US President Donald Trump conducted his first major international tour since taking office, stopping at Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates from 13-16 May 2025.. Despite much of the tour being focused on economic action, it also addressed other important issues. Most notably, Trump made the decision to lift sanctions on Syria after meeting with the country's president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in Riyadh. Trump’s tour and his meetings in these Gulf capitals expressed a shared desire to build major commercial, military, and technological partnerships.[1] At times, however, Trump leaned back on his campaign rhetoric, applauding himself and his achievements, and attacking previous administrations and their policies.
Mega Deals
The agreements signed by the US and several national companies with the three Gulf states covered various sectors, including energy, defence, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, education, trade, and health. The total value of these deals exceeds $2 trillion. Saudi Arabia pledged to invest $600 billion in the US, with the possibility this will increase to $1 trillion. The UAE signed investment projects worth $1.4 trillion over ten years. Qatar reached an “economic exchange” agreement with the US worth $1.2 trillion, including on energy.[2] Despite the celebratory atmosphere that accompanied the signing of the agreements, especially emanating from Trump, some of these agreements are not new, and doubts have been raised about their actual value and feasibility, especially in light of the decline in oil prices. According to Reuters estimates, the total value of the deals expected to be executed over the next ten years is estimated at approximately $740 billion. Some of these projects, such as Qatar's order to purchase 210 Boeing aircraft and Saudi Arabia's $142 billion arms deal with the US, are expected to take decades to implement.[3]
A Pragmatic Approach
Trump embarked on this Gulf tour guided by his “America First” campaign slogan, which has become the basis of his administration's foreign policy. He expressed his belief that concluding trade deals with Gulf states and attracting investment to the US to boost its economy would be preferable to getting involved in costly conflicts in the Middle East. Based on this perception, during his speech at the Saudi-US Investment Forum in Riyadh, he was quick to condemn the interventionist approach of previous US administrations and other Western powers under the pretext of “nation-building”.[4]
According to Trump, “The so-called nation builders wrecked far more nations than they built, and the interventionists were intervening in complex societies that they did not even understand themselves”.[5] In this context, he added, “the birth of a modern Middle East has been brought by the people of the region themselves, the people that are right here, the people that have lived here all their lives, developing your own sovereign countries, pursuing your own unique visions and charting your own destinies in your own way”. He noted that “a new generation of leaders is transcending the ancient conflicts and tired divisions of the past, and forging a future where the Middle East is defined by commerce, not chaos; where it exports technology, not terrorism”.[6]
Trump’s transactional approach, far removed from claims of spreading democracy and respecting human rights, represents a complete break with traditional US policy in the region, particularly that of the Biden administration, during which Washington’s relations with the Gulf states were cooled somewhat. However, the change in the US approach to the Gulf states, and the Middle East in general, under the second Trump administration also contrasts with his own first administration (2017-2021). While Trump’s first visit to the region in 2017 was limited to Saudi Arabia, which marked his first foreign destination after his inauguration, his second visit also included Qatar and the UAE. It is also noteworthy that he omitted a visit to Israel during his last trip, unlike his first trip, in which he travelled directly from Riyadh to Tel Aviv, a move President Biden also made during his visit to the region in 2022.
Although Trump urged Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel, he did not make this a priority, nor did he make it a condition for any economic agreements or military deals. Multiple reports and leaks indicate a divergence of priorities, and perhaps hidden tension, between the Trump administration and Benjamin Netanyahu's government.[7] Trump’s “America First” approach has generated frustration for Netanyahu regarding the dynamics of US policy in the Middle East.[8] Meanwhile, Trump administration officials privately express their dissatisfaction with Netanyahu for thwarting the president’s efforts to fulfill a campaign promise to end the war in the Gaza Strip.[9]
However, there can be no talk of strategic differences between Trump and Netanyahu, or of a fundamental difference between the US and Israel at this stage. Although Trump is capable of halting Netanyahu’s brutal plans in Gaza, he neither expresses a desire to do so nor does he consider it a priority. He does not disagree with Netanyahu on the goal of eradicating Hamas from Gaza, but refuses to be dictated to by Netanyahu regarding wider US regional policies, and is highly wary of entering into a war with Iran. Regarding Trump’s policies in the Gulf, and non-interference in human rights and other issues, Netanyahu’s reservations are limited to Trump’s closeness to the Qatari leadership, against which the Israeli lobby and Netanyahu are leading a campaign in Washington. It is worth noting that Qatar is the only country that urged for a permanent Gaza ceasefire in talks with Trump during his Gulf visit.
