In a recent interview, President Donald Trump
voiced optimism that Saudi Arabia would soon join the 2020 Abraham Accords that normalized relations between Israel and some Arab countries. His comments reignites speculation about a potential breakthrough in US-led efforts to advance Saudi-Israeli normalization, even as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and other officials
continue to stress that major political and regional challenges, particularly regarding the Palestinian issue, still impede progress toward an agreement.
Within this complex setting, MBS’s forthcoming November
visit to Washington carries major symbolic and strategic weight. Beyond the normalization issue, two
others are expected to dominate discussions: A proposed US–Saudi defence pact, modelled on Trump’s commitment to treat any attack on Qatar as an attack on the United States; and a potential nuclear-cooperation framework that would permit peaceful nuclear activity within Saudi territory.
Above all, the visit will be a symbolic occasion: the first by the crown prince since the 2018 killing of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. It marks a bid to turn the page on that crisis and to re-establish high-level engagement between Riyadh and the political elite in Washington.
US and Israeli Calculations
Under the Trump administration, Washington appears poised to view Saudi Arabia as far more than a traditional energy ally. The kingdom is instead seen as a linchpin in reshaping the regional order and a potential engine for US-based investments. Trump’s economic agenda
seeks to attract sovereign-wealth funding into US infrastructure and technology, while reinforcing the US industrial base.
In the Middle East context, Washington perceives Saudi Arabia as a stabilizing actor capable of advancing American interests through a trilateral structure that includes Israel. Trump’s worldview places high value on transactional partnerships: Saudi capital, Israeli military power, and American security backing as the triad of a new Middle East compact.
For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia represents not only an economic gain but also a major strategic achievement. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu views the inclusion of Saudi Arabia in the circle of normalization as a
historic triumph that could help consolidate Israel’s regional status and expand its economic reach. More importantly, Israel regards the prospect of Saudi normalization as a tool to
counterbalance Turkey’s growing influence in the region, particularly in the Levant, and to further weaken Iran’s regional role.
Netanyahu’s government also understands the symbolic power of an agreement with Saudi Arabia. The kingdom’s religious weight in the Muslim world would open for Israel unprecedented access across the Islamic sphere. For this reason, many Israeli politicians from across the political spectrum have shown
affinity with this issue. Many have also sharply criticized Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich after his recent statements
attacking Saudi Arabia, an indication of the priority Israel assigns to the normalization with Riyadh.
Still, normalization remains a complex objective. The situation in Gaza remains unsettled, and Saudi Arabia wants to see the territory politically and securely stabilized, and
removed from Hamas’s control, before considering any normalization steps. Riyadh envisions a post-conflict scenario where figures from the Palestinian Authority assume responsibility in both Gaza and the occupied West Bank, allowing renewed talk of a Palestinian state. The Saudis want to see Gaza stable and safe enough to become suitable for investment, though the prospect of Saudi funding for Gaza’s reconstruction remains uncertain given the kingdom’s current
fiscal pressures.
Israel’s ruling coalition, however, rejects the notion of a Palestinian state and remains opposed to political concessions. As a result, the process remains stalled, while Israel continues to hope that Riyadh might eventually separate normalization from the Palestinian issue, especially under the promise of cooperation in advanced technology, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence, fields that align with Saudi Arabia’s ambition to become a regional innovation hub. Israel is also betting on attracting Saudi Arabia through the prospect of a strategic commercial partnership, centered on establishing an energy
corridor that connects the kingdom to Israel and facilitates the efficient transport of oil and goods to Europe.
Saudi Priorities
At the forefront of Saudi objectives for MBS’s visit to Washington lies the goal of
securing a defence agreement with the United States. Riyadh hopes to obtain a US commitment similar to that given to Qatar in the
executive order issued by President Trump last September, which stipulated that any attack on Doha would be treated as an attack on Washington itself. This would differ, however, from the formal defence
treaty with the United States Saudi Arabia has long sought, one that would require congressional approval and has been repeatedly linked in Washington to the issue of normalization with Israel.
A presidential executive order would therefore represent a partial success for Saudi Arabia. It would carry symbolic and political value, ensuring US protection of the kingdom, yet it would fall short of the binding guarantees envisioned under a treaty. Nonetheless, such a measure could serve as a practical alternative in the short term, particularly given the political difficulties of ratifying a full treaty in the current American political climate. For Riyadh, even a limited executive commitment would demonstrate Washington’s readiness to reassert its security role in the Gulf and signal a renewed depth in bilateral relations.
Another priority for Saudi Arabia is its long-standing request to
purchase F-35 stealth aircraft, a step viewed in Riyadh as both a sign of strategic trust and a major advancement in defence capability. Yet this ambition faces familiar
obstacles. In Washington, opposition remains strong among lawmakers and within the Pentagon, where many argue that supplying such aircraft to Saudi Arabia could undermine Israel’s qualitative military edge that the United States has assured for decades. Israel will likely try to block any such deal, as it seeks to preserve its role as the indispensable intermediary for Arab nations seeking influence in Washington. It perceives this leverage slipping away as Trump pushes for major direct deals with Gulf countries.
The precedent of the United Arab Emirates, which has
yet to finalize its own F-35 deal despite joining the Abraham Accords, reinforces the perception that such transfers remain politically sensitive. As a result, the issue is likely to remain on the negotiating table, but without an imminent breakthrough.
Equally central to the Saudi agenda is a peaceful nuclear-energy program that allows domestic uranium enrichment under international safeguards. However, it clashes with American and Israeli efforts to eliminate regional enrichment capabilities, particularly as Washington continues to press Iran to restrict its own nuclear program. Negotiations on the Saudi nuclear framework, intensively
discussed in spring of 2025, appear to have stalled, largely due to these concerns. Saudis hope to revive the deal in the crown prince’s visit.
The broader symbolic resonance of this visit cannot be overstated. It marks MBS’s first trip to Washington since 2018, when the Khashoggi affair poisoned bilateral relations. In the last few years, US liberal media hostility has cooled, and many congressional Democrats have softened their tone regarding human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia. Even the previous Biden administration quietly recalibrated its Saudi policy.
For Riyadh, the visit signals international rehabilitation and a shift from pariah status to indispensable partner. For Trump, it demonstrates the ability to reset relationships on pragmatic and interest-based grounds.
The Trump–MBS Dynamic
The personal rapport between President Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is arguably one of the most consequential bilateral relationships shaping US policy in the Middle East. Both men share transactional instincts and a focus on tangible outcomes: investment flows, arms sales, and visible deals. Their mutual pragmatism has historically overridden political turbulence, whether the Khashoggi crisis, debates over oil prices, or the 2025 Israeli-Iranian confrontation.
On energy, Riyadh’s current production strategy closely aligns with Trump’s priorities. The kingdom
emphasizes market share and stability over high prices needed to finance its flagship projects, supporting global economic recovery and Trump’s domestic economic agenda. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has sought to discipline OPEC members who exceed production quotas, underscoring its leadership role in stabilizing markets.
Crucially, Trump has avoided publicly pressuring Riyadh to rush normalization with Israel. His approach grants MBS time to manage domestic and regional sensitivities while maintaining forward momentum. Meanwhile, Trump’s family business interests continue to find a
receptive environment in Saudi Arabia, further binding the two leaders in shared economic and personal incentives. Thus, the combination of strategic interdependence and personal affinity suggests that November’s visit will emphasize continuity, confidence, and deal-making over controversy.
Conclusion
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s November visit to Washington represents far more than a diplomatic reunion with the US political class. It is a potential milestone in redefining the Middle Eastern regional balance. The likelihood of sweeping agreements remains unlikely, yet incremental progress, through a defence pact by a presidential executive order, memoranda, investment pledges, and technical working groups, appears plausible. The visit’s enduring significance may lie less in what is signed than in what it signals: that both Washington and Riyadh are prepared to redefine their partnership for a new Middle East order.
