Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Coast: Background and Implications

Background and Implications

In the weeks leading up to the violence, remnants of the former regime had waged a series of attacks against the GSF in the country’s coastal region, home to many from the Alawite minority from which the Assad clan hails. The new administration, which managed to prevent widespread sectarian atrocities in the lead-up to Assad’s departure, had subsequently urged former regime personnel to “settle their status” and surrender their weapons immediately. Tens of thousands of soldiers did so, along with personnel from security agencies and the Ministry of Interior, which was effectively dissolved with the fall of the Assad regime and officially disbanded at the end of the “Victory Conference” on 29 January, where anti-Assad armed factions elected Ahmed al-Sharaa as the country’s interim president.

The sweeping disbandment of the army and the dismissal of tens of thousands of state employees have been highly controversial, particularly given that neither the new Syrian administration nor the country’s war-ravaged economy can offer alternatives able to offset the damage caused by these policies. These measures also reflect a general state of alienation between the Syrian public and state institutions, not just the former regime itself.

The attack extended to all four major cities in the coastal region (Latakia, Tartus, Jableh, and Baniyas), in a drive to seize control of their centres. There were also fierce battles in their respective hinterlands, killing dozens of GSF personnel, mostly in well-planned ambushes. In light of the ferocity of the attacks, and having small number of fighters available to counter them, the government sought the backing of undisciplined anti-Assad factions. Some proceeded to commit sectarian massacres in the Alawite-dominated districts they entered.

Some units of the GSF also took part in these incidents, clear acts of retaliation which demonstrated a gap between the media discourse of the leadership in Damascus and the culture of HTS fighters, who had not transformed overnight into the responsible soldiers of a national army simply by way of being renamed an army or the GSF.

Many civilians from Idlib, Hama, and other governorates also headed to the coastal areas to help the government repel the attack, a clear example of sectarian mobilization. The result was a massacre. It left hundreds of Alawite deaths, including women and children, while thousands fled to the mountains or across the border into Lebanon. Pro-Assad forces also committed sectarian killings in various areas along the coast, and families were targeted on the main roads between Latakia and Idlib.

This wave of attacks against defenceless civilians revealed severe sectarian tensions within Syrian society, deepening existing rifts. It also damaged the image of the new Syrian government, its efforts to unify the country and its campaign for the lifting of international, particularly American, sanctions. The government, realising the extent of the damage to its credibility due to its failure to prevent its allied military factions from perpetrating massacres, raced to form a commission of enquiry into the events, pledging to hold those responsible accountable. It also formed a committee to maintain civil peace on the coast, including representatives from the region.

In order to win over Alawites, who had been totally reliant on the state for jobs and income, the pro-Assad rebels exploited their widespread feelings of fear and exclusion following the dissolution of the former regime’s army and security services, as well as the new administration’s arbitrary layoffs, which had been ostensibly aimed at fighting corruption and nepotism and easing the financial burdens on the state. Sectarian considerations had clearly played a role in these measures, which were in any case of limited success.

Syria’s Sectarian Problem

Sectarianism is neither new nor an exceptional phenomenon in Syria. Treating it as such amounts to a form of denial, which prevents leading political, media, and cultural figures from confronting its dangers. Syria has witnessed outbreaks of sectarian violence at many junctures in its history, which are beyond the scope of this paper. However, the phenomenon takes on dangerous new dimensions in the era of populist rhetoric, social media, and the welcome of mass participation in revolutionary discourse.

It is no coincidence that sincere slogans such as “No to sectarianism” were widespread in the early days of the Syrian revolution, because activists understood the danger it posed and the fear among many Syrians of a sectarian bloodbath were the regime to fall. Although the Assad family had shared the luxuries of power with a clique that included Syrians from all sects, they also disproportionately employed Alawites in state agencies, especially the security services, owing to their loyalty. The majority of these individuals were not from the ruling class, but rather the ruled.

These long decades of oppression saw a gradual process through which Sunni Syrians turned into a sect, an oppressed majority. Many came to believe that the country was ruled by Alawites lording over Sunni Muslims, despite this being a caricature of the regime that reached the point of obfuscation and ignorance, as it ignored the injustice inflicted on the Kurdish and Druze minorities – and Alawites themselves.

This process echoed the transformation of Iraqi Shiites into an oppressed sect under what was seen as Sunni minority rule in Iraq (a discourse also widely accepted in the West). Yet political, social, and cultural forces with roots in all sects and affiliations were active in Syrian society, giving the lie to these generalizations. Among these actors were men and women who had spent decades in Assad’s prisons. Conversely, organized political forces promoted sectarian rhetoric for the purposes of mobilization, periodically retreating from it then returning to it.

As the revolution turned to armed violence, regime militias carried out sectarian killings, as did opposition factions. This phenomenon, then, is not new. Yet pro-revolution forces often ignored the sectarian rhetoric and practices of armed factions, particularly those of an Islamist bent (which had never adopted revolutionary discourse in the first place), for fear of dividing the opposition and indirectly serving the regime.

After the collapse of the regime, there was a widespread impression that power had shifted from the Alawite minority to the Sunni majority. This was false. Most Syrian Sunnis currently have no more power than members of any other sect. While it is true that the country’s current rulers are Sunni in origin and doctrine, they constitute a small minority both in number and ideology compared to the vast numbers and diversity of Syrian Sunnis. In any case, it makes no sense to measure matters by these standards, but that has not stopped those who use sectarianism from falling into this contradiction. The promotion of such narratives, which aim to portray the regime has having a primarily Sunni, sectarian basis, must stop, for several reasons.

Firstly, this characterization is not sufficient to explain what is happening. Sunnis do not live on sectarian identity alone; they need the means to make a decent living and exercise their rights as citizens. Sectarianism and identity politics can distract from demanding these rights only in the short term.

Second, such oppressive rhetoric leads the current administration to adopt an implicit “us” versus “them” approach toward the rest of the Syrian population. This turns the state into a partial social actor before it even begins the process of reconstruction following the demolition of most of its institutions. Instead of a relationship between the citizen and the government, and between civil society institutions and the government, such demands thus turn into a form of conflict. This can only be resolved through compromises, without a process of integration into “one Syrian people” (as per the famous revolutionary slogan). All that remains is a label, aimed at uniting in name something that in reality is disparate. It is imperative to confront this danger before it gets worse.

Third, it makes no sense to say that the administration does not recognise majorities and minorities, while simultaneously treating it as the majority and the rest of the country as minorities. Such a dynamic suggests that a quota system the only solution. One cannot impose a specific character on the state (which some consider majoritarian, even though it is not), then demand that those who have become “others” integrate under its umbrella. It is either a state of citizens, or a quota system, whether implicit or explicit. Those who cannot accept the terms “citizen” and “nation of citizens,” must accept a quota system.

Finally, political sectarianism signifies latent violence, the primary expression of which is the constant fear experienced by people in certain areas because their lives and property are not safe. This fear can spill over from its latent state in city alleys at night, or in reciprocal raids between distant forces – or it can explode into bloody, massacres that are a mark of shame on the country. The fact that some have defended or justified what happened, even after the facts have been revealed, is evidence of the depth of the crisis.

International Reactions

On March 10, the UN Security Council held a closed session at the request of Russia and the US to discuss the developments, calling for accountability and a political process that guarantees the rights of minorities.

Israel, for its part, sought to capitalize on the episode. Israeli Defence Minister Yisrael Katz accused Syrian government forces of committing atrocities against Alawite civilians, and reiterated that Israel “will protect itself from any threat emanating from Syria.”

Conclusion

The wave of sectarian violence that erupted in Syria’s coastal cities and rural areas, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of unarmed civilians, has severely damaged the transition that began with the fall of the Assad regime. Thus far, there are no clear answers to the question: transition to what?

The killings deepened the rifts in Syrian society and demonstrated the new government’s inability to protect its citizens. They also nullified all the efforts the authorities have made in the three months since the fall of the regime to appear responsible and capable of preventing sectarian violence. The new authorities have failed to address the root of the problem: sectarianism, a phenomenon that is widespread and openly acknowledged in some circles, and in the view of some people, aligns with support for the new administration. The issue of sectarianism cannot be ignored, and nor can the perceived identification of the sectarian majority with the political or ruling majority.

The new administration must address the issue of equal citizenship, including equality in rights and in opportunities to participate in state institutions, in which appointments currently appear to be based on loyalty rather than competence. The events in the coastal region have also severely damaged the government’s campaign for the lifting of international sanctions, particularly those imposed by the US, as Washington has made the protection of minorities a key condition for lifting them. The lifting of US sanctions is a vital first step towards reviving Syria’s war-ravaged economy, starting reconstruction efforts, and addressing Syrians’ grim living standards.

The Syrian government has moved quickly to contain the damage, acknowledging that sectarian atrocities were committed and pledging to investigate the events by establishing a commission of enquiry and holding to account those responsible. However, regaining the trust of Syrians requires will require further, major steps – most notably: engaging all segments of society in the political process; forming a representative government that neither excludes nor monopolizes power in the hands of certain groups; criminalising sectarian incitement, including the constant torrent carried by social media; treating all Syrians as equal citizens in rights and duties, regardless of their sectarian, religious, or ethnic affiliations, in a way that this cannot be perceived as a gift or a favour; and rapidly launching a transitional justice process that ensures accountability for perpetrators of abuses, curbs extrajudicial acts of revenge, and finally turns the page on the Assad regime and the atrocities it committed.