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Case Analysis 12 January, 2025

Saudi Arabia’s Cautious Embrace of The New Syria

The Unit for Political Studies

The Unit for Political Studies is the Center’s department dedicated to the study of the region’s most pressing current affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS’ activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Policy Studies draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center’s publication series: Situation Assessment, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. 

On 8 December 2024, armed factions of the Syrian opposition entered the capital, Damascus, declaring the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, after he fled to Moscow. This event marked the culmination of a protracted conflict that has lasted over 13 years. The crisis in Syria has evolved beyond a mere domestic civil war to become an international confrontation, drawing in numerous regional and global actors. Their involvement has not been limited to supporting particular factions but has also included direct military engagement on Syrian territory.

The collapse of the Assad regime paves the way for significant transformations in the Middle East, already strained by the ongoing Gaza conflict, which has expanded to Lebanon, Yemen, and partially Iran. Initial assessments suggest a decline in the influence of Iran and Russia, while Israel appears increasingly inclined to expand its territorial ambitions within Syria. Meanwhile, Turkey may emerge as a principal beneficiary from the opposition's victory, given its influence over the rebels who now control Damascus after years of support. The situation is further complicated by anticipation surrounding the US position following Donald Trump's inauguration, particularly regarding the potential withdrawal of US forces from Syria.

The regional dynamics also involve Saudi Arabia, which has played pivotal roles in the Syrian conflict since its inception in 2011. However, its stance regarding the crisis has varied and undergone significant shifts. In this new phase, Saudi Arabia may adopt a more cautious approach, particularly given that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has been at the forefront of the recent efforts to overthrow the regime and is positioned as a leading contender for power in a post-Assad Syria. This scenario heralds the potential return of political Islam to govern a major state in the region.

Consequently, it is anticipated that Saudi Arabia, while recognizing the importance of a stable and unified Syria, is likely to adopt a cautious approach aimed at maintaining regional stability, solidify the end of Iranian influence in Syria, and ensure that Syria does not become a launchpad for regional instability or a platform for exporting an Islamic model that threatens the stability of Arab regimes. Saudi Arabia's welcome of the change in Syria, which dealt a significant blow to Iran's regional influence, is coupled with caution regarding the nature of the incoming regime in Damascus and a desire to play a pivotal role in shaping Syria's future.

Supporting the Syrian Opposition

Prior to the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Bashar al-Assad regime was marked by instability. The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005 exacerbated tensions, leading both parties to support opposing factions in Lebanon's political landscape, namely the 14 March and 8 March coalitions. Assad’s strengthening of his relationship with Iran, the divergence of positions regarding the Hezbollah operation that led to the July 2006 war in Lebanon, and his description of Arab leaders as “half-men” after the war all contributed to increased Saudi-Syrian tensions. A reconciliation attempt took place at the Arab Summit in Kuwait in 2009, culminating in a visit by the late Saudi King Abdullah to Damascus, followed several months later by another visit to Damascus and a joint appearance with Assad in Beirut. This was part of a Syrian-Saudi initiative aimed at establishing a political consensus in Lebanon and protecting the Saad Hariri’s government after leaks suggested the international tribunal investigating his father’s assassination was preparing to indict members of Hezbollah for their involvement. However, Assad's cessation of support for Iyad Allawi in Iraq and his acceptance of Nouri al-Maliki's return to the premiership in 2010 strained relations. The reconciliation deteriorated after the collapse of Saad Hariri's government in January 2011, triggered by the resignation of ministers affiliated with Hezbollah due to Hariri’s refusal to convene cabinet to discuss how to address the naming of suspects in his father’s assassination case.

Saudi Arabia maintained a negative stance toward the uprisings occurring in the region in 2011, viewing them as threats to regional stability and the potential rise of political Islam. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia did support the revolution against Assad, driven by its animosity toward him and a desire to counter Iranian influence in the region.

Saudi Arabia has favoured factions less associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, such as certain factions of the Free Syrian Army and more Salafist groups like the "Army of Islam." The stance on the Muslim Brotherhood also influenced Saudi’s support for the political opposition. Saudi Arabia preferred secular and national figures distanced from political Islam.

In December 2015 Saudi Arabia formed the High Negotiations Committee in Riyadh, thereby increasing its influence within the Syrian political opposition while diminishing the role of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gulf crisis of 2017, which erupted when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing it of destabilizing the region fragmented the Syrian opposition forces. This division led to the formation of competing alliances taking sides in the crisis, and resulted in a decline in their political effectiveness.

