On 1 April 2024, the ACRPS Iranian Studies Unit (ISU) hosted a public lecture by Mehran Kamrava, Professor of Government at Georgetown University Qatar and Head of the Iranian Studies Unit. The lecture, titled “State Resilience and Institutions in Iran,” was moderated by Ibrahim Fraihat, Associate Professor of International Conflict Resolution at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. Kamrava’s lecture focused on the resilience of the Iranian state in the face of both internal and external pressures.

Kamrava began by discussing three interrelated pressures on the state in Iran: systematic pressures related to the structure and make-up of the Iranian state; international pressures (“maximum pressure” and comprehensive sanctions); and pressure from within the Iranian society, most notably repeated protests and acts of civil disobedience. He stated that “the Islamic Republic and its institutions have evolved in a way that were not always planned, and there have been institutional appendages that have been added to the state that were not constitutionally envisioned.” Kamrava further contended that the fact that these institutions were added does not mean that they always work in tandem with one another. Often the Iranian state is dysfunctional, undermining itself from within and failing to function as a cohesive whole.

Kamrava then discussed the Iranian state’s sources of strength. The Iranian state is strongly ideological. According to Kamrava, “15 to 20 percent of Iranians are ideologically motivated and view the state as legitimate and are actively supporting it.” He added that the state has 30 to 40 percent electoral legitimacy. Of the remaining 70 to 80 percent of Iranians who do not regard the state as legitimate, the vast majority of them are simply quiet and do not actively undermine or overthrow the state. Kamrava elaborated that “in authoritarian systems, the majority of the population exists from the political process. There is an apathy caused by the high cost of political activism.”

A bigger source of strength of the Iranian state is its institutional structure, which has several distinct characteristics. First, elections in Iran serve three functions in authoritarian contexts: they provide the regime an appearance of democracy; they allow the leaders to gauge public sentiment; and they facilitate elite recruitment, which is crucial considering that Khamenei started what he described as the second phase of the revolution in 2019. Second, the state is highly authoritarian and will not hesitate to resort to coercive measures through its two praetorian guards: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Basij. Third, there are internal mechanisms and institutions for maintaining the system in order to ensure that it operates the way it should. These consist of the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the Judiciary. Additionally, a number of institutions known as the “deep state” play influential roles in maintaining the system such as intelligence agencies, the clerical establishment, the Special Court of the Clergy, and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

Kamrava then examined intra-elite dynamics and factionalism given that the Iranian state is not unitary and has multiple institutions that each faction uses for its own purposes. These factions include the Conservatives or Principlists, who want to preserve the principles of the revolution; the Reformists, who want to reform Khomeini’s legacy; and the Moderates. Kamrava argued that “the existence of this elite give-and-take at least between the Moderates and the Principlists is itself a source of strength”. Lastly, the Iranian state’s role as the main contractor and a major source of wealth for a considerable portion of the Iranian population, primarily through clientelism and rent-seeking behavior, is a significant source of strength. In light of Khamenei’s succession issue, Kamrava concluded by stating that “Iran and the Islamic Republic will far outlast Khamenei. The IRGC and the deep state will intervene, and it will be business as usual, much to the dismay of the Iranian opposition.”