Proposed Syria-Israel Security Agreement: Provisions and Prospects

Negotiations Under Fire

Contours of the Prospective Security Agreement between Syria and Israel

The arrangements further envisage dividing southern Syria into three zones, modelled on the Camp David Agreement with Egypt (though in contrast, Egypt recovered the entirety of its occupied territory, the Sinai). Each zone would be subject to specific restrictions on the types of forces and weaponry permitted, prohibiting military presence or heavy armaments in the demilitarized area and allowing only police and internal security forces. This was the arrangement to which Egypt consented in Sinai, and one that Syria had previously negotiated for the Golan – i.e. for land restored to Syrian sovereignty – balanced by parallel demilitarized areas on the Israeli side. Imposing such a plan south of Damascus, however, would effectively transfer the basis of the Golan arrangements to these areas rather than restoring the Golan itself.

The proposal also envisages expanding the demilitarized zone by two kilometres on the Syrian side and designating the entire area from southern Damascus to the border as a no-fly zone for Syrian aircraft. As such, the Israeli plan discloses an attempt to re-engineer the security order of southern Syria by dividing it into distinct geographical zones, each with a specific status that constrains Syrian sovereignty. These include:

Yellow Zone (De-Facto Occupied): This strip would remain under Israeli security control and serve as a base for intelligence and strategic military operations.
Blue Zone (Disengagement Strip): The area directly adjacent to the border, historically known as the disengagement zone under the 1974 Agreement, to be managed under international supervision (e.g. by a monitoring force).
Orange Zone (Demilitarised Zone): Extending deeper into Syrian territory, this zone would prohibit the presence of heavy weaponry and possibly restrict organised Syrian military deployment, without reciprocal arrangements on the Israeli side – thereby creating a de facto buffer between the border and the area of direct Syrian control.
Green Zone (No-Fly Zone): Covering large parts of the Daraa and al-Suwayda governorates and extending towards the environs of Damascus, this zone would impose restrictions on Syrian military aviation, thereby limiting Syria’s ability to project air power in the southern theatre.

The Israeli Proposal: Re-engineering the Security Geography of Southern Syria (Source: ISW)

Challenges of the Security Agreement

The Israeli proposal reflects an attempt to impose a new political and military reality, whereby vast areas of southern Syria would be rendered militarily detached from Syrian authority and placed under direct or indirect Israeli oversight. Moreover, if approved, the proposal would entrench Israeli influence across the southern governorates of Syria (Daraa, Quneitra, Suwayda, and parts of the south-western Damascus countryside). Under the pretext of ensuring stability, security, and the implementation of agreements, Israel would acquire the ability to carry out military incursions into these areas at will.

The agreement would also open the door to far-reaching Israeli interventions in Syria’s domestic affairs, particularly in areas with concentrations of the Druze community, under the pretext of protection. This would include Quneitra, Damascus countryside, and Suwayda. The Israeli proposal thus carries grave implications, as it undermines Syrian sovereignty over the south and threatens the territorial integrity of the country. It effectively treats these areas as outside the control of the Syrian state, reshaping their security status through arrangements with a foreign occupying power, rather than restoring the Golan and negotiating security provisions there.

The proposal also comes as both an embarrassment and a test for the interim Syrian government. Acceptance of such arrangements would entail making profound sovereign concessions from the very outset of its tenure, thereby jeopardizing its domestic legitimacy. The plan emerged shortly after Syria, Jordan, and the US had announced a preliminary roadmap to calm tensions in al-Suwayda and address the demands of its inhabitants. The Israeli intervention, framed as an alternative security order, undermines the possibility of building on that roadmap as a first step towards internal stability. It conveys the impression that security arrangements with foreign powers take precedence over domestic political solutions aimed at safeguarding Syrian unity. This weakens the credibility of the Syrian government and risks replicating the model of demilitarized or buffer zones elsewhere in the country, effectively dismantling national unity and fragmenting Syria into competing zones of regional and international influence. Both the hollow claim of central authority and the abandonment of the unity of the people and the land represent equally dangerous alternatives. Moreover, Israel’s success in carving out a buffer security zone in southern Syria would encourage other regional and international powers to demand similar arrangements and to impose sovereign restrictions on the Syrian state through military pressure were negotiations to fail.

Should Syria engage with this proposal, the interim government would face formidable political, legal, and security challenges, foremost among them the absence of constitutional legitimacy and popular mandate to conclude such an agreement. Any agreement with Israel – particularly one involving sovereignty and territory – requires legal and political authorization, including ratification by an elected parliament, which is not currently available. Given that the present government is, under the terms of the constitutional declaration, transitional, the signing of such an agreement would be subject to intense legal dispute, with some deeming it constitutionally void. It could also provoke rejection from large segments of the Syrian public, who continue to regard engagement with the Israeli occupation and agreements compromising Syrian sovereignty as crossing national red lines.

In addition to popular opposition to any agreement that fails to secure Syrian sovereignty over its land, the acceptance of a demilitarized zone in the south would establish a dangerous precedent, infringing upon Syria’s legal right to full sovereignty over its territory and implicitly conceding to Israeli influence that requires special arrangements. Rather than affirming Syria’s right to restore the occupied Golan and enhance its defensive capacities, such an agreement would be read by Israel as Syrian acquiescence to a special security regime for the south –potentially paving the way for new de facto boundaries separating the region from the rest of the country. Added to this is Israel’s direct military presence on Mount Hermon.

The agreement also carries long-term security risks, as it would disarm a huge portion of Syrian territory, leaving it exposed to future Israeli incursions and assaults. Ultimately, acceptance of the buffer zone proposal would mortgage the south to an unequal equation for years to come, weakening Syria’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the occupation in any future talks over the restoration of the Golan Heights.

Conclusion

The Israeli proposal for the demilitarized zone in Syria represents a dangerous threat to Syrian territorial integrity, sovereignty, and long-term security. It exploits the country’s weak military and economic capabilities during the transitional process and its internal divisions, to impose a fait accompli serving only the interests of the Israeli occupation. Accepting this proposal, without popular consensus or constitutional legitimacy, would inflict historic damage on Syria’s position in the conflict with the Israeli occupation. Historical experience, from the Camp David Accords (1978), through Oslo (1993), and up to the Abraham Accords (2020), has proven that offering concessions or concluding separate peace agreements with Israel fails to reign in its expansionism. Rather, this has afforded Israel greater scope to entrench its occupation and impose new facts on the ground.

As such, any security arrangements concluded by Syria with Israel must remain within the framework of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, without offering political recognition, implicit or explicit, of Israeli influence. Syria must maintain a principled position which does not allow it to relinquish its rights under pressure, refrain from signing any agreement that undermines Syria’s security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and affirm the necessity of returning to consult the Syrian people (through a referendum) or ratifying it through an elected parliament.

Existential questions that determine the fate of the nation are above the mandate of an exceptional interim government. Furthermore, the government must be transparent in addressing these issues, consult the people about the challenges and options at hand, and involve national elites in the discussions. It must also mobilize a popular, regional, and wider Arab stance rejecting any Israeli attempt to impose coercive arrangements in southern Syria. It must also refrain from revealing weakness in dealing with the challenges posed by Israel, which could be used against it. Instead, despite the difficult circumstances, Syria’s defence priorities should be restructured so that military capabilities are strengthened in the south, to send the message that any large-scale aggression or ground incursion will not be easy.