Introduction
Following
their first ever face-to-face meeting on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in
Hamburg last month, the US and Russian presidents signaled their approval of a
“De-Escalation Agreement” covering areas of southwestern Syria, including parts
of Quneitra and Deraa. The agreement, aimed at reducing armed conflict between
the Russian-backed Syrian regime and the armed opposition backed by other
powers, went into effect on July 9 while Israel was quick to condemn it. Details
of the plan were agreed upon during months of strenuous negotiations between
Russian and American officials, with input from both the Jordanian and Israeli
governments[1]. In accordance with the agreement, Russia
deployed hundreds of its military police across Suweida, Deraa and Quneitra to
patrol the frontlines between the opposing factions of the conflict. Moscow also
erected a number of military bases, flying the Russian flag, at locations across
these governorates. The Russians further created a buffer zone between Iranian
forces and Iranian-backed militia and the Syrian borders with Jordan and the
occupied Golan Heights.
Israel, in
true form, opposed the agreement despite Russian guarantees that the deal
provided for Iran-loyal armed forces from the border with Israel. Israeli
premier Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials were quick to criticize the
agreement for not meeting Israel’s security needs—needs which are inherently
impossible to satisfy. This paper seeks to determine the factors that have
influenced Israeli opposition to this latest deal.
The Israeli Stance on the
De-Escalation Agreement
With the
beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Tel Aviv has sought to prolong the
armed conflict and the eventual post-conflict division of the country along
sectarian and communal lines. Despite repeated protestations denying direct
involvement in the Syrian conflict, Israel has established communication
channels with a number of the opposition factions along the Israeli-occupied
Golan Heights. Tel Aviv has also explicitly stated its “red lines” regarding the
Syrian conflict, including the use of Syrian territory to carry sophisticated
weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as the presence of Iranian proxy forces
in the corridor along the Golan Heights. Since January 2012, Israel has sought
to enforce these restrictions on the combatants in the Syrian crisis through a
number of air strikes on selected targets. The latest Israeli airstrike took
place after the declaration of the “De-escalation Agreement” in Hamburg.
This is in
line with Israeli behavior since the outbreak of the conflict, and throughout
which it has sought to secure a set of fundamental strategic objectives. These
include international acknowledgement for its annexation of the Golan Heights,
which it has occupied since the June 1967 war; and the establishment of a
de-militarized buffer zone extending tens of kilometers into Syrian territory.
Since March this year, Netanyahu has communicated with the White House, the
Kremlin, and other foreign leaders to repeatedly demand that any diplomatic
efforts to end the Syrian crisis must entail the creation of such buffer zones.
Israeli demands include the clear-out of any forces loyal to Iran, both along
the Syrian side of the Golan Heights as well as the Syrian-Jordanian
border[2]. In a series of meetings with American
officials, which took place in March, the Netanyahu government further demanded
that discussions about the potential buffer zones, as part of a deal for wider
de-escalation in Syria, should be held in isolation from ongoing peace
negotiations in the Kazakh capital of Astana to which Turkey and Iran were
party. Throughout their meetings with American officials, the Israelis further
objected to Russian implementation of the ceasefire, suggesting instead that the
US assume the role of overseer of the ceasefire[3].
As a
US-Russian agreement on Syrian de-escalation appeared imminent, Israeli
officials held increasingly frequent consultations with their Russian and
American counterparts. These included a number of secret meetings in Amman as
well as in a number of European capitals, attended by prominent members of the
Israeli diplomatic, defense and intelligence communities. American attendees at
these meetings included Michael Ratney, the US Special Envoy for Syria, and
Brett McGurk, the US Special Representative to the international coalition
against ISIL. At another meeting, attended by Jordanian, Israeli and American
officials, the Israelis again affirmed their opposition to the presence of
Russian forces in southern Syria. The Israelis used the same meeting to
introduce an entirely new demand- that Iranian and Iranian-backed forces be
cleared from all Syrian territory, not only the south of the country.
