On Tuesday, 20 September 2022, the Strategic Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha hosted Erik Skare, researcher at the University of Oslo and author of the book A History of Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Faith, Awareness, and Revolution in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 2021), to give a lecture titled “Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Quo vadis?” Assistant professor on the Critical Security Studies Program at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Muhanad Seloom, chaired the session.

Skare began by noting that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is one of the most important Palestinian armed factions, in terms of both history and ideology. While the movement, which was founded in the Gaza Strip in 1981 and commenced its military operations against Israeli targets in 1994, has been classified as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, it has grown to become the second largest armed movement in the Gaza Strip, and the third largest in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Illustrating the historical circumstances in which the PIJ came into existence in the 1980s, Skare noted that the Palestinian Liberation Organization at the time began to open up to using other means in the liberation struggle than armed resistance. At the same time, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the de-facto leader of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza – the forerunner to Hamas – believed that it was not the right time for the Palestinian Islamic movement to join the armed struggle, and they instead had to prepare the masses by raising their religious awareness and engaging in social work. In contrast, the founding fathers of the PIJ (Fathi Shaqaqi, Ramadan Shalah, Nafez Azzam and Abd Al Aziz Awda), refused to lie in wait, especially as the Israeli occupation was growing stronger and annexing more Palestinian land by the day. Thus, the foundation of the PIJ in the early eighties came as a solution to two issues: (1) The feasibility of armed struggle and the necessity of leading the Jihad by the leaders of the Islamic movement; and (2) Solving the tension between Palestinian nationalism and Palestinian Islamism. Shaqaqi, as the main idealogue of PIJ, had been a Nasserist and pan-Arabist before he saw this ideology crumble in the June 1967 war. He did not frame the conflict between the Palestinian national movement and Israel in religious terms. Rather, he saw Israel as an extension of Western colonialism that was placed in the heart of the Islamic world to preserve its interests, and that Israel’s continued existence means that Palestinians, Muslims, and all the oppressed in the Global South will continue to depend on the West economically, militarily, and politically. As a result, PIJ took an intermediary position in the Palestinian struggle between the PLO on the one hand, and Hamas on the other.

When it comes to Hamas-PIJ relations, Skare notes that tensions never ceased to exist, and they inevitably escalated once Hamas took power in the Gaza Strip in 2007. The Palestinian Prime Minister at the time and the leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, urged the Palestinian factions, including PIJ, not to launch rockets at Israel in order to keep the border crossings with Israel open for fuel, medicine and foodstuffs. As a result, PIJ was convinced that Hamas was pursuing its own interests by trying to maximize its gains within the status quo, and so a segment of the Gazan population started perceiving Hamas to instead be using resistance to protect its political power. This meant that there was a void left behind by Hamas that the PIJ was ready to exploit by portraying itself as the “principal defender” of Palestinian rights and unconditionally adhering to armed struggle.

Skare noted that the recent escalation in the Gaza Strip (August 2022), like previous attacks, is connected to the situation in the West Bank, which started with the arrest of Bassam al-Saadi, the PIJ leader, in Jenin. Skare argued that PIJ is heading towards increased confrontation with the occupation, and that both Hamas and PIJ are re-allocating resources to the West Bank to ignite a confrontation there, while simultaneously preserving calmness in the Gaza Strip. Skare also remarks that the PIJ grew more confrontational after Ziyad al-Nakhalah was elected as its secretary-general, noting that the movement has been aiming more rockets towards Israel without taking cues from Hamas. The assassination of Khaled Mansour, the PIJ commander in Rafah, may further serve to strengthen the “hawkish” camp within the movement, but the extent of this, for PIJ and Hamas alike, depends on the scale of violence. While PIJ celebrated the recent escalation in Gaza, dubbed “the unity of the squares”, the movement’s spokesman, Ahmed al-Mudallal, admitted that PIJ took a “heavy hit” in the latest escalation.

Regarding the PIJ’s relationship with Iran, Skare rejected any suggestion that the movement is an Iranian proxy. Rather, the relationship is an alliance that serves to further both parties’ interests. And despite the support Tehran provides to the PIJ in terms of weaponry, military training, and funding, the movement would refuse that Iran’s order threaten its organizational, political, or ideological independence. In 2015, for example, when Tehran demanded that PIJ abandon its neutrality in the Syrian civil war and issue a statement denouncing the bombing of the Houthis in Yemen, the movement refused. Iran subsequently cut its funding to the movement for several months. It is thus safe to say that the movement’s future depends on its management of its relations with Hamas and Iran, as well as its ability to adhere to armed struggle.