طائرات إسرائيلية تقصف غزة المدمرة أصلا
Situation Assessment 10 April, 2025

Why Did Israel Resume Its Genocidal War on Gaza?

The Unit for Political Studies

The Unit for Political Studies is the Center’s department dedicated to the study of the region’s most pressing current affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS’ activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Policy Studies draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center’s publication series: Situation Assessment, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. 

On 19 January 2025, Israel violated the ceasefire deal it had previously agreed with Hamas through Qatari-Egyptian-US mediation. Israel refused to begin negotiations on the second phase of the agreement according to the timeframe agreed between the two parties.[1] It also refused to withdraw from the Salah al-Din border crossing between Gaza and Egypt, from which it was supposed to have completed its withdrawal within a period not exceeding fifty days from the implementation of the agreement.

acrobat Icon At the end of the first phase, on 1 March 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his intention to extend this phase to negotiate the release of additional Israeli detainees. He also announced that they would not move to the second phase to complete negotiations on a prisoner exchange and end the war, as Hamas had demanded. The US administration supported his position, and its Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, presented a prisoner exchange proposal consistent with this. This proposal would extend the first phase of the ceasefire agreement by approximately 50 days to conduct indirect negotiations. The goal would be to release half of the Israeli prisoners, both living and dead, on the first day of the agreement's implementation, followed by the release of the remaining Israeli prisoners, both living and dead, if a permanent ceasefire was agreed upon at the end of the specified period.[2] Hamas rejected this proposal and demanded that the agreement signed between the two parties be implemented as is and that negotiations on its second phase be initiated.

Israel and Hamas exchanged several proposals through mediators. While Hamas accepted the Egyptian proposal and agreed to release five Israeli detainees in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners and a 50-day ceasefire, Israel presented an alternative proposal calling for the release of 11 Israeli detainees, the return of 16 bodies, and information on all Israeli detainees in exchange for a 40-day ceasefire and the release of Palestinian prisoners.[3]

The Freezing of Humanitarian Aid and Resumption of Genocide

Netanyahu refuses to halt his genocidal war in the Gaza Strip until he has achieved the stated and unstated goals of eradicating Hamas both militarily and politically, recovering the Israeli captives, and ethnically cleansing the Palestinians. He is doing this by making Gaza completely uninhabitable area through repeated massacres, a comprehensive blockade, deliberate starvation, and widespread destruction. He insists on conducting indirect negotiations with Hamas, even as the Gaza Strip crumbles.

In this context, on 2 March 2025, the Israeli government halted the entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, closed all the crossings from Egypt and Israel, and tightened the blockade until further notice.[4] It followed this on 18 March by resuming the genocide in coordination with the US administration, in pursuit of its war goals and also to pressure Hamas to accept Israel’s terms for a prisoner exchange deal.[5] It launched a surprise attack on the Strip, resulting in the deaths of 436 Palestinians on the first day alone, including 183 children, 94 women, and 65 elderly people.[6]

On 23 March 2025, Israel’s political-security cabinet approved the establishment of an Israeli government agency to evacuate Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, called the “Administration for the Voluntary Transfer of Gaza Residents to Other Countries”.[7] Making the decision public is unprecedented in the history of Israeli government plans to expel Palestinians, which have always kept such decisions secret. This indicates the seriousness of the Israeli government in its efforts to displace Palestinians from the Strip. The political-security cabinet assigned a set of tasks to the new agency, including the necessary preparations to provide safe passages for Gaza residents to be evacuated to other countries. This includes paving roads and ensuring their movement, establishing pedestrian inspection centres in the planned corridors, and coordinating the establishment of infrastructure within the Gaza Strip and Israel that would enable land, sea, and air routes to the countries to which Palestinians from Gaza would be evacuated.[8]

Opening an Israeli cabinet meeting on 30 March, Netanyahu explained that only military pressure, coupled with political pressure, would bring back the Israeli captives. He added that the Israeli government’s plan for the day after the war was to disarm Hamas and expel its leaders from the Gaza Strip, bring public security in Gaza under Israeli control, and implement US President Donald Trump’s plan for the voluntary displacement of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.[9]

Can Netanyahu Achieve His Goals?

