Nearly two months since the fall of the Assad regime, the new Syrian administration faces major domestic and foreign challenges as it tries to resurrect state institutions. With scarce liquid capital and no way to pay public sector salaries, the government is also faced with the anxiety of civil servants whose continued employment is currently undergoing assessment. On 29 January 2025, the new authorities organized a “Victory Conference”, which brought together the leaders of the armed factions that had participated in military operations to topple the regime. The meeting resulted in a series of decisions, most prominently the termination of the 2012 constitution, the dissolution of the former regime's parliament, army and security agencies, and the integration of revolutionary armed factions, including Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) into state institutions. Ahmed al-Sharaa was elected as interim president, pending the drafting of a new constitution and elections. The Baath Party was outlawed.[1]
Domestic Challenges
Maintaining security and improving living conditions are the most prominent domestic considerations of Sharaa’s interim government, intricately linked to the ability to revive state institutions and provide a clear roadmap for the transitional phase. The new administration has so far succeeded in preserving civil peace by preventing any widespread incidents of retribution, and also in preserving state institutions, with no large-scale looting or sabotage as the regime was deposed. However, security challenges remain serious, most notably the collection of weapons, the trade and possession of which have become prolific across Syria. While it has successfully extended its authority in the centres of major cities, the new government is yet to control all regions sufficiently, especially the coastal countryside, where its security forces are subjected to repeated attacks, increasingly in the form of guerrilla warfare, by remnants of the former regime who refuse to settle and seek to negotiate a general amnesty for their leaders and members.
The new administration is also struggling to gain control the border areas shared with Lebanon in particular, where forces involved in arms and drug smuggling are stationed, some of which harbour elements of the former regime. The government is recruiting and training new members through the Interior Ministry to control societal violence resulting in particular from sectarian tensions and attempts to avenge crimes of the former regime. But al-Sharaa’s administration remains primarily focused on integrating the various military factions within the structure of the new Ministry of Defence. While many factions have agreed to dissolve themselves and join the new army, other factions are still resisting the merger under various pretexts, especially in Daraa and Sweida.
The biggest integration challenge facing the new administration is the position of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which has an army of 60,000 fighters and controls three Syrian provinces in the north and east of the country (Raqqa, Hasaka and Deir ez-Zor);[2] together they constitute about a quarter of the country’s area rich in natural resources. The SDF demands that in order to join the new administration, it must retain its weapons, integrate as a bloc, not as individuals, into the new army, and maintain civilian control over its areas (through the institutions it has established).[3] In other words, the SDF has agreed to formally integrate into the new administration as long as it can maintain the status quo, at the same time expressing its willingness to share the natural resources in the areas under its control equally with Damascus.[4] The SDF relies on the US, which still considers the armed backbone of the SDF as its main tool in fighting ISIS, for support in its negotiations. The SDF controls the prisons that hold thousands of ISIS members and their families (especially in Al-Hawl camp and Gweiran prison), which constitute one of the main bargaining chips in guaranteeing continued US support, so it refuses to give them up. The United States is currently discussing with Ankara the possibility of Türkiye taking responsibility for these prisons.
Economic challenges are equally ominous for the new Syrian administration. It has inherited a devastated country, a depleted economy, and a broken infrastructure. Going into its third month in power, the new authorities remain unable to revive state institutions or pay public sector salaries, a large part of which the caretaker government has made no secret of its desire to dismissal as part of a broad restructuring process that could send home about half of employees. The new Minister of Administrative Development has indicated that the public sector needs between 550 and 600 thousand employees out of a current 1.3 million.[5] Likewise, the Minister of Finance also spoke about the large-scale operations in various parts of the state, where there are approximately 400,000 “ghost” employees who are currently on leave.[6] Add to that the army and employees of the dissolved Ministry of Interior, the number of those who have lost their jobs since the fall of the regime stands at about a million people. This threatens the emergence of a resentful social bloc and, if alternative job opportunities are not created, social unrest in the foreseeable future, against a backdrop of miserable living conditions.
