

المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات  
ARAB CENTER FOR RESEARCH & POLICY STUDIES  
(Doha Institute)



[www.dohainstitute.org](http://www.dohainstitute.org)

## Case Analysis

# *Sudan's Future: between partition and war*

Dr. Amani Tawil

*Doha, JULY - 2011*

## *Series (Case Analysis)*

# *Contents*

---

<i>SUDAN'S FUTURE: BETWEEN PARTITION AND WAR</i> .....	
THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH OF SUDAN.....	1
THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING A STATE INSTITUTION IN SOUTH SUDAN .....	6
CHALLENGES POSED BY NORTHERN SUDAN'S STATE INSTITUTIONS .....	7
THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA AND THE PRESENCE OF CORRUPTION.....	9
THE NATURE AND OUTLOOK OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.....	10
CONCLUSION .....	10

The partition of Sudan, which was officially announced on July 9, poses a number of questions about the future, and the role this partition will play either in making peace or making war; the answers to these questions will make themselves felt in the lives of tens of millions of people living in Sudan and its surrounding areas. The process of partition will have its repercussions on the geopolitics of East Africa and Central Africa. Attempting to reply to the questions posed by these issues and trying to divine the future vision of Sudan, one finds that there are three tracks that need to be discussed first.

The first is the inter-relationship between the two states born of Sudan: the North and the South, and the nature of the factors that will impact this inter-relationship. The second and the third deal with a precise understanding of the internal challenges, the factors that will influence the internal politics of each of these two states domestically, as well as their expected outcomes, and the probability of all of these factors leading to either stability or war.

### **The North and the South of Sudan**

Since independence in 1956, relations between the Northern and Southern regions of Sudan have been victim to a complex make-up of the remnants of colonial policies that sought to exacerbate existing ethnic divisions. These policies continued after independence, using patriotic dimensions in a racist fashion against the Southern Sudanese. The state pursued unbalanced development projects in the different parts of the country, discriminating against particular groups of Sudanese and the regions from which they came; it was only natural for foreign intervention to influence the inter-play between the North and South of the country over the 60 years that have elapsed since. The understanding of these dimensions helps in developing a framework for the current controversial issues as flashpoints that play an important role in the north-south relations, where the seeds of an explosive conflict have always been present.

### The Border Issue

One of the most pressing and controversial issues within the bi-lateral relations of the two states is the question of drawing the borders between them, which stretch around 1,950 kilometers between the latitudes 9° and 12° North. This territory itself is host to a wide range of natural wealth, including mineral and oil resources, animal biodiversity, and a human population that is ethnically divided between Arabs and black Africans. The new peace agreement between the government in Khartoum and the rebels in the South made use of the dividing line that was present at the time of independence on January 1, 1956, which was also adopted during the Addis Ababa talks of 1972, putting an end to the first phase of Sudan's North-South civil war (1955-1972). Legislation to govern the Southern region as a self-rule area deemed this as a boundary for administrative demarcation, but this quickly became problematic with the increase in oil exploration activities and the mechanization of agriculture in the area.

Since the Sudanese parliament had delineated the southern boundary, using old unreliable maps with misleading topographic data, and had neglected to conduct a thorough land ownership survey in Sudanese states, the very beginning of the demarcation process was coupled with a conflict. The strains of conflict

became apparent on both the national and local levels.<sup>1</sup> A list of the areas that were affected by this conflict can be found below:

- Abyei
- The frontier between the Dinka-Malual tribe from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Rezeigat tribe from Southern Darfur State.
- The oilfields between the Unity (“Wahda”, a part of South Sudan) and South Kordofan states.
- The boundaries between the Blue Nile, Upper Nile, and South Kordofan states, all of which are in the North of Sudan, but lie on the border with South Sudan states.
- The *Shall al Fil* (“Elephant's Shawl”) area in the Blue Nile State.
- The Northern boundary to the Upper Nile State.
- The Hufirat el-Nahas area in South Darfur, in North Sudan, and the Kafia Kingi area in Bahr el Ghazal of South Sudan.<sup>2</sup>

