Lebanon Seeks a State Monopoly on Arms: Political and Security Implications

The US Plan to Disarm Hezbollah

The recent Israeli war on Lebanon, which inflicted severe damage to Hezbollah’s capabilities[2] and decimated its political, security, and military leadership,[3] gave the United States and Israel an opportunity to impose a new reality in Lebanon. On 19 June, US envoy Tom Barrack presented a proposal to the Lebanese government to extend and stabilise the ceasefire concluded on 27 November 2024.[4] It included a package of political and security provisions – most notably, the disarmament of Hezbollah, in exchange for steps by Israel including the withdrawal of its forces from five border points where it has retained forces since the end of its aggression against Lebanon, an end to ground and air violations, demarcation of the border, and support for the Lebanese army’s capabilities, in addition to the release of funds allocated for the reconstruction of areas Israel destroyed in the latest war.[5]

In its initial response to the US proposal, the Lebanese government merely presented “ideas for a solution,” without endorsing it. It did express the “state’s commitment” to restoring its exclusive right to possess weapons and use force, a principle enshrined in the Lebanese constitution. However, it also emphasized that any further progress in disarming Hezbollah would first require Israel to withdraw from all the Lebanese territories it occupies, and an end to its repeated violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty.[6] However, the US stepped up the pressure on the Lebanese government to compel it to respond to the terms of Washington’s proposal. Barrack made two consecutive visits to Beirut, on 7-8 July [7] and again two weeks later, to extract a response from the Lebanese government. He said his frequent visits reflected US President Donald Trump’s “great interest” in bringing stability to the region.

On 3 August, the US presented the Lebanese government with the final version of its document aimed at “Consolidating the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement,” following a series of contacts and exchanges between the two sides. The document presented a detailed vision for extending the cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel, based on a combination of pressures (such as threatening to impose economic sanctions in the event of non-compliance) and incentives (including providing economic aid and support for reconstruction efforts). The document laid out 11 specific objectives, including disarming Hezbollah, demarcating Lebanon’s land borders with both Israel and Syria, addressing the issue of cross-border drug smuggling, and deploying the Lebanese Army in border areas and key domestic locations. It also stipulated Israel’s withdrawal from five locations it still occupies in southern Lebanon, the resolution of border and prisoner issues through diplomatic channels, the return of displaced persons to their villages, and the holding of an international economic conference attended by the US, France, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other countries in order to support the Lebanese economy and enhance the capacities of the army and security services.[8]

The document also set out a timeline for implementing the proposal, divided into four phases, with a total duration ranging from two weeks to four months. Implementation would begin with the Lebanese government’s agreement to abide by the memorandum, through an official decree that includes a pledge to disarm Hezbollah and all non-state armed groups by 31 December, 2025. In return, the US side would commit to strengthening cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, facilitating reconstruction efforts, and providing incentives for investment in Lebanon.

As US pressure mounted, the Lebanese Council of Ministers held a session on 5 August 2025, of which a large portion was devoted to discussing the clause on “restricting the possession of weapons to the Lebanese state,”[9] a clear reference to Hezbollah’s arsenal. This was the first time this issue had been officially raised for discussion by any government since the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended Lebanon’s civil war. The session saw a lengthy discussion, after which the ministers of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement withdrew. The meeting was held under pressure, as the US linked the continuation of its efforts to calm the situation on the southern front to Lebanon taking a clear position on Hezbollah’s weapons, and threatened to freeze its mediation were the political process to falter. At the end of the session, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam affirmed that the inaugural address and the ministerial statement had emphasized “the state’s exclusive right to a monopoly over weapons.” He announced that the Council of Ministers had decided to continue discussing the US document at its next session, on 7 August, and to task the army with preparing an executive plan to restrict the possession of weapons to the state by the end of the year. This is to be presented to the government at the end of the month for discussion and ratification. When the 7 August session came around, the government voted to approve the terms of the American document.

