The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections

On 11 November 2025, Iraqis are heading to the polls to cast their vote in the sixth parliamentary election since the 2003 invasion and subsequent deposition of Saddam Hussein. The last set of elections were held in the wake of, and as a solution to, the Tishreen uprising that swept the country in the autumn of 2019. Meanwhile the current elections are taking place against the backdrop of regional changes brought about by Israel's aggressive wars against Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran since the Al-Aqsa Flood and the fall of the Assad regime. Iraq’s dominant government and non-government political forces have not agreed on a shared vision or unified stance on these developments, nor on how to respond to them. Rather, these events have deepened polarization within Iraqi politics, as reflected in the ongoing election campaigns.

Voter Turnout Expectations
Amid a prevailing sense that the electoral process does not generate any meaningful change in governance or political practice, the turnout is widely expected to be the lowest to date, following a pattern of steady decline in turnout with each successive election. The table below illustrates the declining voter turnout in Iraqi parliamentary elections since the first such elections were held in 2005.

Source: "Voter turnout in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion," Amwaj Media, accessed on 28/10/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9BPa1

A Return to Pre-Tishreen Electoral Laws

Entrenchment of Sectarian Structures and the Decline of “Cross-Sectarian” Forces

The prevalent discourse surrounding the current elections further consolidate the retreat of detailed political programmes in favour of personalist campaigning centred around the name, image, and persona of each bloc’s leader – often accompanied by a brief, slogan-like phrase that encapsulates the bloc’s supposed message and vision, such as “State of Law”, “Strong Iraq”, “Reconstruction and Development”, “Progress”, “Sovereignty”, “National Resolution”, or “The Alternative”. A significant number of these slogans carry an unmistakably sectarian undertone that asserts a sense of privilege or entitlement associated with that sect.

As inter-sectarian competition has receded, giving way to intra-sectarian rivalry, the intensification of sectarian discourse functions primarily as a tool for parties within each community to demonstrate their superior claim to represent and defend that sect. One of the salient features of this election – reflecting patterns already visible in previous cycles – is the pronounced fragmentation of sectarian blocs, which have chosen not to enter into coalitions. Consequently, the elections are set to perform the function of determining the relative weight of each bloc within its own community, rather than constituting a nationwide contest for power.

Within this framework and given that the Shiʿa political elite assert their right – grounded in demographic realities – to hold the office of Prime Minister, the primary function of parliamentary elections has effectively become the quantification of political capital among Shiʿa blocs. The bloc that ultimately nominates the Prime Minister may not necessarily be the one that wins the most seats, but rather the one capable of brokering an intra-Shiʿa deal to form the largest parliamentary grouping. This has, in fact, been the case in two out of Iraq’s five previous parliamentary terms. Such dynamics reveal a deeper crisis of legitimacy within Iraq’s political system. Given widespread voter abstention, declining turnout, and the fact that the ruling bloc typically represents only the Shiʿa component and not necessarily the electoral majority, the resulting government ultimately reflects a narrow segment of the Iraqi populace rather than a truly national mandate.

In this context, the broader regional shifts of the past two years have also left a tangible imprint on Iraq’s electoral environment. Iran’s ability to orchestrate electoral alignments within the Shiʿa camp appears diminished compared to previous years, while US pressure on the Iraqi government to curb the influence of Iran-aligned armed factions has intensified. These factions themselves now face stringent sanctions that may shape both the post-election bargaining landscape and the overall political balance.

Against a backdrop of waning electoral enthusiasm and a lack of genuine political commitment to democratic reform, Iraq’s dominant political forces appear to regard the elections less as a vehicle for change than as a mechanism for consolidating their respective sectarian bases. This is evident in the fragmentation within the Coordination Framework – an alliance of Shiʿa parties, formed originally in 2021 to counter the rising political power of Muqtada al-Sadr – whose constituent parties chose to contest the elections separately, despite its previous function as a de facto state management council, while declaring their intention to reunite after the vote. A similar pattern is visible among Sunni political forces, which, despite efforts at reconciliation, are currently locked in fierce electoral competition for seats in the predominantly Sunni provinces.

The Map of Political Forces and Electoral Alliances

The configuration of political forces competing in the current Iraqi elections can only be understood with reference to the ethno-sectarian division upon which the post-2003 political order was constructed. This division has become the key to understanding Iraqi politics and is increasingly entrenched over time. Iraq’s political landscape can be broadly divided into three main components: Shiʿa forces, the Sunni forces, and Kurdish forces.

Although there has always been a limited space for so-called civil forces, made up of secular or cross-sectarian movements, within the political process since 2003, such as the Iraqi National Accord (Wifaq) led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, this space has steadily narrowed. While there were moments of expansion, most notably with the Iraqiya List, which won the 2010 elections, or with the Sadrist movement’s call ahead of the 2021 elections to form a cross-sectarian bloc, these initiatives ultimately receded, giving way once more to small, traditional leftist or secular coalitions that typically secure only a handful of seats.