The Abyei case in particular had been a stumbling block to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, endangering the negotiations, nearly driving the parties in Northern and Southern Sudan to war. These unresolved issues have yet to be addressed. The placement of Abyei within either Northern or Southern Sudan is still an open question; this was partially a result of the way Abyei changed hands between the Bahr el Ghazal State, now in South Sudan, and the South Kordofan State, now in the North, several times in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. There was even a special article covering the future of Abyei within the Naivasha Agreement, which called for a referendum to determine the future of the region and its share of future oil reserves.<sup>3</sup>

The question of Abyei was a particular sticking point for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, and came close to bringing an end to the negotiations as a whole and possibly even re-igniting the North-South civil war. The on-going complications which prevented a decision on which states would have control of Abyei, and whether it would be in the North or the South of the Sudan, were due in part to the history of the region. This necessitated a special, Abyei-specific protocol as a part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, which made way for a referendum to be held in Abyei simultaneously to the one planned for South Sudan, in January 2011. However, disagreements over voter eligibility put a stop to that – the leadership of the Dinka tribes in the area insisted that the Arab inhabitants had no rights to vote in such a referendum. Attempts to hold this referendum as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement have failed due to a dispute over the fate of Abyei region. The Ngok Dinka tribe inhabitants of Abyei insisted that the nomadic Misserya Arab ethnic group, which makes annual migrations to the region, should not be included in the vote.

---

<sup>1</sup> Douglas H. Johnson, *When Boundaries Become Borders: The impact of boundary making in Southern Sudan's frontier zones*, (The Rift Valley Institute, 2010).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), on the Resolusion of Abyei Conflict, (Naivasha, Kenya), May 26, 2004, [http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace\\_agreements/abyei\\_05262004.pdf](http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/abyei_05262004.pdf).

A number of alternative resolutions were attempted in order to bring an end to this dispute through Abyei border delimitation, but they all failed. One of these was a 2005 plan to have the future of Abyei decided by an independent commission of international experts known as the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC); however, the Khartoum government rejected the commission's report, claiming that it had overstepped its Comprehensive Peace Agreement mandate.<sup>4</sup> The next attempted remedy was to refer the case to the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal seated at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which adopted a consensual resolution in July of 2009.<sup>5</sup> In this case, the Misseeri Arab tribesmen rejected the 2009 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the grounds that it would deprive them of nearly half of their best grazing pastures and aquifers for eight months in a year. The tribesmen remained adamantly opposed to the imposition of the agreement, threatening to go to war if need be to prevent the implementation of the plan. The North-South conflict over Abyei escalated into armed skirmishes of varying size and intensity, and led to human casualties. Perhaps the most important aspect of the dispute is how the government in Khartoum has been able to leverage it in its dealings with the international community.

North Sudanese forces attacked the area in May of 2011, leading to the evacuation of a civilian population which foreign media sources estimated to be over 100,000 persons.<sup>5</sup> This attack was in itself retaliation for an attempt by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement to establish a military presence for itself in the area, with its cadres using police uniforms as disguises. The Khartoum government then conceded that it would not leave Abyei except in the framework of a political resolution. This new fork in the road was an opportunity for the North Sudanese authorities to secure an international response regarding a write-off for their debts; they also were able to rally elite public opinion of North Sudan around the cause of Abyei, which they came to see as vital for the future of their country, and take it away from concern over the Arab Spring and hopes of democratization in their own country. Ultimately, the United Nations Security Council intervened in the form of Resolution 1990, which paved the way for the placement of 4,200 Ethiopian troops in the region, as well as 50 Sudanese police personnel. These were to act as a buffer between the two warring factions in Abyei. The Security Council granted the Ethiopian forces six months of authority to remain there.

### Oil as a Factor in the Conflict

The conflict over the Abyei region is also connected to the broader conflict over oil resources, to which the North and South of Sudan are parties. When the state of South Sudan came into being, the north of the country lost 70% of its oil reserves and would lose 45% of its revenues.<sup>6</sup> These same oil reserves will be contributing 98% of the budget to the new state in the south. These facts gave rise to the repeated crises between the North and the South during the transition period from 2005 to 2011. During this time, the authorities in the South claimed that the Northern government had withheld some of the revenues of oil production, and had been dishonest about the actual scale of the oil production. It was these sorts of allegations, which remain to be verified by an independent source, which fanned the flames of separatist

---

<sup>4</sup> Sudanese *As Sahafa*, (Arabic), July 22, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Pan-Arab *Ash Sharq Al Awsat*, July 22, 2009, <http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=528543&issueno=11194>.

