 1958 to 1986 and from 1989 to the present day. The author concludes with a number of conclusions and recommendations.

The Army, the Elite and Ideology: Sudanese Political Path between Democracy and Coup since 1958

Gaysar El-Zein

Since independence in 1958, Sudan has come under military rule on three separate occasions: November 17, 1958; May 20, 1969; and June 30, 1989. Each was the result of complex interactions between the nation’s civilian and military forces. Foreign intervention and international political-ideological issues of concern to Sudan’s elite and the grassroots also impacted the outcomes of the coups. This paper looks at a 30-year slice of Sudanese history, to examine the intertwined relationships between civil, military, and international/elite forces. It will examine the network of relationships that each of these forces operates within, particularly as these relate to the question of freedoms and to democracy. Beginning with a definition of terms, the paper sets out the categories of “elite” and “ideology” and then goes on to explore these ideas with relation to the ethnic and class composition of the Sudanese military, and how this relates to the composition of broader Sudanese society. It ultimately aims to contribute to understanding the drivers of Sudanese political life, in particular given current —highly rhetorical—debates over liberty and democracy.

The Political Discourse of the Egyptian Military: From Revolution to Coup

Saifeddin Abdelfattah

This paper does not claim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the political discourse of the Egyptian military. Rather it uses key historical elements as an overarching framework such as: the long history of Egyptian constitutional politics
extending from the 1923 Constitution to the 2013 accord; the historical milestones in Egypt’s civilian-military relations, beginning with the formation of the army under Mohammed Ali Pasha and moving through the toppling of Mubarak and on to the June 30, 2013 coup; the economic aspects of civilian-military relations in Egypt and civilian-military relations in Egypt since the January 25, 2011 revolution. The above factors are key to understanding the political discourse employed by the Egyptian military. Using this framework, the author focuses his attention on critical concepts deemed fundamental to understanding the Egyptian army’s doctrine such as the nation state, the people, revolution, human rights and democracy. The author explores how the army’s domestic rhetoric deals with issues of development, and looks at how the foreign rhetoric of Egypt’s generals deals with the United States and the West more broadly, as well as questions of national security. In conclusion, he investigates how concepts such as civil society, civic life and the militarization of society are addressed in the discourse of the Egyptian military.

**Intervention of the Egyptian Military in the Political Process after the January 25 Revolution**
Mahmoud Abdelal

The author examines the role played by the Egyptian military in the nation’s political transition in the aftermath of the January 25, 2011 revolution. His study begins with a historical-theoretical overview of the role of the military in political transition, and then addresses the development of the Egyptian military’s constitutional and legal status since the period of the Egyptian monarchy. The third section examines the transitional period administered by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF, the highest military authority in Egypt), looking at the extent to which the policies of SCAF contributed to the overall success of the post-Mubarak transition. A final section tests an emerging hypothesis: that the military abandoned Mubarak because of his support for a reduction in military spending.

**Military Coups d’Etat and the Development of Arab Political Consciousness**
Yasser Djazaerly

The relationship between the peoples and militaries of the Arab World provides the overall frame of this paper, which pays special attention to the question of public confidence in national armies. Specifically, this paper examines how public confidence impacts military coups d’états and their political ramifications. It focuses
here on two seemingly contradictory trends in the present-day Arab world. While the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011 is said to have ended the post-colonial era defined by military rule, the results of the Arab Opinion Index, the largest public survey of Arab public opinion, indicate that public confidence in the militaries of the region is robust. In fact, 82% of respondents expressed confidence in their countries’ militaries. How is it possible that the Arab world is both in the midst of a revolution against totalitarian regimes while, simultaneously, public confidence in the Arab armies that facilitated state repression remains strong? This paper will seek to understand whether the Arab Spring, followed by the counter-revolutionary coups two years later, altered the relationship between Arab societies and their militaries. It seeks to assess whether events will lead to the creation of a new political consciousness among the Arab peoples that will ultimately transcend the terms of the post-colonial military regimes. Comparing the two periods, the paper concludes decisively that military-social relations are today vastly changed from the post-colonial period.

Tahrir Square: How the Army Turned a Sacred Public Space into a Profane Stomping Ground

Ali Abd al- Raouf

At the outset of 2011, with the world’s attention fixed on Cairo, Hosni Mubarak was driven from power as President of Egypt. Tahrir Square was the focal point for 18 days of public outrage and anger, which culminated in the termination of Mubarak’s 30-year rule and the reclamation of Egyptian national pride. Public spaces played a central role in the movements that came to be known as the Arab Spring, giving places for millions of citizens to express their desires for a new era defined by freedom, dignity, and social justice. Tahrir Square provided the archetypal image of this, taking in hundreds of thousands of revolutionary activists who had organized their efforts through social media to come out on the streets on the now emblematic date of January 25, 2011. The ruling regime in Egypt has learnt the importance of public space. This paper examines the steps the military has taken since 2013 to maintain Tahrir as a geographically diffuse, subjugated space and actively prevents it from becoming a space for the expression of popular power.

The Challenges of Preventing Military Coups and Defending Democracy in Turkey

Omar Ashour

Late in the evening of July 15, 2016, Turkey was subjected to the bloodiest coup attempt in its history. Several of the institutional symbols of democracy and state institutions in the Turkish Republic came under unprecedented artillery fire. The barbarity of the
coup attempt notwithstanding, it ultimately failed. This paper analyzes why the coup attempt failed despite the high level of combat preparedness of the forces under the control of its conspirators. The author also seeks to draw conclusions around how to continue foiling such attempts in the future. Beginning with an overview of events and the necessity of understanding them, the paper puts the events in historical context, and then in their contemporary political and economic context. A third section provides a comparative study of anti-coup tactics employed by young democracies, and concludes with a comparison counter-coup experiences in developing democracies.

Civil-Military Relations during the AKP Era
Ahmet Uysal

Despite being himself rooted in the military ranks, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk managed to keep the military out of politics to a certain extent between the 1920s and the 1940s. This facilitated Turkey’s adoption of democracy in the 1950s, when a military coup led by low ranking officers in 1960 challenged the balance of power; similar incidents became more frequent with time. The military intervention of 1998 led to deep political and economic crises between 1998 and 2001, paving the way for the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) that won a major election as a civilian project. The AKP improved the position of civilians vis-a-vis the military through constitutional amendments and popular demands. It began to exert control over foreign and security policies, traditionally the preserve of the military. The Gulen organization that initially started as an apolitical religious group began to infiltrate state institutions and civil society during the 1980s, and gained political ground. They made an alliance with the AKP after the 2007 military intervention and exploited the government to infiltrate more extensively. Gulen’s secret organization managed to infiltrate the secular Kemalist military earlier and found more space to promote their members to the upper ranks of command. After their plan to topple the AKP government with a graft case in the late 2013 failed, clandestine Gulenists in the middle and upper ranks of the military tried to stage a coup in mid-July, 2016. This was the beginning of a new chapter in civil-military relations in Turkey. This paper will analyze the current state of civil-military relations, considering the changes brought by public resistance and legal and political actions following the coup attempt.

The Reformulation of Civilian-Military Relations in Turkey Following the Failed Coup of July 15, 2016
Murat Yesiltas

The author explores the military and political repercussions of the failed attempted coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016. His paper works within the interpretational
framework of military-civilian governmental relations in Turkey. It begins by trying to understand the dynamic relationship between the Turkish military and the country’s civilian government under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). It then goes on to analyze the concept of a “transformation of the army,” by focusing on the reforms to military structure in the wake of the failed coup attempt.

Media Coverage of the Attempted Coup in Turkey: Content Analysis of Arab and Western Media Outlets

Fayrouz Lamtaie

Media institutions, broadly defined in a variety of forms, contributed significantly role in July 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. President Erdogan himself made use of social media to call his people to the streets, an act that contributed to the public reaction in defense of the AKP government and democracy. The use of media to direct the coup and its aftermath meant that coverage was hugely diverse, and warrants a comparative analysis in order to understand how different media was used by various sides to affect the outcome. Examining multilingual coverage from both western and Arab media outlets the day of the attempted coup and the day after (including: Al Jazeera News; Sky News; Al Arabiya; the BBC and France 24 alongside Syrian and Egyptian television stations) this paper shows how outlets chose stories that best served their institutional interests. In some cases, media stations were prepared to spread misinformation. In studying the media landscape during the days of the coup and its aftermath knowledge is gained about the progress of events themselves, as well as the actors dictating the media positions.