* This article was published in its original Arabic version on June 29th.
In the face of three main dangers that have long threatened to undermine efforts toward democracy and comprehensive, sustainable development in Egypt over past decades, the events of June 30, in the absence of any diffusion of tensions and calming measures, do not negate the still fresh gains of the January 25 Revolution or prevent Egypt's return to square one.
The previous regime-corrupt, exhausted, and overthrown by the revolution-is the main root of these dangers. The present alliance between the "revolutionary" opposition and the remnants of this regime will lead to the previous regime's hijacking and dominating the revolution, with hopes of reproducing their defunct regime. Secondly, political Islam, in all its forms, will be pushed to renounce not only their participation in civil politics, but their adherence to democratic rules as well, thereby reverting to working outside institutional and constitutional frameworks. Lastly, the militarization of politics, with the army playing an advanced role in civil life and the political process, is a distinct danger.
It seems that the deceptive politics integral to the political rivalry between leading figures of the revolution, whether they are Islamist or secularist, has created a situation in which the ability to reach any agreement, or even the desire for co-existence and cooperation to achieve the revolution's goals, is nearly impossible. The "revolutionary" secularist opposition, which is demanding that President Mohammed Morsi step down in preparation for early presidential elections, has approved a suspect alliance with members of the former regime. Ultimately, they want to benefit from their formidable election machine, substantial financial, organizational, and propaganda capabilities, in addition to their expertise, political manpower, and security apparatus.
Along with the successive "acquittals" of former regime members, and the whitewashing and rehabilitation of Hosni Mubarak himself during the days running up to June 30, the National Salvation Front's opposition leadership has provided political cover and moral justification for this alliance. In an interview with London-based Al-Hayat newspaper, Dr. Mohammed Baradei, leader of the opposition Dostour Party, stated, "The remnants [of the old regime] belong to the past, and those associated with the former regime who did not commit crimes must be embraced." Hamdeen Sabahi promoted the same idea in an interview with a private Egyptian satellite channel, describing those opposed to the alliance with those from the former regime as "politically immature and narrow-minded".
The alliance between the revolutionary opposition and figureheads of the former regime to face an elected president is alarming not only because of the growing chances for the success of the counter-revolution, but also the serious doubts it raises regarding the opposition's commitment to the rules of the democratic game.
In an effort to stay in power, and in response to the opposition's position, President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood have bolstered themselves up with support from other forces within the Islamists, including radical groups and the takfiri-jihadi program. In doing so, they have sometimes turned a blind eye to some leading figures in the jihadist camp who support the president, and have sent signals intended to intimidate and terrorize the oppositional political forces who planned the recent demonstrations. These actions raise questions over the Islamists renunciation of violence, their continuation as part of the political process, and their acceptance of the rules and mechanisms of democratic practice.
As the atmosphere and disturbances have worsened, and in response to the failure of both the Islamist-oriented president and the secular opposition to offer a better alternative, many Egyptians have started to look to the army to once again run the country. This attitude has been expressed by some who are supposed to be impartial, such as the judiciary, including the Judges' Club, headed by Counselor Ahmed al-Zend. They issued a statement in support of General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, minister of defense and the armed forces. However, they army has remained part of the political equation since the removal of army head Field-Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and chief of staff Sami Anan, and civil opposition forces have continued to call upon the army to intervene and bolster their position in the face of political Islamists.
Shortly before June 30, military sources continued to affirm that the army had no desire to take power because they do not want to present themselves to the world as having carried out a coup. Additionally, they felt that removing an elected Islamist president may alienate elements of the political Islamic movement and push them into returning to violence to confront the state, as happened in Algeria at the beginning of the 1990s, which led to a dark period for a whole decade. At the same time, Western analysts believe the army will not seize power again for a number of reasons, including the country's critical situation and the amount of criticism the military faced during the transitional period.
However, the specifics of the current situation in Egypt might create a different reality that will in turn lead to quite different or unexpected results in terms of the army's role in the crisis. On a number of occasions, General al-Sisi has confirmed that the military will not allow civil war to break out between Egyptians, and will intervene to save lives or if the political authority tries to suppress the will of the people; he also said that the army will not allow the Egyptian people to be terrorized, the state to collapse, or the army to be insulted. Lastly, he reminded those in power, as well as the opposition of the need to reach political agreement.
President Morsi may have been anticipating the army's willingness to defend legitimacy and the elected president, as did chief of staff General Mohammed Ahmed Sadiq and commander of the Republican Guard Major-General al-Lithi Nassef in May 1971 between then-president Anwar Sadat and other state powers. Sadat learned of the plot against him, led by his secretary and minister of presidential affairs Sami Sharaf, and General Mohammed Fawzi, minister of war. The plot intended to overthrow the regime by surrounding and arresting the president while he was giving a speech at the Radio and Television Center. If the army had not supported him, primarily through General Sadiq and Major-General Nassef's refusal to join the coup, he would have been overthrown. Instead, Nassef arrested all conspirators, and put them on trial in what became known as the Corrective Revolution.
General Sadiq derived constitutional and moral support for his position at that time in light of the country's situation following the 1967 defeat. This meant the people were unable to handle a power struggle that might develop into civil war, political upheaval, and dangerous divisions, especially as Egypt could not tolerate a coup, given the foreign military presence and Soviet bases, when the influence of the power centers extended to the army, police, media, general intelligence service, and the presidency.
Perhaps President Morsi has banked on a similarity between the current and previous crises. Whether his intuition is right or not, and regardless of possible military intervention in the current crisis, it can be said that this crisis, which reveals the fragility and weakness of the civil forces and their inability to reach agreement among themselves, has created a space for the re-entrenchment of the army in political life after the January 25 Revolution and the election of a civilian president for the first time. This creates a variety of obstacles and challenges to the process of democratization and the civil nature of politics in Egypt for the coming period.
Should the three dangers come about, the January 25 Revolution will take several steps backwards and return to square one. This will inhibit the completion of the revolution, which achieved the most important process of political, existential, and intellectual liberation for Egyptians in their modern history.
