Abstract
This paper concludes that the root causes of the Tunisian uprising lie in the strangulation of political practice via methods, such as political injustice and the repression of freedoms, which lead to the collapse of the intermediary relations between state and society. Moreover, regressions in the social and economic sectors, in addition to financial and economic corruption in the wake of the global economic crisis, also contributed to the uprising.
Other factors certainly played their part, including the level of education within Tunisian society, the presence of a middle class, and the role of the army, which remained neutral, and did not intervene to quell protests. In addition, modern telecommunications played an un-mistakable part, from the internet and social media to the satellite images broadcasted by certain Arab stations, all of which played an important role in directing and politicizing the popular protests.
From now on, the term "popular will" will have a specific resonance in the political lexicon, and the term "people" will have a profound, deeply significant meaning that symbolizes the ability to bring about change, and to overcome all defeatist attitudes that masquerade as realistic pragmatism in the confrontation of authoritarian regimes that weigh heavily upon the chests of Arab peoples thirsting for liberty, dignity, and democracy.
Four weeks of continuous protests were sufficient to overthrow a corrupt political regime, at the hands of a social protest movement ignited by young Mohammad Bouazizi's act of self-immolation, in protest against oppression and injustice.
The popular movement raised one, unified slogan, "Change", and insisted upon it, and it advanced with such speed that it surprised the political elite, and astonished Arab and international public opinion, just as it surprised the Western forces that had supported the regime of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Carthage.
Moreover, it overwhelmed certain Arab regimes that to this day have not processed what took place in Tunis, and have neither given a statement about the events, nor publically expressed their respect for the people's will; one such example are the Maghreb countries, specifically Morocco. In fact, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi actually bemoaned Ben Ali's fate, wondering, "Couldn't the Tunisian people have waited for three years longer?"
Undoubtedly, the most significant event that the Arab world has seen in the past 50 years has been the collapse of the dictatorship that weighed heavily on the shoulders of the Tunisian people for 23 years. Moreover, there is a consensus by observers and analysts that the Tunisian people were the prime instigators of events, that they had the final say in matters over the month of protests, and that they pushed Ben Ali to leave the country; in fact, the political elite only began to take action towards the end, when it began to prepare for the next period, which is occluded by ominous fears that the people's achievement will be stolen from them.
But, how did the political regime in Tunis collapse this quickly? And what are the structural reasons that led to this rapid collapse? Could the spark of protest reach other Arab countries? In other words: Can the Tunisian model be generalized?
Ben Ali's regime adopted a ruling style based upon the stifling of politics in exchange for preaching economic development and raising citizens' living standards (i.e., by adopting an equation of development without democracy).
In fact, Tunis "succeeded" in achieving levels of development exceeding those in nearby countries due to the flow of external investment and tourism in the context of Western support for the Tunisian model, which argued that the regime's methodology was necessary to thwart the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements by fostering economic success.
The weak point of this model was the absence of institutions with enough legitimacy to monitor the pathways of public funds that were spent on development, one of the major potential sources of fiscal corruption, and the use of organized mafia techniques to collect wealth in the absence of institutional watchdogs and institutional accountability.
This lack revealed the Tunisian regime's overwhelming weakness with respect to containing the consequences of the global financial crisis; the Tunisian economy was unable to respond well to the situation due to an absence of the necessary economic mechanisms.
In their book, La Régente de Carthage [The Queen of Carthage](1), published in France in 2010, journalist Catherine Graciet and author Nicolas Beau reveal the extent of corruption committed by the President and his acolytes, particularly the Materi and Trabelsi families (the family of the president's second wife).
President Ben Ali gave his wife free reign to snatch companies from their owners, leach onto successful capital ventures, and place family members in prominent positions where they could abuse their power, especially in recent years with President Ben Ali's diminished public role due to illness and old age.
This has also been confirmed by the recent WikiLeaks cables, in which the US ambassador discusses the president's diminished public role in affairs of state, and the handing over of power to his wife and her family, who abused their position to pillage the state's coffers and resources. The leaked cables also testify to the fact that an amelioration of Tunis's affairs could only happen with Ben Ali's departure, but that finding an immediate successor would be problematic.
