What do the Latest Tripoli Clashes Mean for Libya’s Political and Security Landscape?

On 12 May, gunfights rocked Libya’s capital as armed groups backing Abdul Hamid Dbeibah’s Government of National Unity (GNU) clashed with others affiliated with the country’s Presidential Council. The fighting was sparked by the killing of the commander of the so-called Stabilization Support Apparatus (SSA), Abdul Ghani al-Kikli. It was followed by angry protests, interspersed with clashes in the Abu Salim district – Al-Kikli’s stronghold and location of the SSA’s headquarters – as well as in the Tajoura area and northwestern neighbourhoods of the capital, home to the Special Deterrence Forces (better known as Rada) and its ally the Judicial Police. The clashes were fuelled by a tense political context, marked by sharp divisions among Libya’s many actors and accentuated by growing regional and international interventions.

Armed Clashes and an Angry Street

Reports also emerged of armed groups from Misrata and its neighbouring cities storming the SSA headquarters in Zliten and its surroundings. On the evening of Monday, 12 May, news came of the killing of Al-Kikli and a number of his bodyguards; a number of other fighters and senior figures from armed groups from Misrata were also killed or wounded, in murky circumstances. That reportedly took place while they were attending a meeting of military and security commanders at the Tambala military base south of Tripoli, home to the headquarters of the 444th Combat Brigade, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Defence.

Al-Kikli’s killing sparked fierce clashes between the SSA and the 444th Brigade, which – backed by the 111th Brigade, which is also affiliated with the Ministry of Defence – seized every SSA base in the capital, including the group’s central headquarters in Abu Salim. These forces also seized most of the SSA’s equipment and vehicles and freed a group of prisoners from its detention centres.

The clashes triggered a wave of chaos and looting in Abu Salim, although this subsided after a few hours. The 444th Brigade was now in control of the neighbourhood, and an uneasy calm returned to most of the capital the following morning. However, it was not to last: the 444th Brigade engaged in more clashes that evening with Rada, which – backed by the Judicial Police – controls the northeast of the capital, including Mitiga Airport, the seaport, and several prisons and detention centres.

The 444th Brigade made territorial advances early on in its fight with Rada. Subsequent mediation efforts involving militia commanders and public figures managed to achieve a ceasefire. The Counter-Terrorism Force, an armed group also affiliated with the Ministry of Defence that draws most of its personnel from Misrata, undertook to keep the belligerents apart. The 444th Brigade withdrew its men from Abu Salim, and patrols from the Security Directorates Support Agency (a GNU-affiliated force that did not participate in the clashes) were deployed in their place.

Reactions Deepen the Divisions

The reactions of the various actors suggest that the armed clashes and subsequent demonstrations were merely a reflection of intensifying political tensions, with each side insisting on moving forward with its own agenda. This was reflected in Dbeibah’s determination to maintain the battlefield gains his loyalists had achieved by removing Al-Kikli, the most powerful militia leader in Tripoli, and taking control of Abu Salim, the capital’s largest neighbourhood, with the support of powerful armed groups such as the 444th Brigade and militias from Misrata. Dbeibah’s supporters also control several locations in the northeast of the capital. In addition, he has used other means to put his opponents in a difficult position, leveraging a briefing by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim Khan, in which he accused the head of the Judicial Police, a close associate of Rada head Raouf Karah, of corruption, torture, rape, and illegal detention, demanding that he be arrested and handed over to the court.

The Political Context of the Crisis

The May clashes and subsequent demonstrations add a new factor that further deepens Libya’s divisions and complicates the path forward. They mark a shift from a dynamic of institutional and political fragmentation, pitting the GNU-controlled west against the eastern and southern regions dominated by Haftar and administered by Hamad’s parallel government, to one of internal divisions in western Libya and Tripoli itself. This has hobbled efforts to create an institutional or political framework to engage with UNSMIL’s initiative.

A Transitional Phase with New Faces?

The latest crisis may prompt pro-Dbeibah forces to seize the opportunity and dismantle their opponents’ military apparatus – especially that of Rada – either through carefully planned military operations, through negotiations with their social base and guarantees to integrate their fighters into the Ministries of Defence and the Interior, or by buying the loyalty of key commanders.

Conversely, the Haftar-Saleh camp appears intent on using the media to capitalize on the violence in Tripoli, in order to mobilize the public against the GNU and demonstrate the administration’s unpopularity in western Libya in general and Tripoli in particular. The eastern camp also looks determined to move forward with its efforts to form a new government, which it is promoting as representing an end to the current institutional division, in partnership with the HSC. However, absent a green light from world powers, Haftar’s forces are unlikely to launch a military operation against the capital as they did in 2019.

Previous experience shows that any attempt to shift the balance of power in Libya cannot succeed without international and UN support or sponsorship. Both the Libyan political dialogue that produced the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj in 2015, and that which led to the formation of Dbeibah’s GNU and the Presidential Council headed by Menfi in 2021, were conducted under international and UN auspices. Therefore, the proposal prepared by the advisory committee set up by the UN mission may represent a framework for breaking the current deadlock, whether in the proposed form or an amended one with an expanded base of participants.

Conclusion

The fighting in Tripoli in mid-May came as little surprise, given the polarization that has long prevailed in Libya. However, it represented the largest and most consequential armed confrontation inside the capital since 2014, killing the leader of Tripoli’s largest armed group, who had been a powerful security actor with far-reaching influence over political, financial, and service institutions.

Despite the rapid territorial gains by pro-GNU armed groups, a complete victory on the ground appears elusive. This is likely to lead to further tensions, given the complexity of the divisions and each actor’s determination to protect its own interests. However, several indicators suggest that an international or UN-led intervention is imminent, with a package of arrangements that could produce a roadmap toward elections and a transitional authority with new faces. This could include a carefully studied departure of the current political class.

However, such a departure would likely be temporary, representing a phased management of the crisis. It is a mistake to expect world powers to be more committed to preserving the unity and sovereignty of the Libyan state than Libya’s main political forces themselves, whose mutual relations are marked by deep mistrust – and who have yet to demonstrate any will to subordinate their disputes and power struggles to the unity and sovereignty of the state, enabling those conflicts to be managed peacefully within the framework of state institutions.