How did Hamas Overrun Israel’s Gaza Division?

Ahmed Qasem Hussein

ACRPS researcher and managing editor of Siyasaat Arabiya journal. Previously served as assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Damascus. He obtained a PhD in International Relations from the University of Florence, Italy. His research interests focus on theories of international relations. He edited The Boycott of Israel as a Strategy: Reality and Ambitions and The June 1967 War: Paths and Implications, published by the ACRPS.

Introduction

The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas, launched a lightning attack on Israeli targets near Gaza on 7 October 2023. Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” delivered a profound shock to Israel. The main military targets were the headquarters of Israel’s Gaza Division and related installations, but the fighters soon entered nearby kibbutzim. Despite facing an asymmetrical fight with the Israeli army, they captured dozens of soldiers and civilians and took them back to Gaza.

The attack highlighted the surprising combat performance of the Qassam Brigades despite the 17-year siege Israel has imposed on the Gaza Strip. The group has both developed its military capabilities and introduced new, home-made weapons into its arsenal. So what was the Brigades’ operational plan? Furthermore, what military considerations could impose further costs on Israel in any ground operation it may carry out in the Gaza Strip?

Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies