On 27 October, Israel held elections for its 26th parliament, the Knesset. The vote was closely watched around the world, and took place in the wake of two pivotal developments. The first was the “judicial coup,” a series of measures initiated by the far–right government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu beginning in early 2023, which caused a deep rift within Israeli society. The second was the genocidal war Israel has waged against the Gaza Strip since the Hamas–led “Al–Aqsa Flood” attacks in October 2023, along with a string of conflicts in Lebanon and Iran, revenge operations in the West Bank and the Al–Aqsa Mosque compound, and the expansion of Israeli settlements.
Owing to intense competition between the pro–Netanyahu camp and those seeking his ouster, turnout was as high as 78 percent of the total electorate. That is particularly elevated given that some 800,000 registered voters live outside of Israel, implying that proportional turnout among eligible voters living within Israel was even higher. That said, nearly 100,000 individuals travelled specifically to cast their ballots, as Israeli law does not provide for citizens to cast ballots from overseas.
The issues surrounding the judicial coup, the 7 October attacks and their far–reaching consequences dominated the election campaigns of the various political parties and factions. While Netanyahu focused on security issues and the perceived threat from Iran, and rejected the formation of any government that would include or rely on the support of Arab parties, the opposition camp emphasized his responsibility for the failures of 7 October 2023, calling for an official commission of inquiry into the events – as well as the conscription of ultra–Orthodox (Haredi) Jews. Yet given the racism prevalent across much of Israeli society, the opposition also pledged not to form a government that includes Arab parties or relies on their support from the sidelines. The Arab parties, for their part, focused their electoral strategy on increasing voter turnout among Arab citizens of Israel, and securing as many seats as possible to prevent a far–right government from returning to power.
Deepening Divisions in Israeli Society
In the event, neither Netanyahu’s camp nor the opposition, led by former army Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, proved able to secure a majority in the Knesset. Netanyahu’s camp won 53 of the 120 Knesset seats, while that of Eisenkot secured 48. The Arab parties won 19 seats, which played a decisive role in preventing Netanyahu’s camp from obtaining the majority needed to form a government.
Although the share of seats held by parties in Netanyahu’s bloc declined from 64 in the 2022 Knesset election[1] to 53 this time around,[2] the latest results show that his camp still commands a clear majority of support among Jewish voters. Conversely, the number of seats held by the parties in Eisenkot’s camp increased by just two compared to the previous Knesset elections. This represents a failure for Eisenkot’s camp, especially given the intense opposition among many in Israeli society to Netanyahu’s attempted “judicial coup” – specifically his efforts to curtail the Supreme Court’s authority to review legislation, a power derived from the Basic Laws (which function as Israel’s constitution), alongside his share of the blame for what the opposition deems his failure to prevent the October 7 attacks, as well as his inability to achieve political results from through the wars he has since waged against the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Iran.
Netanyahu’s Likud party secured 27 seats – roughly 20 percent of the total vote – down from the 32 seats (23 percent) it won in the previous Knesset elections. The ultra–Orthodox Shas party, led by Aryeh Deri and representing Mizrahi Haredim, suffered a significant setback, dropping to six seats from the 11 it held in the previous Knesset. As for the United Torah Judaism party, which represents Ashkenazi Haredi Jews, it retained the seven seats it had held in the previous Knesset election.
Fascist Jewish parties contested the election via three separate lists, securing a total of 13 seats – a decline from the previous election, in which they ran on a joint list and won 14 seats. Specifically, the Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) party led by extremist Itamar Ben–Gvir, won seven seats, while six went to an alliance between the Religious Zionist Party led by outgoing finance minister Bezalel Smotrich and Zehut party led by Moshe Feiglin. Meanwhile, the Amcha Yisrael party, headed by the fascist reserve officer Ofer Winter, failed to cross the electoral threshold (3.25 percent of the vote), garnering only 95,000 votes. Similarly, an alliance comprising The Reservists and the New Economic Party led by Yaron Zelekha, who positioned himself between the Netanyahu and Eisenkot camps, also failed to reach the 185,000–vote threshold, with just 155,000 ballots.
