The Saudi airstrike targeting an Emirati weapons shipment in the port of Mukalla on 29 December 2025, marked a dramatic escalation in the simmering tension between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In the aftermath, Saudi Arabia publicly called on the UAE to withdraw its forces from Yemen and cease supporting any local armed actors, an unmistakable reference to the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC). The call came as the STC expanded its control in early December to include Hadramawt and Mahra governorates, two provinces of deep strategic value to Saudi Arabia. Abu Dhabi’s initial response was to withdraw approximately 200 troops and their equipment from Yemen, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to avoid direct confrontation with Riyadh while maintaining influence through local allies on the ground. On 4 January 2026, STC forces were forced to withdraw from the two governorates and the council agreed to talks proposed by Riyadh to discuss southern Yemen grievances.
This episode does not occur in a vacuum. Disagreements within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are neither unprecedented nor accidental. Despite shared political systems, strong security relationships with the United States, and a collective umbrella of Western military protection, GCC states harbour long-standing anxieties about one another. Smaller states, in particular, have historically sought to assert strategic autonomy from their “big sister,” Saudi Arabia. These dynamics have produced recurring border tensions, divergent foreign policy choices, competing regional visions, and, increasingly in recent years, proxy confrontations across various theatres.
Although the Saudi Emirati rift has been visible for years across multiple policy areas, its sudden eruption into the open is linked to two closely connected developments. The first was Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) appeal to President Donald Trump during his November visit to Washington to intervene in the Sudan crisis in a manner perceived by the UAE as an effort to punish it for supporting Sudan’s “Rapid Support Forces” (RSF). The second was the UAE’s response through an assertive expansion of STC dominance in and control over Hadramawt and Mahra. For Riyadh, this crossed a red line, activated deep strategic anxieties, and prompted a willingness to confront the UAE directly in Yemen rather than continue managing the dispute through quiet diplomacy.
What is unfolding now is not merely a tactical disagreement over Yemen, but an expression of deeper strategic, economic, and geopolitical contradictions shaping Saudi Emirati relations. Understanding these tensions requires unpacking the structural foundations of the rivalry, exploring their arenas of competition, and assessing how major international actors – most notably the US – may respond as the rift deepens.
Foundations of Divergence
The UAE’s entire regional posture is anchored in an uncompromising antagonism toward Islamist movements of all shades. Abu Dhabi perceives Islamist actors not merely as political rivals, but as existential threats to state stability and national identity. This worldview has shaped Emirati interventions across the Middle East and North Africa, pushing the UAE to support forces that demonstrate explicit hostility to political Islam, including armed secessionist factions, regardless of the internal cost for targeted societies. The UAE has repeatedly prioritized the defeat of Islamist movements over other strategic considerations.
Saudi Arabia shares much of this aversion to political Islam but adopts a far more pragmatic stance. Riyadh tends to differentiate between Islamist groups, assess their strategic utility, and evaluate their willingness to compromise. Saudi policy is often transactional rather than purely ideological, prioritizing state stability, and regional influence. The divergence between the two approaches has been particularly visible in Syria, where Saudi Arabia has shown readiness to work with interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, a figure with historical jihadist associations, on the basis of his demonstrable pragmatism, ideological retreat, and effort to rebrand himself away from overt religious framing. The UAE, by contrast, remains deeply suspicious of such recalibrations, sharing this position with Israel.
Beyond ideology, the Saudi Emirati rivalry reflects competing projects of regional influence. The UAE does not seek mere stability but agency to shape the Middle East’s future political and economic architecture according to its own vision. Yemen has become central to this ambition. Dominance over key ports – Aden, Mukalla, and Socotra, all in the south – gives the UAE leverage over maritime trade corridors and reinforces its aspiration to remain the primary economic and logistical hub of the wider Middle East.
Saudi Arabia, however, has embarked on its own transformative journey. Vision 2030 positions Riyadh as the financial, technological, and logistical heart of the region, directly challenging the UAE’s long-standing economic supremacy. While the UAE demonstrates greater clarity in its regional ambitions and greater proactivity in expanding its influence, Saudi Arabia remains determined to safeguard its own regional sway.
For Saudi Arabia, regional stability is now a prerequisite for domestic transformation, particularly after an unsuccessful war against the Houthis in Yemen, one that resulted in direct targeting of several Saudi regions. Efforts to attract foreign investment become considerably more challenging under these circumstances. Yet Saudi Arabia is also the Arabian Peninsula’s largest state by population, economy, and geography, and perceives itself to be the region’s rightful strategic anchor. Yemen, long regarded as Saudi Arabia’s “backyard,” is therefore particularly sensitive terrain. Emirati empowerment of separatist actors challenges Saudi Arabia’s conception of regional order and national security.
A less visible but equally consequential layer of competition lies in Washington. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi understand that American patronage remains central to regional security calculations. The UAE presents itself as the most capable, agile, and forward-leaning American partner, one willing to act decisively in the region and Africa, aligned closely with US counterterrorism and geopolitical priorities. Abu Dhabi’s official normalization with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords is also projected in the UAE as a strategic advantage elevating its value in American policy circles.
Saudi Arabia counters with scale, strategic depth, religious symbolism, and economic weight. Riyadh remains convinced that it is ultimately irreplaceable as a US partner in the Gulf region. Even when bilateral strains emerge, Saudi Arabia believes its centrality ensures continued leverage with the US.
These underlying tensions operate within the broader context of historical mistrust among GCC states, differing security perceptions, and the enduring instinct of smaller states to assert autonomy against perceived Saudi dominance. Together, they represent the structural foundation of the current crisis.
Arenas of Competition
Yemen is the principal arena in which Saudi Emirati contradictions are now crystallizing. The expansion of the STC into Hadramawt represented more than a territorial adjustment. For Riyadh, it signified a direct challenge to national security. Hadramawt’s extensive border with Saudi Arabia makes it integral to border stability and security planning. The province also carries deep historical, social, and economic links with Saudi Arabia and is viewed as a potential alternative route for Saudi oil exports, an invaluable strategic option.
Abu Dhabi’s empowerment of the STC in such a space effectively inserts an external protection actor into Saudi Arabia’s security environment. The December Saudi strike on UAE weapons shipments to the STC and Riyadh’s unprecedented public demand that the UAE withdraw from Yemen demonstrate how existential the issue has become for the kingdom. Saudi Arabia no longer views the STC as merely a southern faction but as a geopolitical arm of Emirati strategy, a reality it now seeks to curtail.
The rivalry extends beyond Yemen. In Syria, the Saudi willingness to rehabilitate and legitimize Ahmad al-Sharaa contrasts sharply with Emirati caution and possible investment in counter-forces. Saudi Arabia remains opposed to the fragmentation of Somali territory and reacted strongly, alongside other states, to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence. By inviting Somalia’s president to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia signalled support for national unity. The UAE, conversely, did not condemn the move and appears relatively comfortable with Somali fragmentation, viewing it as a bulwark against Islamist resurgence in the Horn of Africa.
Sudan represents another contentious arena. The UAE’s alignment with and support of the Rapid Support Forces (though it publicly denies backing the group) stems mainly from its anti-Islamist calculus and its preference for decisive, disciplined, and militarized partners. Saudi Arabia, however, rejects the RSF’s brutal tactics and has favoured a diplomatic resolution while remaining closer to the Sudanese army position. Riyadh’s efforts to mediate amid Sudan’s catastrophic civil war were deeply undercut by perceptions that the UAE was perpetuating the conflict.
Economic Rivalry
Economic competition is becoming as consequential as geopolitical rivalry. Saudi Arabia’s decision in 2021 to compel international firms seeking lucrative government contracts to relocate their regional headquarters to Riyadh directly challenged Dubai’s long standing dominance as the Gulf’s corporate capital. This policy signalled Saudi Arabia’s determination to structurally rebuild the regional economic architecture.
Both states also compete to become the regional hub for artificial intelligence innovation, cloud computing infrastructure, and advanced technology partnerships with the US. Winning this race means not only economic gains but strategic leverage.
Oil politics within OPEC+ have further sharpened tensions. The UAE has long complained that its production quota does not reflect its investment in expanded capacity and seeks larger export allowances. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has periodically used production adjustments as leverage against quota challengers – implicitly targeting Abu Dhabi among others. The resulting friction has injected mistrust into what was once perceived as the most closely coordinated oil partnership in OPEC.
The United States faces a Challenge
The US faces an increasingly complex challenge as tensions between two of its closest regional partners intensify. President Trump has not taken a decisive position, underscoring Washington’s discomfort with choosing between them. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are now lobbying aggressively to help shape American perceptions. Trump may opt for strategic ambiguity, refraining from intervention beyond setting limits to escalation and seeking to preserve relations with both states.
However, prolonged Saudi Emirati confrontation risks undermining US interests across multiple theatres, from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa to energy market stability. Yemen’s fragmentation, Somali instability, Sudan’s civil collapse, and Syrian recalibrations all intersect with American strategic calculations. At some point, the US may find itself compelled to mediate, but doing so will require the politically fraught decision of implicitly backing one partner’s strategic vision over the other’s. The expansion of the conflict is one of the manifestations of the partial US retreat from involvement in the intricacies of regional affairs, thereby providing its allies with broader scope to handle these details.
Conclusion
The Saudi Emirati rift now unfolding is rooted in far more than tactical disagreements. It reflects structural contradictions in strategic aspiration, national security perception, economic ambition, and great-power positioning. The December Saudi airstrike in Mukalla, followed by a confrontation between Saudi and UAE-backed forces in southern Yemen, merely exposed dynamics that have been developing over years: the UAE’s assertive quest for influence through proxy alliances and control over strategic maritime and political spaces; Saudi Arabia’s insistence on regional primacy, Yemeni territorial cohesion, and stable security architecture; and an increasingly competitive struggle for regional leadership.
Given these structural dynamics, tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are unlikely to dissipate soon. Yemen will remain the principal testing ground of their rivalry, but other theatres as well – Syria, Somalia, and Sudan – will continue to reflect divergence rather than coordination. Economically, both states will intensify their efforts to dominate regional finance, technology, and logistics, deepening overlap and competition.
In the absence of a comprehensive reconciliation framework, and given entrenched mistrust, the Saudi Emirati confrontation is poised to continue in indirect, episodic, and proxy-centred forms. While neither side currently seeks open conflict, both appear willing to accept sustained rivalry as a price for asserting their respective visions of regional order. For the broader region, this portends continued instability in multiple conflict zones.
