The Battle for Khartoum and Prospects for the Sudan Crisis

Over the past few weeks, the Sudanese army has made significant battlefield gains against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), imposing its full control over strategic areas of the capital, Khartoum. It is currently advancing on the RSF’s last stronghold in the area of Ombada, west of Omdurman, which is a key prize in the battle to control the whole of Khartoum state. These advances amount to a turning point in the war sparked by the rebellion of RSF commander Mohammad Hamdan Daglo or “Hemedti” in mid-April 2023, and have far-reaching military and political consequences for Sudan.[1]

Regaining the Initiative

After more than a year on the back foot, the army began to see the balance of power shift in its favour in the middle of last year. This trend took on greater momentum in March 2025, when it took full control of the Khartoum Bahri (or Khartoum North) and East Nile regions, seizing vital bridges that gave it access to the heart of the capital. In the second half of March, the army managed to reach isolated pockets of its forces that had been under siege at the military’s General Command headquarters in central Khartoum, paving the way for the recapture of the Republican Palace, which had been under RSF control since the beginning of the war.

Finally, on 26 March 2025, the army announced it had retaken the Republican Palace (the seat of the presidency), where its commander, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, later made an appearance for the first time after a two-year absence, amid enthusiastic celebrations by his forces.[2] That same day, after the army had expelled RSF forces and seized control of the city’s international airport, Al-Burhan announced that “Khartoum is free.”[3]

All this constitutes a major gain for the army, ending the dominance that the RSF had enjoyed since the early days of the conflict, when it had taken control of the airport and other key installations. By April, the army had taken full control of five of Khartoum’s seven governorates, namely the capital district, Khartoum Bahri, East Nile, Jabal Awlia, and Karary (north of Omdurman). In contrast, the RSF has been rolled back to the districts of Omdurman and Ombada, effectively spelling the end of its control over most of Khartoum state.[4]

These consecutive army victories have completely changed the map of territorial control in Sudan. Until recently, the RSF had enjoyed near-total control of the capital and its hinterland, but the situation has now reversed in favour of the army, which has managed to secure key state installations and reopen lines of communication between units that had been besieged and cut off from each other. By contrast, the army’s seizure of several key bridges has isolated pockets of RSF forces in Khartoum from each other and severed their supply lines.

By taking full control of Khartoum airport and the Manshiya Bridge, the army left its adversary only one exit, the Jebel Awliya Bridge, via which a large contingent of the RSF has since withdrawn, leaving in isolated pockets of its forces in a delicate defensive position on the outskirts of Omdurman.[5]

Shifts in Khartoum and their Implications for a Settlement

The army’s recapture of most of Khartoum constitutes a significant shift in the trajectory of the war, with far-reaching military and political dimensions. In military terms, the recapture of the capital, the airport and the Republican Palace represent a turning point after a series of army retreats over the course of almost 18 months of war. That has given a major boost to the morale of the army’s personnel and its political and social backers.

The army has also strengthened its position by wresting back control of key sovereign institutions and centres of state power, including the Republican Palace, the airport, and the General Command. Burhan made a point of emphasising this in the speech he delivered to his forces following their capture of the Republican Palace.[6] Moreover, the change has allowed the armed forces to redeploy and to strengthen their alliances with regional powers. This was evident in Al-Burhan’s participation in the Antalya Diplomatic Forum, where he met with a number of heads of state with influence in Sudan.[7]

On the other hand, the loss of these strategic sites, which symbolise the authority of the state and its agencies, was a major blow to the RSF, which had long tried to exploit its control over them in its propaganda to show that it had the upper hand in the conflict with the army. The army’s advances also inflicted a military cost on the RSF, which had been using Khartoum airport to ship in supplies and reinforcements both from inside and outside the country. Its loss of the Republican Palace, the heart of the executive branch, was a resounding symbolic loss.[8]

Politically, the army’s victories have also strengthened the position of the military establishment. The recapture of the capital gives the army and its backers a stronger position in any potential political process to resolve the crisis that has plagued the country since the overthrow of the regime of then-president Omar Al-Bashir in April 2019. The military leadership has refused to enter into any ceasefire negotiations until it has put down what it sees as a rebellion, a stance that reflects its belief that a military solution is within its reach. Al-Burhan has clearly stated that there is no scope for any political agreement with the RSF.[9] That position was underlined by the army’s ongoing military operations in the capital, where its artillery continues to shell RSF positions in and around Omdurman.

