Yemen’s Houthis Seize Bab al–Mandab: Drivers and Repercussions

​​​On 11 September, Yemeni militants Ansar Allah – better known as the Houthis – announced they had seized six districts across the Taiz and Al–Hodeidah governorates in the country’s southwest, covering a total of 5,400 square kilometres, as forces loyal to the internationally recognized government withdrew. The takeover encompassed the Al–Mokha district and its strategic port, as well as several islands – most notably Mayyun (Perim), situated at the mouth of the Bab al–Mandab Strait, and the Hanish Archipelago further north. The Houthis’ seizure of the strategic coastal area is the most significant development on the front lines between the Houthis and government forces since the United Nations–brokered humanitarian truce between the two sides took effect in April 2022.[1]

Return to Fighting

The immediate trigger for a resumption of hostilities in Yemen was a crisis surrounding an Iranian flight which had transported a Houthi delegation to Tehran to attend the July funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had been killed at the onset of the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on 28 February. The internationally recognized Yemeni government, based in Riyadh, attempted to prevent the landing of the Mahan Air plane carry the returning Houthi delegation, accusing the Houthis of using the flight to transport Iranian weapons and experts.[2] In response, government fighter jets carried out airstrikes on the runway of the airport of the Houthi–controlled capital, Sanaa, forcing the plane to touch down at Hodeidah Airport before returning to Iran.[3]

The Houthis exploited the incident to escalate tensions. In late July, they announced a blockade against Saudi–affiliated vessels and began targeting Saudi oil tankers, which had been transiting the region in greater numbers since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz had prompted Saudi Arabia to channel its oil exports through the Yanbu port on the Red Sea – an alternative to the Ras Tanura port on the Arabian Gulf. The Houthis also intensified their attacks on Saudi military bases and vital facilities in the country’s west,[4] while escalating their strikes on the Yemeni port of Al–Mokha using ballistic missiles and air and maritime drones.

Although the interests of the Houthis and Iran converge when it comes to pressure on Saudi Arabia – specifically as they have together imposed restrictions on maritime traffic across the region, including the southern Red Sea, the Bab al–Mandab Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz – this narrative fails to explain why the Houthis waited six months from the outbreak of the US–Israeli war on Iran to take action. Nor does it explain their declaration, after they seized control of the Bab al–Mandab Strait, that freedom of navigation in the Red Sea would remain unaffected.[5]

Therefore, it is likely that the Houthis opened the Yemeni coastal front primarily due to their own calculations, which Iran, seeking to ramp up pressure on the Trump administration by driving up oil prices ahead of the US midterm elections, subsequently attempted to leverage politically. The Houthi attack was a pre–emptive move to counter efforts by government forces to establish a new reality on the ground in Yemen, which in turn sought to capitalise on the broader regional situation arising from the US–Israeli war on Iran. The government’s thinking was evident in statements by Yemeni officials regarding the imminent announcement of a “decisive battle to liberate Sanaa,” as well as the accelerated rebuilding and capacity–building of the Yemeni army – steps described as “preparation for the next phase, should the Houthi militias reject peaceful solutions.”[6]

In response, the Houthis took the initiative to dictate the timing and theatre of the battle. They began targeting the city of Al–Mokha on 9 August, then expanded their operations on 3 September to encompassed the fronts of Hays, Jabal Ras, Maqbanah, Al–Kadaha, and Al–Barh, followed by Jabal Habashi, Mawza, Al–Wazi’iyah, Al–Khokha, Al–Mokha, and Dhubab, ultimately allowing them to seize key strategic areas along Yemen’s southern Red Sea coast, including the Bab al–Mandab Strait and the Yemeni islands commanding it.

Why Government Forces Collapsed

The collapse of government forces – and their subsequent withdrawal by more than 120 kilometres along the country’s southwestern coastline – is linked to a combination of external and domestic factors. Foremost among them are the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Yemen in recent years, and disputes and conflicts among anti–Houthi armed factions – divisions that have prevented the formation of a unified Yemeni army, as factions have been plagued by a multiplicity of objectives and command structures, as well as conflicting interests and loyalties.

As a result of these rivalries, Yemen has seen numerous armed confrontations within the anti–Houthi coalition over the years. These began with clashes in Aden in 2019,[7] and culminated in armed clashes that erupted in early 2026 after Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, supported by the UAE, attempted to oust Saudi–backed government forces from the Al–Mahra and Hadhramaut governorates. The conflict ended with a Saudi military intervention that resulted in the disbanding of the STC forces and the UAE’s decisive withdrawal from Yemen.[8]

