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Situation Assessment 12 December, 2024

Syria Transition: Nothing Left to Lose and Everything to Gain

The Unit for Political Studies

The Unit for Political Studies is the Center’s department dedicated to the study of the region’s most pressing current affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS’ activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Policy Studies draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center’s publication series: Situation Assessment, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. 

On 8 December 2024, the people of Syria overthrew the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad, after more than half a century of his family’s authoritarian rule. Nearly fourteen years of bloody struggle have seen hundreds of thousands of Syrians killed, millions made refugees or internally displaced,acrobat Icon along with the widespread destruction of infrastructure and public and private property. The already ailing regime collapsed at astonishing speed when a coalition of Syrian opposition forces, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and factions from the Turkish-backed National Army (SNA), launched a major 12-day military offensive on 27 November 2024, dubbed “Deterring the Aggression”. After quickly taking Aleppo, opposition forces marched on major Syrian cities, eventually entering Damascus without a fight after Assad fled to the Russian military base in Hmeimim, and his security services and military units vanished.

Two days after the fall of the regime, Mohammed al-Bashir, Head of the Salvation Government in opposition held areas in the North, was charged with forming an interim government to run the country in a transitional period extending until 1 March 2025.[1] The decision was made following a meeting to coordinate the transfer of power and prevent the country entering a state of chaos, in the presence of Ahmed Al-Sharaa, (formerly known as Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani), who led the rebel offensive, along with al-Bashir and the Prime Minister of the former regime’s government, Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, who has been assigned to run the government’s affairs during this transitional period. But, considering the turbulent domestic, regional, and international context, the new government in Damascus faces many complex challenges, the most prominent of which are assessed below.

1. Restoring Security

So far, the disintegration of security institutions (army, security services and police), the tools of violence that the regime weaponized against Syrians, has not led to any widespread disorder or violence. This stands in contrast to other countries that have undergone similar ousters and seen public order breakdown as a result. During the operations, the new leadership had prioritized the need to impose security, control chaos and restore public order. In general, Syrian society acted with composure and the opposition factions were able to quickly gain control and restore calm, but for the foreseeable future, this state of relative order remains vulnerable.

Security services must be built on new foundations, the essence of which are the public good, human rights and community protections, the preservation of individual rights, the right to property, and the prevalence of justice. Syrians also face the challenge of preventing the emergence of multiple competing authorities, clearing society of weapons that are now widely distributed after prolonged conflict, and re-establishing state responsibility over these weapons. A major task also emerges in the reorganization of the army. Soldiers must be called to their bases for service and the leadership changed, but the mistake of dissolving the army made by Gaddafi in Libya and the occupation authorities in Iraq must not be repeated.

One of the main security challenges will be dismantling the organized armed factions and groups, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the US-backed Free Syrian Army in Al-Tanf, the Southern Operations Room led by Ahmad Al-Awda, and the Turkish-backed SNA factions in the north. This is inextricably linked to the process of unification and restoring indivisible state sovereignty over the entire country. Of course, the threats posed by the jihadist factions, including ISIS, must not be neglected either.

Moreover, the new authorities need to neutralize any threats posed by what remains of the former regime, and prevent them from organizing, especially given that the entire security and military leadership is still at large. At a later stage, the foundations should be laid for a transitional justice system that can hold those responsible for committing crimes to account and compensate those most affected within the limits of the Syrian economy. Other countries of the region have a duty to support and not hinder these efforts.

2. Overcoming Economic Crisis

After years of armed conflict and decades of the looting of state resources by those who clung to power, Syria is in dire economic straits, requiring a new leadership in Damascus to mobilize the nation. According to international organizations, 90 per cent of Syrians now live below the poverty line, while about 27 per cent of housing and public infrastructure has been destroyed. The economic crisis in Syria is multi-faceted, with a lack of funding to cover the most basic daily necessities, never mind the sums needed for reconstruction, which many international bodies estimate at hundreds of billions of dollars.

Gaining the public’s trust is essential for the success of the transition, so the new government faces the daunting task of implementing changes that have a clear tangible effect on people’s lives. Resolving the livelihood crises and securing the provision of food, water, basic goods, fuel, transportation, communications, and electricity is the only way to do this. It also requires the reactivation of state institutions, including ministries and service departments, and encouraging people to return to their normal lives as soon as possible and restore public and private economic activity throughout the country. The gradual return of national companies and capital that left Syria must also be encouraged and facilities provided for Syrian entrepreneurs to return to their homeland. Syria will need significant foreign direct investment to deal with these challenges, which in turn depend on security and political stability.

