The Role of the GCC Countries in Ending Piracy in the Horn of Africa

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Introduction

Piracy in the Horn of Africa has had a far-reaching security and economic impact both globally and regionally. The World Bank estimated that between 2008 and 2012, the global economy lost $18 billion annually due to Somali piracy. Every year, more than 22,000 vessels, almost 20 percent of commercial ships worldwide transit through the Gulf of Aden. The majority of the oil products originating from the Gulf region and destined for Europe pass this important route. This paper examines the international community’s military engagement and that of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in countering piracy in the Horn of Africa. It then assesses the GCC countries’ role in combating piracy. Finally, due to the location of many of the oil-producing countries in the Gulf, and their proximity to the Somalia coastline, the paper argues that the GCC countries should take a leadership role in investing in long-term on-shore solutions in order to permanently end piracy in the Horn of Africa.

Impact of Piracy on GCC Countries

Piracy has had a negative impact on oil-exporting nations in the Gulf. It threatened the security of their oil tankers transiting through the Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Bab Al Mandeb and the Arabian Sea. Although the main hunting ground of the Somali pirates mainly focused on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean, pirates have sometimes strayed as far as the Strait of Hormuz. For instance, in April 2012, pirates hijacked a Chinese ship close to Chabahar, Iran, near the Gulf of Oman leading to the Strait of Hormuz, by using “mother ships” and global positioning systems.²

As expected, the impact of piracy on the economy and security of the GCC countries has been acute. Since 2008, Somali pirates have attacked or hijacked more than a dozen ships that were either owned, managed or flagged by the GCC countries. On November 17, 2008, pirates hijacked the Saudi-owned super oil tanker, the MV *Sirius Star*, around 450 nautical miles (830km) from the Somali coast. The super-tanker was transporting two million barrels of oil – about 25 percent of the daily oil production of

Saudi Arabia. The incident captured the attention of international news agencies. *Sirius Star* was only released after the payment of $3 million. On March 3, 2010, pirates hijacked another Saudi tanker *Al Nisr Al Saudi* in the Gulf of Aden. The Greek captain and its 13 Sri Lankan crews were held hostage till the ship was released on December 7, 2010, after close to $2-million-dollar ransom was reportedly paid. On March 28, 2011, the UAE oil tanker *MV Zirku* was hijacked and released only after $12 million was paid. Within days, the UAE’s *MV Arrillah-1* was also hijacked. This time, the UAE, with the help of US Fifth Fleet, captured the suspected pirates and brought them back to UAE for prosecution. Again, in 2012, pirates captured two Omani ships: the fishing vessel *Naham 3* and the dhow *Shamsi*. The crew of the *Naham 3* was released in 2013. The *Shamsi*, which was captured around 13 nautical miles east of *Masirah* in Oman with seven crew members on board, was released after 11 days.

There have also been unsuccessful attempts by pirates to hijack GCC ships. On November 27, 2011, pirates fired on UAE oil-tanker *MV D&K1*, but the ship managed to escape. In 2001, they also attempted to hijack the UAE ship *Tiba Folk* and the Saudi-owned chemical tanker *Al-Balad*. Both attempts failed.

In total, ships belonging to three out of six GCC member states have been captured by Somali pirates, who used technology advances and strategic planning to hijack the ships. According to expert Bu-Ainnain, the Somali pirates had an “intelligence network” which allowed them to track and hijack ships. In addition, pirate agents monitored the movements of ships and tipped off the pirates ahead of time. This allowed the pirates to set up traps, take hostages and hold them for ransom.

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Responses to Piracy in the Horn of Africa Waters

It took the international community several years to acknowledge the magnitude of piracy in the Horn of Africa and the risk it posed to global security. The United Nations Security Council invoked chapter seven of the Charter arguing that Somali pirates were a “threat to world peace”. It has subsequently passed 10 resolutions that deal with this issue. The Security Council called on all countries to use “all necessary means” to defeat piracy, while encouraging member nations to patrol the Somali coastline, particularly the Gulf of Aden.\(^7\) As a result of these calls, both on-shore and off-shore responses have been proposed.\(^8\)

Most scholars argue that solutions to the piracy problem in the Horn of Africa lie on-shore, however policy responses have largely concentrated on off-shore solutions. Off-shore counter-piracy efforts have taken several forms such as naval warships patrolling the seas; private security on board ships; the construction of on-board “citadel” rooms with communication systems; and the creation of safe corridors.\(^9\)

The international response to piracy has come from different countries and organizations, including the United Nations, the European Union Naval Force (EU-NAVFOR); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS); the United States Combined Task Forces (CTF); and various individual countries. Shipping industries and insurance companies have also devised their own methods of countering piracy.