Economic difficulties are exacerbated by the government’s liquidity restrictions in the markets. While the Ministry of Finance is still unable to pay public sector salaries, it is also trying to maintain a certain level of emergency cash reserves, which has led it to freeze funds deposited in banks for the benefit of merchants and industrialists, and to set a limit on cash withdrawals for citizens.[7] All of this was accompanied by the flood of Turkish goods into Syrian markets on the eve of the fall of the regime,[8] which almost completely grounded local production. The value of the Syrian Lira has risen by about half against the dollar in recent weeks, most likely due to speculation in the currency market, which has become chaotic after allowing foreign currency trading.[9] The rise in the value of the Syrian pound has not been accompanied by a similar decline in the prices of basic commodities. On the contrary, fuel prices, for example, have remained high, which has affected transportation, including employee commutes, given the suspension of their salaries. Moreover, people who keep their savings in dollars or gold are forced to spend more to buy Lira, which has become rare in the markets, threatening their depleted savings.
Despite the new government presenting (sometimes inconsistent) ideas about the arrangements for the transitional phase, it has not yet succeeded in relaying a comprehensive and coherent vision. The interim president presented a proposal for the transitional phase in a speech he gave after the Victory Conference, where the armed factions entrusted him with appointing an interim legislative council until a new constitution is drafted and elections are held. However, al-Sharaa did not specify a clear timeframe for choosing the legislative body, nor for holding the National Dialogue Conference and the powers and tasks of this conference, nor for drafting a constitutional declaration that defines the powers of the executive authority following the cancellation of the 2012 constitution.[10]
The country is currently being ruled without a constitution, nor does it have any interim constitutional declaration to clarify powers and defines rights. This means that major decisions, such as restructuring public sector institutions and adopting a liberal economic system, are being adopted by transitional authorities that have no clear plan or direction regarding the country’s social and economic issues and the nature of its ruling system. While there is a national consensus on the necessity of making the transition in Syria a success, this consensus has yet to translate into any political action.
External Challenges
The new political administration is investing in the existence of an Arab and international consensus on the need to embrace change and prevent Syria from sliding into chaos. The US, under former President Joe Biden, was one of the first countries to communicate with the new Syrian leadership. It sent a high-level delegation from the State Department to Damascus to urge for the formation of an inclusive government, encouraged by the success of the new Syrian administration in preventing sectarian fighting and violence in the name of revenge.[11] As a result, a large number of Arab and foreign officials visited Damascus. The Emir of Qatar was the first head of state to visit Damascus, while Saudi Arabia was the first country visited by al-Sharaa after his inauguration as president, followed by Türkiye. Despite the importance of these visits and contacts, they did not result in much outside the framework of humanitarian and relief aid sent in particular by Gulf countries, some European countries, and an agreement with Qatar regarding electricity and some other matters. Lifting sanctions is now the main priority, as everyone waits for a clear political framework for the transitional phase that reflects the readiness of the new Syrian administration to political pluralism and not to monopolize power or impose a specific ideological outline on a politically and religiously diverse Syrian society.
Although the US and the EU have suspended some sanctions imposed on Syria, regional and international caution about expanding the volume of aid provided to Syria remains.[12] The Trump administration is yet to clarify its position on the Syrian change, fears remain that it will be influenced by the Israeli position, which is unenthusiastic about the new regime in Damascus.[13]
The new Syrian administration, along with other countries, is calling for US and European sanctions imposed on the deposed regime to be completely lifted to allow the flow of Syrian, Arab and foreign investments and launch the reconstruction process. Furthermore, Syria faces major external challenges, particularly from Israel. Since the fall of the regime on 8 December 2024, Israel has been carrying out daily incursions into Syrian territory, and has occupied an additional 600 square kilometers of Syrian territory, including the entire buffer zone established under the 1974 disengagement agreement.[14] Israel had already destroyed 85 percent of Syria’s military capabilities by the time the Assad regime had fallen.[15] In order to prevent the new authorities from being able to extend their sovereignty over all Syrian territory, it is also trying to encourage separatist tendencies by building bridges with some groups within Syrian society, especially the SDF.
