The Mecca Defence Pact: A New Security Architecture for the Middle East?

Key Provisions and Implications

According to the joint statement issued following the summit of the three countries’ leaders in Mecca, the agreement rests on three main pillars. The first is deterrence: the statement notes that the agreement aims to “strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression” that any of the three countries may face. The second pillar is collective security, with the statement declaring that “an armed attack against any of the three countries constitutes an attack against all”. The third, and perhaps most practical, pillar is a commitment to “develop all aspects of defence cooperation” among the member states.[1]

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is the first collective security framework involving both Arab and non-Arab states since the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. In addition to Iraq, the pact included Türkiye, Pakistan, Iran and the United Kingdom.[2] It is also the first joint defence agreement signed by Saudi Arabia outside the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Riyadh had long opposed defence agreements outside this framework and declined to participate in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched at the NATO summit held in Istanbul in 2004 to strengthen defence cooperation between NATO and the Gulf Arab states on the basis of bilateral cooperation. Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates joined the initiative, while Saudi Arabia declined to participate.[3]

In this sense, the Mecca Agreement can be seen as an acknowledgement by Saudi Arabia that the GCC, as a framework for collective security, is unable to address the regional security challenges that have intensified since US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which had been concluded in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries on 8 May 2018. These challenges reached their peak with the US-Israeli war against Iran.

The 2025 Riyadh Agreement

The Mecca Agreement marked a second stage in Saudi Arabia’s efforts to diversify its security and defence partnerships rather than continue to rely entirely on the US. The first stage of this approach was the Riyadh Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on 17 September 2025, which provided for the development of defence cooperation between the two countries, the strengthening of joint deterrence against any aggression, and the principle that “any aggression against either country constitutes aggression against both”.[4]

The agreement was concluded one week after Israel attacked, for the first time, a GCC member state. On 9 September 2025, Israel attempted to assassinate the negotiating delegation of Hamas during negotiations over a ceasefire in Gaza.[5] This was also the first time that Israel had attacked a state that was bound to the US by a strategic partnership agreement and held the status of a major non-NATO ally. Saudi Arabia subsequently signed the mutual defence agreement with Pakistan, providing a further indication of declining confidence in US commitment to the security of the region’s states, particularly under the Trump administration.

The crisis of confidence in Saudi-US relations had begun when the first Trump administration (2017–2021) failed to respond to the September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco facilities, which disrupted half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production.[6] When asked what the US should do to support Saudi Arabia following the attack on its oil facilities by groups allied with Iran, Trump responded that “this is an attack on Saudi Arabia, not on the United States of America”.[7] His position was based at the time on the US National Security Strategy, issued by his administration in 2017, which rejected involvement in any new war that was not directly connected to US interests. It also reflected his America First campaign slogan.

Saudi Arabia’s need for additional security partnerships increased once the scale of Iran’s response to the joint US-Israeli attacks launched in February 2026 became apparent. Contrary to expectations, the aggression demonstrated the limits of what US military power could achieve, as the conflict developed into a prolonged war of attrition with Iran, with little consideration for the interests of the Gulf states that suffered significant effects on their interests and economies. The war disrupted Saudi oil exports through the Gulf, prompting Riyadh to use its Red Sea ports as an alternative route for exporting oil. However, tensions with the Houthis also escalated after Saudi Arabia attempted to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing at Sana’a airport in July 2026.[8] This subsequently threatened Saudi oil-export facilities on the Red Sea, which came under attack by the Houthis.[9] Against this backdrop of regional political and security instability, Riyadh sought to conclude the Mecca Agreement following a period of hesitation over Türkiye’s participation.

Relations Between the Parties to the Agreement

Saudi Arabia has maintained close relations with Pakistan since its independence from India in 1947. These ties deepened particularly during the Cold War, especially during the presidency of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1978–1988).[10] The two countries played an important role in opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989). Saudi Arabia provided substantial support to Pakistan as part of an alliance that also included the US, Egypt and Morocco, with the aim of defeating the Soviet Union in the context of Cold War rivalries. Saudi Arabia is also believed to have played an important role in supporting Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which culminated in Pakistan’s declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons in May 1998.[11]

However, Saudi Pakistani relations declined after the end of the Cold War, particularly following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US and the growing commercial and political ties between Saudi Arabia and India. These ties reached a high point with Saudi Arabia’s signing of an agreement to establish the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor during the G20 summit hosted by New Delhi in September 2023. The US supported this initiative as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013. Pakistan is a key part of the latter through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which connects Xinjiang (East Turkestan) in western China to the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea through a network of roads, railways and energy projects.[12]

However, the changing strategic environment in the region since October 2023 led to a shift in Saudi foreign policy priorities and encouraged closer relations with Pakistan. This resulted first in the signing of the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025, followed by the Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement, which included Türkiye. As an indication of its commitment to strengthening relations with Pakistan, Riyadh announced a financial support package for Pakistan in mid-April 2026, with total commitments of $8 billion. This included an additional $3 billion deposit and the extension of an earlier $5 billion deposit. The support helped Islamabad repay a $3.45 billion deposit owed to the United Arab Emirates, which Abu Dhabi had requested to be repaid in protest against what it regarded as Pakistan’s “weak” response to the Iranian attacks against the UAE.[13]

Similarly, Saudi-Turkish relations have experienced various fluctuations over the past two decades. Relations improved during the early years of the Justice and Development Party’s rule, which began in 2002, reaching a high point with the signing of a strategic cooperation agreement between Türkiye and the Gulf Cooperation Council in Jeddah in 2008.[14] However, relations subsequently deteriorated over disagreements regarding the two countries’ positions on the Arab Spring uprisings, particularly in Egypt. They reached an unprecedented low following the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Relations then gradually improved, culminating in the establishment of a four-country consultative framework in 2025 involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye, which ultimately led to the announcement of the Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement.