However, even though piracy clearly affects the GCC countries and there has been security council calls for all countries to contribute, the Gulf States’ response has been limited. Countries such as Qatar and the UAE paid some money to the CGPCS, and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia participated in the CTF’s counter-piracy operations. The UAE has also financed limited on-shore activities in Puntland, and it hosted major annual counter-piracy conferences.

Navies’ Counter-Policy Operations: The Role of the GCC

The global threat posed by piracy in the Horn of Africa has prompted the Security Council to pass Resolution 1816 in June 2008, calling on its member states to tackle maritime crime by sending warships to high risk areas off the coast of Somalia. Responding to this call, the international community’s primary approach to piracy in the Horn of Africa has been through their navies. To ensure the maritime safety of high-risk areas, the US-led CTF the EU’s EU-NAVFOR and NATO patrolled the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean. As many as 30 ships regularly patrolled the coast at any given time.

The multinational Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), under the command of the US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), patrolled the high risk areas. The CMFs were tasked not only with protecting the shipping routes but also fighting against maritime terrorism, promoting regional cooperation and a safe maritime environment. The CMFs consisted of three Combined Task Forces (CTF 150-Maritime Security, CTF 151-Counter-Piracy, CTF 152-Gulf Maritime Security). CTF-151 dealt directly with counter-piracy operations.

Due to the large area where piracy attacks took place – about 2.5 million square miles within international waters - each of the CTFs was responsible for patrolling a specific

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sector. CTF-150 patrolled the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. CTF-151 was assigned to guard the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin. CTF-152 largely focused on the Arabian Gulf, along with the GCC, which had its own Maritime Security Operations.\(^\text{13}\)

EU-NAVFOR, launched in December 2008 under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), focused on the protection of vessels in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. EU-NAVFOR, known as Operation Atalanta, created the Maritime Security Center in the Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA) for coordinating counter-piracy operations, registering ships transiting in high-risk areas and sharing information. Operation Atalanta was also charged with averting, preventing and repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. Atalanta guarded the World Food Programme (WFP) ships carrying humanitarian aid to refugees in the Horn of Africa; shipping supplies for African Union Forces in Somalia (AMISOM); and commercial shipping passing through Somalia’s waters.\(^\text{14}\) It also monitored fishing activities off the coast of Somalia, although it did nothing to stop or even report foreign vessels illegally fishing within Somalia’s territorial waters.

The NATO Naval Forces have also guarded Somalia’s coastline as part of the off-shore military response. The name of the operation changed several times, from Operation Allied Provider to Operation Allied Protector. It is currently known as Operation Ocean Shield\(^\text{15}\) and was created in 2008 as part of NATO’s response to the Security Council’s


request. An indicator of piracy’s ongoing threat can be seen in the mandate renewal of Operation Ocean Shield, which has been extended to 2016 by the NATO Atlantic Council.

A number of other nations sent ships in order to help secure the massive area in which pirates operate. China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Iran and Saudi Arabia are among those that sent warships. These countries independently commanded their ships, although they coordinated their activities with other countries and with the coalitions.

The GCC countries have also contributed to the off-shore based military response, but in a limited way. In addition to participating in the CMF and the CTF coalitions, the GCC adopted an initiative in which 11 Arab countries formed an all-Arab Navy Task Force, including Qatar, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates and Yemen by jointly agreeing in June 2009 to fight against piracy. In 2010, they also established the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force, a maritime information-sharing center in Bahrain. Moreover, the GCC has recently announced the


22 Frederic Wehrey, "Combating Unconventional Threats in the Gulf: Convergence and Divergence Between the West and the GCC." In *The Uneasy Balance: Potential and Challenges of the West's*
The formation of a Maritime Security Force. However, neither initiative has succeeded in significantly contributing to the military response to piracy in the Horn of Africa.

The military response of nations sending ships to the Horn of Africa waters demonstrates the strategic and economic importance of the area. What is remarkable is the level of cooperation it has fostered among nations that do not traditionally cooperate with each other. Though many countries were determined to secure this strategically important area, the attacks continued, albeit with lesser frequency and success than previously.

**Strengths and Weaknesses of Off-Shore Military-Based Responses**

Navies are largely responsible for the significant reduction of pirate attacks, although private security guards and the use of best management practices (BMP) also contributed to the success. Since 2014, the number of attacks has declined with only 26 incidents occurring.

The number of pirates apprehended by the navy warships has also increased. Previously, “catch-and-release” was a common practice for pirates detained by the navies due to legal ambiguity and lack of political will to prosecute them. This changed, however, once western countries began to sign transfer and prosecution treaties with

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*Relations with the Gulf States*, by Riccardo Alcaro and Andrea Dessi (Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2013), 97-112.


Joris Larik and Quentin Weiler, “Going Naval in Troubled Waters: The EU, China and the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia,” *China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors?* 81-103. ed. by Jing Men and Benjamin Barton. Farnham [etc.]: Ashgate, 2011

regional states affected by piracy. The navies began handing over captured pirates to countries such as Kenya, the Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania. As a result, more than 1,200 people have now been charged or convicted with acts of piracy and are incarcerated in more than 20 countries.

Furthermore, navies have ensured, among other things, the safe delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. Since they have started working in the area, ships carrying humanitarian aid have not been hijacked. Finally, the high premium insurances have declined. Although this is a short-term response, it is nonetheless an achievement.

Still, there are limitations when it comes to heavily relying on the use of navies in countering piracy in the Horn of Africa. First, off-shore counter-piracy navy operations are expensive. The World Bank study estimated that the cost of navy operations was $1.09 billion annually. There is the added cost incurred by the shipping industry, which hires private security guards to protect their ships, at an estimated cost of $2.06 billion annually.

Second, although about 30 naval vessels were involved in counter-piracy operations, no number of ships can guarantee the safety of such a large and busy area, covering more than 2.5 million square miles. Meanwhile, the number of ships transiting the Gulf of


Aden every year is estimated to be between 21,000 and 30,000, increasing the likelihood of some of them being taken as hostage.\textsuperscript{33}

Moreover, the naval warships’ capacity to respond and immediately reach the site of piracy attacks is severely limited. Pirates often attack ships in locations that are far away from where the ships are patrolling. Once it became clear that it was difficult to intercept or stop piracy attacks, the navies established the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) for ships passing through the Gulf of Aden.\textsuperscript{34} The IRTC did reduce the success of pirates in capturing ships, although it did not entirely eliminate it.\textsuperscript{35}

Finally, the sustainability of keeping navies in the region for the long term is questionable. The deterrence and repression policy that warships carry out as part of their counter-piracy work has not translated into a long-term solution to one of the most important sea-lanes.\textsuperscript{36} Pirates still attempt to attack ships in the Horn of Africa waters, although they are now largely unsuccessful.

The Role of GCC Countries in Counter-Piracy Operations

In general, the Middle East and North Africa region, and particularly the GCC countries, continue to face maritime security challenges stemming from piracy and related crimes. They have a vested interest in oceans that are free from piracy. So far, the GCC countries’ contribution has included limited naval activities, financial contributions, membership of policy forums such as the Contact Group and Djibouti Code of Conduct, employing private security guards and implementing best management practices.

Individual GCC countries have also developed their own initiatives in the region. For example, the United Arab Emirates annually hosted counter-piracy international


conferences in Dubai, bringing together all government and non-government stakeholders involved in counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. The UAE wants to demonstrate to the world how critical it is for the Arab world to get a comprehensive, lasting piracy solution. Showing how piracy is detrimental to the region’s survival and its need to end it, the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan, stated in 2011 at the opening of the Counter-Piracy Conference that piracy “threatens our region’s sea lanes and indeed its livelihood as a center of commerce and trade.” As retired UAE General Al Bu-Ainnain put it, the solution to Somali piracy lies in finding “an indigenous, Arab solution.”

There is widespread belief that the UAE is also paying the training fund for the Puntland Maritime Forces (PMF). With the help of the UAE, Saracen International, working under Sterling Corporate Services, formed the PMF without informing the UN and “allocated tens of millions of dollars to establish, train and equip” the PMF.

The UAE, the biggest trade partner with Somalia, is the only GCC country directly involved both militarily and financially in the counter-piracy operations. Others such as Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia collaborated and contributed militarily to the CTF-51 anti-piracy operations and donated to the training and regional capacity building efforts in the region like the Djibouti Code of Conduct.

Despite several attempts, neither the GCC nor the Arab League succeeded in forming unified policy and initiatives to end piracy. Initiatives to establish a joint Arab anti-piracy navy failed and today “Arab patrols and coordination are mostly coordinated via third countries.” The CTF based in Bahrain, consisting of 30 states, has four GCC members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Although not all GCC states are members of the CTF, their navies participated in, or contributed to, the military activities of the three CTF divisions – CTF-150, CTF-151 and CTF-152. GCC members contributed almost $2 million to the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States

38 Bu-Ainnain, *The GCC and Piracy*


40 Bu-Ainnain, *The GCC and Piracy.*
Countering Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, which implemented projects aimed at reducing piracy onshore.\textsuperscript{41}

The Horn of Africa piracy threat is similar to that in the Strait of Malacca, but the regional approach taken by the states in that region was different. Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia opposed the intervention of foreign navies and formed the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), specifically tasked with eradicating piracy.

To replicate ReCAAP for the Horn of Africa, the Djibouti Code of Conduct was formed with the help of International Maritime Organization (IMO). However, its member states rely completely on the international navies for the suppression of piracy while ReCAAP members have their own navies that actively engage in the fight.

\textbf{Instability in Yemen}

There are strong fears that the ongoing war in Yemen might lead to the country becoming a failed state, thus creating an “ungoverned space” for pirates and extremist groups in the region. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, and Al Shabab in the mountains off the Somali coast overlooking Yemen, coupled with pirates, could be the next great challenge for GCC countries. The AQAP, previously accused of maritime terrorism like the USS COLE bombing, currently controls some of the port cities in Yemen, asserting itself as the sole power in the area. They released 40 Somali pirates from prison when they captured Mukallah.\textsuperscript{42} Yemen has also supported the anti-piracy initiatives in the region including the Djibouti Code of Conduct’s Sana’a information sharing center.

While the above contributions are important, they are not sufficient in ending piracy in the region. In fact, GCC countries are better positioned to design and implement their own on-shore-based strategy while coordinating with the already existing counter-

\textsuperscript{41} The following GCC countries donated: United Arab Emirates, $890, 752; Kuwait, $445,376; Qatar, $344,538; Saudi Arabia, $300,000.

piracy initiatives. An approach that focuses on on-shore solutions is not only desirable but is more efficient and sustainable than the current containment-oriented approach. As Rick “Ozzi” Nelson and Scott Goossens argue “counter-piracy represents a chance for the GCC countries to lead. They should not pass up the opportunity.” On-shore strategy should focus on addressing the root causes – the development of local maritime industry for the coastal communities that are affected by piracy. GCC countries could also contribute to rebuilding state institutions in Somalia. Creating effective national institutions is the only permanent solution to ending piracy.

For the on-shore solution to work, the GCC should focus on assisting Somalia with the capacity to repatriate the outsourced functions of the state. That includes assisting Somalia with comprehensive counter-piracy legislation and strengthening judicial institutions to allow Somalia to detain, arrest and imprison pirates within the country. Finally, it is necessary to create effective national coastal guard institutions that are inclusive and legal. This would allow Somalia to protect its own territorial waters and resources as well as deter pirates from going out to sea to commit crimes.

This however is easier said than done, particularly when it comes to dealing with Somali authorities who are not yet ready to reliably deliver their part or become a credible partner. However, there is no alternative to investing in on-shore long-term solutions in ending piracy once and for all, and there is no more suitable body than the GCC to lead in this effort.

Conclusion

Piracy in the Horn of Africa has been a major security challenge for the last two decades (1995-2015). This paper has examined the impact that piracy has had on the GCC countries as well as the international community’s military response to piracy in the region. It has also assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the military approach and


44 Rick “Ozzi” Nelson and Scott Goossens, Counter-Piracy in the Arabian Seal Challenges and Opportunities for GCC Action, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Middle East program, May, 2011, 7.
discussed the limited role that the GCC countries played in counter-piracy activities (off-shore and on-shore). The authors argue that the heavy reliance on the use of navies is a short-term, inefficient and unsustainable way of ending piracy in the Horn of Africa. They thus call for the GCC countries to lead the on-shore effort, contending that these countries are well-placed to address the challenges on the ground.
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