Hezbollah’s Response

Hezbollah did not wait until the August meeting to announce that it rejected the plan. On 5 August, the movement’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, announced his refusal to set what he described as a timetable “under cover of occupation.” He affirmed that “resistance is part of the Taif Accord” and that “a constitutional issue cannot be discussed through a vote.”[10] As for the Lebanese government’s decision to task the army with preparing a plan to restrict possession of weapons in the country to the state by the end of the year, Hezbollah described it as a “great sin,” as it would amount to stripping Lebanon of the arsenal it needed to “resist Israeli-American aggression,” thus achieving what Israel had been unable to obtain through its attacks on Lebanon. Hezbollah therefore described the decision as a clear violation of the Taif accord and the government’s ministerial statement.[11]

Accordingly, Hezbollah and its ally, the Amal Movement, announced that they would “treat the decision as if it did not exist,” accusing the government of bowing to “American dictates.” That said, Hezbollah affirmed its openness to dialogue and its willingness to discuss a national security strategy, even as its parliamentary bloc described the prime minister’s adoption of the American plan as a “coup against the pledges he made in the ministerial statement,” considering the “suspicious haste” in meeting Washington’s demands a violation of the charter and a breach of the Taif Agreement.

The government’s decision prompted Hezbollah supporters to take to the streets, but their protests remained peaceful and limited, in contrast to the party’s clashes with the government in May 2008. Its supporters organised nighttime motorcycle parades in Beirut’s southern suburbs and other neighbourhoods of the capital, to voice their objection to “handing over the weapons of the resistance.” The Lebanese army responded with a statement affirming that it “will not allow any breach of security, violation of civil peace, blocking of roads, or encroachment on public and private property,” calling on all citizens and political forces to act responsibly at this delicate moment.[12]

The Government’s Options and Hezbollah’s Likely Reaction

US pressure, aimed at accelerating the process of disarming Hezbollah, could initiate a scenario that the Lebanese government has long sought to avoid: a slide into a direct confrontation with the movement, dragging the army into a domestic clash with serious consequences for Lebanon’s security and stability. On the other hand, were the government to renege on its commitments, this would place it in a confrontation with Washington, and could trigger a major Israeli escalation against Lebanon. The Lebanese government appears to have decided on its course, having tasked the army with preparing a procedural and executive plan up until the end of 2025 to impose a state monopoly on the use of force.

Given the pressure from the US, it is unlikely the government will attempt to back down from this step, especially given the agreement among major international powers (the US, Saudi Arabia, and the European Union) on the principle of the Lebanese state imposing a monopoly on arms. This means that the government has made up its mind on the matter, and the main question is no longer over the position of the government, but how the decision will be implemented and how Hezbollah, which remains part of the government, will respond. The question now is whether it will accept this path or seek to obstruct it. What will the party do if it finds itself besieged? Will it be forced to surrender its remaining arsenal, or will it defend it?

The US approach is based on the assumption that the best mechanism through which the movement can be effectively disarmed is the Lebanese Army, seen as the “best, neutral, and trusted mediator,” even if it faces a severe funding shortage due to Lebanon’s economic collapse.[13]

Before the government issued its official response to the US proposal on 7 August, Hezbollah adopted an approach based on limited cooperation on the disarmament issue, particularly in the areas south of the Litani River, in order to contain international pressure, buy time for a gradual recovery, and deliberately maintain its ambiguity regarding the future of its arsenal. Its Secretary-General reiterated the party’s traditional position, linking the issue of its weapons to the national dialogue on Lebanon’s defence strategy.[14] However, the Lebanese government’s decision to impose a state monopoly on the possession of arms and task the army with developing a plan to implement this by the end of the year has closed the door to Hezbollah’s manoeuvring and placing it on a course to a confrontation with the government – a showdown that is now manifesting through a combination of calculated popular escalation and direct political positions.

Hezbollah may find itself with a list of options, ranging from escalation on the ground and mobilizing its supporters in the street to prevent the emergence of any national consensus – a path on which it has already set out by organizing the motorbike protests – up to and including a broader protest movement that could escalate into major public demonstrations. This remains dependent on the scale of the response from its popular base. The movement, with the support of its allies, may also resort to disrupting the government’s work, if it can summon the necessary political bloc. However, this seems like a weak possibility, given the emergence of a Lebanese consensus, with the exception of the “Shi’i duo” of Hezbollah and Amal, on the question of restricting arms to the state. Many fear that “cornering” Hezbollah could push it to repeat the scenario of 7 May, 2008, which saw armed clashes in Beirut and elsewhere in response to government decisions against the movement, most notably attempts to dismantle its communications network. However, Hezbollah’s ability to repeat such a scenario has weakened due to the decline of its political power and security capabilities. Furthermore, any new escalation could fail to find the political cover, as happened with the Doha Agreement in 2008, and certainly risks bringing it into conflict with the Lebanese Army.