3. Establishing a New Government and Political System

The responsibility with which the new leadership has dealt with these two most crucial weeks in the history of Syria has been widely acknowledged. The leadership had already shown during its administration of opposition held Idlib that political pragmatism can constitute an important driver for change and development. With the fall of Assad, there is an urgent need to fashion a political consensus in which various forces participate in the management and shaping of the transitional phase, not only to prevent the emergence of a power vacuum, but also to spare Syria and its people the return of tyranny. HTS and its allied factions should not fall into the trap of monopolizing power and marginalizing the political forces that have contributed for years (some for decades) to the struggle against the authoritarian regime. The policies of exclusion and marginalization, if adopted by the new government, threaten to deepen divisions not only between the forces of the revolution and the opposition, but also within Syrian society itself. The Syrian state is currently in dire need of a leadership that the Syrian people can rally around.

Hence the importance of involving everyone in consultations on government formation and making them feel that they are part of the future. Syria is a diverse landscape of multiple political orientations and religious and ethnic affiliations, which should be united under one citizenship. The transitional government must therefore represent the widest possible spectrum of the Syrian political space and embrace the entire Syrian geography. The government must include figures that address Syrian society and the international community. Once formed, this government must also develop a comprehensive program for the transitional phase, during which a constituent assembly will be established to then draft a constitution for the country within a specific timeframe, on the basis of which elections will eventually be held.

Consolidating the state’s security apparatus is a matter of existential necessity for the state, which cannot function without a monopoly on legitimate violence. But political, intellectual, and societal pluralism, and consensus on constitutional principles that protect civil rights and freedoms, are the only means to guarantee the same tyranny and oppression against which the Syrians revolted will not resurface. Regardless of the Salvation Government's experience in managing areas in northern Syria, the administration of Syria is a formidable project that the administration of Idlib cannot compare to. After a long revolution stained by sacrifice and bloodshed for the sake of freedom and citizenship expectations of governance far outweigh what is expected of the temporary administration of a besieged region in a state of conflict. Syrians have a lot to learn from the experiences of Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries, but they can also learn from their own experience after years of factional fighting, chaos, and attempts to impose a certain way of life on people, and the dire consequences this has had for society and for the revolution itself.

  1. Countering Israeli Aggression

As soon as the news of Assad fleeing the country and the collapse of his regime broke, Israel announced through its Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, that it “will not allow any hostile force to establish itself on our border,”[2] considering that the 1974 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Syria “has collapsed, the Syrian soldiers have abandoned their positions.”[3] Netanyahu explained, during his visit to the Golan Heights, that he had “directed the (military) yesterday to seize the buffer zone and the commanding positions nearby.”[4] Israel has now extended its full control further than the buffer zone.[5] The Israeli Air Force carried out what it described as “the largest air operation carried out by its air force in its history”, targeting Syrian military infrastructure.[6]

Whether through direct operations or through air strikes, Israel is intent on Syrian destroying air defence facilities, weapons depots, and missile bases in order to turn the country into a demilitarized state and deprive the future Syrian army of any ability to reorganize as a central force, reclaim its occupied territories, or deter Israeli attacks. Consequently, any future Syrian government will be bound by geopolitical and security conditions that prevent it from playing an effective role in confronting regional challenges, thus redrawing the regional power equations in favour of Israel and its allies. Israel is seeking to drag the new authorities in Damascus into negotiations without bargaining power so that the occupying state can sideline the issue of the occupied Golan Heights after seizing yet more Syrian territory.

This fierce Israeli aggression seeks to break the morale of the Syrian people, before they can even begin to build state institutions, following a pattern of Israeli regional bullying and unprecedented Arab humiliation. This Israeli thuggery should ring alarm bells in the Arab capitals pursuing normalization with Israel. The occupying state wants to become the undisputed master of the region, so that Arab states, after years of competing to seek Washington’s approval, instead capitulate to Israel – an unacceptable fate.

5. Gaining International Recognition and Lifting Sanctions

Since 2011, international sanctions have been imposed on Syria in response to the regime’s repression of civilians during the Syrian revolution. These sanctions have included freezing financial assets, travel bans on Syrian officials, and restrictions on trade, especially in the oil sector. They have also contributed to shrinking the Syrian economy to about 20 per cent of its pre-revolution size in 2011. Furthermore, Washington imposed sanctions on the Syrian Central Bank, banned the export of US goods and services to Syria, and issued the 2019 “Caesar Act”, triggering an increase in the prices of basic commodities and medical products.[7]

Major obstacles stand in the way of the new leadership in Damascus to lift international sanctions; the UN classification of the most prominent opposition factions, represented by HTS, as terrorist organizations will be the main dilemma for the new government.[8] The classification precludes the recognition of al-Bashir’s government as a political partner in the international community and undermines its ability to secure economic and diplomatic cooperation. In this context, the administration of US President Joe Biden, in a statement by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken on 10 December 2024, set four conditions for recognizing the new government, according to which it must commit “to fully respect the rights of minorities, facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to all in need, prevent Syria from being used as a base for terrorism or posing a threat to its neighbors, and ensure that any chemical or biological weapons stockpiles are secured and safely destroyed.”[9]

This means sanctions, with new conditions, are being extended on a devastated Syria before the country has even caught its breath; delaying a return to normal life and punishing Syrians for finally securing their freedom from tyranny. In addition, the restrictions imposed on the movement of money and goods exacerbate the economic crisis and hamper humanitarian efforts. Lifting sanctions requires international and regional consensus, in addition to the removal of individuals and entities from international terrorist lists.

