Introduction
NATO and EU members, and several other states, provided considerable military assistance to Ukraine in the year following Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. This assistance included both financial mechanisms to support military ends and the donation of substantial volumes of a broad and growing range of weapons systems. NATO and EU member states also likely assisted Ukraine by providing military intelligence that impacted the course of the war.[1] However, given the lack of public information on the supply and use of intelligence, this aspect is not considered here.
According to estimates by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, whose ‘Ukraine Support Tracker’ is the most credible source of data on military and other assistance to Ukraine, supporting states provided some 68.5 billion euros’ worth of arms and military equipment on a bilateral basis between 24 January 2022 and 24 February 2023; those supporting states that are also EU members provided an additional 3.6 billion euros’ worth in the same period through common funding.[2] This support undoubtedly changed the course of the war: notwithstanding the enormous courage, spirit and adaptability of the Ukrainian people, it is almost certain that without foreign military assistance, Ukraine would not have been able to fight for so long, or to have achieved many of its successes on the battlefield.
Despite their public pledges to help Ukraine to the greatest possible extent, however, the supporting states provided far less military assistance than Ukraine requested, both in terms of quantity, and levels of sophistication and lethality. They worried about provoking a response from Russia, and about the depletion of their own inventories. They sometimes quarrelled openly about the level and nature of assistance they should provide, while setting red lines only to later step over them. Providing support to best match Ukraine’s needs while at the same time preserving vital cohesion among the supporting states has thus proved complex.
Russia too was a recipient of military assistance, although this was not as visible as the support to Ukraine, or at anything approaching similar levels. It was also most likely on a more commercial basis. Nonetheless, this support too shifted the war’s course. Perhaps the most notable example is Russia’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to force Ukraine to the negotiating table by attacking energy infrastructure in the winter of 2022-3 – a tactic that would have been difficult to implement without the supply of inexpensive Iranian loitering munitions.
