In late April 2025, sectarian violence broke out in the towns of Jaramana, Sahnaya, and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya in the Damascus countryside, home to a majority of Syrian Druze citizens. Dozens of civilians, local militants, and public security forces were killed or injured in the clashes, which spread from the outskirts of the capital to the countryside of the Sweida Governorate, also home to a Druze majority. This threatened to spark wider confrontations,
especially following an Israeli intervention under the pretext of protecting the Druze community from sectarian massacres. This is the second violent confrontation to shake the country since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024, following the sectarian events along the coast in early March 2025.[1] The recent clashes ended with security forces regaining control of the three towns in the Damascus countryside, following an agreement to hand over weapons held by local groups. Meanwhile, armed groups in Sweida held on to their weapons, despite an agreement with the central government stipulating that the province’s residents would assume responsibility for maintaining security after they were integrated into the ranks of the General Security Forces.
Background
The tensions began with an audio recording attributed to a Druze cleric, insulting the Prophet Muhammad, which triggered widespread anger and a wave of incitement across social media platforms. The sheikh to whom the recording was attributed denied any connection to the clip, the recording was deemed fabricated, and several Druze sheikhs denounced the content, with the original source untraceable. These responses failed to contain reactionary mobilization against the Druze as a whole, leading to clashes, particularly in areas with a mixed demography.
Tensions that began in the university campus in Homs developed into fistfights between students, leading to the evacuation of Druze students from the city. The clashes quickly spread to Sweida, particularly within Bedouin neighbourhoods, and the outskirts of Damascus. The most significant security escalation began in the city of Jaramana, located on the airport road east of Damascus, on the evening of 28 April 2025. Clashes erupted in several locations after armed elements attacked the city and clashed with local groups. The General Security Service, affiliated with the Ministry of Interior, intervened, and direct confrontations erupted, resulting in an initial death toll of 14 people. Tensions spread to the towns of Sahnaya and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya in the western Damascus countryside, where armed groups – described by the Ministry of Interior as “outlaws” – launched attacks targeting security forces, indicating that sectarian tensions had descended into open confrontation.
Accordingly, the ministry deployed security and military reinforcements,[2] imposed a security cordon around the trouble zones, and closed roads leading to the affected areas, in an attempt to regain control of the area and pursue those involved in the violence.[3] The clashes extended to the western countryside of the Sweida governorate, where dozens were killed and wounded.[4] Sweida, which had revolted against Assad’s authority since September 2023, refused, after the fall of his regime in December 2024, to allow the entry of the General Security Forces affiliated with the new Syrian administration. The armed factions there refused to hand over their weapons, and spiritual leader of the Druze in Syria, Hikmat al-Hijri, has opposed recognizing the new authority in Damascus. It has also been suggested that the Sweida Military Council had requested protection from Israel.
Containing the Crisis
Efforts by the Syrian authorities, in coordination with local dignitaries and Druze religious leaders, resulted in a ceasefire agreement in Jaramana, Sahnaya, and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya.[5] The agreement stipulates the immediate surrender of heavy weapons, while unlicensed individual weapons would be surrendered within a specified timeframe. Possession of weapons would be exclusively in the hands of official state institutions, and the deployment of public security forces would be increased within the city to consolidate stability and ensure a return to normal life.[6] Anyone retaining any type of weapon after the expiration of the timeframe would be considered a criminal.[7]
The Spiritual Leadership of the Druze Muslims in Sweida, along with dignitaries from the province and representatives of the military factions, held a meeting in which they agreed to direct their demands to the government in Damascus. These demands are: 1) Establishing a security force and a judicial police force exclusively drawn from the residents of Sweida, with immediate effect; 2) Lifting the siege on the areas of Sweida, Jaramana, Sahnaya, and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya, and an abrupt return to normal; 3) Securing the Damascus-Sweida highway and ensuring its safety and security, under the responsibility of the authorities; and 4) A region-wide ceasefire.[8] The Syrian administration in Damascus has agreed to the terms of the initiative reached by the province's leaders, hoping to contain the escalation and end the crisis.
Repercussions of Sectarian Tensions
The sectarian clashes that swept through the Druze-majority areas surrounding Damascus and Sweida represent a continuation of the sectarian violence that, since the fall of the regime, has spread from one Syrian region to another. This violence has become a real threat to the country’s territorial and societal unity. Even minor incidents can lead to widespread sectarian clashes that engulf entire governorates. The situation has been exacerbated by the proliferation of armed non-state individuals and local groups, amid the absence of a clear and decisive stance from the authorities regarding sectarian incitement and the sectarian religious rhetoric that serves as a cover for it.
Moreover, the government has been unable to control the armed factions acting in its name or affiliated with it. Widespread sectarian violence erupted in the Syrian coastal region in March 2025, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,700 security forces and civilians, according to the latest update by the Syrian Network for Human Rights, including children and women.[9] These attacks were carried out in retaliation by groups affiliated with the government, which the government described as out of control, in response to attacks by groups linked to the former regime. However, the recent sectarian clashes have become increasingly complex and dangerous following Israeli interference, which is motivated by a desire to dominate southern Syria and transform it into an Israeli zone of influence, exploiting Druze sectarian strife between southern Syria and northern Palestine.
