The Arab Spring revolutions varied according to the social environment and nature of each ruling regime, and depending on the degree of civility in surrounding environments, the momentum in achieving the revolution's goals and was faster when charting the features of such revolutions. The revolts of Tunisia and Egypt were the fastest to take shape despite the apparent control and strength of the ruling class, whose allegiance and connections to the institutions providing security for the regime did not cross professional boundaries, though some officials in these institutions reaped multiple material merits at the individual level.
In those countries where, historically or politically, regional, tribal, sectarian, doctrinal, or ideological partisanships have developed and prevailed, the demise of existing regimes meant a collapse of their supporting institutions gains. Such an environment led to a prolonged conflict and an escalation of confrontation, revolts, actions, and reactions to an extent that drained each party and forced them into accepting bargains and compromises, as in Yemen.
In other cases, the parties had to consider such insurrection as a chapter in a long battle of destiny, so each party, particularly revolutionists, had to be content with what has been achieved, and postpone a showdown until sometime in the future. However, each party understands the risks such a stand entails for their presence. This is evident in the Syrian case, where the possibility of the regime relinquishing control, as in Tunisia and Egypt, or bargain with the populace, as in Yemen, is unlikely. The international presence, however, may make the liquidation of opposition figures by the regime a difficult task due to the relative weakness it would suffer after the battle.
The Libyan situation can be considered a mixture of the two cases above. The spark of mobility against the regime was a byproduct of the violent way in which it faced people with other ideologies (i.e., Islamists). Such groups have become centered and built capabilities in the eastern part of the country for work-related reasons, which was then mingled with regional and tribal sympathy. Around these groups, all those with reasons to clash with the regime, whether ideological, political, or regional and perhaps tribal motives, gathered. Additionally, insiders with views that clashed with the regime rapidly turned into pillars for revolting against it. And because the forces supporting the Libyan regime were not based on strong partisanship, they were at an existential threat if the regime and its individual leader fell, which prolonged the battle, relatively speaking. The end was known and inevitable, no matter how long the regime resisted, because of what we can term the collective fanaticism among supporters as in Yemen and Syria.
The international factor was strong in setting the course of mobility against regimes, though indecisive in some cases. The can be seen when taking into account the quality and nature of existing social and political environment in each country. One cannot claim that the external factor was a key player in the Tunisian and Egyptian cases. Rather the motives, effectiveness, and persistence of the movements were propelled by factors capable of resolving the battle with civil tools. Perhaps the external factor, with its media and political pressure, was effective in that it made the target regime lose effectiveness, as well as the confidence in its tools and methods, causing an ultimate loss of control.
The external factor, led by Western countries, was certainly important in taking the Libyan revolution away from a situation like that of Syria. Let alone the fact that the internal factor in Libya was the main decisive, if not the sole, factor. It was indispensible, so the West's intervention was an optional choice that they imposed depending on their reading of the effectiveness of the internal ability to bring the battle to a close.
Noticeably, the nature of the dispute and battle in Yemen and Syria may have defined the directions of Western intervention, regardless of the nature of the West's relations with ruling regimes. This is not to say that the Russian and Chinese stances had a direct impact in charting Western intervention because the West has always had the tools and means to pressure both countries. The West has always been able to ignore their stands, while retaining international support by fabricating political and security pretexts as in the Iraqi case.
Western countries may have found a way out in the stances of Russia and China, rather than getting involved in a battle they do not have effective tools to steer its course and results. Societies such as Yemen are able to set the direction of its internal battles, and regimes like Syria have a proper understanding of their geopolitical situation and its regional implications, thereby making what takes place on their soil a life-or-death battle for the views that rule the region and define its future.
If we put aside the West's self-interest, and its political and economic effectiveness in the course of change in the Arab world, we must then ask what is considered, even theoretically, a common goal or principle shared by the intellectual and political leaderships of change/revolution and Western powers? What urges such currents, including Islamists, to request the help of the West given the implications of international resolutions?
Undoubtedly, the political premises for such acceptance are replacing a totalitarian dictatorship with freedom and democracy, but the situation does not resemble a pure political formula, though it does, perhaps, indicate a shift in the thought patterns and orientations of Islamist groups. It is possible that they rediscovered what could be defined as common interest and intellectual rapprochement with the West, which goes beyond pure beliefs. Those groups, during the Arab Spring and afterwards, cited common grounds with Western secularism at the intellectual level via the term "civil state" and at the political level by accepting the option of democracy as a mechanism for competition and participation. Such groups may have gone so far as to adopt "proportional representation" in parliament, which secures a stake for all political and intellectual currents.
Perhaps among the new realities the Arab Spring has highlighted is the role Arab monarchies have played in the domain of public affairs in the region. The catalyst for these forces has perhaps been their financial capabilities utilizing media, political, and logistical mechanisms. They tested their media capabilities during the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, building political stands off of these capabilities that have been effective and decisive in setting the course of official Arab and international orientation to a certain degree in Syria and Libya.
The role of Arab monarchies was logistically not only evident, but also efficient in Libyan. The Gulf Cooperation Council's role was clear in the intervention and determination of the course of the Yemeni stalemate and its repercussions as well. They also played a role in relieving in Jordan and Morocco, inviting the two monarchies to join the GCC and injecting funds, directly and indirectly, into the two economies.
Arab monarchies, of course, had a military reaction to the Shiite movement in Bahrain. The coordination of efforts with Western powers cannot be denied, but this may indicate the degree of efficiency such countries gained compared with their role in the Iraq war.
The Arab Spring highlighted the effectiveness of another power, Turkey. Turkey soon realized the political and social impact of Arab mobility in the Middle East, and it felt it had to steer events in the Arab region, perhaps as a historical right. Turkey's awareness of that role, undoubtedly, heightened after political forces with Islamist views took over social and political affairs in the country. The role of Turkey has been effective for sure, given its large civilization, strategic geography, and robust economic capabilities. Turkey managed to efficiently become a direct contributor to regional affairs in line with the international stand.
Describing the Arab Spring as a wave of change that will cover the entire Arab world on the political level may not be accurate. Mobility, though having similar general mottos, has rendered varying results. In countries like Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria, the revolutionary movements have been content with partial responses from the regimes. They had no united intellectual, central political, or coordinating leadership, with cross-regional influence. Most likely the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups have had a regional outreach. It seems, however, that such groups were not the leaders of the mobility, regardless of how extensive their support was. The gains the Brotherhood had after the revolts can be attributed to a comparative advantage in the practical coordination, rather than a reward for leading popular revolts.
The future alone can say whether the Arab Spring is merely a chapter of competition between political and intellectual groups whose platforms and tools are the ruling regimes, or an onset of an all-out social transformation. The future shall answer the question: will Western powers allow Arab and Islamic communities to discover some of the laws of relative success, or will they create creative anarchy?