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/06/110620\\_sudan\\_war.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/06/110620_sudan_war.shtml).

<sup>6</sup> *Al Akhbar*, interview with Sudanese Minister of Petroleum, September 10, 2010.

sentiment in the South.<sup>7</sup> It is noteworthy that the discovery of oil, by the US oil giant Chevron, in South Sudan towards the end of the 1970s, had been Jaafar Numeiri's incentive to abrogate the 1972 Addis Ababa peace treaty between the central government of Sudan and southern rebels.

The present peace agreement – the Naivasha Agreement – calls for the sharing of oil revenue between the North and South; this division is based on the fact that while most of the oil fields are in the south of the country, the infrastructure for refining and exporting it lies in the north. Sudanese President Omar Bashir made this very clear in a speech that he gave on June 21, 2011.<sup>8</sup> The central government also found many ways to apply pressure on the regional power structure in Juba; for example, they delayed the delivery of refined petroleum products (gasoline) to Southern Sudan, which drove prices at the pump to above \$10 per liter.<sup>9</sup>

#### Marginalized Areas and the ever-recurring Civil War

The two states of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile represent a vital interest in North-South relations, as they straddle the border between the two new states, and shelter units of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. This military presence is based on a supposed ethnic affinity between the peoples of the South and those living in these two states, the Nubians. The military form of alliance between Southerners and Nubians dates back to 1983. Some of the more famous Nubians to emerge from this joint struggle are the late Yousef Koua and Abdulaziz Helou, who lost the gubernatorial elections in South Kordofan state. The problem begins with the text of the Naivasha agreement, which is unclear in its wording on the text governing these two states, and leaves much room for interpretation for an interpreter.

The agreement itself also made use of the popular legislative assemblies that were formed during the fourth year of the transitional period. Another body being created by the agreement is an independent commission that is authorized to monitor and evaluate the Khartoum government's implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.<sup>10</sup> The position of the state's governor also gained in significance, with a governor being made responsible for much of the coordination with the central government (in Khartoum for the present time). It is also possible that the role of governor, in southern states, will be able to play a crucial role in relations with the North. This was the background to the South Kordofan gubernatorial elections, which were held in May of 2011; the announcement of the winner of the election had to be delayed due to a dispute over the result. The People's Liberation Movement had accused the National Congress, which is in power in the North, of cooperating with the election commission to rig the election results in favor of their candidate, Ahmed Haroun; Abdulaziz Helou who was the Movement's candidate, lost out.<sup>11</sup> This same controversy over the electoral process coincided with the new security arrangements agreed upon in the security agreement for the two states, which took force after the

---

<sup>7</sup> Visitors to Juba Airport in June of 2006 made note of billboards, proclaiming, "The land is ours; the oil is ours; freedom is ours."

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-Bashir-threatens-to-turn/39299>.

<sup>9</sup> Eyewitness accounts of visits to Juba between May and June 2011.

<sup>10</sup> The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, [www.aec-sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf](http://www.aec-sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> *Al Jazeera* (Arabic), July 14, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/90E622C8-0254-43CF-AD83-D8B016C67168.htm>.

declaration of the independent state of the South. All of this combined would see the re-deployment of the People's Liberation Movement military forces to within the boundaries of South Sudan, while forces loyal to the government in Khartoum withdrew to the North.

The Khartoum government has complained that the Southern authorities' have maintained a military presence for the People's Liberation Army in areas like Abyei, which is part of the Northern State. Nubian fighters in the People's Liberation Army in the South Kordofan state have refused to hand over their weapons to the federal authorities; in the Blue Nile state, the governor himself refused the re-deployment of People's Liberation Movement forces outside of his state. Both South Kordofan and the Blue Nile are within the territory of the North.

The government in the North was then pushed to intervene militarily in South Kordofan in early June of 2011, but this drove Nubian members of the northern military to join the ranks of southern rebels. Abdulaziz Helou, who lost the election in South Kordofan, declared himself the leader of an armed insurrection to overthrow the political, thus threatening to plunge the country into civil war again.

