The Turkish Military Operation in North Syria: Scope, Aims and Reactions

Only three days after the phone call in which Donald Trump agreed to withdraw US troops the border areas in the north of Syria, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has launched the first phase of a broad military operation covering an area 130km wide and 32km deep between the cities of Tel Aybad and Ras Al Ayn. “Operation Spring of Peace”, which aims to set up a safe area to repatriate the majority of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, will be conducted by units of the Turkish army alongside Syrian opposition factions. Ankara has described it as a continuation of Operations Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch in northwestern Syria, which targeted what it considers a separatist project led by the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Operational Goals

Reducing internal pressure on the Turkish government regarding Syrian refugees resident in the country.
Establishing a demographic map friendly to Turkey in northern Syria, since the majority of inhabitants will be former Turkish residents.
Creating a demographic and geographic barrier between Turkey and Kurdish militias.
Increasing Turkey’s influence in the conflict within Syria and its role in the political solution.
Expanding the geographical area under the control of the Turkey-backed Syrian opposition to encompass other areas of resource-rich north Syria.
Reducing the effectiveness of the “Kurdish card” used by Turkey’s opponents and solve one of the fundamental sources of disagreement with Washington.
Putting a definitive end to the Kurdish separatist project in north Syria.
Increasing the popularity of both President Erdogan and the government, who have long suffered from a revival in nationalist feeling. This is particularly important given the economic crisis and the imminent announcement of splits from the AKP.[3]

Obstacles and challenges

Operational challenges: The geographic space east of the Euphrates covers approximately one third of the area of Syria and is inhabited by approximately two million people of various ethnicities, most of whom are Arabs. It is garrisoned by a significant SDF force estimated at 60,000 fighters,[5] equipped with modern US-made weaponry. These forces have years of experience fighting ISIS, and the area is of great economic importance to them: as well as its natural and water wealth, it is the location of about 90% of Syria’s oil resources and 45% of its gas production.[6] There are various US and Coalition bases, positions and patrols operating in the area, which may result in unintended confrontations as happened in Ayn al-Arab/Kobane when Turkish forces targeted a US observation post (without casualties). Turkish bombers will also face additional problems now that the Coalition has halted aerial and intelligence coordination.[7]
International and regional challenges: Since the very beginning, Spring of Peace has faced a wave of condemnation from both international and regional organisations, first among them the European Union[8] and the Arab League.[9] Germany, the Netherlands and France have imposed sanctions on Turkey.[10] Only a small number of states have supported the operation, most importantly Qatar, Pakistan and Azerbaijan.[11] The pressure on Turkey centres on concerns that there will be negative repercussions for the fight against ISIS and the containment of its detained members in Syria, the possibility of civilian casualties and fears of long-term demographic shifts in the region. These pressures are likely to persist and increase with time as Turkish penetration deepens.
The US position: The US and to a lesser degree the Russian position is probably the most important for Turkey because of Washington’s influence and military presence as well as its role as the SDF’s main baker. True, the USA and Turkey came to an understanding leading to US forces being withdrawn from Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, allowing Turkish forces to enter, which has been understood as an implicit green light for the operation. The USA and Russia have also prevented the clear condemnation of the operation adopted by European countries from being passed by the UN Security Council. But Ankara is still concerned that Trump’s position may change given the great pressure he is facing both domestically and from his allies in Europe, the Gulf and Israel. The Pentagon continues to express its opposition,[12] while Congress has threatened to impose sanctions on Turkey.[13]
The Russian and Iranian position: It seems fairly clear from Russian and Iranian statements expressing sympathy with “Turkey’s security concerns” that there is some form of Turkish coordination with both countries. This represents a reversal of their previous positions, which rejected any Turkish military operation in northern Syria along with any safe area established there. The change may be attributable to both countries’ desire to secure US withdrawal from the area first in order to deal with Turkey later. These positions also suggest a rejection of Kurdish separatism, with the hope being that the Turkish operation will punish the Kurds for their alliance with the USA and show them that they cannot be relied upon to provide protection to their allies. This may change if the USA withdraws decisively from the areas east of the Euphrates, particularly given both countries’ insistence that these areas be returned to the Syrian regime and the revival of the Adana Agreement regulating Syrian-Turkish relations in issues relating to the border and to security.
The cost of the operation: Given the complications and challenges already noted, the operation is expected to cause the Turkish military unprecedented civilian and military casualties, particularly if it is not resolved quickly. It is also likely to have repercussions on the Turksih economy if international pressure continues and produces sanctions, which is less likely.
The Safe Zone: The Safe Zone that Turkey intends to set up in northern Syria requires the agreement of various important parties such as the USA, Russia, the EU and the UN and their cooperation in planning, execution, funding and logistical support. Under current circumstances this seems unfeasible.

Future

However, it is still too early to be sure that Ankara is capable of accomplishing all of its first-stage goals without major complications, never mind extending its control over the whole of the region if a full US withdrawal does take place. In any case, Turkey will have to provide convincing reassurances to all parties that its real aim is to confront separatism in northern Syria and protect its borders and national security – and that it is not planning to stay on Syrian soil for long or bring about major demographic changes that will breed future insecurity for Syria and for the region as a whole.