Therefore, one of the most significant structural reasons for stoking the revolutionary spirit of the Tunisian people was a deterioration of the socio-economic situation, characterized by high levels of unemployment, in particular amongst holders of university degrees, where it reached over 22%, as well as an increased discrepancy between regions and social classes, in which all the country's wealth was concentrated in the hands of a privileged few who were loyal to the president's family.
These discrepancies strongly affected Tunisian civilians, who had attained a level of education that furnished them with the cognitive tools to correctly diagnose and analyze the reasons behind the deterioration of their social and economic situation, especially given the presence of a middle class of educated professionals, such as lawyers, educators, and organized labor leaders in a society that hardly numbers 11 million people.
The results of the concentration of wealth and power in one group, and the clampdown on all forms of expression and political organization, meant that the ruling regime committed substantial crimes against the Tunisian people, especially in the ranks of the political opposition, including against members of the Islamic Ennahda (Renaissance) party.
Despite the outspoken condemnation of international human rights organizations, Ben Ali's regime continued to be supported by obsessively Islamophobic Western governments.
The series of repression of freedoms, crimes perpetrated against civilians, and bans on political organization contributed to weakening all the intermediary organizations that could transmit the society's demands to government institutions.
In the absence of such mediating structures, it was inevitable that the pressure would create an explosion whose timing no-one could have predicted, particularly in a police state that targeted citizens. It was the kind of oppression that destroys a civilized society, as Ibn Khaldoun would have said.
These structural causes were aided by elements that increased consciousness about the necessity of change, the most significant being telecommunications, especially the internet and social networking sites, which helped to encourage group sentiment through rousing texts and images. They provided a space for organization and information exchange.
Some satellite news organizations participated by broadcasting the events in Tunisia to the outside world as they happened; moreover, they helped Tunisian citizens know what was happening in other Tunisian cities and towns. Another aspect of the media's contribution was the identification of political players inside and outside the country, which helped to direct the popular street movement after Ben Ali's departure through public appeals to organize popular committees aimed at protecting cities from the armed gangs suspected of being loyal to the former ruling regime and its security apparatuses.
The army also played a certain role in the way that events unfolded through adopting a policy of neutrality vis-à-vis the protests, which may have contributed to Ben Ali's speedy departure from the country. But, it is difficult to understand the stance taken by the Tunisian armed forces with regards to the popular demonstrations, and the matter needs some time to become clearer.
Two assumptions must be tested in order to understand the repercussions and consequences in greater detail: does the matter have to do with a nationalist, popular stance on the army's part, in which the army will support the national liberation movement, and commit to the role defined for it by the constitution, including the protection of borders and the safeguarding of the Tunisian civilian population? Or, is this merely a temporary stance that aims to gain people's sympathy before the army takes over security in order to fill a political vacuum in case the political elite fails to reach a stable political consensus?
Meanwhile, the Western attitude to the situation also requires a quick overview, especially the French and American stances towards Tunis. France had offered a legitimizing cover to the previous regime, and had supported it when international NGOs increased their pressure upon it. Consequently, it was extremely late to express a public condemnation of the Tunisian security forces' use of excessive force against demonstrating civilians.
In fact, it only gave a clear reaction to events after the regime had fallen, and the deposed president was searching for a place to live; at that point, Paris expressed its refusal to allow the deposed President or his family to live in France. Following that, the French government called for free and fair elections at the earliest possible date.
Yet, this public about-face occurred after the French government had been shamed by the Tunisian people's continued protests, and after the public lobbying by the opposition French Socialist party. As for the United States, President Barack Obama publicly expressed his administration's respect for the Tunisian people's will, and its admiration for the Tunisian people's dignity and courage, and also called for the swift organization of free and fair elections.
Can we expect that the Tunisian model for regime change will be replicated elsewhere? Certainly, there are similarities between the former Tunisian government and several other Arab regimes, whether in respect to the repression of citizens' political rights, personal liberties, and the right to political expression, or the monopolization of wealth through illegitimate means. The difference is in degree, not in type.
If we consider the Moroccan case, for example, then we can recognize that the frequency of disturbances that the country is undergoing seeks to reproduce the Tunisian model.