However, despite appearances that the conflict in the south had been resolved in favour of the government, harmony remained elusive among the various loyalist factions fighting the Houthis, particularly in Taiz and along the southern stretch of the Red Sea coast. Such discord was clearly evident between the forces responsible for the Taiz axis and the so–called “National Resistance” forces, established under UAE auspices and led by Brigadier General Tariq Saleh. The latter comprised the Republican Guard, brigades from the Tihama Resistance and the Zaraniq tribal confederation, and three contingents from the Giants Brigades.[9] It was also notable that these forces lacked air support or logistical supplies during the initial stages of the battle with the Houthis, who in turn exploited that delay to expand the scope of their offensive and cause widespread losses in government ranks.[10]

In addition to poor coordination and a lack of cohesion, other factors helped weaken government forces’ ability to repel the Houthi offensive – which appeared well–coordinated and meticulously planned. Most notable was the widespread corruption within government forces. This manifested in the inflation of troop numbers on payrolls compared to the actual forces present on the ground.[11] Geographic, local, and tribal factors also had a major impact on the battle’s outcome. Most government commanders deployed in the area hailed from outside the regions where their troops were stationed, limiting their ability to build local networks of support.[12]

Consequently, government forces faced a greater defensive burden than they could shoulder, given the Houthis’ numerical and qualitative superiority and the firepower they brought to the offensive. This was compounded by the fact that the western coastline was the primary axis of the Houthi attack, while the fronts called to action in Marib and Al–Jawf – with the aim of relieving pressure on the west coast – failed sufficiently to curb the Houthis’ advance southwards or to sever their supply lines. Furthermore, reinforcements and air support were slow to reach government forces.[13] Most importantly, the latter faced a determined adversary that maintained strong centralized command over its troops and held an advantage in certain types of weaponry, which it had acquired from Iran despite a long-running blockade.[14]

The Implications of Houthi Control over Bab al–Mandab

The Houthis’ total control over the southern part of Yemen’s Red Sea coast has major political and military repercussions. The duration of these consequences will depend on the Houthis’ ability to retain the territories they have seized, and on the nature of the local and international response.

The Houthi seizure of strategic areas in the country’s southwest represents a major political setback for the Yemeni government, likely to have significant repercussions for its standing, both domestically and on the regional and international stages. Beyond weakening its domestic position, it has cost the government the ability to engage with regional and international powers as the party controlling one of the most vital maritime straits in the region and indeed the world – a conduit for some 12 per cent of global trade.[15]

Conversely, this control has granted the Houthis greater leverage in dealing with nations whose interests are tied to this crucial maritime corridor, enabling them to exert leverage over these states vis–à–vis the conflict in Yemen. Should the Houthis succeed in maintaining the territories they have seized, this would grant them the opportunity to engage with the international community as the de facto authority over the Bab al–Mandab Strait, responsible for ensuring the protection of maritime trade routes, freedom of navigation, and cooperation in countering threats.

Furthermore, the Houthi takeover of areas previously held by the National Resistance forces – led by Tariq Saleh – has eliminated a significant political adversary. These forces represented a constituency that had formerly been loyal to Saleh’s uncle, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, whom the Houthis killed following a dispute in December 2017.

Militarily, the Houthis have succeeded in displacing one of their adversaries’ most prominent armed factions, while simultaneously undermining the ability of government forces and their allies to target or disrupt weapons–smuggling routes. Moreover, Houthi control over the majority of the western coast and its adjacent waters has proffered an advanced logistical position in their efforts to break the blockade – and to threaten shipping lanes, should their interests dictate it. This is accentuated by a surge in activity by pirates, capitalising on the fact that Western naval forces are focusing on the conflict with Iran and efforts to secure navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, have ramped up their activities, especially in the Gulf of Aden. This coincides with an expansion by the Somali group Al–Shabaab on the opposite side of the Red Sea, and the potential for an alliance of convenience between them and the Houthis – as indicated in a recent UN Security Council report.[16]

From a regional perspective, Houthi control over the Bab al–Mandab Strait has added a significant strategic dimension to the conflict in Yemen, reinforcing its link to the broader regional struggle between Iran and the US. It has also heightened the Houthis’ importance to Iran, which can now politically leverage not one but two strategically vital straits: Hormuz and Bab al–Mandab. However, the Houthis have appeared keen to assert their independence in this regard. They have avoided entering the US–Israeli war on Iran since February, and have remained committed to understandings reached on 6 May 2025 with the US, with which they continue to communicate directly. They have affirmed that their control over the Bab al–Mandab Strait will not impede freedom of navigation – except for Saudi vessels, until Saudi Arabia lifts its blockade on Yemen – while making no mention of the conflict between Iran and the US.[17]

Conclusion

Houthi control over long stretches of Yemen’s Red Sea coast and the Bab al–Mandab Strait, alongside the rapid collapse of the Yemeni government’s “National Resistance Forces,” constitutes a significant shift in the local and regional balance of power, and will have major repercussions for the Yemeni government’s standing, both domestically and internationally. Its effects also extend to the broader confrontation unfolding in the region, including the struggle for control over maritime crossings, trade routes, and energy transport lines, which have become key focal points of regional and international rivalry in the context of the US–Israeli war on Iran. This will be particularly significant if Houthi control over the Bab al–Mandab Strait and most of Yemen’s Red Sea coast consolidates a sphere of Houthi influence extending across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden toward the African coast, thereby intensifying the competition for dominance there too.

