If one was to only look at the rise and normalization of conflicts that are in violation of the UN charter and international law in the last few years alone, from Russia-Ukraine to Israel-Palestine, through to what is escalating into Israel-Lebanon-Yemen-Iran and even the wider Middle-East, then it may be argued that the rule-based Liberal International Order (LIO) is in decline. These events however, as vivid and disastrous as they are – and will continue to be - appear to most as only surface level symptoms of an order that looks to be in a period of crisis or turbulence. For example, while the Russia-Ukraine conflict caused significant regional instability and impacted global energy markets, especially in Europe, it has not triggered the kind of worldwide economic collapse some feared. Countries quickly adapted by diversifying energy supplies, accelerating shifts to renewable energy, and securing new partnerships, helping to stabilize global markets. Similarly, the Israel-Palestine conflict and recent escalations in the Middle East, while tragic, have largely remained regional in scope, and the broader global order appears relatively unaffected. Major economies have resumed growth, global trade flows have continued, and financial markets have remained stable, largely because these conflicts, while significant, have not deeply disrupted the core infrastructures of global trade, finance, or supply chains. Even US-China tensions, including trade tariffs, sanctions, and geopolitical rivalries, have not severely disrupted the order. While tariffs and tech restrictions create friction between the two largest economies, supply chains, global trade, and financial markets have remained resilient, with countries and companies adapting to new realities through diversification and regional agreements. Though tensions remain, the ability of nations and economies to adapt has maintained what could be called normality in most parts of the world.
However, as we examine the current geopolitical landscape and deeper, interconnected commonalities of what appears to be a decline, there are disturbing patterns worth examining. These patterns range from a clear decline of the LIO’s institutions and their significance in global affairs, increased warfare, and including more diverse and multi-dimensional symptoms: the rise of sanctions, and the development of alternative infrastructure-based orders in the global south. In such a context, the disintegration and unravelling of the LIO is becoming increasingly clear.
Most worryingly, it is anticipated that there are bigger blows to come, which, given the above has even liberals reconsidering their positions. Consequently, it is worth exploring the effects of the upcoming US presidential election – and whether a victory for either candidate would make a significant difference to the turbulent trajectories of the LIO.
The LIO as an Order of Relative Stability, Peace, and Prosperity
The LIO has long been promoted by its Anglo-American architects and guardians as a pillar of global rules, institutions, and norms that emerged after World War II, designed to promote peace, security, economic cooperation, and political stability.[1] At its self-professed core were the principles of free trade, democratic governance, multilateralism, and the rule of law, promulgated and selectively upheld by Western powers, particularly the United States. Key institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and later, the World Trade Organization (WTO), were created to foster international cooperation, manage economic growth, resolve disputes, and prevent conflicts. The LIO aimed to create a more open, interconnected, and rules-based world, encouraging economic interdependence and diplomatic dialogue to avoid war and instability. But its foundations were always firmly rooted in Western elite interests, colonial and racial mentalities, and centred on a settlement designed to restore a corporate-driven profit system.[2] The order was not, in its very essence truly international, particularly liberal, or very orderly. In addition, even its successes, the gradual integration into the order several major emerging or re-emerging economies like India and China, laid the groundwork for its current geostrategic challenges, while the domestic effects of globalisation have resulted in greater social and economic inequality, and a political system that is dysfunctional, polarised and factionalised.[3] The US political system does not appear confidently able to deliver a peaceful transfer of power at the November 2024 election.
As we consider the various institutions at the heart of the so-called LIO, it is clear that major morbid symptoms have appeared because even its own core powers no longer feel able to achieve their interests through the order as it is, particularly as there are challenges from newly-confident emerging and re-emerging powers, combined with domestic resistance to neoliberal globalisation’s devastating effects.[4] International law, rules of warfare, Geneva conventions on war crimes, human rights, rules and laws barring the seizure of financial assets held in the West by official enemies – appear as mere scraps of paper, agreements written to be torn up if they fail to deliver preferred results.[5]
[1] G. John Ikenberry,
A World Safe for Democracy:Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order (New Haven/ London: Yale University Press, 2020).
[2] Thomas M. Flaherty & Ronald Rogowski, “Rising Inequality as a Threat to the Liberal International Order,” International Organization, vol. 75, no. 2: Challenges to the Liberal International Order: International Organization (Spring 2021), pp. 495- 523; Inderjeet Parmar, “The US-led liberal Order: Imperialism by Another Name?””
International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 1 (2018).
[3] G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?”
International Affairs, vol.94, no.1 (January 2018), pp. 7-23; Barbara F Walter,
How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them (New York: Crown, 2023).
[4] Arman Azedi & Evan Schofer, “Assessing the Anti-Globalization Movement: Protest Against the WTO, IMF and World Bank in Cross-National Perspective,”
The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 46, no. 3 (2023).
[5] Elena Chachko & J. Benton Heath, “A Watershed Moment for Sanctions? Russia, Ukraine, and the Economic Battlefield,”
AJIL Unbound, vol. 116 (2022), pp. 135-139.