On Monday 29 August 2022, the Strategic Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held the symposium “Ukraine Conventional and Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Fighters.” Presentations were given by researchers specialized in security and military studies, namely Omar Ashour, Director of the Strategic Studies Unit and Head of the Critical Security Studies Program at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Kacper Edward Rekawe, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo, and Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, Visiting Fellow at Magdalene College, University of Cambridge and former Commanding Officer of the UK CBRN Regiment and NATO’s Rapid Reaction CBRN Battalion. The symposium was chaired by Sidahmed Goudjili, Professor of Critical Security Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate studies.

Speaking first, Ashour focused on the background to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, noting that this war has actually been going on for eight years but that what is happening now is an escalation, different from the Russian hybrid operation in the Crimea (February 2014), which also took Ukraine by surprise. Ashour compared between the Russian invasion of Crimea (February-March 2014) and the Russian-backed separatist attempt in the City and Province of Kharkiv (April 2014), noting that both regions are overwhelmingly Russian-speaking. Crimea was a decisive victory for Russia, while Kharkiv was an astounding defeat. Ashour moved on to assessing the conventional and hybrid military adapations during the current war. He stated that the first phase of the war (February-March 2022), was characterised by land, sea, air, intelligence/information, cyber and electronic operations – generally a multi-domain manoeuvre warfare. Russia failed to achieve its strategic objectives though: failed to occupy Kyiv, failed to topple the elected government and failed to instal a quisling. Russian forces have made advances in the east and the south – where currently the Ukrainian forces are launching a counteroffensive campaign to liberate Kherson Province. Ukrainian partisan operations inside the occupied areas, especially the City of Melitopol and the rest of Zaporizhzhia Oblast, have increased and so did the Western support to Ukraine.

The next speaker, Rekawe, focused on the phenomenon of foreign fighters — on both sides — on the frontlines since 2014, noting that the phenomenon is not new to the region. It dates back prior to the nineteenth century, when units made up of foreign fighters were used in warfare, for the purpose of deniability. For example, the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth used Cossack formations to attack the Ottoman Empire, while the latter used the Crimean and Caucasian Tatars to attack back. Both sides denied connections to their proxies. In 2014, Russia did the same, initially stating that it had not invaded Ukraine, while using instead local militias and foreign fighters. Rekawe noted that both sides have invited volunteers to fight, in a competition to show international legitimacy and support. Foreign fighters played an essential role for Ukraine. President Zelensky's advisor has announced that about 1,000 volunteers have fought on the Ukrainian side during the current war. Volunteers without prior military experience – that can be transferred to the Ukrainian soldiers and others – have a limited impact. Discussing foreign fighters on the Russian side, Rekawe believes that these fighters will cause political instability in European countries – giving an example of French foreign fighters, who fought for the Russia in 2014 and then caused riots during the Yellow Vests demonstrations in Paris (May 2018) as well Serbian fighters who fought for the “separatist” side in Donbas and then attempted a (failed) coup in Montenegro to topple down the elected government.

The final speaker – Colonel de Bretton-Gordon – noted that technological and military deterioration has impacted the traditional Russian way of warfare. The Russian military doctrine is still overwhelmingly a twentieth century doctrine, and with limited upgrades to twenty-first century. Russia’s irregular and unconventional warfare is still putting the civilian population as a target of the war. Among Russia’s strategic aims is forcing the civilians to surrender so that the military follows suit. Without moral constraints and adherence to the Geneva Conventions, unconventional warfare can be used to remain in power – just as Bashar al-Assad did in Syria, after using chemical weapons. The success of Assad’ chemical warfare operations has encouraged Putin to try to repeat the Syrian experience in Ukraine. Finally, de Bretton-Gordon pointed out that Russia has targeted many chemical facilities and factories in Ukraine without any strategic objective, and signalled its possible usage of its nuclear capabilities, including raising readiness levels of its nuclear forces. Meanwhile, the electricity to the Zaporizhzhia plant. – the largest of its kind in Europe with six nuclear reactors – was briefly cut in late August. Safety and cooling devices thus switched to backup energy sources, raising fears over a possibility of a nuclear disaster. After six months of the Russian occupation of the plant, concerns of safety and maintenance are high. The International Atomic Energy Agency will be sending inspectors to the Zaporizhzhia station to verify the facts, especially that explosives near the reactors have been reported.