Tunisian Night Protests: Background and Repercussions

Since mid-January, several Tunisian cities have played host to violent clashes between security forces and groups of youths taking part in night demonstrations interspersed with acts of vandalism and looting of both private and public property. Although the country has witnessed similar events over the last decade, the level of violence that has characterized the recent activity and the absence of any political or social leadership, raise many questions about the context and prospects of these protests, as well as their connection to the political and social crises sweeping the country.

Context

December and January have been particularly symbolic months for protest movements in Tunisia ever since the 1970s. On 26 January 1978, the general strike declared by the Tunisian General Labour Union turned into bloody clashes resulting in hundreds of Tunisians killed or wounded by police bullets. On 3 January 1984, demonstrations swept across the country against the doubling of food prices. The security forces once again killed and injured hundreds of citizens. Between 17 December 2010 and 14 January 2011, popular protests turned into a revolution that toppled the regime of former President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. In the decade following the revolution, a number of movements have arisen, with social and living demands remaining the most prominent causes.

The living conditions in most other areas that hosted skirmishes between the security forces and the demonstrators during recent events are not much different from the situation in Ettadhamen, as development projects in states such as Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid and Kairouan are grounded to a halt, unemployment rises and infrastructure and service facilities falter. Although a decade has passed since the revolution, development policies that have deepened crises in the suburbs for decades have not been reconsidered. And unlike the states of the interior and the capital suburbs, which have seen continual protests throughout the past decade, recent events have spilled into the governorate of Sousse. It is the first time the coastal city has witnessed clashes, looting and vandalism of this level. It seems that the repercussions of the pandemic on the tourism and service sector and the new unemployment of so much of the youth have collided to bring social tensions to breaking point.

Protest Clashes

Despite continual protests in Tunisia during the last decade, especially in December and January, the recent events were marked by an exceptional level of violence, as protesters blocked roads with burning tires and looted shopping centres and post offices. They engaged in violent clashes with the security forces, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails.

The recent events were not unusual just because of the violence; the age group was another significant feature, as children and youth under the age of twenty were shown to have participated in the violence that accompanied the demonstrations. The absence of any clear and declared demands behind the violence was another factor that distinguished these events from those that took place before and after the revolution. The recent events represented a new opportunity for the various political parties to interact, with some expressing their support for what happened as a justified uprising against marginalization, poverty and the failure of the system. The ruling parties responded by condemning the action as an organized riot fuelled by the opposition to sow chaos and target the state. Some other parties reacted by expressing understanding towards the movement without justifying the violence and looting.

A New Phase of the Crisis

A decade after the revolution and the high hopes that accompanied it, many social and economic difficulties that were among the causes of the 2011 revolution have remained, casting a shadow on the political scene and reflected in the public mood. Behavioural and social phenomena such as drug consumption and promotion, robbery, rejection of family traditions, emigration or involvement in organized crime and terrorism are on the rise.

It is clear that the social strata most involved in the recent events were too young in 2010 to keep pace with the demands and finer details of the revolution. As such, they are not attracted by the discourse related to transition, construction and accumulation, nor concerned with the narratives of political, academic and cultural elites, their struggles, their interpretations of the economic and living crises and their proposals to progress. Recent events have also shown that the feeling of injustice and falling into the margins of development has left this group representing themselves and their own world. Their involvement in violence and rioting is nothing but an expression of this crisis.

The success in achieving a democratic political transition in Tunisia, compared to other Arab countries, does not conceal the failure to address social and economic issues, which feeds uprising, rebellion and social disruption. The economic and social crisis in Tunisia is not a product of the last decade as much as it is a structural crisis due to political choices and developmental policies that have produced poverty, deepened regional disparities and increased injustice. As long as the elites persevere with their economic and social plans without adjusting them to fit an inclusive national project and fail to adopt an effective communication plan, there will be no solution to the discontentment. It will not be possible to achieve development without stability and without the unions and other institutions refraining from impeding the government plans with endless sectoral protests that do not allow the implementation of the necessary reforms.

The political tensions and the weak will of the elites in dealing with the economic and social issues, over the past decade have exacerbated problems. In recent events, the authorities found themselves facing youth groups without specific demands out on the street at night. Attempts were made by some political parties close to the opposition and the union-led left to impart specific trends to the events by organizing daytime demonstrations in the centre of the capital, protesting the government and its party and parliamentary belt. But their ability to mobilize appeared lacklustre and weak, and the participants did not exceed a few dozen. Noteworthy was the participation of parties that failed to achieve any parliamentary representation in the recent elections despite the absence of an electoral threshold chanting to “bring down the regime.” This indicates the absence of their social and national responsibility, and the major issue of party politics.

Conclusion

Calm has returned to the popular areas of the capital and Tunisian interior following the past few days of night demonstrations punctuated by acts of looting, vandalism and violent clashes. The country is still vulnerable to more tension due to the structural economic and social crisis and the failure of the elites to agree on a national project that breaks from development policies that produce marginalization and regional disparities and remove obstacles to an agreed development approach. The short-sighted treatment of repeated protests contributes to the emergence of social behaviours and cultural representations outside of elite narratives and discourse. It perpetuates the obstacles of the fragile transition and deepens the indicators of social disruption. Despite the possibility of such events recurring and spilling into other areas that have remained calm until now, it is unlikely that they will produce any changes due to their lack of a clear identity and the ambiguity of their demands.