There were, thus, two layers of this conflict: the first level was the conflict between the Sudanese government and the People's Liberation Movement, which was fighting a proxy electoral war through Abdulaziz Helou. The second layer was the conflict between the People's Liberation Movement and the Nubians in the mountains of Kordofan, as the Movement apprehended Telephone Coco, a Nubian electoral candidate.<sup>12</sup> The People's Liberation Movement now stands accused by the Nubian movement of betraying the Nubians' through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which the Nubians did not benefit from, despite fighting alongside the People's Movement for 30 years. The Movement even allegedly summarily executed a number of Nubians in the mountains, in a clear breach of principles of human rights. In the end, the Nubians were not able to extract any concessions from the peace treaty in exchange for the price they paid.<sup>13</sup>

It is in this sense of unruly chaos that the three marginalized areas (Abyei and the Blue Nile and South Kordofan States) lie, feeding the probability of the outbreak of a new civil war. This chaos is due to the intersection of interests between the leadership in both Northern and Southern Sudan, forming one axis, with tribal and ethnic alliances forming a second axis. These divisions become clear in a very complex conflict over resources, and proxy wars resulting from the inter-play between the previous factors. In this regard, we need to consider the peace agreement between the People's Movement and the Sudanese government in Addis Ababa, which covered the administration of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The agreement might lead to a fissure in the ruling National Congress Party of the North, as a result of the provisions it made for the People's Liberation Movement to be politically active in the areas to be administered from Khartoum, with grave repercussions in the North of Sudan.<sup>14</sup> The governor of the Blue

---

<sup>12</sup> Mustafā Al Batal, *The No-return Sacrifice for the Struggle*, available online in Arabic: <http://www.sudaneseonline.com/arabic/permalink/5704.html?print>.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Al-Sudani* (Arabic), "Backstage agreement between Nafe' and Uqar", June 29, 2011, <http://www.alsudani.sd/index.php/news/3-flashnews/3883-2011-06-29-11-41-19.html>.



Nile state views the allowance of activities of the People's Movement in the North as a way to prevent war.

It is worth noting here that the chaos and crises afflicting Sudan due to internal reasons are also connected to foreign powers' interests as they use the Sudanese sides as pawns in a blood-letting exercise in a bid to gain control of the country's natural resources, which include not only oil but vast agricultural lands in the south, which could be important in the development of bio-fuels by large American corporations. Reports in the British press even revealed evidence of a secret agreement to sell the equivalent of 9% of South Sudan's landmass at a price of \$0.04 per square kilometer.<sup>15</sup>

### **The Challenge of Building a State Institution in South Sudan**

#### Security Challenges

South Sudan suffers from a number of internal tribal divisions. Historically, these disputes have been rooted in political and economic conflicts over resources, and on other occasions because of ethnic divisions. These divisions were brought to the fore in armed conflagrations after the 2010 elections, whence electoral irregularities and vote-rigging embittered those in the political opposition, especially those who were not members of the Dinka tribe, as well as upset members of the People's Liberation Movement. Numerous international observers also recorded a number of incidents of voter intimidation and threats of the use of the violence, as well as interference in opposition candidate's campaigns, arbitrary detentions, and direct interference on the part of the People's Liberation Movement in the election process. All of this, alongside allegations of the rigging of the final results, added to the continued conflict.

In the wake of all of this, three Southern field commanders declared open, armed insurrections of varying intensity. One of these leaders was former Khartoum ally George Athor, who lost the elections to become Governor of Jonglei. Additionally, there was David Yauyau, who was running for a legislative assembly seat for the Pibor County in the same state, and Gatluak Gai, who was promised to be appointed the county commissioner in the Unity state. What they all had in common was their anger and their preparedness to form militia as a means to pressure the People's Liberation Movement in the South and the authorities in their areas. With the shortfalls in the management of diversity in southern areas, and the fact that the economy is limited to oil production, much more responsible government is needed to manage the tribal relations. This is especially true as the Dinka control the power while other tribes have been left out; this includes the Nuer tribe, under whose lands much of the oil lies. The government in the South has their work cut out for them if they want to ensure an orderly production of oil and distribution of its revenues in a way that preserves stability. This challenge comes at the same time as the pressing need to deploy massive efforts to work on the human development of the people of South Sudan, and to enhance their capacity to manage the affairs of their new state. Being able to overcome the difficulties in this stage might necessitate complete acquiescence with Western plans regarding an alliance between South and West Sudan, against the central government of Khartoum. Given the situation, it will only be a

