On 28 May 2024, the ACRPS Iranian Studies Unit hosted a panel titled “Iranian Politics after Raisi: Domestic and Regional Ramifications”. The panel included Hamidreza Azizi, Nonresident Fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, Dina Esfandiary, Senior Advisor in the Middle East and North Africa department of the International Crisis Group, and Mehran Kamrava, Professor of Government at Georgetown University Qatar and Director of the Iranian Studies Unit. The event was moderated by Aicha Elbasri, Researcher at the Arab Center.

­ Kamrava began by offering an analysis of contemporary Iranian politics in the aftermath of President Ebrahim Raisi, asserting that Iran is undergoing a period of transition, although Iranian politicians continue to perceive everything as business as usual. He observed, “what we have seen is a very steady effort to make sure that the crisis of having lost the president and the foreign minister is minimized in terms of domestic politics, coupled with a clamping down on any expression of dissent”. Moreover, preparations for the upcoming presidential elections are underway, with political insiders vying for candidacy. Kamrava noted a prevailing sense of resignation and apprehension among the populace, stemming from uncertainty about the future political landscape.

Kamrava emphasized the resilience of the Iranian state, highlighting that it excels in crisis management—a trait ingrained since its inception. He asserted that the core decision-making apparatus has remained steadfast and resilient, noting that the demise of a sitting president within the Islamic Republic is not unprecedented. Kamrava focused on the pragmatic nature of the system during crises, stating that “expedience, the core principle of the political system, takes precedence”. He also noted a continuous merging of civil-military relations, emphasizing the influential role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in both politics and society.

He elaborated on the ongoing politicization of Shi’ism and its reinterpretation under Khamenei to govern the state. Kamrava then addressed Khamenei’s influence on state affairs, highlighting his use of theological justification for various actions, such as invoking the concept of “political haram” in relation to the hijab. He claimed that whoever succeeds Khamenei will not wield the same level of influence within the state-dominated clerical establishment.

Azizi looked at intra-elite competition and factionalism, suggesting that instead of focusing on individual figures in the context of the upcoming elections and post-Khamenei transition, it would be better to analyze factions and overarching trends. He noted the emergence of what he termed as intra-conservative factionalism, contrasting initial expectations of a monolithic political system under Raisi. Azizi anticipated a range of pragmatism and ultra-conservatism within the conservative camp, though competition would likely remain contained. Regarding the parliament, Azizi highlighted notable intra-conservative rivalry during the March 2024 elections, characterized by reciprocal attacks between traditional conservatives and hardliners from the stability front. He remarked that despite post-election efforts to unseat Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, it was not surprising that Ghalibaf retained his position given the disqualification of individuals with even marginal ties to moderate or reformist camps.

Next, Azizi discussed Iran’s relationship with the Axis of Resistance in light of Israel’s war on Gaza and the death of Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. He argued against expecting a shift in Iran’s position on the ground and suggested that Tehran and its allies might maintain or even escalate tensions with Israel to demonstrate resilience amidst internal crises. Highlighting Amir-Abdollahian’s role in advocating for the Axis of Resistance on the international stage, Azizi emphasized the potential impact of his absence on post-war arrangements, suggesting it could be more consequential than Raisi’s.

Esfandiary contended that Iran’s foreign policy will maintain continuity, given that decision-making rests with the Supreme Leader and the IRGC. According to Esfandiary, Iran will continue to focus on building ties with the Gulf Arab neighbors and countries in the East. When Raisi came to power, the objective of Iran’s foreign policy shifted towards de-escalation and border stability. She further stated that “the Iranian administration tried to engage the Gulf Arab states as a group but over time it noticed that it was not going to be possible because of the different positions of these states”.

She also concurred with Azizi on his analysis of the Axis of Resistance, highlighting its significance to Tehran’s forward defense strategy as the Islamic Republic’s foremost accomplishment. Iran, facing international isolation, resorted to building relationships with non-state actors. Esfandiary noted that Iran’s increased visibility in terms of its presence, partly spurred by the need to demonstrate success and partly in response to Qasem Soleimani’s killing, represents a departure from its earlier discreet engagements with non-state actors.

Regarding Iran’s nuclear talks, Esfandiary observed that Iran’s rhetoric on its nuclear program has hardened compared to previous stances. She explained, “this reflects the Islamic Republic’s desire to leverage it as a card for deterrence amidst escalating regional tensions, particularly with Israel. This heightened rhetoric aims to inject a dose of doubt in the international community about where Iran stands with its political decision to go nuclear or not”. Consequently, Iran and the US have engaged in talks in Oman to address these concerns, although prospects for significant progress appear slim. Esfandiary argued that “it is becoming increasingly difficult to fathom what an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program would look like”.