Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the White House on 18 November marked a highly symbolic moment in US–Saudi relations. After years of strained ties, marked by disagreements over human rights, energy policies, and security commitments, this visit represented a deliberate attempt to restore warmth to a relationship that had endured extended turbulence. The meeting carried particular significance given the close personal
rapport between President Donald Trump and the crown prince, a factor that has often shaped the tone and trajectory of bilateral relations in Trump’s first and second terms, more than institutional dynamics or long-term strategic planning. The favourable reception of Trump’s family
business interests in Saudi Arabia further strengthens the economic and personal ties between the two leaders.
The atmospherics of the visit were conspicuously
celebratory. The White House sought to project a renewed sense of partnership, supported by a series of public
announcements about agreements spanning defence and security cooperation, emerging technologies, artificial intelligence, and prospective nuclear collaboration. Yet behind the optimistic public messaging lies a more complicated reality: the specifics of many of these agreements remain ambiguous, subject to further negotiations, bureaucratic hurdles, and political constraints in Washington.
Moreover, the
cancellation of the crown prince’s scheduled meetings with Senate committees on Capitol Hill, coupled with vocal
criticism from influential senators over Saudi policies and human rights issues, underscored the persistent structural tensions in the relationship. These dynamics suggest that while the executive branch may be eager to embrace Riyadh, the broader US political establishment remains divided, making the future of the partnership heavily dependent on President Trump’s personal leadership style.
Partial Security Guarantees
The centrepiece of the visit was the announcement of a new
defence agreement, though this fell short of what Saudi Arabia had long sought: a binding
defence treaty requiring congressional approval. Instead, the United States extended to Saudi Arabia the designation of Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), a status that, while meaningful, does not offer the ironclad security guarantees associated with a formal treaty.
Such executive agreements can be revised or rescinded by future administrations, making them a weaker form of assurance. Nevertheless, for Saudi Arabia, these arrangements offer a measure of reassurance at a time when confidence in US security guarantees has been shaken, most notably by Washington’s limited
response to the September 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco, which deeply rattled Saudi policymakers and raised doubts about the reliability of previous American verbal commitments to the kingdom’s security.
Also highlighted was the
Declaration on the Completion of Negotiations on US–Saudi nuclear cooperation, a development that could eventually enable Saudi Arabia to operationalize its long-desired civilian nuclear program. While the question of domestic uranium enrichment remains off the table, due to entrenched American and Israeli opposition to enrichment anywhere in the region (and most particularly in Iran), this declaration signals substantive movement. For Riyadh, even incremental gains without the enrichment component represent a step forward, especially given that these demands were previously
tied to a potential normalization deal with Israel.
F-35 Without Normalization
Perhaps the most charged outcome was President Trump’s stated
approval for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. Israel had
sought to tie such a sale to Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords, hoping to maintain qualitative military superiority and leverage normalization for strategic concessions. Trump’s willingness to bypass Israeli preferences and align with Saudi demands reflects both his unconventional political style and the shifting influence of pro-Israel lobbying networks in Washington, particularly weakened after the Gaza war and its political repercussions. The approval signals that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, backed by their financial capacity, may be able to secure major gains from Washington without relying on establishing ties with Tel Aviv, and that the once-popular notion of Israel as the essential “bridge” to winning meaningful concessions from the United States is losing its lustre.
Even with presidential approval, the eventual delivery of F-35s remains uncertain. The United Arab Emirates, after all,
never received the jets promised as part of its entry into the Abraham Accords. Moreover, stringent US end-use restrictions, likely accompanied by clearly defined limits on how Saudi Arabia will be permitted to operate the aircraft, combined with lengthy production timelines, mean that any actual transfer – if it occurs at all – would still be years away. Yet the approval is certain to ignite a political battle in Washington, where pro-Israel lawmakers and lobbying networks will seek either to re-link the sale to Saudi normalization with Israel or, at minimum,
prevent Riyadh from receiving aircraft with the same specifications and capabilities enjoyed by the Israeli Air Force.
Still, the symbolic value of the approval is substantial. President Trump explicitly
stated that he was authorizing the delivery of F-35s to Saudi Arabia at the same level of capability possessed by Israel, a notable departure from the long-standing American practice of preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge. Nevertheless,
reports indicate that US officials have given assurances that the aircraft to be provided to Saudi Arabia will be less advanced than those possessed by Israel.
The original Saudi demands in the normalization negotiations, restoring trust in US security guarantees by a defence treaty, acquiring advanced weapons systems, and accessing cutting-edge technologies, now appear partially achievable without formal normalization. This development will likely prompt a reassessment in Riyadh regarding whether the political and reputational costs of entering the Abraham Accords are justified by the concrete benefits currently offered. Trump may revive his push for Saudi normalization with Israel later in his term, after MBS reportedly
rebuffed his proposal on this visit. For now, Riyadh can postpone tackling the issue of normalization.