Shifting Towards Reconciliation

With the backing of Russia and Iran, Bashar al-Assad successfully regained control over most of Syria by 2018. This development led to the perception that the Syrian civil war had concluded in Assad’s favour, prompting several regional countries to reassess their relations with him. The UAE took the lead in restoring diplomatic ties, reopening its embassy in Damascus in 2018. The UAE's approach emphasized the importance of a strong “secular” Arab nation-state to counter extremist Islamic organizations. Saudi Arabia shared this perspective; however, it did not take significant steps to normalize relations with Assad until 2023, despite acknowledging the end of efforts to oust him.

By reestablishing ties with the Assad regime, Saudi Arabia completed its regional reconciliations with Turkey and Iran, part of a broader strategy to reduce regional tensions and create an environment conducive to implementing its Vision 2030 economic transformation plans. Additional motivations for Saudi Arabia's normalization with Assad included a desire to prevent Iran from gaining complete control over Syria and a wish to provide Assad with an Arab alternative, thereby reducing his dependence on Tehran. Saudi Arabia also aimed to address the issue of Syrian refugees and their potential return, while seeking to combat the smuggling of Captagon, which has significantly infiltrated Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, with Syria emerging as a central hub for this trade.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE advocated for Syria's reinstatement in the Arab League. In May 2024, Saudi Arabia appointed its new ambassador in Syria, and reopened its embassy in Damascus in September.

Regional Perspectives of the Future of Syria

The recent actions of the Syrian armed factions, supported by Turkey, took regional actors by surprise. Following the opposition's control of Aleppo, communication occurred between the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Syria, and a phone call was held between Assad and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed. Reports emerged suggesting that Emirati-American discussions preceded the opposition's advance, focusing on potential sanctions relief for Syria if Assad distanced himself from Iran and ceased arms supplies to Hezbollah.

The UAE was hesitant about this development, trying to persuade Turkey to avoid a major confrontation with the Assad regime and return to negotiations. The UAE's concerns regarding the rise of extremist groups like HTS were evident, and Saudi Arabia exhibited a cautious response to the opposition's actions. After Assad's fall, Saudi Arabia cautiously welcomed the situation in Damascus, with the call to protect institutions. Saudi media expressed relief over Assad's decline, signifying a setback for Iran and its allies. In addition, Saudi media has emphasized the crucial role Saudi Arabia plays in supporting the new Syria, particularly by highlighting Saudi aid directed towards Syria.

However, what is most striking is the interview conducted by Saudi channel Al-Arabiya with Ahmad al-Sharaa, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the governing body in Damascus. In the interview, al-Sharaa expressed positivity towards Saudi Arabia and its Vision 2030, and expressed his desire for Saudi Arabia to play an economic role in Syria. Furthermore, al-Sharaa emphasized the absence of any threat from Syria and its new rulers towards the Gulf states and neighbouring countries. He reiterated that his actions in ending Iran's presence in Syria have provided a guarantee of security for the Gulf states for the next fifty years.

Saudi Arabia seeks to deepen the erosion of Iranian influence in Syria and capitalize on this regional Iranian decline in other regional issues. Additionally, Saudi Arabia remains keen on addressing the issue of Captagon smuggling from Syria, the return of refugees, and achieving regional stability that helps in the success of Vision 2030 projects. Despite official and media welcome of the new situation in Syria and the rhetoric of its new rulers, caution still characterizes the Saudi approach towards Syria. This is due to the presence of an Islamic regime with a jihadist background, with the implications this carries for the possibility of exporting an Islamic model of governance to the Arab neighbourhood, and the presence of elements from Arab countries (including Saudis) that could use Syria as a launchpad to threaten Arab states.

This concern is particularly acute for Saudi Arabia, which has sought to strengthen a national identity that counters transnational Islamic movements. The potential rise of jihadists in Syria raises fears of a new wave of violence within Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries. The Saudi position on the transition of power in Syria remains unclear thus far, but the Saudis will be supportive with guarantees that allay their concerns. They will also be monitoring Western reactions, especially those of the Trump administration, to the new reality in Syria.

The clarity of Saudi Arabia's stance toward the new rulers of Damascus will depend on their ability to manage the transition period while adhering to Saudi demands. It will also hinge on the nature of Saudi-Turkish relations. Saudi Arabia may be motivated to act in Syria to prevent Turkey from dominating the Syrian arena and to avoid repeating the post-2003 Iraq experience, where the Arab world played a passive role as Iran filled the political vacuum.

In conclusion, the recent developments in Syria, bolstered by Turkish support, have shifted the regional landscape and prompted significant diplomatic engagements among Gulf states. Meetings with new Syrian officials in both Damascus and Riyadh offer an opportunity to test the waters and assess the potential for cooperation. While Saudi media has welcomed the fall of Assad and the decline of Iranian influence, this does not clarify the final Saudi stance on the new Syrian regime. Determining Saudi Arabia's acceptance of the ideological background of these rulers, its acceptance of the transitional phase, and the possibility of establishing genuine Saudi influence in Syria in the presence of Turkey as a key player in the Syrian equation will require time.