Reasons for Israeli
Opposition to the De-Escalation Agreement
Outspoken
Israeli opposition to the De-Escalation Agreement intensified in mid-July, when
the Israeli authorities were notified of its terms. The Israeli assessment of
the agreement was extremely negative, with Israel suggesting that its terms
failed to meet their security needs. The Israeli criticism became even sharper
when Russia began to deploy its forces across the governorates of Quneitra,
Deraa and Suwaida—despite the fact that Israel had been pre-notified of this
deployment, and that Russian forces would keep a distance of at least 13
kilometers from the Israeli controlled Golan Heights.
Netanyahu,
together with his National Security Minister Avigdor Liebermann, inspected the
readiness of Israeli forces stationed in the occupied Golan Heights prior to a
meeting of the Israeli Security Cabinet. At the time, Netanyahu had made clear
that the rapidly changing situation on-the-ground in the south of Syria meant
that Hezbollah was gaining ground at the expense of a weakened ISIL. The Israeli
prime minister entirely neglected to mention that Hezbollah forces had been
pushed back 40 kilometers from the front lines under the terms of the
Russo-American De-escalation Agreement. When the Israeli Security Cabinet
eventually convened for its four-hour meeting, including high-ranking members of
the Israeli military, Defense Ministry, and diplomatic core, participants
concluded that the De-Escalation Agreement reached by the US and Russia remained
“preliminary”, and that the sponsoring countries were yet to confirm the details
of the plan. It was apparent from these deliberations that the main Israeli
objections were rooted in the singular Russian responsibility for policing the
agreement[4].
The
anxieties were exacerbated by news of a possible division of Syria into distinct
American and Russian “spheres of influence”, with Russia being able to place its
forces in the south and southwest of the country while the US had responsibility
for the security of Eastern Syria up to the point of the borders with Iraq.
While such a deal, if verified, would serve to sever Syria and Lebanon from the
supply lines to Iran, it would also serve to entrench Russian forces within
southern Syria, which would represent a bone of contention for Israel. Indeed,
Russian forces have already established a base and operations control center in
Sanamayn and a further base in Mothbeen, in the Deraa Governorate, to help
oversee the implementation of the agreement.
Israeli
fears are centered on the idea that Russian oversight of the De-Escalation
Agreement will eventually translate into a permanent Russian Air Force base to
south of Deraa, adjoined to the Suweida Governorate. Such a base would give
Russia the ability to station S-300 and S-400 missiles similar to those already
placed at the large Syrian airbase at Hmeimim in northwestern Syria. In such an
event, the Russian forces would likely be backed by ground forces, placed a mere
55 kilometers from the occupied Golan Heights. This would effectively end
Israel’s outright dominance of Syrian airspace, and its ability to enforce its
“red lines”.
Conclusion
Israeli
opposition to the US and Russian sponsored De-Escalation Agreement for Southern
Syria is rooted in what it sees as challenges to its strategic-military
supremacy over Syria. Israel is opposed to a resolution of the conflict in
Syria, which this agreement seems to presage. More importantly, the
De-Escalation Agreement seems to forego any Israeli plans to create a
de-militarized buffer zone deep within Syria which would be under Israeli
control. Nonetheless, there is ample reason to doubt that the presence of
Russian forces in southern Syria will constrict Israeli aerial maneuverability
over Syrian skies, particularly as Israeli aerial strikes are usually
coordinated with the Russian operations room.
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[1] For more on details of how the topic was agreed, see “The US-Russian
Agreement on Syria: Aims and Implications of the Hamburg Ceasefire”, Assessment
Report Series, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, July 11, 2017,
available online:
http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/2a0c8c3d-3383-4da4-8688-a62b1b4726e2
[2] Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu Seeks Buffer Zones Against Iran and Hezbollah on
Syria’s Borders With Israel and Jordan”, Haaretz, April 7, 2017,
available online:
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.782143
[3] Barak Ravid, “Israel Tells U.S. It Doesn’t Want Russia Policing Safe
Zones in Southern Syria”, Haaretz, July 9, 2017, available online:
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.800079
[4] Barak
Ravid, “Israeli Cabinet Convenes for First Time to Discuss Southern Syria
Ceasefire”, Haaretz, July 31, 2017, available online:
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/.premium-1.804400