Trump appears committed to advancing his agenda, which focuses on trade and investment deals in the region and creating the appropriate conditions for their success, even if this requires bypassing Israel. This approach has guided his administration into nuclear negotiations with Iran to Netanyahu’s dismay, as well as a ceasefire agreement between the US and the Houthis in Yemen, which is not conditional on the cessation of attacks on Israeli ships in the Red Sea or missile strikes on Israel. His administration also unilaterally engaged in negotiations with Hamas, with successful Qatari mediation, to secure the release of Israeli American soldier Edan Alexander. Netanyahu escalated the bombing of Gaza after his release. Finally, Trump announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria and called for the normalization of relations with Damascus under the presidency of al-Sharaa, whom Israel accuses of being a “jihadist”.
Trump has denied any tension in the relationship with Israel, and Netanyahu emphasized the strength of this relationship,[10] citing the fact that Trump did not pressure Israel to de-escalate in Gaza, or to allow humanitarian aid into the territory as he had promised if Hamas released Alexander. But the underlying tension in their relationship is becoming clearer. However, it is not political or strategic; rather, it stems from Netanyahu’s excessive expectations of what he had hoped Trump would do. This is preoccupying the Israeli press, particularly voices critical of Netanyahu, who exaggerate the dispute, ignoring the fact that the US has lifted all restrictions on arms sales to Israel, thus giving Netanyahu and his defence minister a free hand in Gaza.
Relationship with Syria
Trump’s pragmatic and contractual nature was also reflected in his decision, which took even some administration officials by surprise, to meet with President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh on 14 May, with Turkish-Saudi mediation and lift sanctions on Syria.[11] Trump justified his decision as support for a new government through the hope that it will succeed in stabilizing the country and preserving peace, describing the sanctions as “brutal and crippling”.[12] Although the US designates al-Sharaa as a terrorist and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which he leads, as a terrorist organization, several factors contributed to Trump’s acceptance of the meeting. Most notable among these factors were the group’s role in toppling the Assad regime and removing Iran from Syria, as well as al-Sharaa’s good relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Turkish support, and his willingness to negotiate with Israel and cooperate in the fight against terrorism.[13]
Available data indicates that there are two camps within the Trump administration regarding the approach to Syria. The first camp, represented by the US National Security Council, adopts a cautious stance, calling for a wait-and-see approach and not trusting al-Sharaa and his government, based on his history. The second camp, represented by the State Department, believes it is necessary to quickly fill the vacuum left by Assad’s fall to prevent Russia and Iran from regaining influence in Syria. Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa and the announcement of the lifting of sanctions on Syria represent a victory for the second camp. Their mission was facilitated by al-Sharaa through a series of steps he took to gain Washington’s support for the reconstruction of Syria – arresting foreign militants, communicating through intermediaries with Israel, and expressing a willingness to conclude deals that would allow US oil and gas companies to operate in Syria.
In an official statement, the White House announced that Trump had asked al-Sharaa to help prevent the resurgence of ISIS and to “take charge” of its detention centres in northeastern Syria. He also urged him to deport Palestinian resistance factions present in Syria and to normalize relations with Israel.[14] There is no doubt that the process of lifting sanctions will not be immediate, as some US demands are likely to turn into negotiating conditions and pressures. However, lifting at least some of them by presidential decree, particularly those that prohibit financial transfers, will contribute to revitalizing the Syrian economy.
The China Factor
Another crucial factor underscoring the pragmatic dimension of Trump’s regional tour and his focus on trade and investment deals relates to the trade and technological rivalry with China, determining who has the upper hand in the competition for influence within the Gulf. In this context, the question of the Trump administration’s willingness to lift restrictions on the sale of hundreds of thousands of advanced semiconductors (electronic chips) to the UAE and Saudi Arabia emerges. Based on this, Trump issued a decision to rescind the “AI Diffusion Rule”, enacted by the Biden administration, restricting the export of advanced semiconductors to countries including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, among others, to prevent any being leaked to hostile states, especially China. The Trump administration is currently studying a potential deal to supply hundreds of thousands of the most advanced US-designed artificial intelligence chips to G42, a UAE company specializing in artificial intelligence, which has severed ties with Chinese partners to facilitate a new partnership with US companies.[15] The White House also announced other deals with Saudi Arabia, including a commitment from Humain, a state-owned artificial intelligence company in Riyadh, to build an AI infrastructure using hundreds of thousands of advanced American Nvidia chips over the next five years.[16]
US reports suggest the Trump administration’s negotiations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia regarding AI technology partnerships indicate a shift toward the view that strengthening US commercial and technological superiority over China requires such partnerships and investments. This approach represents the position adopted by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, which assert that if the US seeks their partnership and demands restrictions on their advanced technology relations with China in the context of the global AI arms race, then Washington must do its part to lift restrictions on its own technologies. Conversely, there remains a current within the Trump administration that views such a partnership as carrying significant risks regarding the potential for critical technologies to leak to China.[17]
Conclusion
The Republican Party’s cohesion and unity behind President Trump gives him significant leverage in shaping foreign policy, regardless of the domestic constraints that limited the ability of former presidents to act. This includes notable decisions, such as his abandonment of absolute support for Ukraine and his endorsement of direct talks with Iran over its nuclear program. Indeed, Netanyahu, who did not hesitate to challenge former Presidents Obama and Biden on the nuclear negotiations with Iran and other issues, remained silent regarding Trump’s decision to resume negotiations with Iran, his negotiations with Hamas without coordination with Israel – twice, his ceasefire agreement with the Houthis, and his subsequent recognition of the government in Syria.
Together, these steps, along with his Gulf tour and the deals he concluded during it, embody Trump's “America First” approach. However, this approach should not obscure another dimension: the personal nature of Trump’s actions and achievements, especially given his focus on trade and investment deals rather than broader US strategic interests in the Middle East. The region is home to several new projects for the Trump dynasty, including Trump Towers in Dubai and Jeddah. An Emirati investment fund also backed Trump’s digital currency earlier this year.[18] The Gulf states appear to view Trump’s pragmatic and transactional nature as an opportunity to strengthen their own strategic, security, and economic alliances with the US. However, it is important to note that Trump’s visit to the region did not result in any breakthrough on Gaza. Despite his declared dismay at the Israeli military escalation, Trump took no concrete steps to pressure Netanyahu.
[1] Natasha Turak, “Qatari Cybertrucks, Elite Camels and Trillion-Dollar Vows: Why Gulf Countries are Going all out for Trump’s Visit,”
CNBC, 16/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRJt
[2] Nabih Bulos & Michael Wilner, “Trump Returns to the Middle East with Tech Titans, Seeking Trillion-Dollar Deals,”
Los Angeles Times, 13/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRR4
[3] Turak.
[4] “In Riyadh, President Trump Charts the Course for a Prosperous Future in the Middle East,” The White House, 13/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRmz
[5] Sean Mathews, “Trump seals deals and slams western 'interventionists' in Saudi Arabia visit”,
Middle East Eye, 13/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRpA
[6] The White House “In Riyadh, President Trump Charts the Course for a Prosperous Future in the Middle East”, 13/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRmz
[7] James Mackenzie, “Bypassed by Trump, Israel Dismayed but Silent,”
Reuters, 14/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRWn
[8] Ibrahim Al-Olabi, “Trump and Al-Sharaa’s meeting in Riyadh crowns a political marathon of preparations,”
Al Jazeera, 14/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRr1
[9] Mackenzie.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Caitlin McFall, “Trump Wraps Momentous Middle East Trip with Economic Deals, Syria Sanctions Relief and Warning to Iran,”
Fox News, 16/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRBg
[12] Mostafa Salem, “Trump’s Embrace of Syria and its Jihadist-Turned-President could Shake up the Middle East,”
CNN, 15/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zS02
[13] Callum Sutherland, “Trump Meets with Syria’s President After Announcing Plans to Lift U.S. Sanctions on Country,”
Time, 14/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zSja
[14] “Trump calls on al-Sharaa to normalize relations with Israel in their first meeting,”
Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 14/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRvd
[15] Frederick Kempe, “Trump’s Remarkable Middle East Tour is all about Striking Megadeals and Outfoxing China,” The Atlantic Council, 13/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zS3I
[16] Omar El Chmouri & Ian King, “Nvidia, AMD Sell Chips to Saudi Arabia for AI Data Centers,”
Bloomberg, 13/5/2025, accessed on 19/5/2025, at:
https://acr.ps/1L9zRYV
[17] Kempe.
[18] Dorn.