The Feasibility of a Trillion-Dollar Commitment
The visit also featured ambitious announcements about expanded US–Saudi economic cooperation. MBS prominently declared that the kingdom was
raising its planned investments in the United States from $600 billion to $1 trillion, a dramatic figure reminiscent of the grandiose commitments made during President Trump’s visits to Riyadh in May 2025. As with past announcements, however, these projections must be interpreted cautiously. Many are framed as
memoranda of understanding or
preliminary agreements rather than firm investment commitments.
Saudi Arabia’s current economic realities further complicate the feasibility of such massive investments. The country continues to
grapple with oil prices that fall short of the levels needed to comfortably finance its sweeping economic transformation plans. Vision 2030’s flagship projects, including the high-profile
The Line, have encountered delays, downscaling, and growing scepticism regarding their viability. Foreign direct investment, once envisioned as a cornerstone of the transformation strategy, remains
below expectations. As a result, the Saudi government has increasingly relied on public spending to keep megaprojects afloat, raising questions about the sustainability of the strategy.
Compounding these challenges, Saudi Arabia has
shifted from being a global capital exporter to a significant borrower. External debt is
expected to soon exceed reserves. Meanwhile, the Public Investment Fund (PIF) faces liquidity
constraints, prompting it in recent months to
sell stakes in multiple US companies. These pressures limit Riyadh’s capacity to execute the massive investment pledges made.
The Saudi leadership used the US–Saudi Business Forum to encourage American investors to participate in the kingdom’s large-scale projects. Yet the combination of opaque project designs, unclear cost-benefit frameworks, and doubts about commercial viability continues to dissuade many potential investors.
One area where Saudi Arabia appears determined to advance is artificial intelligence (AI). Recent
reports suggest that the PIF is shifting emphasis away from real estate toward logistics and technology. Saudi Arabia aims to establish itself as a regional AI
hub by attracting major American tech firms and data centre operators, leveraging its access to cheap energy to secure advanced semiconductors and AI chips.
However, this ambition faces structural constraints. Creating an indigenous AI ecosystem requires long-term capacity building. Reducing dependence on Western firms will take years. Furthermore, advanced data centres require massive quantities of water, posing serious challenges in a country with chronic water scarcity and expensive desalination infrastructure.
The US Department of Commerce’s recent
decision to approve sales of advanced AI chips to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, subject to strict controls designed to prevent technology transfer to China, adds momentum to the kingdom’s AI aspirations. The coming period will reveal what specific technologies Saudi Arabia will ultimately be able to acquire and how quickly it can turn them into functional components of a national AI strategy.
Limited Discussion on Regional Issues
Regional politics played a minor role in the official discourse surrounding the visit. The issue that appeared most prominently was Sudan, with President Trump signalling a
willingness to take a more direct role in addressing the crisis at the crown prince’s request. The Saudi request reflects Riyadh’s broader interest in stabilizing its Red Sea neighbourhood. It is also part of the Saudi-Emirati rivalry, with Sudan being one of its main battlegrounds.
The war in Gaza, by contrast, received only cursory mention in public statements. No detailed discussions were disclosed. It appeared that President Trump was pushing the Saudis toward active participation in the reconstruction of Gaza, while the Saudis showed no enthusiasm in that direction. Saudis believe the current conditions are still not ripe for it, in addition to Saudi Arabia having different financial priorities.
Notably absent from public remarks was any elaboration on reports that Saudi Arabia has been quietly exploring a form of
mediation between the United States and Iran. Reports suggesting that the Iranian president
sent a letter to MBS before his departure to Washington raised expectations, but no tangible initiatives have surfaced yet. Iran
denied that the letter was related to potential talks with the United States. Given the deep gulf between American and Iranian positions, particularly surrounding nuclear enrichment, Saudi Arabia’s ability to broker meaningful progress appears limited. Nonetheless, Riyadh’s broader strategic interest is clear: the kingdom is intent on preventing a renewed Iran–Israel war, fearing that any escalation could engulf the entire Gulf region.
Conclusion
In many ways, the most consequential aspect of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit was not the long list of agreements announced, but the symbolism of his return to the White House after years of strained engagement. The visual and political impact of the crown prince once again entering the Oval Office may ultimately matter more than the details of defence, economic, or technological cooperation unveiled during the trip.
Despite the strong personal relationship between Trump and Mohammed bin Salman, the visit did little to repair relations with Congress. The decision to cancel meetings with Senate committees due to Saudi objections to the presence of certain lawmakers and concerns over the topics to be discussed generated frustration on Capitol Hill.
Criticism from Democratic lawmakers, particularly those
raising the issue of Jamal Khashoggi’s
murder again, confirmed that Democrats’ scepticism toward the Saudi crown prince remains entrenched. Thus, even as executive-level ties warm, the broader institutional framework of the relationship remains fragile.
Saudi Arabia’s ability to secure even partial progress on long-standing demands, whether in defence assurances, advanced weapons, or technological cooperation, reduces the urgency of pursuing normalization with Israel. Saudi Arabia no longer views normalization as the sole or immediate avenue for obtaining strategic gains from Washington. For now, Riyadh appears comfortable delaying major decisions on the Abraham Accords, confident that it can extract meaningful benefits from the United States without making transformational concessions over relations with Israel.