Those following the affairs of the upper echelons of the state will notice that the king's friends have occupied key posts since the beginning of the new reign. Furthermore, the monarch has surrounded himself with his friends, and has placed them in high state positions (e.g., security, finance, and media). At the beginning, this was explained by the fact that the monarchy was new, and that trusted friends were needed to help manage the affairs of state.
The state has its own logic; when it supports a side, it grants that side vast authority, without holding it accountable. This contributes to creating a situation where ambitions overcome goals. Slowly, the Moroccan people have found themselves ruled by a new political elite that occupies high positions in the power hierarchy and wields vast wealth.
The logic of power demands that this elite uses all means necessary to maintain power, and fortify it in the face of threats to financial and political privileges and wealth. For this reason, the growing role of the king's close friends represents, in this manner, a real threat to the political and economic fields in the country.
Some WikiLeaks documents have discussed the role that two persons close to the king have played in real estate developments, in addition to the role played by the king's friend, Mr. Fu'ad ‘Ali al-Himma, who established a political party supported by the state, and in six months, managed to rise to the top of the political establishment in parliament and in local municipalities.
The monarchy in Morocco is viewed by the populace as being legitimate, and the country has a government, parliament (despite their limited roles), political parties (despite their limited influence), and a free press (which is frequently silenced). It also has periodic elections, with their concomitant struggles over control.
Yet, it can be said that we live in the shadows of an authoritarian regime that is careful to maintain the symbolic functions of state institutions, including elections and maintaining pluralism, while also ensuring that these institutions are shackled, thus emptying them of democratic content and real power.
As for the economic side, Morocco has not yet achieved a democratic system that clearly separates between the state and wealth. Historically, some religious scholars issued edicts banning the correlation of state power and wealth.
Of course, this situation will have long-term repercussions that could burden the political system and place it before some dangerous challenges, such as being called to public accountability when citizens feel that state institutions have no true authority.
For this reason, the peaceful continuation of state functions in the future requires that the state liberate itself from the burden of the authoritarian regime in favor of institutions that are transparent and accountable.
The monarchy is exposing itself to scrutiny because it demanded to be an executive body, which does not comply with the kind of democracy that Moroccans demand. The vast majority's absence from political participation cannot be explained by political apathy alone, but should be considered a form of accountability and protest.
In the absence of democratic maturity, and in the shadow of high levels of illiteracy (around 40%), no-one can predict how the Moroccan people will demand accountability. It could happen in the form of boycotting elections, social unrest, or an increase in violent organizations. In light of the current constitutional system, we cannot expect the Moroccan parliament, government, or even political parties to play a significant role.
If we add to this the authoritarian nature of the system, then it is natural that representative bodies have no real power, especially since the state continues to create political groups loyal to it, and nourish and support them through various means. These are nothing but the logical, political manifestations of the Moroccan authoritarian regime, which in each political arena requires groups of this kind to play roles that accommodate the needs of those at the top of the state hierarchy, and allows them to directly interfere in affairs in order to preserve the monarchy.
This clearly appears in speeches by those politicians who affirm that their goals are to serve the king's project. However, the regime's methods of creating new political parties have grave consequences for the future and development of Moroccan democracy.
Economic and social development will not be achieved without bringing the major issues of political reform before the public for debate, in a climate that builds a consensus between all the political actors, as well as on the basis of political and constitutional reform that guarantees the country's gradual development into a constitutional parliamentary monarchy in which the prime minister and cabinet hold the real executive power, while the king maintains his position as a symbol of national unity and guarantor of liberties.
In this system, the king would retain some of his authority, in addition to enjoying necessary privileges in some matters of special sensitivity, such as the army, security, and protecting religious/spiritual affairs, in a manner that guarantees political balance and achieves the necessary collaboration between institutions.
In democratic monarchies, it is expected that the ruler not have an agenda; rather, his role is to watch over the work of state institutions that, in turn, work to apply the programs approved by the electorate through fair elections. If not, then the monarch exposes himself to accountability. In Morocco today, holding the monarch accountable is inconceivable.
In its present form, the state is closely approaching the formula of development without democracy. This is a dangerous formula that only works in totalitarian societies. Despite producing short-term achievements in the economic sector, it often fails to achieve long-term, stable, economic prosperity.
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(1) Paris: La Découverte, 2010