The accomplishment of Israel’s war goals in Gaza are based on the following factors:

  1. The Israeli government enjoys the Trump administration’s unconditional support in its pursuit of the goals of its war on Gaza, particularly regarding the displacement of Palestinians.[10] The Trump administration fully embraced the right-wing Israeli government's vision on this matter when, in early February 2025, it presented its plan to displace Palestinians from the Strip to Egypt, Jordan, and other countries.[11] This represents a dangerous shift in US policy on the Palestine question and the Arab region, that if not addressed, could lead to its complete “liquidation”. The Trump administration provides Israel with various forms of unconditional military, financial, and diplomatic support, enabling it to continue its massacres against Palestinian civilians. Netanyahu and his government believe that this administration exerts more pressure on Arab countries and other countries in the region than any previous US administration, through which it can contain and mitigate opposition to the genocide in Gaza.
  2. Netanyahu stands on solid ground domestically. His government, based on an extreme right-wing coalition, has a majority of 68 out of 120 members in the Knesset. Despite occasional internal disputes within the coalition, particularly between the two fascist parties, Jewish Power, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, and Religious Zionism, led by Bezalel Smotrich, the coalition remains cohesive. These disagreements arise within the context of competition over extremism, to further their party’s position in the coalition and gain the support of the extreme religious right public, rather than as a threat to the coalition.[12] Netanyahu has furthermore been able to split the opposition and strengthen his governing coalition. On 29 September 2024, Gideon Sa’ar and his party returned to the governing coalition.[13] On 15 November 2024, Netanyahu dismissed Defence Minister Yoav Gallant after long disagreements, appointing Israel Katz in his place.[14] On 13 March, Likud and Sa’ar’s party signed an agreement, joining him with Likud.[15] Netanyahu subsequently strengthened his position within the party and the coalition, as well as his own role in making decisions pertaining to the war, especially since Katz has no military or security background, and is keen to avoid disagreements. In addition, Netanyahu and Katz pressured the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, Herzi Halevi, to submit his resignation, on 21 January 2025.[16] On 1 February 2025, they decided to appoint Eyal Zamir as Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, starting in March. In doing so, Netanyahu got rid of Halevi, with whom he had clashed on several issues, such as judicial reform, responsibility for 7 October, the plan for the day after the war, and the issue of the Israeli prisoners. Zamir, who served as military secretary to Netanyahu in 2012-2015, as deputy chief of staff, and as director general of the Ministry of Security, maintains a good relationship with Netanyahu. And unlike Halevi, Zamir advocates for the occupation of the Gaza Strip, for which he has drawn up a comprehensive military plan fand established a directorate within the Ministry of Defence to expel the Palestinians.[17] Netanyahu, who is well aware of the depth of Israeli society’s rightward shift, has been able to restore the strength and popularity of Likud, because this party occupies the first place in all public opinion polls in Israel. According to these polls Netanyahu himself also ranks first place in the polls for choice of prime minister[18], ahead of opposition leaders, with the exception of Naftali Bennett, who stepped down from politics after the last Knesset elections, but seeks to participate in the next.
  3. The normalization agreements of Arab countries with Israel have led to a change in the nature of the enemy Israel faces. The main enemy has shifted from states to non-state military actors. This, in addition to the technological developments that have transformed the nature of wars, has contributed to strengthening the Israeli army. More than three decades ago the decision was made to transform it into a small and “smart” army under the plan of the Chief of Staff and later Prime Minister, Ehud Barak. The focus turned to the development of the Air Force and artificial intelligence. All of this has led to the reduction of reserve forces in the Israeli army and increased reliance on the regular army. Following the reduction of these forces on the one hand, and the increase in Israel’s population on the other, only 6 percent of the population is registered in the reserve forces system, and less than 2 percent of the total population is called up for active duty.[19] These developments enabled Israel to fight long-term wars, contrary to when it was fighting very short wars; in the past its army relied on reserve forces, numbers the Israeli economy cannot do without for a long time.
  4. Netanyahu and the Israeli military leadership believe that the ability of Gaza to resist is limited. Despite the bravery of the fighters of Hamas and other Palestinian organizations and the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in Gaza, he believes that Israel can achieve the goals of the war now he has appointed obedient and loyal officials, namely Katz and Zamir. He is further bolstered by Israel’s neutralization of Hezbollah and Iran, the Arab states’ reluctance to exert any real pressure on it to end the war, and the Trump administration's continued support for it. Netanyahu believes that Israel can achieve the goals of the war, whether through prisoner exchange deals with Hamas that allow the war to resume after, or without any deal, through the blockade and continuation of the war and massacres against the Palestinians as Israeli regular army gradually expands its occupation of areas in Gaza. He seeks to expel its inhabitants and cut the Strip into more than five areas that the Israeli army is currently besieging and continues to eat away bit by bit. Netanyahu’s insistence on occupying the Strip and achieving absolute victory is consistent with Israeli policy since Al-Aqsa flood towards both Lebanon and Syria and the other Arab countries. This policy, which takes advantage of the Trump administration’s absolute bias toward Israel and the weakness of the Arab states, seeks to impose an Israeli sphere of influence in the Arab Mashreq.[20]

Conclusion

Netanyahu will not be satisfied with the return of the Israeli prisoners with or without a deal, as he is determined to reoccupy the Gaza Strip, not only to eliminate Hamas, but also to create the necessary conditions to displace the Palestinians according to the Trump plan. Arab and Palestinian actors must step up to stop the war and rebuild Gaza, in a way that enables the Palestinians to resist plans to displace them.


[1] “Hamas-Israel Ceasefire Agreement: Implications and Challenges”, Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 20/1/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQr7

[2] Itamar Eichner and Einav Halabi, “Time for Negotiations to End the War: The Proposal Embraced by Israel—and Hamas’ Response,” Ynet, 2/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQWn [Hebrew]

[3] Jonathan Lis, “Israeli sources: The gaps with Hamas are large, but Israel is willing to negotiate to narrow them,” Haaretz, 30/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zR9h [Hebrew]

[4] “Israel halts entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip,” Arab 48, 2/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zRgB [Arabic]

[5] Anna Barsaki, “Behind the Curtain of the Surprise Attack on Gaza: How the Ceasefire Collapsed,” Maariv, 18/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQOJ [Hebrew]

[6] Nir Hasson and Hanin Majadele, “The Israeli army killed about 300 women and children in one terrifying night in Gaza,” Haaretz, 27/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zR4X [Hebrew]

[7] Jonathan Lis [et al.], “The Cabinet approved the establishment of an administration for the voluntary transfer of Gaza residents to other countries,” Haaretz, 23/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQBG [Hebrew]

[8] Ibid.

[9] See: Hamas-Israel Ceasefire Agreement: Implications and Challenges.

[10] Mahmoud Muharab, “The War on Gaza and the Expulsion of the Palestinians,” Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 19/3/2024, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zRj8

[11] “Trump’s Plan to ‘Cleanse’ Gaza: Origins and Implications”, Situation Assessment, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 10/2/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQxk

[12] See: Hamas-Israel Ceasefire Agreement: Implications and Challenges.

[13] Michael Hauser-Tov and Noa Spiegel, “Gideon Sa’ar Joins Government as Minister Without Portfolio: My Duty Is to Try to Influence Decision-Making,” Haaretz, 29/9/2024, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQBH [Hebrew]

[14] Michael Hauser-Tov [et al.], “Netanyahu fired Defence Minister Galant at the height of the war,” Haaretz, 15/11/2024.

[15] Yuval Karni, “Gideon Sa'ar returns to Likud”, Ynet, 14/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQBK [in Hebrew].

[16] Yanib Qubovich, "Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi announces his resignation, and will leave on 6 March 2025", Ha'aretz, 21/1/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQZm [Hebrew]

[17] Amos Harel, "Zamir shows the government his readiness to occupy Gaza, but faces a major obstacle from within", Haaretz, 28/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQEC [Hebrew]

[18]Study finds ‘consistent recovery’ in Likud’s prospects as voters return to PM’s party”, Times of Israel, 25/2/2025, accessed on 9/4/2025 at; https://n9.cl/meqsq

[19] Mahmoud Muhareb, “The Retreat of Israel’s Reserve Forces”, Political Analysis, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 7/8/2024, accessed on, 8/4/2025 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQnV 

[20] See: “Azmi Bishara: Without an Arab response, the region may become an Israeli sphere of influence” The New Arab, 9/4/2025, accessed on 9/4/2025 at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQFG