Introduction
China’s relations with US allies in the Middle East are far more stable and lucrative than its ties with a sanctioned and unstable Iran. Therefore, would the collapse of the Islamic Republic and the establishment of a new Iranian political system, sanction-free and integrated into the US security architecture, in fact be more favourable to Beijing? Could the demise of the current Iranian system, help China’s long-term best-case scenario, facilitating a swift transition to a more stable partnership?
Since the United States and Israel launched their recent war on Iran, analysts have viewed China’s diplomacy in handling the war through two lenses: either a “hands-off” approach or clandestine support to Iran. Both assumptions, however, overlook a critical analytical pillar: the boundaries Beijing places on its diplomatic engagement during international conflicts. By boundaries, this paper refers to the limits China imposes on its involvement, particularly its avoidance of direct confrontation, reluctance to assume leadership responsibilities in conflict resolution, and preference for rhetorical positioning over costly political or military commitments. These boundaries are usually established early in crises and are designed to protect China’s broader long-term strategic priorities, including economic stability and the avoidance of any entanglement in regional wars.
A pertinent example of this was when Chinese President Xi Jinping responded to calls from his then counterpart, Joe Biden, for cooperation to end the Ukraine war by invoking a proverbial constraint: “He who tied the bell to the tiger must take it off.”[1] Similarly, regarding the Gaza genocide, the Chinese government published a position paper delegating responsibility to the Security Council,[2] speaking of it as if it were external to China despite its status as a permanent member, and China has not introduced or co-sponsored any proposal in the Council to stop the war. A similar pattern appeared during the 12 days war on Iran, where China’s first statement was calling on a vague “international community” to act and urging “the countries that have influence over Israel to make concrete efforts to restore peace.”[3]
China’s initial reaction to the 2026 war on Iran further illustrates these boundaries, as it stated “China is highly concerned over the military strikes against Iran launched by the US and Israel. Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity should be respected. China calls for an immediate stop to the military actions, no further escalation of the tense situation, resumption of dialogue and negotiation, and efforts to uphold peace and stability in the Middle East.”[4] Notably, this and subsequent statements lacked clear condemnation. Instead, Beijing employed the language of “high concern,” calling for a “resumption of dialogue” and “restrain,” rhetoric that treating an existential attack on a strategic partner as a mere “tense situation” to be managed by others.
[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “President Xi Jinping Has a Video Call with US President Joe Biden,” 19 March 2022,
https://acr.ps/1L9B9qt.
[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on Resolving the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,” 30 November 2023,
https://acr.ps/1L9B9G2.
[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Has a Phone Call with Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi,” 14 June 2025,
https://acr.ps/1L9B9lQ.
[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the Military Strikes Against Iran by the US and Israel,” 28 February 2026,
https://acr.ps/1L9Bakc.
