On September 17, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif visited Riyadh and announced a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. The announcement of the Saudi–Pakistani defense agreement has injected a new element into the Gulf’s evolving security landscape. According to the publicized details, the agreement includes provisions for military cooperation and a nuclear security umbrella, signaling Pakistan’s readiness to extend strategic deterrence to the kingdom.
Its timing is particularly striking: the deal was unveiled just days after an Israeli strike on Doha, Qatar, targeted senior Hamas leaders, an event that rattled Gulf capitals and raised questions about the credibility of US security guarantees.
The post-Trump international order is being reshaped by shifting alliances, transactional diplomacy, and a weakening of traditional security arrangements. Gulf states, once deeply reliant on Washington’s protective shield, are increasingly hedging their bets by diversifying partnerships, revisiting past rivalries, and exploring alternative alignments. Israel’s attempt to entrench military dominance in the region only sharpens these dilemmas. For Gulf capitals, the new security environment is marked by uncertainty, compelling them to expand their options while facing diminishing trust in American commitments.
The Saudi–Pakistani Defense Agreement
Saudi Arabia’s defense partnership with Pakistan is not a new development, but the latest agreement underscores an elevation of strategic ties. Historically, Riyadh and Islamabad have cooperated closely on military training and strategic consultation. Pakistani military officers were embedded in Saudi institutions as early as the 1960s, and during the 1980s thousands of Pakistani troops were stationed in the kingdom to bolster its defenses against regional threats. This long history provides the foundation for the new and more ambitious defense pact.
The new agreement reportedly reaffirms this longstanding relationship but adds a significant dimension: extending Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence umbrella to Saudi Arabia. While details remain confidential, media leaks suggest a framework that envisions Pakistan as a guarantor of Saudi security in scenarios where regional escalation could threaten the kingdom’s survival.
The timing is crucial. The Israeli strike on Doha was not met with US deterrent action, and American reaction was interpreted by some Gulf policymakers as tacit approval. By moving quickly to finalize the Pakistani defense pact, Saudi Arabia signaled both its discontent with Washington and its determination to widen security choices. Pakistan, for its part, gains renewed financial and strategic relevance in the Gulf, strengthening its leverage in regional geopolitics.
The symbolism matters: the agreement sends a message to Israel that Saudi Arabia is not without recourse in the face of shifting security balances. It also reminds Washington that Riyadh can draw on non-Western partners, including nuclear-armed allies, when American guarantees appear hollow.
Waning Confidence in US Security Guarantees
The reliability of US security assurances to the Gulf has been eroding for years, but the trajectory becomes clearer when set against the historical backdrop of the American role in the region. Since President Jimmy Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address, the “Carter Doctrine” established that the United States would use military force if necessary to protect Gulf oil supplies. That commitment was dramatically demonstrated in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, when Washington mobilized a global coalition to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. For a generation of Gulf leaders, this episode confirmed that the United States was willing and able to underwrite regional security.
Yet the decades that followed saw erosion in this perception. The American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and abandoning it to Iran’s allies, the Obama administration’s reluctance to intervene in Syria in 2013, and the 2015 nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic all fed suspicions that Washington was less committed to Gulf security than before.
The September 2019 drone and missile attacks on Saudi Aramco’s facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais were a turning point. Despite the attacks briefly cutting Saudi oil production in half, the Trump administration refrained from a military response, underscoring a reluctance to confront Iran directly. For many in the Gulf, this episode revealed the limits of American commitments under the longstanding security partnership.
The Israeli strike on Doha reinforced these doubts. The perception that Washington not only failed to restrain Israel but may have granted a green light for the operation deepened Gulf skepticism. Qatar’s decision to fast-track negotiations on an enhanced defense deal agreement with the United States has not erased concerns. Since 2017, Doha has sought to hedge its bets by hosting a Turkish military base alongside the large American presence at al-Udeid Air Base. This dual posture illustrates a broader Gulf pattern: reliance on US power remains essential, but diversification has become a strategic imperative.
Saudi Arabia’s recalibration is even more evident. Alongside the new agreement with Pakistan, Riyadh pursued a rapprochement with Iran under Chinese mediation in 2023, recognizing that de-escalation with Tehran was necessary in a context of unreliable American guarantees. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has cultivated military ties with China, and a Chinese military facility was detected in the UAE by American spy services, further highlighting the Gulf’s drift toward multipolar hedging.
Washington’s unwillingness to offer firm commitments has also stalled key initiatives. The much-discussed Saudi–US nuclear cooperation agreement, once touted as imminent during Donald Trump’s last visit to Riyadh in May, has suddenly disappeared from the agenda. Similarly, Riyadh’s request for a binding defense treaty has been repeatedly linked to normalization with Israel, an increasingly unlikely prospect after the Gaza war. The Trump administration’s alignment with the Israeli far-right, particularly its pursuit of West Bank annexation, runs counter to Saudi Arabia’s declared priority of advancing a two-state solution.
The United States is trying to reassure its Gulf allies that the strike will not be repeated and that US security guarantees will continue, but this may not seem sufficient to them. Gulf states no longer view US guarantees as sufficient insurance against regional turbulence. This loss of confidence fuels the search for alternative arrangements, even if Washington remains the cornerstone of Gulf defense architecture.
Israel as a Strategic Challenge
For decades, Gulf threat perceptions were dominated by Iran’s regional behavior and nuclear ambitions. Today, Israel’s unrestrained military assertiveness is emerging as an equally destabilizing concern. The Israeli strike on Doha demonstrated that Israel is willing to project force beyond its immediate neighborhood, with little regard for regional stability or the sensitivities of US allies. The Israeli strike made normalization with Saudi Arabia much more remote than it was before.
While Gulf capitals do not anticipate a direct Israeli military threat against their own territories, the implications of unchecked Israeli dominance are unsettling. Israel’s effort to secure regional primacy by force runs counter to Gulf interests in stability, economic diversification, and diplomatic balancing. For Qatar, the attack raised an existential question: if Netanyahu claims the right to reshape the Middle East, could Gulf states themselves become targets of coercion? This anxiety extends beyond Doha. Saudi Arabia recognizes that Israel’s militarized approach to regional politics, if unmoderated by Washington, could trigger spirals of escalation involving Iran, proxy actors, and other regional powers. The erosion of US restraint mechanisms only heightens this risk.
The shift is notable: whereas Iran once represented the singular existential concern, Israel’s behavior is now seen as a catalyst for instability. Gulf policymakers fear that regional crises sparked by Israel could entangle them, even if they are not direct targets. The uncertainty surrounding Washington’s willingness to moderate Israeli behavior only deepens these concerns. Saudi Arabia is trying to maintain a good relationship with Iran in light of these concerns.
Moreover, the Gaza war has left a political residue that complicates Gulf calculations. Public opinion across the Arab world has hardened against normalization with Israel, making it more difficult for Gulf leaders to justify strategic alignment. Netanyahu’s rhetoric about “changing the Middle East” resonates ominously in Gulf capitals that worry about being caught in the crosshairs of a new regional order designed without their consent.
Despite their doubts, it is extremely unlikely that Gulf states would sever their security ties with Washington. US arms sales, training, and intelligence cooperation remain indispensable. The Gulf recognizes that alternative partners cannot fully replace American capabilities in the near term. Gulf states also understand that security is not merely military. The attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2019 highlighted the vulnerability of the energy infrastructure. Israel’s potential to disrupt regional energy flows, directly or indirectly, adds to Gulf anxieties. Strengthening cybersecurity, maritime defense, and energy resilience has become part of the wider strategic calculation.
Conclusion
The Israeli strike on Doha underscored a painful reality for Gulf capitals: they are not insulated from the shocks of regional power struggles, and no US guarantees would protect them. Israel’s aggressive pursuit of military primacy, combined with Washington’s reluctance to impose restraints, has created a volatile environment in which Gulf security cannot be taken for granted.
The Saudi–Pakistani defense pact illustrates one pathway forward: diversification of security guarantees beyond Washington. Qatar’s reliance on Turkey, the Saudi agreement with Pakistan, and the Emirati engagement with China reflect the same impulse. These moves do not signify an abandonment of the US alliance but rather a recalibration to reduce vulnerability to American ambivalence.
Still, the Gulf’s options for diversifying its security partnerships are not a substitute for the American security umbrella. The United States retains unmatched military assets and strategic depth in the region. Gulf leaders will continue to rely on Washington while sending clear signals of unease. The challenge is to craft strategies that protect Gulf security without triggering confrontation with Israel. Ultimately, the post-Trump era compels Gulf states to navigate a more fragmented, less predictable security environment. Their response so far reflects a pragmatic recognition: while America’s protective shield is weakening, no alternative can fully replace it.
The Gulf has begun considering new strategies to ensure its security, but the vision needs more time to become clearer. At the same time, Gulf states are sending repeated signals to Washington, urging it to recognize and safeguard the interests of its Gulf allies rather than granting Israel an unrestrained hand in the region. These messages of concern will continue, as Gulf capitals wait for a tangible American response.