Moreover, the army now views any truce as an attempt to save the RSF from complete collapse. It appears to feel that it has enough domestic political capital to press on with its military campaign; the majority of political and civilian forces opposed to Hemedti would prefer an RSF defeat over the group remaining active as a de facto rebel force. Furthermore, the army effectively faces zero pressure to end the war. The RSF’s well-documented atrocities, especially in the Wad al-Noura village (Gezira state) and Geneina (Darfur) have contributed to the widespread conviction that any settlement must begin with the complete dismantlement of the RSF, rather than its incorporation into the power structure.[10]

The RSF, for its part, opted not to recognize its setbacks as a defeat, but rather to portray them as a tactical withdrawal, despite the crippling battlefield losses it has suffered in Khartoum. In his first statement after the expulsion of his forces from the capital, Hemedti vowed not to retreat or surrender,[11] indicating that his forces intend to continue fighting in the west of the country – specifically in Al-Fasher, the only province that remains outside their control in the Darfur region.

The RSF still believes it has sources of leverage that could bring about a settlement that would allow it to remains a player in the Sudanese arena, despite its losses in the capital. It still controls large parts of Darfur and some areas of Kordofan. This territorial influence gives Hemedti and his allies the means to wage a war of attrition against the army over the longer term, using guerilla tactics across a wide geographical area. RSF forces are seeking to rebuild their political standing through alliances with other social, political, and military forces, most notably the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu.[12]

This move appears to be aimed at avoiding a forced surrender, and instead paving the way for negotiations that would take into account the demands of the marginalized regions of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Hemedti, in other words, is trying to turn the war from a bilateral confrontation between the army and the RSF into a broader national problem that requires a broad political solution involving multiple civilian and military stakeholders. However, the RSF will struggle to gain local or international sympathy after the atrocities it has committed in Darfur and Gezira state. Furthermore, its reputation as a militia that looted the capital and killed many of its residents will pose a serious barrier to its involvement as a political partner in any new negotiations.[13]

Where now for the Conflict in Sudan?

Based on the latest military developments and the new reality they have created on the ground, it is possible to identify several scenarios for the next phase of the conflict in Sudan:

1. A military resolution in favour of the army. In this scenario, the Sudanese army would continue its advances, capitalising on the momentum it has gained in Khartoum until it wipes out the RSF as an organised force. The army would continue its operations in Omdurman and on the outskirts of Khartoum to clear the remaining pockets of RSF forces there, then move the battle to RSF strongholds in Sudan’s more remote provinces. It would focus on major cities in Darfur such as Al-Fasher, Nyala, and Al-Junaynah, which the militia currently controls, as well as some key districts in North Darfur, such as Al-Malha, which borders Libya.[14]

Were this scenario to materialise, it would mean the end of the RSF and lead to the state imposing its control over the entire territory of Sudan. However, this would entail a costly and prolonged fight which could prompt new waves of displacement and a resurgence of tribal conflict, particularly in Darfur, which has witnessed massacres along tribal and ethnic lines in the past.[15] Politically, the army could use such a victory to justify a longer period in power before a transition to civilian rule, citing the need to secure and rebuild the country.

2. A long war of attrition. Under this scenario, under which neither side is able to inflict a decisive defeat on the other, the army would maintain control over central, northern, and eastern Sudan. The RSF and its allies would hold Darfur, South Kordofan, and parts of the west, thus cementing the de facto partition of Sudan. Indeed, the latest developments point to the crystallization of entrenched front lines that may portend a protracted conflict similar to previous civil wars in Sudan.

This course of events would have devastating consequences for the country’s unity and sovereignty, with two or more administrations emerging in the different regions, such as a central government in Khartoum competing with a de facto authority in Al-Fasher. Were Darfur to become a haven for the RSF, from which it could regroup and rearm across the borders with Libya and the Central African Republic by capitalising on its social connections there, this would exacerbate the situation further.[16] Sudan has witnessed a similar conflict in the past that culminated in the secession of South Sudan, which gaining independence in 2011 following a decades-long civil war.

3. A Negotiated Settlement Under Pressure. In this scenario, the two sides would reach a deadlock, eventually forcing them to enter into serious negotiations. The army would recognise the cost of its incursions into Darfur, while the RSF would acknowledge its defeat in Khartoum and its inability to reclaim territories it has lost. The conditions could then ripen for a truce that could pave the way for a political solution. This could also result from regional and international pressure, due to fears of widespread atrocities or new waves of refugees.
4. Regional Escalation of the Conflict. This scenario would see the conflict expand beyond its current geographical reach, involving deeper involvement from regional actors. For example, were an escalation of fighting in Darfur cause the chaos to spill across the western border into Chad, this could prompt to greater intervention by N’Djamena, especially since the Zaghawa and other tribes have branches that extend into both countries, and could mobilise to protect themselves from cross-border attacks by the RSF. In addition, the CAR and Libya, which both neighbour Darfur, may be affected by an influx of fighters and weapons.

