On 13 February 2023, the ACRPS Iranian Studies Unit (ISU) hosted a panel titled “Protests in Iran.” The panel consisted of Maral Karimi, PhD in Social Justice Education from University of Toronto and the author of The Iranian Green Movement of 2009:Reverberating Echoes of Resistance (2018), and Amir Hossein Mahdavi, PhD scholar in Political Science at the University of Connecticut. The event was moderated by Mehran Kamrava.

The panel discussed the recent protests in Iran over the killing of Mahsa Amini by the morality police in September 2022, as well as the consequences of those protests. Karimi began by providing an overview of the protests and recent developments in Iran. According to Karimi, this movement has been longer and more widespread than previous uprisings. It has also been extensive in terms of geography, class makeup, and participants. “It brought together two main fault lines of the regime — gender and race, and the sense of disquiet on ground is because the unspoken is being yelled in the streets.” Nevertheless, while street protests have subsided in recent months, there has remained a strong street presence as well as official violence and repression. In order to regroup, these protests’ underground organizers are reducing their participation. Meanwhile, the government has been releasing many protesters who had been detained. According to Karimi, the issue remains unresolved because the government lacks the political will and capital to accommodate them.

Mahdavi then discussed why these protests have been unprecedented in terms of geographical spread and duration. He emphasized three major causes behind the recent wave of protests: institutional, foreign policy, and the composition of the ruling political elite. These factors are also mentioned in official public opinion surveys, in which Iranians indicate that there is no hope for immediate improvements in governance and that these three indicators will only get worse in the future. Mahdavi observed, “this time not only are multiple fronts of governance experiencing significant decline, but people also see no sign of chance and improvements.”

In reference to the letters written by Mohammad Khatami, the former Iranian president, and Mir Hossein Mousavi, a candidate for the 2009 Iranian presidential election and former prime minister (1981–1989), Kamrava asked if they represented the emergence of an internal discourse of opposition. Mahdavi replied that these letters acknowledged that the conventional methods of trying to push for reforms within the existing structures of state are blocked, and the same methods and strategies utilized since the 1990s, during the reform era, cannot be used. “Without addressing the impasse in foreign policy, which is under the control of the Supreme Leader and would not change with elections or the interaction between political elites and factions, it is impossible to discuss any domestic solutions, resolutions for reconciliation among the factions, free elections, or any reform.” Mahdavi also referred to Khamenei’s “Second Phase of the Revolution,” which was put into effect five years ago and promoted system purging. These elections, according to Mahdavi, are hegemonic authoritarian elections with no competition among the regime’s loyal factions.

The opposition outside of Iran was also discussed in detail by Karimi, who claimed that these opposition figures were primarily chosen due to their celebrity status and name recognition and are therefore unfit to serve as political leaders capable of managing the challenging circumstances in Iran. Political viewpoints, narratives, and voices that support the right’s agenda are always given a platform and a louder voice. “This does not imply that they represent the majority on the ground. ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ speaks for itself, and it is in no way representative of politics or future forms of government based on hereditary forms of governance.”

According to Mahdavi, a common theme in texts by Khatami, Mousavi, and Mostafa Tajzadeh, ex-adviser of Khatami (2004-2005), is structural reform. While many saw it as wishful thinking, Mahdavi said it provided a forum to discuss reform and the steps that could be taken to achieve it. The proposal for the opposition outside the country, on the other hand, calls for regime change and wants to be seen as a united front in the eyes of Western countries. “It is difficult to see how the various platforms of the opposition, both inside and outside Iran, can collaborate and create synergies.” Outside opposition does not attempt to cooperate with those inside Iran, and there is a disengagement between the two groups. It remains to be seen whether the opposition from the outside would be able to mobilize people inside Iran.

Finally, both panelists discussed whether a revolution is taking place right now or whether this political phenomenon has yet to be defined. “When we call it a revolution already, we reduce its potential, and the longer it takes the more time we will have to hear each other out and have a discourse on this, as well as guide it to a democratic Iran,” Karimi said. She disagreed with calling it a feminist revolution because certain characteristics, relating to women and minoritized ethnics taking center stage, were not met. Mahdavi also agreed with Karimi and added, “it would be good to examine the influence and the use of those terms in relation to the current events to determine whether they are contributing to the objectives of these movements or jeopardizing them in some way.”