In the landscape of Shiʿa political forces participating in this election, the conspicuous absence of the Sadrist Movement stands out. The Sadrists had won 71 seats in the 2021 elections but subsequently withdrew from the political process after failing to form a governing coalition due to the intransigence of other Shiʿa factions and their refusal to ally with them. For the current election, Al-Sadr has officially declared a boycott.

Al-Sudani’s principal electoral asset, according to his own narrative, lies in the reconstruction projects undertaken during his premiership – particularly in transport, infrastructure, and housing. Accordingly, the name and campaign message of his alliance, Reconstruction and Development, draws upon the notion of reconstruction as both a symbol and substance of achievement, with “reconstruction” deliberately placed before “development” to underscore its primacy.

Other prominent Shiʿa actors participating in the elections include: Al-Sadiqoun Bloc, led by Qais Al-Khazali, Secretary-General of Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq, which is fronting Higher Education Minister Naeem al-Aboudi as its public face; the Badr Organisation list, headed by Hadi al-Amiri, Secretary-General of Badr; Abshir Ya ʿIraq, led by Humam Hamoudi, leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council; Asas, headed by First Deputy Speaker of Parliament Muhsin Al-Mandalawi; and the Tasmim Alliance, led by Basra Governor Asaad al-Eidani, whose campaign, like al-Sudani’s, foregrounds his record of service delivery as the governor of Basra.

The current elections have further underscored the decline of traditional Sunni political forces, particularly those that dominated the Sunni political sphere in the years following 2003, such as the Iraqi Islamic Party and long-established leaders like Osama al-Nujaifi and Saleh al-Mutlaq. In their place, two major blocs have emerged, now challenged by two rising competitors, led by what might be termed the second generation of the Iraqi Sunni elite.

The two principal forces are:

The al- Seyada Party, led by businessman and politician Khamis al-Khanjar, who presents his party as the principal representative of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs.[13] The party brings together several smaller groups and figures, including Speaker of Parliament Mahmoud al-Mashhadani and the LegislationParty headed by Ziad Al-Janabi. It has also formed alliances with locally based parties such as Al-Masar Al-Watani, led by Abdullah Atheel al-Nujaifi and primarily active in Nineveh Governorate.
The Progress Party, led by Mohammed al-Halbousi, whose political discourse has evolved markedly between the 2021 and current elections. Having previously centred his message on reconstruction and governance, al-Halbousi now embraces an overtly sectarian tone, framing his campaign around Sunni identity under the slogan “Sunni in spirit and identity”.[14]

The two competing forces are:

The AzmAlliance, led by MP Muthanna al-Samarrai, which includes a number of Sunni parties and political figures.
The National Resolution Alliance (al-Hasm al-Watani), headed by Defence Minister Thabet al-Abbasi. This coalition includes several Sunni parties, among them The Solution Party and Nineveh for Its People, led by Abdullah Hamidi Ajil al-Yawar, chief of the Shammar tribe, along with former Nineveh Governor Najim al-Jubouri.

In contrast to the volatility of the Sunni and Shiʿa political arenas, the Kurdish political field remains more stable and institutionally consolidated, continuing to be dominated and effectively divided between the two major parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani. Since the death of the PUK’s founder and former Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, the party has experienced significant internal rifts, marked by power struggles between the party leadership and political bureau on one side, Talabani’s sons – backed by their mother, Hero Ibrahim Ahmad (daughter of Ibrahim Ahmad, Talabani’s political partner in founding the PUK) on another, and their cousins on yet another front.

As for civil, cross-sectarian forces, most of which boycotted the 2021 elections in protest at the wave of assassinations and threats targeting their activists, they have returned to the electoral arena through the Albadil Alliance. This coalition brings together a range of secular and leftist organisations and figures, including the Iraqi Communist Party, the Independence Party led by MP Sajad Salim (a prominent figure in the Tishreen movement), Al Bayt al-Watani led by activist Hussein al-Ghorabi, and the National Civil Movement, led by former MP Shirouk Abayachi. The alliance is headed by Adnan al-Zurfi, the 2020 prime ministerial nominee and twice governor of Najaf, whose name is closely associated with Saulat al-Fursan (Operation Charge of the Knights) – a 2008 campaign conducted under Nouri al-Maliki’s government to drive the Sadrist Mahdi army out of the southern cities. Alongside AlBadil, other civic alliances have also emerged, such as the Democratic Civil Alliance, led by academic and politician Ali al-Rufaʿi, which brings together several civil and democratic groups that were part of the Tishreen protest movement.

Conclusion

Amid expectations of low voter turnout in the current elections, political forces regard the electoral process as an opportunity to consolidate their political weight through their established voter bases. While some actors may not necessarily be genuinely concerned with increasing participation rates, they nevertheless view elections as a mechanism for redistributing power balances within the political process and among the constituent communities themselves. This approach is manifested in their efforts to pursue two parallel strategies of electoral mobilization: the first relies on identity-based, particularly sectarian, rhetoric, while the second draws upon entrenched networks of patronage and influence that ensure electoral loyalty. Consequently, Iraq remains captive to its sectarian and ethnic divisions, inhibiting the emergence of a genuinely national political agenda and turning elections into yet another occasion for reproducing the existing political order.