[1] “UN Initiative to Broker a Two–Month Truce,” Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary–General for Yemen, April 2022 (in Arabic), at: https://acr.ps/hBy1Cm0; “Negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis to End the War in Yemen,” Situation Assessment, ACRPS, 30/4/2023, accessed 17/9/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBy1Cij.

[2] “Iran flew IRGC Commanders, Missile Gear to Yemen's Houthis, Sources Say,” Reuters, 23/7/2026, accessed 17/9/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxNLZj. 

[3] “After Strike on Sanaa Airport Runway... Iranian Plane Carrying Houthi Delegation Arrives in Hodeidah,” Al Jazeera Net, 13/7/2026, accessed 17/9/2026 (in Arabic), at: https://acr.ps/hBxNMbS; Mohammed Ghobari, Tala Ramadan & Timour Azhari, “Houthis Fire Missiles at Saudi Arabia, Breaking Years of Calm,” Reuters, 4/7/2026, accessed 17/9/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxNMor. 

[4] “Houthis Announce Naval Blockade on Saudi Arabia,” Reuters, 29/7/2026, accessed 13/9/2026 (in Arabic), at: https://2u.pw/7h9SQn. 

[5] “Houthis: Navigation in the Red Sea and Bab al–Mandab is Safe and Regular,” Swissinfo.ch, 10/9/2026, accessed 17/9/2026 (in Arabic), at: https://acr.ps/hBybHeB. 

[6] Such comments came from the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council Rashad al–Alimi, and Council member and Commander of the National Resistance Tariq Saleh, who has stated on multiple occasions that his forces are ready to retake the remainder of the West Coast and advance toward Sanaa. See: “Chairman of the Leadership Council Announces Successful Handover of Military Camps and Formation of a Supreme Military Committee to Recover State Institutions—Peacefully or Through War,” Official Website of President Dr. Rashad al–Alimi, Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, 10/1/2026, accessed 15/9/2026 (in Arabic), at: https://2u.pw/GR9KwY. 

[7] On the Aden clashes, see: “Aden Conflict: Implications of the pro–Hadi Forces’ Defeat in the Capital,” Situation Assessment, ACRPS, 19/8/2019, accessed 17/9/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBy1CpH.

[8] On the UAE–Saudi conflict in Yemen, see: “The Crisis in Saudi–UAE Relations and the Conflict in Yemen,” Situation Assessment, ACRPS, accessed 17/9/2026 (in Arabic), at: https://acr.ps/hBxNM8D. 

[9] “National Resistance Forces: Capabilities, Stages of Formation, Organizational Structure, and Deployment Map,” Defense Line, 30/4/2025 (in Arabic); accessed 17/9/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxNMB0.

[10] “Official Spokesperson for the National Resistance Forces, Sadiq Dwaid,” X (formerly Twitter), 15/9/2025; accessed 15/9/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://2u.pw/tnKq3m. 

[11] Nic Robertson & Lauren Kent, “‘A f***–up of Epic Proportions’: Blame Game Begins after Iran–backed Houthis’ Lightning Advance Down Red Sea Coast,” CNN, 12/9/2026, accessed 17/9/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxNLJv. 

[12] On these challenges, see: Ali al–Dahab, “Rebuilding the Yemeni Military Institution in Light of the Repercussions of the Popular Revolution and Democratic Transition in the Year 2011,” in: Yemen: Revolution, Democracy, and War—Political Transformations and Hopes for State–Building, Ahmed Al–Mawri (ed.) (Doha/Beirut: ACRPS, 2023) (in Arabic), p. 175–218.

[13] Official Spokesperson for the Resistance.

[14] Some reports indicated that the Houthis received Russian intelligence and information support. See: “Washington Accuses Russia of Arming the Houthis,” Al Jazeera Net, 26/9/2024, accessed 14/9/2026 (in Arabic), at: https://2u.pw/jeygpw. 

[15] “Placing the Gulf in a 'Pincer Grip'… What Is the Significance of Bab al–Mandab and the Danger of Escalation There?” Al Jazeera Net, 13/9/2029, accessed 17/9/2026 (in Arabic), at: https://acr.ps/hBxNMlc.

[16] United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 15 October 2025 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2025/650,” 17/10/2025, accessed 17/9/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBybGBg. 

[17] “Houthis Consolidate Control over the Bab al–Mandab Area and Yemen's West Coast,” AFP, 11/9/2026, accessed 14/9/2026 (in Arabic), at: https://acr.ps/hBybH1Z.