This suggests the possibility of greater involvement by regional powers supporting one side or the other. That could prolong the conflict and transform it into a regional proxy war, in light of ongoing outside support for both sides. This scenario is the worst described here, as it would imply the disintegration of what remains of the Sudanese state and the transformation of the country into a theatre of prolonged conflict.

Conclusion

The army’s recapture of Khartoum was a major development in Sudan’s war. However, it does not mean the end of the conflict; rather, it may have simply shifted it into a new phase of ongoing violence. Although the military balance has, for the moment, shifted in favour of the armed forces, a sustainable peace requires more than battlefield gains. The RSF had enjoyed the upper hand on the ground, and initiatives during the first year of the conflict such as the US and Saudi-brokered Jeddah negotiations, or African efforts through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), did not achieve any significant progress.[17] Even if the army succeeded in completely resolving the conflict in its favour, this would likely leave a deep wound in Sudanese society – unless it is followed by a comprehensive political project that addresses the roots of the crisis facing the Sudanese state, beset by a proliferation of armed groups organised along ethnic and regional lines. Therefore, a comprehensive political settlement based on citizenship and equality remains the only solution that could end the cycle of conflict and rebuild the Sudanese state.

[1] “The Sudanese army takes control of strategic positions west of Omdurman,” Akhbar Al-Sudan, 8/4/2025, accessed 8/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/5n7rha3x.

[2] “Sudanese Army Drives RSF from Central Khartoum, Witnesses Say,” Reuters, 26/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/y4dch99e.

[3] “‘Khartoum is Free’ Says Sudan Army Chief Al-Burhan after Airport Captured,” Al Jazeera, 26/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/4w78xts9.

[4] “Sudan’s Army Takes Full Control of Khartoum, RSF Remains Defiant,” Al Jazeera, 28/3/2025, accessed on 8/4/2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/2uv7hfz5.

[5] "Sudan war: Army’s progress changes the map of deployments and control in Khartoum,” Al-Rakoba, 18/3/2025, accessed 14/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/5n7mb6sx.

[6] "Rapid Support Forces after losing control over Khartoum: ‘No withdrawal and no surrender,’” Al-Mamlaka, 28/3/2025, accessed 9/4/2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/5dxr6yyc.

[7] “Head of Sovereignty Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan arrives in Türkiye,” Akhbar Al-Sudan, 11/4/2025, accessed 11/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/3ubsf9ek.

[8] “What’s Happened in Sudan’s Civil War after New Khartoum Battles?” Al Jazeera, 27/3/2025, accessed on 9/4/2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/mvauzjwm.

[9] “Sudan's Burhan Says 'No Reconciliation' with Paramilitary RSF,” Reuters, 5/1/2024, accessed on 11/4/2025, at: https://tinyurl.com/2dv8wn3j.

[10] Ibid.

[11] “After consecutive losses, Hemedti vows ‘return to Khartoum,’” 30/3/2025, accessed 14/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/4junvhuf.

[12] Mohammad Amin Yassin, “The ‘Foundation’ alliance nominates Hemedti to lead the ‘presidential council’ in the ‘parallel government,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 27/3/2025, accessed 14/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/bde638hj.

[13] Al-Nour Ahmad Al-Nour, “Rapid Support Forces’ violations in Sudan: are they a battlefield culture?” Al Jazeera, 24/7/2024, accessed 14/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/mpjpbwru.

[14] “After the army seizes the Republican Palace in Khartoum, the Rapid Support Forces take the Malha area in western Sudan,” BBC Arabic, 23/3/2025, accessed 14/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/39r9st2m.

[15] “New York Times: As the war intensifies, civilians flee Darfur en masse,” Al Jazeera, 7/4/2025, accessed 14/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://acr.ps/1L9zQrd.

[16] Osama Al-Ashqar, “The social repercussions of the war on neighbouring African societies,” TRT Arabic, 21/3/2024, accessed 14/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/2dusszp2.

[17] Abdul Hamid Awad, "Sudan War: A year of sabotaging initiatives for a political solution,” Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 15/4/2024, accessed 14/4/2025 (in Arabic), at: https://tinyurl.com/5dhh2kvv.