The designation of HTS as a UN terrorist organization could severely restrict on any direct or indirect international cooperation with areas under HTS influence, complicating the delivery of humanitarian and development aid. Resolving this dilemma requires the new Syrian government to take several steps, including: providing international guarantees not to deal with groups designated as terrorists; implementing effective policies to combat violent extremism and ensure the state’s monopoly on weapons; enhancing transparency in the management of international aid; and opening up to individuals from the civil political and opposition forces that have a role in running the government to rebuild international confidence and gradually lift economic sanctions.

6. Building Relations with the Regional and International Communities

During the conflict, Syria became a proxy arena for competing regional and international interests. These powers have established complex networks of political, military, and economic influence within Syria, which leaves any new government with the task of dismantling these networks and restoring state sovereignty through building stable institutions. It is also important to deal with Russian military bases in Syria, to ensure that they do not become a source of foreign interference in sovereign decisions.

The Syrian opposition’s Department of Political Affairs held a meeting in Damascus on 10 December with a number of Arab ambassadors from Iraq, Bahrain, Oman, Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, in addition to the Italian ambassador,[10] while Qatar made contacts with the new authorities in Damascus. The spokesman for the Qatari Foreign Ministry – the only Arab country that refused to normalize relations with the former Syrian regime – expressed his country’s welcome for “the positive steps taken by the opposition forces, especially in preserving the safety of civilians, the stability of state institutions, and ensuring the continuity of public services,” stressing that “Qatar will reopen its embassy in the sisterly Syrian Arab Republic soon after completing the necessary arrangements”.[11] Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia expressed its “satisfaction with the positive steps taken to ensure the safety of the Syrian people”.[12]

Despite the positive reactions of Arab countries towards the change in Syria, these countries maintain concerns about the challenges faced by the new government, especially those related to the potential spread of armed groups, the influx of refugees, and the smuggling of weapons and drugs. In addition, the Salafi-jihadist background of the government is concerning to many of these countries that fear that the Syrian experience will be reflected in their own domestic environment. However, the new Syrian leadership is also met with a measure of relief by some Gulf countries now that Syria has disengaged from the Iranian axis. Conversely, fears emerge that direct intervention by some countries which supported the armed rebellion could seek to exploit the multiplicity of armed factions the way they have, for example, in Libya and Sudan. To prevent this from happening it is crucial that the various armed factions are unified under the banner of a single national military establishment.

Conclusion

Syria has entered a new phase with the fall of the regime facing myriad challenges. The deposed regime destroyed the country through policies of violence and oppression, and stubborn rejection of any change through reform for more than half a century leaving a legacy of terror and tyranny. The success of any government in facing these challenges will depend on its ability to secure the broadest possible political consensus, attract the participation of a wide spectrum of political forces that resisted the regime, rebuild state institutions, and confine legitimate violence to the state. Likewise, it must work to gain the trust and cooperation of the public and respect individual freedoms; Syrian society is an open society, with multiple religions and cultures. Attempting to impose religious or political alignments will push people away from the new government, which risks a repeat of the painful post-2011 revolution experiences in much of the Arab region.


[1] “Mohammed al-Bashir assigned to head a transitional government in Syria”, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 10/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQX4

[2] Jon Donnison, “Israel seizes Golan buffer zone after Syrian troops leave positions,” BBC News, 8/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zR36

[3] “Israel's Netanyahu declares end of Syria border agreement, orders military to seize buffer zone,” The New Arab, 8/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQNZ

[4] Ibid.

[5] “The Israeli occupation penetrates deeper into Syria.. This is what separates it from Damascus,” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 10/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQqS

[6] “Israel says to impose ‘sterile’ zone in south Syria, launches 480 air raids”, Al Jazeera, 10/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zReJ

[7] “Sanctions on Syria: A Heavy Legacy and Open Questions after the Regime’s Fall,” CNBC Arabia, 09/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQD2

[8] United Nations, The Security Council, “Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant,” 14/03/2022, accessed on 12/12/2024, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQzu

[9] “The Syrian People Will Decide the Future of Syria,” Press Statement, U.S. Department of State, 10/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQjo

[10] Adnan Al-Imam, “The Syrian Opposition’s Political Affairs Department Holds a Meeting with Arab Ambassadors,” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 10/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQZl

[11] “Advisor to the Prime Minister and Official Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Majed Al-Ansari, Expresses Qatar’s Welcome to the Positive Steps of the Syrian Opposition,” Qatar News Agency, 09/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQUh

[12] Abdullah Al-Saeed, “Saudi relief over positive steps to secure the safety of the Syrian people,” Riyadh, 09/12/2024, accessed on 12/12/2024, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zRju