In any case, Hezbollah, and Lebanon as a whole, appear to be facing what may be their most difficult challenge since the end of the civil war in 1990. Although the timing of the government’s decision suggests that it is a response to US pressure and an attempt to avoid becoming politically and diplomatically isolated, the granting of a deadline until the end of 2025 and making do with approval of the objectives of the American document without discussing its remaining mechanisms reflect the Lebanese authorities’ desire to avoid a clash with Hezbollah and avert a crisis of trust with the Shi’i community. This gives Hezbollah a window to adapt to the decision or seek to influence its trajectory and content, in line with the potential shifts that may emerge from developments in the broader region, given the fragile security and political situation currently prevailing in the region.

Conclusion

Adopting the American demand to restrict arms to the Lebanese state poses extreme risks to Lebanon’s security and stability. It could even push the country toward civil war, as it could pit the Lebanese army against Hezbollah were the government to implement the decision to impose a state monopoly on arms without reaching understandings with the party. This is a matter on which the government and Hezbollah must strive to reach an understanding, to deny Israel the opportunity to pit Lebanese forces against each other. While it is necessary to acknowledge that Hezbollah has suffered a painful blow that has damaged its ability to confront Israel, it would be a mistake for certain Lebanese political forces to believe that an Israeli victory is a victory for themselves. This is the last thing Lebanon needs. It is vital that no political or social faction impose the rules of the conflict with Israel on internal relations.

[1] Gavin Blackburn, “Lebanon Backs US Proposal for Hezbollah to Disarm and IDF to Withdraw from South,” Euronews, 7/8/2025, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9GPmI.

[2] “Israel Signals Escalation with Attacks on Hezbollah Communications Devices,” Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 22/9/2024, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/pager-massacre-implications-for-lebanon.aspx.

[3] “After Assassinating Nasrallah, Will Israel Escalate Further?,” Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 30/9/2024, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/israeli-aggression-in-lebanon-after-nasrallah-assassinated-in-strikes.aspx.

[4] “Israel Hezbollah Ceasefire: Drivers and Challenges,” Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 3/12/2024, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/hezbollah-israel-ceasefire-drivers-and-challenges.aspx.

[5] William Christou, “US Demands for Hezbollah Disarmament May Force Lebanon into Dangerous Choice,” The Guardian, 7/8/2025, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://n9.cl/wut07.

[6] “US Envoy Hails Lebanon’s Response to Hezbollah Disarmament Proposals,” Al Jazeera, 7/7/2025, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://n9.cl/l3h2o.

[7] “The US Asked Lebanon to Disarm Hezbollah. How Did Lebanon Respond?” Al Jazeera, 8/7/2025, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://n9.cl/2qjuo.

[8] Laila Bassam, "US Plan Sees Hezbollah Disarmed by Year-End, Israeli Withdrawal," Reuters, 7/8/2025, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://n9.cl/dyzlm.

[9] “Lebanon tasks army with enforcing monopoly on arms, in challenge to Hezbollah,” Al Jazeera, 5/8/2025, accessed 13/8/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://n9.cl/1kqzt.

[10] “Sheikh Qassem: the withdrawal of weapons does not concern us, and resistance is part of the Taif Agreement and a constitutional issue,” Al-Manar, 5/8/2025, accessed 13/8/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://n9.cl/ahrrci.

[11] Rita El Jammal, “Hezbollah rejects the arms restriction agreement: ‘We will act as if it doesn’t exist,’” Al-Araby al-Jadeed, 6/8/2025, accessed 13/8/2025, at: https://n9.cl/tlvh0.

[12] “Lebanese Army warns against consequences of protests over arms restrictions,” Al Jazeera, 9/8/2025, accessed 13/8/2025, at: https://n9.cl/7ibyw.

[13] Michael Young, “Beirut Can Do More on Tom Barrack’s Proposal,” Diwan (blog of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 15/7/2025, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://n9.cl/gixzk.

[14] Bilal Y. Saab, “Lebanon’s Moment of Truth,” Chatham House, 9/7/2025, accessed on 13/8/2025, at: https://n9.cl/ltgodb.