​​The Iranian Studies Unit hosted a panel discussion titled “Iran in Crisis: Domestic and Regional Consequences”, which assessed Iran’s latest unrest, state resilience, and prospects for political change.

Mehran Kamrava, Professor of Government at Georgetown University Qatar and Director of the Iranian Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, began his segment by arguing that the Iranian political system is “nowhere near collapse”. While the recent protests were described as distinct, with the most intensity being in non-central, border-adjacent cities in western Iran and turning violent relatively quickly, he went on to stress that protests have become a regular feature of Iran’s political landscape. He pointed to intact state capacity and elite cohesion: “We saw absolutely no indication that there would be any kind of a fracture within the political elite, and neither the revolutionary guards nor the regular military in Iran showed or have shown any signs of defection”. To further emphasize the extent of the government’s penetrative capacity, Kamrava highlighted the state’s ability to restrict connectivity and locate and collect Starlink hookups.

On leadership dynamics and prospects, Kamrava rejected questions about a government takeover by the revolutionary guards, arguing that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains “firmly in control”. He linked this argument to the June 2025 elimination of certain IRGC figures by Israel, noting that current commanders owe “their position to Khamenei. They are totally completely beholden to him for their appointment”. Kamrava highlighted Iran’s substantial ideological base in society, citing the 13 million votes won by a hardline candidate aligned with the Supreme Leader’s choice.

The panel moved on to the broader nature of opposition, with Fatima Alsmadi, Senior Researcher at Al Jazeera Center for Studies, emphasizing that opposition movements have long been tailored in the very fabric of the Iranian society. The Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) was described as a cross-class coalition of clerics, merchants, journalists, intellectuals, and cultural figures, and although suppressed, it generated a lasting impulse “still inspiring the Iranian people until today”, she argued. The 1979 Revolution succeeded, Alsmadi argued, because it combined a broad social coalition with fractures in the military, including the air force and army. She argued that on the contrary, today’s opposition lacks both a charismatic leader and an organized local structure capable of bringing about systemic change.

Meanwhile, Marwan Kabalan, Director of the Political Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, argued that the 2025 protests represent a “perfect storm” of internal mismanagement, corruption, economic crisis, drought, sanctions, and regional setbacks following the recent June 2025 War. He pointed out that there are also difficulties posed for Iran internationally: “Trump is always focusing on Iran”. While change is “inevitable”, he said, the question is when it will happen and what form will it take. Kabalan outlined three possible scenarios: a populist rebellion similar to the one in 1979, reform initiated from within the government, or an internal coup or assignment of a new supreme leader. Looking at current possible scenarios, he argued that a large-scale foreign intervention is unlikely, though tools of leverage such as external pressure may continue through economic and surgical military measures: “US policy for Iran for decades has been based on changing behaviour. This [US] President wants to subjugate this regime”.

He concluded by saying that while reforms remain possible, the leadership appears cautious, placing more emphasis on survival against structural transformation.