Are Israel and Hezbollah Headed for All-Out War?

Introduction

On 8 October 2023, the day after the Hamas-led offensive that triggered Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah opened a limited military front against Israel, starting from the occupied Shebaa Farms on the Lebanese border. From the beginning, Hezbollah made clear that it had no desire for an all-out confrontation, but was rather waging a limited campaign of attrition to support the Palestinian “resistance” in the Gaza Strip, a campaign it stressed would continue until Israel halted its war against the Palestinian enclave.

As the war has dragged on, with the situation of Israeli evacuees worsening and Hezbollah attacks inflicting ever-greater material and human losses, pressure has mounted on the political and military leadership to resolve the situation so residents of the north can return to their homes. As the second phase of the war on the Gaza Strip and full-scale military operations there draw to a close, Israel has stepped up its threats to launch a full-scale war against Hezbollah unless the latter ends its attacks.

Drivers of War and Diplomacy

While the war of words has calmed somewhat since the plan was announced, several factors could push Israel to launch a war—whether limited or full-scale—against Hezbollah. The first is that the group’s strength, both quantitatively and qualitatively, continues to mount over time. Time and a state of relative calm have not played in Israel’s favour since its 2006 war on Lebanon, making it harder for Israelis to accept the current security situation in the north. From Israel’s perspective, it is vital to remove Hezbollah’s forces from the border area, return displaced northern residents to their homes, and restore Israel’s deterrent power in the face of its adversaries and in the eyes of Israeli society by landing a blow against Hezbollah that would erode the group’s military strength and prevent a repeat of the 7 October attack coming from across the northern border.

Yet despite these drivers towards war, there are other considerations which mean that Israel may hesitate before entering into a comprehensive military confrontation with Hezbollah, or at least first to exhaust all the available options for a political solution.

Firstly, a state of mutual deterrence has emerged between Israel and Hezbollah, resulting from the latter’s successful accumulation of an arsenal of modern weapons which Israel sees as “breaking the balance”. This formidable stockpile means that Israel would be faced with potentially heavy losses, both human and physical, in the event of a full-scale war with the group. Moreover, Iran would extend various forms of support to Hezbollah to enable it to withstand a confrontation, including by encouraging allied militias across the region to send support and join the fighting.

The third factor is that deep schisms remain in Israeli society over Netanyahu’s unfinished attempt to overthrow the judiciary. Nor have Israelis emerged from the shock of the October 7 attack, which demolished public confidence in state institutions and in the political and military leadership, which failed both to prevent the attack and to achieve Israel’s goals in Gaza—especially the rescue of Israeli hostages. Furthermore, a showdown is continuing to escalate between Netanyahu’s extreme far-right government and the military-security establishment over the management and goals of the war. The legitimacy of ruling coalition is also declining, despite the fact it still holds a majority in Israel’s parliament.

Finally, the United States is opposed to Israel launching a comprehensive war against Hezbollah. Washington has been encouraging both parties to avoid escalating the confrontation and working to reach a border agreement over the Lebanese territories occupied by Israel, similar to the maritime border demarcation agreement the two parties signed in 2022. This could ensure the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which was intended to resolve the 2006 war, and bring about a permanent truce, as well as—potentially—the return of the Shebaa Farms border district to Lebanon. Officials familiar with American mediation efforts claim that an agreement is almost ready and is acceptable to “the parties”. It should be noted that the U.S. administration is of central importance in any decision Israel may take regarding waging a war against Lebanon: the Israeli military relies heavily on American weapons and ammunition, and Israel would need direct American support were the confrontation to expand and drag in all of Iran’s allies in the region.

Conclusion

Netanyahu and the heads of the Israeli military and security establishment face difficult choices over the situation on the border with Lebanon. On the one hand, they find it hard to live with the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israel. On the other, they are aware that Israel would suffer huge losses both in terms of human casualties—military and civilian—and damage to infrastructure were the army to launch a ground attack on Lebanon. They also realise that the army is not ready for a comprehensive war against Hezbollah, potentially lasting many months, concurrently with military operations in the Gaza Strip and in the face of opposition both from Washington and a divided Israeli public.

Therefore, Israel is likely to try to exhaust all means of reaching a political solution that would distance Hezbollah from its the borders before resorting to the military option of all-out war. The leadership of the Israeli military and security establishment believes that were a prisoner exchange deal reached that included a sustainable ceasefire in Gaza, the exchanges of fire in the north would stop automatically. This could create an opportunity for Hezbollah to choose between war and a sustainable truce, based on Resolution 1701 and possibly involving some Israeli concessions regarding the Shebaa Farms.