Israel is exploiting the sectarian tensions in Syria to reshape the landscape in southern Syria. It prevents Syrian government forces from entering the region, thereby pursuing its goal of fragmenting Syria into sectarian cantons. This scenario could have repercussions extending far beyond Syria’s borders to the wider Levant, particularly Lebanon and Jordan. In this context, Israel is presenting itself as the protector of the Druze community and offering them financial incentives and the provision of infrastructure and health services, which the Syrian government is currently unable to provide.
In a practical translation of these policies, the Israeli Air Force has carried out raids targeting the vicinity of the town of Sahnaya in the Damascus countryside, coinciding with intensive warplane raids in Syrian airspace. These raids were preceded by a drone strike targeting a Syrian security forces site on the outskirts of the city. Israel claimed that its members had been planning to launch attacks against the Druze population. The raids resulted in the death of one member of the security forces as well as several injuries. The Israeli army linked these operations to internal developments in Syria, with its spokesperson stating that the Chief of Staff had issued instructions to target Syrian government sites if what it described as “acts of violence against members of the Druze community” continued.[10]
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz released a joint statement stating that the Israeli occupation army carried out a “warning operation” targeting a group allegedly preparing to attack Syrian Druze in Ashrafiyat Sahnaya. This was intended as a message to the Damascus government to prevent any harm to the Druze.[11] Israeli intervention was not limited to these raids, but escalated into widespread airstrikes, as part of attempts to exploit the clashes to impose its control over southern Syria. These attacks are unprecedented level, with raids targeting the vicinity of the presidential palace in Damascus, as well as other Syrian areas.[12]
Conclusion
The escalating sectarian violence in Syria has come to pose a major challenge to the country’s stability, unity, and ability to recover from its 14-year internal crisis. This is an existential national issue that requires a radical approach; temporary local truces in specific areas are not an effective solution. The situation requires a comprehensive solution that both shuts down Israeli-led plans to divide the country and confronts interference in its internal affairs under the pretext of protecting minorities, as expressed by the positions of some Western countries, most notably the United States, which has made protecting minorities a primary condition for lifting sanctions on Syria.
The new Syrian administration remains unable to address the roots of the sectarian problem, and some close associates view this as a natural phenomenon. This administration bears primary responsibility for healing the rifts between Syrian society’s various groups. This means it is crucial that Syrians regain confidence in their government’s ability to protect and represent them all, without bias toward any particular political or sectarian faction. To achieve this, the government must take important additional steps, most notably involving all segments of Syrian society in the political process and activating Article 7 of the Constitutional Declaration, which prohibits “inciting strife and incitement to violence”. This includes the criminalization of public sectarian and religious incitement in Syria, particularly through social media. It must also prevent security forces from discriminating between citizens based on sectarian affiliation and treat all Syrians as equal citizens in rights and duties, regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliations. Furthermore, it must initiate a transitional justice process that ensures criminals are held accountable and limits extrajudicial reprisals. With these measures, Syria can emerge from its current crisis and prevent Israel from implementing its plans to dismantle the country and transform it into warring sectarian cantons.
[1] “Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Coast: Background and Implications”, Situation Assessment, ACRPS, 13/3/2025, last accessed 7/5/2025 at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRzr
[2] "General Security Forces Deployed to the Outskirts of Jaramana to Maintain Security and Enhance Stability in the Region," SANA, 29/4/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/k46pj
[3] “Ashrafiyat Sahnaya Events: Syrian Security Deployment and International Contacts to Contain the Crisis,”
Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30/4/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/ow9fv
[4] “Deaths in clashes in the town of Ashrafiyat Sahnaya in the Damascus countryside,”
Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 30/4/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/cu5y0k
[5] “A preliminary agreement was reached to cease fire in Jaramana and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya,” SANA, 30/4/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/uhg4ty
[6] “Director of the Damascus Countryside Security Directorate, Lieutenant Colonel Hussam al-Tahhan, to SANA: An agreement regarding the city of Jaramana between representatives of the Syrian government and notables of the city of Jaramana stipulates the immediate surrender of heavy weapons and the increased deployment of General Security forces in the city to consolidate stability and return life to normal,” SANA, 1/5/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/54s8zq
[7] “Implementation of the arms surrender agreement begins in Jaramana, Damascus countryside”,
Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 4/5/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/xler7
[8] Bani Ma’ruf ‘Druze Monotheists’ Facebook page, 3/5/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/ixf2j
[9] “Update on the toll of extrajudicial killings that occurred in the context of the events that took place on the coast between 6 and 10 March,” Syrian Network for Human Rights, 16/4/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRuo
[10] “Israeli raids on Sahnaya and the General Security announces the end of the ‘security operation’ in the area,”
Al Jazeera, 30/4/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/uh3t2
[11] “Netanyahu: We carried out a warning strike against ‘extremists’ who were preparing to attack the Druze in Syria,”
Asharq Al-Awsat, 30/4/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/4il1m
[12] "Katz sends warning to al-Sharaa after airstrikes near the presidential palace in Damascus,"
Al Jazeera, 2/5/2025, accessed 7/5/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/iu19g
