The ACRPS has published Lebanon’s October 17 Uprising: Squares and Testimonies (512 pp.) by Paul Tabar et al. and prepared, coordinated, and edited by Khaled Ziadeh and Mohammed Abi Samra. Methodologically, this book would be classified as “contemporary history”, where historians are concerned with studying events via observation and using written and oral testimonies and documents. Contemporary history is part of political history because it addresses revolutionary events and the transformations that result from unrest and uprisings alongside economic and cultural developments. A large portion of the book’s task is devoted to documenting the uprising and studying some of its preconditions and events, as well as stimulating discussion on what it achieved and what it failed to achieve. It offers a contribution to research on uprisings and the sociology of politics in Lebanon and other Arab countries.
Lebanon saw three moments from 2011 to 2019 during which activists demonstrated in the streets. In 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, protesters for the first time began chanting the famous slogan “the people want to overthrow the regime” [al-shaʿb yurīd ʾisqāṭ al-niẓām]. They were not met with repression, as was happening in Libya, Egypt, and Syria, where the regime is centred around the head of government; in Lebanon, the regime is split between a set of sectarian movements and parties that had varying attitudes toward the revolution in Syria.
In 2013, protesters again took to the streets after parliament extended its own term on the pretext of unfavourable conditions for elections – an excuse that, despite being unconvincing, would recur several times until 2018. Perhaps the broadest of these movements came as a result of the garbage crisis in 2015 under the slogan “You Stink!” [ṭolʿet rīḥetkon], directed at the incompetent authorities which were unable to solve the refuse collection issue. Unlike the 2011 and 2013 protests, the 2015 movement was widely supported among Lebanese, who were becoming aware of the extent of government corruption and incompetence.
The October 17 Uprising and subsequent developments underscore the need to adopt a nonterritorial perspective on Lebanon to understand and analyse the participation of expatriates, given its impact on Lebanon as a society and political regime. Through this perspective, the role of the diaspora transforms from a kind of subordinate participation in the homeland into a separate, independent phenomenon with its own modes of influence (e.g., lobbying groups, heavy social media use, demonstrations, publishing declarations and petitions, etc.) that reproduce themselves in identity and organization to promote the image expatriates have of their country. It thus becomes possible to evaluate the diaspora’s significance while avoiding the pitfall of reducing it to simply an echo or extension of what is happening in the home country.
For wide segments of the diaspora, this interaction produced a kind of national affiliation that transcends politicized local allegiances, especially sectarian, as is evident in calls to do away with the sectarian regime and the politicians that symbolize it. As transregional expatriate communities took shape and set goals, lending momentum and continuity to the reforms initiated by October 17, an imagined, transnational diaspora identity emerged as a foundation for activating and developing the role of the Lebanese diaspora, whose loss of confidence in the ruling class represented an essential step toward transforming the political and economic situation and building a better country for all.
The October 17 movement was only able to galvanize public opinion during its first six months, with a degree of backing from private media outlets. At that time, media competition was at its most positive in terms of purposeful messaging until it began to decline and figures who preferred not to limit themselves to a particular group or alliance argued, unconvincingly, that the movement must be kept free of a distinct leadership. The movement’s rejection of institutionalization and revolutionary claims had repercussions for public opinion. A significant number of critics attributed this failure to the lack of planning, coordination, and judicious use of investment to direct public opinion toward a clearly defined alternative.
Moreover, preparations for parliamentary elections faced numerous shortcomings: the lack of coalition lists; the lack of a candidate base, contrary to the claims of some civil society organizations that rely, if implicitly, on massive funding and party agendas; intensifying conflict between traditional powers despite their intersection on the battle for sovereignty; the lack of academic activity in opinion polling that would help define what kind of candidates ought to join the fray and their chances of success; overlooking the importance of addressing the electorate to make the right choices; and the failure to meet the exceptional efforts of the Lebanese diaspora to effect a transformation in voter turnout in favour of reform.
