Introduction
In August 2008, the war between Georgia and Russia, despite lasting only a few days, marked the culmination of long-standing tensions between the Russian Federation, as the successor state to the USSR, and the newly independent Republic of Georgia. This conventional clash between the armed forces of two nations underscored the complex dynamics of a former colonizer engaging in what appeared to be a hybrid war against its former colony.
Notably, this involved the utilization of armed non-state actors (ANSA). Post-war, Russian interference in Georgia's internal affairs persisted, leading to a lack of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Notably, Russia maintained its military presence on Georgian soil without the latter's consent. This article primarily investigates events leading to the war, shedding light on the mechanisms and rationale behind Russia's aggression towards its smaller Southern neighbour. It draws parallels with the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict, providing insights into the broader context of geopolitical tensions and hybrid warfare strategies employed by powerful nations against their smaller counterparts.
Based on an analysis of contemporary Russian strategic thought and specific policies enacted by the Kremlin towards Ukraine and Georgia, it is evident that this confrontation has, from its inception, incorporated methods now recognized as Hybrid Warfare. This approach involves refraining from formally declaring war, intentionally blurring the boundaries between war and peace, and combining information warfare, economic and diplomatic pressures, with the subversive activities of special services and elite units, as well as armed non-state actors (ANSAs). Remarkably, during both the 1990s and the large-scale Russian army intervention in Georgia in 2008, the concept of Hybrid Warfare was not explicitly applied to these conflicts. Only in 2014, following the outbreak of armed action in Crimea and the Eastern Ukraine, masterminded by the Moscow leadership, some experts retrospectively revealed the common hybrid tactics of Russia in both cases, employed long before its open military confrontation.
The article hypothesizes that foreign support of armed insurgencies is one element of hybrid war, which is why ANSAs have become increasingly capable of challenging the states, as happened in Ukraine prior to 2022 large scale invasion, as well as in Georgia. However, both cases reveal the limitations of hybrid threats, when the targeted state becomes consolidated and finds strategic allies, while ANSAs remain materially weak. In August 2008 especially Russian officials and operatives on the ground realized that insurgents in Georgia were losing ground to increasingly modernized state and military. Faced with this shift in dynamics , Russia was compelled to resort to conventional warfare.
The first part of this article deals with the political and geopolitical factors contributing to the severity of the Russo-Georgian confrontation following the collapse of the USSR, acknowledging the different stages of such confrontation. Shifting focus, the second section scrutinizes the Ukrainian scenario, examining Russian hybrid and subsequent conventional warfare, providing a comparative framework to retrospectively navigate the Georgian example. The third section directly analyses of Russo-Georgian conflict and the role played by ANSAs. Concluding remarks reiterate that Russia's reliance on ANSAs proves ineffective when confronted by consolidated states like Georgia and Ukraine with international backing. Nevertheless, the article notes that the Georgian case is ongoing, cautioning that its state's democratic consolidation is yet to reach completion.