---

<sup>15</sup> Javier Blas and William Wallis, *Financial Times*, January 9, 2009.

matter of time before Sudan becomes an African Lebanon, where global and regional power players wage proxy wars; both North and South Sudan will be open to possible conspiracies aiming to divide them and disintegrate their territories.

### Democratization

Just as its northern rival, the National Congress Party, the People's Liberation Movement has been able to grab the reins of power within their territory despite not being the only political faction representative of the people in the area. The April 2010 elections throughout Sudan witnessed a forgery of results, which the international community, led by the US, did nothing to stop so as to allow the plans for the partition of Sudan to move forward.<sup>16</sup> It was only natural that, during the final two years of the transitional period, a political shift occurred in South Sudan's political arena. The various ethnic and political groupings in South Sudan have cooperated since signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement around one goal – self-determination. Some of them have set some of their own misgivings aside, for the sake of overall unity. Yet with the completion of the electoral process and the referendum, and the official announcement of the outcomes, the common interests have been eclipsed, and old political feuds that have been latent for a long time have re-surfaced.

The People's Liberation Movement and the opposition parties have re-started their maneuverings to form a unity government to take them through the transitional phase and to set the time period of that phase. The People's Movement is also looking to move quickly in order to put in place a transitional constitution, as a priority above all else to be completed before independence. The opposition worries that the People's Movement is making use of this time to ensconce itself in power. The Movement's behavior is seemingly threatening to undo the previous work of the political parties in the South to build mutual confidence through the "All Southern Sudanese Political Parties Conference" joint summit held from October 13-17, 2010. Political mismanagement of these types of situations has also bred rivalries between the different opposition groups, especially at a critical time for state building, regarding the management of internal security, which makes the southern unity the major objective.<sup>17</sup> The People's Liberation Movement has yet to understand that democratization and the sharing of power will not be a threat to its authority, but are rather an investment for the sake of stability and legitimate rule.

### **Challenges posed by Northern Sudan's State Institutions**

The Sudanese situation is remarkable for the wide number of academic and media reports, a by-product of vast Western interest, considering the international jostling between China, the US, and others for positions in the race for Sudan's resources. Being the first Arab country to be divided, and the largest country in Africa, the case of Sudan has come to epitomize what the African Union and the Arab countries did not want; the division of Sudan was completely at odds with the intentions of the founders

---

<sup>16</sup> Amani Al Tawil, *Egyptian Nahda* (Arabic), "The Causes of America's Stance with Regards to the Sudan's Elections", April 16, 2010.

<sup>17</sup> "Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan," International Crisis Group, Report 172, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/172-politics-and-transition-in-the-new-south-sudan.aspx>.

of African Union. We will now discuss the developments related to the recent happenings in North Sudan, which seem to present a threat to the regime in the North and its state institutions.

It can be said that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan has not contributed to any increased legitimacy of the Khartoum regime within the domestic political scene of Sudan. This was due to the pattern of the regime's behavior and its exclusionary attitudes towards minorities, be they ethnic, cultural, or religious. These regime policies were only exacerbated by the results of a referendum that indicated the desire of Southerners to secede from the North.<sup>18</sup> The elections within the North made for a horizon to integrate new elements of the political opposition within the governing bodies; these elections, like those in the South, have also been subject to allegations of vote rigging and other irregularities.<sup>19</sup> The opposition itself shares part of the blame for the shortcomings in the political system. Their stance is one of a balancing act, trying to offset their political weakness in the present system against their need for it to continue. Similarly, the National Congress Party has insisted that it alone be involved in any of the structural crises affecting the integrity of the country's boundaries, including the Darfur conflict and the conflict in the east of the country. The lack of a comprehensive national mechanism to counter these challenges and to organize political interactions between those within and those outside the regime is what made it easy for Western powers to deal with the insiders of the regime without having to worry about other political forces in Sudan.

