Will Trump Revoke the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action?

The White House confirmed on Friday, 13 October that President Trump does not intend to certify Iranian compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the “Iranian nuclear deal”. The deal, which was concluded in 2015, placed restrictions on Iran’s capability to enrich fissile materials in exchange for easing the economic sanctions on Tehran. The US president has consequently placed the onus on the Congress to amend the terms of the agreement, thereby absolving the Executive of responsibility for the continuous, cyclical rubber-stamping of the deal. The president has threatened to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement if US lawmakers cannot present a deal which both prevents Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and curtails its ballistic missile program, in addition to ending Iranian support for what the White House describes as “terrorism”. While regional actors like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were supportive of Trump’s posture towards the JCPOA, it met opposition from the other members of the Security Council and Western European countries.

Trump’s approach can be categorized in three strategic steps:

Sanctions to be placed on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard: the president has already authorized the US Treasury to impose sanctions on the IRG and affiliate companies. This stops short of labelling the IRG as a terrorist organization, possibly a concession to its engagement in a battle alongside US forces across the Iraqi border.
A new set of comprehensive sanctions on Iran outside of the remit of the nuclear agreement. These new sanctions would also target Tehran’s ballistic missile program. Trump has also called for an end to Iranian support of what he describes as terrorism, and for US allies across the Middle East to join him.
A refusal to certify the JCPOA as part of a regular, quarterly approval process mandated to the president in legislation (the “Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act”) passed by the US Congress in 2015. According to Trump, this is to account for the rise of what he describes as Iranian belligerence in the wake of lifting economic sanctions in 2015.

With no appetite for a unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, Trump has instead chosen to place the burden of restricting Iran further on Congress. This would take the form of new conditions placed by Congress for the continuation of the JCPOA. By making these new conditions stringent enough, the president will effectively create conditions conducive to the return to the sanctions regime on Iran. There are three “triggers” which the president imagines precipitate a return of the sanctions regime on Iran, according to the White House:

Tehran continuing to develop and test ballistic missiles.
Iranian refusal to extend the timeframes during which its enrichment of uranium, beyond the limits set by the original terms of the deal.
The capability by Iran of being able to produce a nuclear warhead in less than a year, as determined and assessed by US intelligence services.

The fulfillment of any of the above three criteria would lead, claims the US president, to Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA.

In spite of these challenges, two Republican congressmen—Senators Bob Corker (the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee) and Tom Cotton—are working with the Trump White House to draft new legislation that would formalize the triggers to ending the JCPOA along the lines described above. The ultimate scenario will play out in one of three likely ways:

In the situation that the United States pulls out of the deal with Iran, Washington would have found itself in violation of the terms of the JCPOA, leading to the likely collapse of the entire framework. In fact, congressional approval is not even necessary for such a situation to play out, with Trump having the Executive authority to lead the country out of the deal without the need for legislators’ approval.
A second potential outcome would be for the US Congress to attempt to “improve” or “enhance” the deal. This would be most consistent with Trump’s behavior and his aims, as well as the stated position of his Secretary of State. Such a maneuver by the United States would likely be met by an Iranian refusal to bend, thereby threatens to unravel the entire agreement.
A third possibility is congressional stalemate. This looks more likely given the present composition of the two Houses of Congress. In such an outcome, Trump will have the ability to both grandstand and lay the blame on Congress for failing to live up to its bellicosity on Iran.

In the present circumstances, all options are on the table for the future of the US-Iran relationship. The only certainty is that the short-lived era of openness between Washington and Tehran has come to an end, and that greater tensions and pressures between the two sides are expected.