In contrast, the new Syrian administration is facing great pressure from Türkiye to abandon the diplomatic track and enter a military confrontation with the US-backed SDF to regain control of the areas east of the Euphrates and expel Kurdistan Workers’ Party forces. At the same time, Türkiye is pushing to revive the 2007 free trade agreement with Syria,[16] and is trying to move quickly to demarcate the maritime borders with the new authorities in Damascus, which would strengthen its position in the dispute with Cyprus and Greece over investment in the eastern Mediterranean,[17] a move that would anger the EU. In turn, the EU is pressuring the new Syrian government to close the Russian military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim. This is happening at a time when the new Syrian administration is trying not to completely sever ties with Russia, which it needs in the Security Council to lift al-Sharaa and HTS from the terrorism list. This would be an important step towards recognizing the legitimacy of the new regime in Damascus, which is striving to achieve a delicate balance in its foreign relations in a highly competitive regional and international environment.
Conclusion
The new Syrian administration faces enormous external and internal challenges that require political acumen and patience to manage in light of the complex security, economic, and political reality left behind by decades of the former regime’s policies, in addition to the conflicting regional and international interests in Syria. For the interim government to succeed in dealing with these matters, it will need to abandon its caution in dealing with Syrian society, allowing for the integration of all its groups into the process of rebuilding the state. In addition, a clear, integrated and agreed-upon plan for political transition must be adopted, including a clear path for transitional justice in parallel with a national reconciliation process, to help turn the page on the former regime once and for all and look to the future in building the new Syria.
[1] “Outcomes of the ‘Victory Conference’ announced during the meeting of the leaders of the military factions,” Syria TV, YouTube, 30/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/doin8g
[2] “The End of an Era: 60,000 Strong US-trained SDF Partner Force Crumbles in a Week under Heavy Turkish Assault,”
Military Times, 14/10/2019, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/tr0x07
[3] “Syrian Defence Minister Rejects SDF Offer to Join Army,”
Arabi21, 19/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/22nuw
[4] “Abdi: ‘SDF’ is ‘in principle’ ready to transfer border security to Damascus,”
Asharq Al-Awsat - Syria, Facebook, 27/12/2024, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/e4pdq
[5] Riham Alkousaa, “Syria's New Islamist Rulers to Roll Back State with Privatizations, Public Sector Layoffs,”
Reuters, 31/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/oqbc9
[6] Ibid.
[7] Lama Diab, “The Syrian Central Bank is withholding citizens’ money,”
Enab Baladi, 10/2/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/fc312; “Unrest on Syrian social media sites due to the government’s attempt to drain the lira,” “Networks” program,
Al Jazeera, 10/2/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/orpix
[8] “Syria and Turkey redraw trade relations…customs cuts and new agreements,”
Al Jazeera, 28/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/2oa29
[9] “The Syrian Lira continues to recover against the dollar and pushes down the prices of basic commodities,”
Al-Arabiya TV, YouTube, 5/2/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/uyzna
[10] “Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara’s speech at the Victory Conference,” Syria TV, YouTube, 30/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/e067pn
[11] Erin Banco, “In First Contacts, US Officials Urge Syrian Rebels to Support Inclusive Government,”
Reuters, 11/12/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/eb1eck
[12] Victor Goury-Laffont, “EU Set to Suspend Certain Syrian Sanctions,”
Politico, 27/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/d63rr; “U.S. Treasury Issues Additional Sanctions Relief for Syrian People,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 6/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/l7xxp
[13] “Israeli fears about the new leadership in Syria,”
Al Jazeera, 23/12/2024, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/cww1y
[14] Heba Muhammad, “Israeli Incursion into Syria: Establishing 12 Military Points with an Area of 600 Square Km and Threatening Water Security,”
Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 9/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/xdxb0
[15] “Israel Destroys 85% of Syria’s Air Defence Systems,” Middle East Monitor, 13/12/2024, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/yk0zpi
[16] Seda Tolmach and Yilmaz Ozturk, “Turkey, Syria agree to start negotiations to revive free trade agreement, according to statement issued by the Turkish Ministry of Trade,”
Anadolu Agency, 25/1/2025, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/y70iz
[17] “Demarcating the Maritime Borders between Turkey and Syria: An Early Step or a Strategic Necessity?”, Turk Press, 30/12/2024, accessed on 16/2/2025, at:
https://n9.cl/bwqon