The United States was behind some extraordinary types of pressure that were brought to bear against the government of Khartoum. The regime's infractions against human rights in Darfur, and in particular crackdown on public freedoms, especially on liberties in the press, made it much easier for the US to do this. Western governments have a ready-made approach to attacking states such as these, whether through their official or unofficial channels. All of this, of course, was in addition to the Sudanese authorities being considered a force of political Islam, which quickly became Public Enemy No. 1 in the US after the September 11 attacks. While the official posturing of the US administration did change, in theory, after public announcements made in October of 2010, there has been little tangible difference in the behaviors of Western governments towards the Northern Sudan. Despite Chinese support for the Khartoum government, there is now an environment of political distrust and tension, as well as a wide political impasse leading to a conceivable three-way division of North Sudan along ethnic lines.

Some of the possible threats that would make this more likely are enumerated below:

#### The Arab Spring and Demands for Change

The examples of Tunisia and Egypt have been an inspiration to the peoples of the wider region, encouraging them to demand states where the ideals of human dignity, freedom, and justice are respected in the state-building process. While these ideals are enough of a cause for both the political elites and the masses of Sudan to rise up, they are emboldened by the 20-year reign of Omar Bashir. In addition to this,

---

<sup>18</sup> Statements by Sudanese President Omar al Bashir on imposing shari'a (Islamic) law in the North, see <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/2302/World/Region/Bashirs-statements-provoke-public-anger.aspx>.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2010/africa/sudans-rigged-elections.aspx>.

the National Islamic Front, which was once led by Hassan Turabi and was later dominated by Omar Bashir, had failed to meet its promises of an improved quality of life and a welfare state to the people of the country. Its internal schism in 1999 and the internecine fighting between its former members had an impact on the domestic political scene of Sudan. The past six years have also seen a large degree of infighting amongst the regime's insiders.<sup>20</sup> It is this kind of mismanagement that is making it easier for people in Sudan to be divided along tribal lines. Overall, it is the author's opinion that this particular government has played a bigger role in splitting the country than any other post-independence government.

Of course, any observer of the political situation in Sudan must have noticed the increased emphasis in the debates of Sudanese elites that criticize the government and ask for reforms based on the devolution of power.<sup>21</sup> Yet what stands between these demands, which are widespread, and the formation of an organized political movement, is the presence of the societal and cultural differences within Northern Sudanese society. These divisions make it impossible to enhance a patriotic spirit built on a consensus around these important issues. Poor infrastructure remains an impediment in linking various Sudanese regions; while the internet might play an important role in the dissemination of political ideas in other areas, some estimates have suggested that only 6.7% of Sudanese use the Internet and social networks according to certain widely available estimates.<sup>22</sup>

### **The Economic Dilemma and the Presence of Corruption**

The secession of South Sudan from the rest of the country without the signing of any official agreements between the two new states, particularly on the issue of oil, will make it difficult for the government of the North to meet its responsibilities to the people in the shape of public services like education and health. There has already been an increase in the inflation index, and the government is now attempting to control any changes in the currency in a bid to stave off further economic losses. While the government is clamping down on public spending, they are also trying to promote increased exports, such as beans and agricultural products, as well as gold mines. President Bashir's latest visit to China might also play a role in diversification of government revenue sources, trying to ensure continued Chinese interest in the search for oil in the North. Yet alongside these governmental efforts is the wide spread of public corruption, which President Bashir himself has acknowledged, putting in efforts to follow it; political Islamists have been able to use these facts of corruption to attack the regime.<sup>23</sup>

The Sudanese press, as well some of the government's own institutions, have monitored issues related to the corruption of the Sudanese state, some of them are checked by Sudan Auditor General.<sup>24</sup> These allegations are given credence by Transparency International's ranking of Sudan as one of the more

---

<sup>20</sup> See "Division in Sudan's Ruling Party and the Threat to the Country's Stability", International Crisis Group study, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/174-divisions-in-sudans-ruling-party-and-the-threat-to-the-countrys-future-stability.aspx>.