The anti–Netanyahu camp contested the election on four separate lists, reflecting their fractious relations. The Yashar (“straight” or “honest”) party, founded last year by Eisenkot, has drawn into its ranks military and security leaders, prominent figures from the worlds of business and tech, as well as activists from civil society and protest movements. It secured 21 seats in the Knesset. The Beyachad (“Together”) electoral list – which includes former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s “Bennett 2026” party, as well as the Yesh Atid (There is a Future) party of Yair Lapid – secured 12 seats, a marked decline from Yesh Atid’s 24 seats in the previous Knesset. The Democrats, formed through the merger of the Labor and Meretz parties and led by former Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Golan, won 8 seats. Meanwhile, the Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel is Our Home) party, led by Avigdor Lieberman and drawing its support from Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, added an extra seat to the six it had held in the previous legislature.
Arab Parties: The Biggest Winners
The Arab parties contested the elections through two separate lists: the Joint List and the United Arab List or Ra’am (the Islamic Movement). The Joint List is composed of three parties: the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash), the National Democratic Assembly (Balad) and the Arab Movement for Change (Ta’al). For the 2026 poll, the United Arab List formed an alliance with Yoav Segalovitz, a retired Israeli police brigadier–general who was placed second on its list, as it sought to position itself as a potential member of a governing coalition opposed to Netanyahu.
The Arab parties achieved a major breakthrough by securing a total of 19 seats, driven by a surge in voter turnout among Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Participation reached 80 percent of eligible Arab voters, a significant increase from around 56 percent in the previous Knesset elections. The Joint List garnered half a million votes, earning it 11 seats in the new legislature, while the United Arab List received 337,000 votes, securing eight seats.
This result can be attributed to a combination of factors, most notably the intense anger among Palestinians within Israel’s pre–1967 borders over Israel’s genocidal war against the Gaza Strip, the campaign of ethnic cleansing by the Israeli army and Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank, and the Netanyahu / Ben–Gvir government’s systematic, organized oppression against “1948 Palestinians” in every aspect of life. The government had also attempted to bar Arab political parties from participating in Knesset elections, including by banning Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh from standing in the poll.
Interpreting the Results
A number of factors help explain the outcome of the poll, most notably:
- Israeli society’s growing embrace of far right–wing and fascist values, the prevalence of anti–Palestinian racism, and growing opposition by a large segment of the Israeli elite to universal human values such as equality, freedom and justice, when it comes to the rights of Arab citizens in Israel.
- The cohesion of the far–right bloc led by Netanyahu, uniting both its religious and secular factions, and the willingness of its constituent parties to submit to Netanyahu’s leadership.
- The success of that bloc’s primary force, the Likud party, in maintaining its solid socio–political base, which relies heavily on Mizrahi (Middle Eastern) and religious Jews, as well as an economically influential segment of Ashkenazi (European) Jews.
- The failure of the opposition to form a unified, coherent political bloc, or to rally around a leadership capable of challenging Netanyahu. Most of the parties that have emerged from this camp have been ephemeral, briefly appearing only to vanish again – as has been the case with their leaders. By contrast, Netanyahu has become a central figure within the far–right camp. Furthermore, although a broad, secular, Zionist middle and upper class does exist, and seeks to preserve liberal values (albeit within a Zionist framework), it has never succeeded in translating its strength into political impact, such as by creating a major party that represents its interests.
- Persistent tension among the various factions of the camp opposed to Netanyahu. Throughout the election campaign, both Lieberman and Bennett persistently challenged Eisenkot for leadership of the bloc camp.
- While the parties opposing Netanyahu have, to varying degrees, opposed his attempted judicial coup, they offer no alternative to his policies on the core issues around Israel’s various conflicts. This includes his approach to the Palestinian question, the broader Arab Israeli conflict, the war with Iran, and rising racism within Jewish society toward Palestinian Arabs – a sentiment consistently fuelled by Netanyahu and his camp to delegitimize the participation of Palestinian citizens of Israel in the political process, as their involvement could prevent him from forming and leading a new government.
- Despite his insistence on continuing to wage war, and the burdens on Israeli society as a result, Netanyahu’s camp has maintained a clear majority among Jewish voters, as the election results demonstrate. This may be because those burdens have not yet risen to the point of undermining the support of Netanyahu’s base for his policies, or its willingness to vote for him.