Pakistan and Türkiye, meanwhile, have maintained strong relations since the 1950s. Both countries were part of the Northern Tier initiative launched by the US in the early 1950s to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East. The initiative included Türkiye, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq.[15] These four states subsequently joined Britain in the treaty that led to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Within the Cold War alliance system, Türkiye and Pakistan developed strong military and defence ties, which continued after the end of the Cold War and ultimately contributed to the signing of the Mecca Agreement.

The Significance and Future of the Agreement

The Joint Defence Agreement brings together regional powerhouses. However, differences in priorities, strategic outlooks and sources of threat limit its ability to develop into an effective defence framework. These differences are likely to keep it within the boundaries of a political-security alliance focused primarily on intelligence sharing, joint training and exercises, air and missile defence, and joint defence production.

Saudi Arabia’s security concerns centre largely on Iran, a view that is not shared by the other two countries. Pakistan, which has a large Shi’i minority accounting for around 10 per cent of its population of 240 million, does not appear willing to enter into hostile relations with Iran.[16] The two countries also share concerns about separatist groups operating in the border region of Sistan and Baluchistan. Türkiye, meanwhile, helped thwart Israeli plans, through its contacts with President Trump, to use Iranian Kurdish forces as a “spearhead” to overthrow the Iranian regime during the early days of the US-Israeli war against Iran.[17]

While India remains the main threat in Pakistan’s defence doctrine, Türkiye operates in a security environment in which it faces challenges, particularly from Israel and Greece. Saudi Arabia does not share the same threat perceptions in either case. It has extensive trade and investment relations with India, which is its second-largest trading partner after China, with total trade reaching $50 billion in 2025.[18] Saudi Arabia also maintains strong relations with Greece, and Greek military forces are stationed in Saudi Arabia. Greece deployed these forces to support Saudi Arabia during the war with Iran, and they intercepted missiles launched by the Houthis in July 2026.[19]

Conclusion

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement represents an important regional political centre of gravity, with significant implications for both the Gulf and the wider Middle East. Its three members possess substantial financial resources and an important position in global energy markets (Saudi Arabia), an advanced defence-industrial base (Türkiye), and a large military with extensive operational experience and the backing of a nuclear arsenal (Pakistan). However, differences in security priorities, interests and strategic outlooks, together with disparities in military deployment capabilities and the existing defence commitments of each country in its immediate neighbourhood, suggest that the agreement is likely to remain primarily a political-security alliance aimed at deterrence and preventing wars, rather than at fighting and winning them.​

[1] “Statement issued by the Mecca Summit on Defense between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan,” Saudi Press Agency (SPA), 7/8/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMvT6

[2] Emad Kaddorah, “The Baghdad Pact,” Encyclopedia Arabica, 30/3/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMw6H

[3] “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 3/10/2024, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMwki

[4] “Joint Strategic Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,” Umm Al-Qura, 22/9/2025, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMwxT

[5] “The Drivers and Consequences of Israel’s Attack on Qatar,” Situation Assessment, ACRPS, 11/9/2025, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBy1CVg

[6] “Unpacking the Saudi/US Response to the Aramco Attacks”, Situation Assessment, ACRPS, 23/9/2025, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBy1CYX

[7] Steve Holland & Rania El Gamal, “Trump Says he does not Want War after Attack on Saudi Oil Facilities,” Reuters, 17/9/2019, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMvV1

[8] “Airstrikes target Sana'a airport, Houthis accuse Saudi Arabia,” Al-Modon, 13/7/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMw8C

[9] “Houthis claim to have hit a second Saudi oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden,” Al Jazeera, 6/8/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMwmd

[10] Barnett R. Rubin, “Arab Islamists in Afghanistan,” in: John L. Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? (London/ Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 187-195.

[11] Tim Weiner, “U.S. And China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb,” The New York Times, 1/6/1998, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMwzO

[12] Shayan Rauf, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Britannica, 14/8/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMvJl

[13] “Pakistan completes repayment of $3.45 billion in deposits to the UAE,” Al Arabiya, 24/4/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMvWW

[14] “Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding paves the way for strategic Gulf-Turkish relations,” Al Jazeera, 3/9/2008, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMwax

[15] “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1,” Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMwo8

[16] “Shia Population by Country 2026,” World Population Review (2026), accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMwBJ

[17] Nurbanu Tanrıkulu Kızıl, “Erdoğan Convinced US to Halt Plan to Arm Iranian Opposition: Report,” Daily Sabah, 6/6/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMvLg

[18] Donovan Vanderbilt, “Saudi Arabia Trade Partners,” Saudi Vision 2030, 18/4/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMvYR

[19] "Greek-operated air defense system intercepts two missiles over Saudi Arabia,” Reuters, 25/7/2026, accessed on 16/8/2026, at: https://acr.ps/hBxMwcs