<sup>21</sup> See Mukhtar Ahmed Fadl, "This is the Age of Liberal Democracies," *As Sahafa* (Arabic), April 19, 2011.

<sup>22</sup> See reports on a women's meeting in Sudan: <http://www.africaalyom.com/web/Details/202-5/news.htm>.

<sup>23</sup> See the publications of Dr. Tijani Abdelkader.

<sup>24</sup> Saad Othman Madani, *Corruption in the rescue era*, unpublished study based on the reports of Sudan's Auditor General and the documentation of the Sudanese press.

corrupt countries in the world.<sup>25</sup> The current thinking in political science is that increased poverty, unemployment, and the massive appropriation of public funds will have to make itself felt in the near future in the shape of a qualitative change in the Sudanese political scene.

### **The Nature and Outlook of Political Developments**

The Khartoum regime is now trying to engage the main political opposition groups to try to contain the fallout of the splitting off of the South. The difficulty is that past experience indicates that the government's efforts, which will extend over many years, are not likely to provide much power for these political parties. The government's attitudes towards the opposition will likely be “superficial,” and this is eating away at their credibility to effect substantive change in the political reality on the ground, so long as there is no devolution of power of any form, and no guaranteed way to reduce the likelihood of regional rebellions against the central government. Of course, the government is also not taking any steps to lighten the load of the common citizen, further clouding the political horizon.

In this environment, it was possible for the sectorial strikes, which found their way to Khartoum and other regional cities in the North, to flare up; this strike movement took within its grasp university lecturers and physicians. There has been a noticeable shift in the behavior of the government with the opposition since the rise of the Arab Spring, while at the same time the ruling party is divided within itself with regards to how to deal with the protest movement. In addition to the sector-specific strikes, Sudan has also seen the birth of the youth-driven “We are Fed Up” movement, which the government is finding it easy to suppress.<sup>26</sup>

### **Conclusion**

The two parties to the Naivasha agreement lost a valuable opportunity, during the transitional phase, to preserve the unity and integrity of Sudan though they managed, with the help of the international community, to maintain a certain level of inter-play between them, thus ensuring that both sides colluded each of them could stay in power in their own local spheres. However, certain changes came to the fore that have made this continuing inter-play more difficult. These include:

1. The renewed armed conflict in border areas (the “three marginalized regions”); this is a dispute both between the parties to the Naivasha Agreement and a further dispute between the people in the North and those who live in the marginalized areas who share some common ethnic denominators with the southern population. The continued agitation between the people of the North and those in the marginalized areas could, in the future, be a channel for global players to ignite another civil war, unless the Northerners discontinue their exclusionary view of citizenship.
2. An increasingly popular unrest against both of the authorities in power, which are political and economic in nature, but are fanned by cultural, ethnic, and religious differences. In order to save Sudan from a disastrous fate, a more mature political leadership needs to take the helm and expand the concept of citizenship within the state.
3. A rational political will in both northern and southern Sudan is badly needed to rescue Sudan

---

<sup>25</sup> See Transparency International country rankings.

<sup>26</sup> See the Egyptian journalists' syndicate statement of June 26, 2011 with regards to the attacks on members of the group and the need to protect personal liberties.

from this tragic fate, to contribute in devolution of power through peaceful means, thus initiating national dialogues revolving around economic and minority demands. It is also essential to find a mechanism for national dialogue in the North and South to address the ethnic and cultural divisions and to promote policies based on equal citizenship and the rule of law state.

4. Additionally, the troubled relations between the North and South, need to be recognized, especially given that there is a risk that vested interests in both areas that would benefit from a renewed conflict. Each side of the North-South divide is involved in its own economic affairs, and the extraction of natural resources, such as oil and minerals, as well as trying to work on the development of massive agricultural and water capabilities.<sup>27</sup>

It is these resources which, in the presence of a reasonable, stable, and rational government that serve as an incentive for renewed peace in the border regions, thus eluding new wars and regional ethnic polarizations. Nobody stands to gain from the alternative, which is for the country to be subject to international pressures to drive the country into crisis that will threaten the country's stability and development.

---

<sup>27</sup> Amani Taweel, "The Egyptian Position in Sudan", Egypt's *Al Ahram* (Arabic), September 7, 2010.