- High voter turnout among Palestinian Arabs, which resulted in Arab parties securing 19 seats in the Knesset and prevented Netanyahu’s camp from immediately forming a government. Given the polarization among Zionist parties, this level of Arab representation poses a significant challenge to Israeli state and society. The government has openly declared that it would be illegitimate to rely on Arab votes, even were those parties to remain outside the governing coalition; it has also framed high Arab voter turnout as a conspiracy. Yet the opposition remains conflicted on how to address this challenge. This embodies a phenomenon frequently highlighted by Dr. Azmi Bishara: the inherent contradiction between democratic citizenship and a “Jewish state” – or, more broadly, between democracy and Zionism.
Prospects for Forming a Government
According to Israeli law, the chairman of the Central Elections Committee should officially submit the results of the election to Israeli President Isaac Herzog on November 4. Immediately thereafter, Herzog should begin consultations with representatives of parliamentary factions over a candidate to form a new government. Herzog is expected to task Yashar leader Gadi Eisenkot with this job, as Eisenkot is likely to command the support of more Knesset members than Netanyahu. Herzog will grant Eisenkot 28 days, with the possibility of a two–week extension, to complete the process. If that fails, the President will task another candidate with forming a government. Should this second candidate also fail to form a government within 28 days, which cannot be extended, Israel will head to new elections.
Eisenkot will examine all his possible options for forming an administration. This could involve forming a national unity government, or a minority government that includes United Torah Judaism but also relies on the support of Arab parties – or, alternatively, a coalition backed by both the Haredim and the Arab parties. Eisenkot faces several obstacles, most notably his persistently strained relations with Bennett and Lieberman, as well as the latter’s opposition, to date, to forming a minority government backed by Arab or Haredi parties. Additionally, it remains unclear the extent to which Bennett supports Eisenkot’s efforts to form a government – and the price he might demand in return. It is also uncertain whether all Yashar’s Knesset members would support a government that relies on Arab parties, or how prepared they would be to remain united and avoid splintering, should he choose that path.
In any case, Eisenkot and his allies are working to prevent Netanyahu from controlling Knesset sessions and setting the legislative agenda. They aim to do so by electing a new Knesset speaker from their own camp, and by appointing a chair for the Knesset Arrangements Committee during the first plenary session, scheduled for 10 November.
Conversely, as head of the transitional government, Netanyahu will seek to obstruct Eisenkot’s efforts to form a new administration. He may attempt to exploit weaknesses within the opposition camp to win over some of its members. Furthermore, he is likely to continue his systematic and organized incitement against Palestinian Arabs and their political parties, spreading lies and racist rumours to delegitimize their political participation, in a way that prevents the formation of a government that excludes him and relies on the support of Arab parties. Netanyahu will also continue to pressure the Trump administration to resume the war against Iran. His objective is to thwart Eizenkot’s efforts to form a minority government, and instead push for a national unity government under his own leadership. Furthermore, Netanyahu hopes that a renewed conflict could destroy Iran’s infrastructure, particularly its power plants, anticipating that Iran might retaliate by striking energy facilities in the Arab Gulf states and thus ignite a war between them and Tehran, effectively upending the entire regional order.
Conclusion
The 2026 Knesset election did not yield a decisive outcome that would allow either of the two Zionist camps to form a government. At this early stage, it remains unclear what the respective efforts of each side will produce in this regard. Netanyahu is doing everything in his power to obstruct Eizenkot’s attempts to form a new government, whether by trying to peel off certain factions from the opposing camp to join his own – or should that fail, by pushing for a national unity government (leveraging pressure from Presidents Trump and Herzog). Should these efforts fail, he may seek to trigger another round of elections, anticipating that this could strengthen his position. Throughout this period, Netanyahu is likely to persist with his racist anti–Arab incitement, aiming to delegitimize both the Arab parties and any government that relies on their support.
[1] “Results of the 25th Knesset Elections,” Knesset Elections Committee website, accessed on 2 November 2026 (in Hebrew) at:
https://acr.ps/hBy2sTt. Subsequent information regarding the results of the 25th Knesset elections, held in 2022, is based on the same source.
[2] “Results of the 26th Knesset Elections,” Knesset Elections Committee website, accessed on 2 November 2026 (in Hebrew) at:
https://acr.ps/hBy2ta4. Subsequent information regarding the results of the 26th Knesset elections is based on the same source.
