The Iranian Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) hosted a panel on 25 June 2025. Dr Mehran Kamrava, Professor of Government at Georgetown University Qatar and Director of the ACRPS Iranian Studies Unit, and Dr Marwan Kabalan, Director of the ACRPS Political Studies Unit, discussed the recent Israeli war on Iran, its strategic outcomes, and its broader consequences. The session was moderated by Dr Aicha Elbasri, a Researcher at the ACRPS.

Kamrava kicked off the panel discussion by breaking down Israel’s objectives when it launched the war on Iran, citing its attempt to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and trigger regime change. “The Israeli objective evolved from setting back Iran’s nuclear program to making Iran similar to the tragedy that characterizes Libya, Syria, or Iraq after 2003,” he said. Kamrava further noted that despite Israel’s heavy and loaded attacks on the Islamic Republic, which also included the country’s Evin prison, “none of those objectives were met.” Kamrava said Israel’s objectives were not achieved and although it “was able to decapitate heads and leaders in Iran [... it] was not able to subdue Iran through those attacks.” Kamrava went on to highlight Tehran’s strategic patience and readiness for an extended war, noting that “the assumption in Iran has been that [...] it has the strategic depth to engage in a prolonged war of attrition, one in which Israel cannot engage in.”

Kamrava addressed some of the lessons Israel learned during its war with Iran, which included its underestimation of Iran’s military capabilities: “There is no denying that Iran inflicted major damage and gave the Israelis a bloody nose no matter how Iran's adversaries can try to spin it.” The war between Iran and Israel spotlighted some of Israel’s insecurities. As Kamrava noted, “certainly we see that Israel's multiple defence system has vulnerabilities and that the Iranians have proved themselves kind of as a formidable adversary for Israel, depleted no doubt, but still formidable and we saw this in the waning hours of the of the war.”

For his part, Kabalan described the war as the first round of a long-term war. He expanded on the war’s regional ramifications, stating that “it is very early to talk about who is victorious and who is defeated in this battle […] I think this is one round of a long war and this [is] … a kind of hybrid war” with future intelligence and security confrontations expected as time passes. He went on to discuss Iran’s strategy of deterrence as having failed, specifically following the loss of regional proxy groups: “the Iranian deterrence in my personal view was destroyed altogether in the summer of 2024 when Israel started targeting the allies of Iran one after another.” He detailed that it first began with Hamas before it started with Iranian allies in Lebanon. Kabalan went on to argue that a “big mistake that was committed by Iran” was the “bystander” position it took in the face of losing its deterrence representatives in the region: “we have seen what has happened in Syria and the confrontation with the Americans and Houthis.”

Kabalan further speculated that Iran will now look inwards and recalibrate to rebuild its defence capabilities and argued that there may be a civilian uprising. “The regime is going to face a wave of protests”, he said, pointing to mass rage over the losses it sustained during the war. He further predicted a regional shift in power dynamics, arguing that “the weakness of Iran is going to lead to a rise of other states such as Turkey, and we know that the influence of Turkey has been rising in the recent period of time with the new regime in Syria […] we're going to see perhaps a much bigger role of Turkey in Iraq and in the Orient in general and also in the Caucasus.” He argued that Iran’s network of non-state allies like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen may now pursue greater independence from Tehran: “So when you have a kind of an empire and when the centre becomes weaker and weaker, you see the peripheries detaching themselves from the centre.”